599 N.E.2d 278 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1991
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *367 [EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *368 Plaintiffs-appellants Michael Anderson and Karen McDonley, individually and as co-administrators of the estate of Shari Anderson, brought a survivorship and wrongful death action against defendants-appellees CSX Transportation, Inc. ("CSX") and city of Piqua to recover damages arising from an accident in which Anderson died of injuries suffered in a collision with a CSX train at a crossing in the city of Piqua. The trial court granted summary judgment to both appellees. Appellants appeal both decisions. For reasons more fully stated below the summary judgment for the city of Piqua will be affirmed and the summary judgment for CSX will be reversed.
Certain traffic signs and pavement markings were in place to warn drivers of the upcoming railroad crossing. Specifically, there were the standard *369 railroad "crossbucks," stop bars, yellow advance warning disc signs, and white pavement markings. There were no flashing lights, gates, or any other "active" warning devices at the crossing. It is agreed that just prior to the collision the train was traveling at about forty-five miles per hour and the car was traveling at about twenty-five miles per hour.
We will address the appeal from each summary judgment separately.
R.C.
In Sanchez v. Clark Cty. (1988),
In this case there was no contention that the road itself was defective; nor was it asserted that any traffic signals or signs were defective. Moreover, the alleged "obstruction" caused by the weeds and dirt did not conceal the view of the various traffic safety signs and markings in the area. *370 Furthermore, the condition constituting the alleged nuisance was wholly located on property adjacent to the road.
Based on the foregoing facts, we find that the city had no duty to remove the alleged nuisance. It was not an aspect affecting the physical condition of the roadway. It did not extend onto the road or the appurtenant areas for which the city was responsible. The duty of the city to remove nuisances which render use of the road unsafe does not extend past the berm or shoulder of the road to adjacent property where the defect constituting the "nuisance" was physically and wholly located.
Appellant's assignment of error will be overruled.
The trial court granted summary judgment to CSX upon a finding that federal and state regulations have preempted the common-law duties CSX is alleged to have breached, thus also relieving CSX of any liability to Anderson or appellants.
The doctrine of preemption governs federal and state relations under the Supremacy Clause of Article
"Pre-emption may be either express or implied, and `is compelled whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.' Jones v. Rath Packing Co.,
"Even where Congress has not completely displaced state regulation in a specific area, state law is nullified to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law. Such a conflict arises when `compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,' Florida Lime AvocadoGrowers, Inc. v. Paul,
"Federal regulations have no less pre-emptive effect than federal statutes." Id. at 153,
In support of its argument for preemption, CSX relies primarily on the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, Section 421 et seq., Title 45, U.S. Code, ("FRSA"), which authorized the United States Secretary of Transportation to establish guidelines for the states to improve the safety of railroad crossings and appropriated funds for the use of the states in implementing those measures. The act also authorized the secretary to adopt safety regulations for trains.
Section 434 of the FRSA provides:
"The Congress declares that laws, rules, regulations, orders, and standards relating to railroad safety shall be nationally uniform to the extent practicable. A State may adopt or continue in force any law, rule, regulation, order, or standard relating to railroad safety until such time as the Secretary has adopted a rule, regulation, order, or standard covering the subject matter of such State requirement. A State may adopt or continue in force an additional or more stringent law, rule, regulation, order, or standard relating to railroad safety when necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety hazard, and when not incompatible with any Federal law, rule, regulation, *372 order, or standard, and when not creating an undue burden on interstate commerce."
In response to this charge and to his responsibilities under the Federal Highway Safety Act, Section 401 et seq., Title 23, U.S. Code, the Secretary of Transportation promulgated a manual of traffic control devices for use by the states. Ohio has adopted these regulations in the form of the Ohio Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways.
Sections
"Crossbuck signing.
"At all points where its railroad crosses a public road at a common grade, each company shall erect crossbuck signing in accordance with the department of transportation manual for uniform traffic control devices, adopted under section
It is undisputed that the crossing was marked as required by this section when the collision between Anderson's vehicle and a CSX train occurred on January 5, 1988.
A railroad has a common-law duty to use ordinary care to protect the safety of motorists and to warn them of the fact that its train is crossing or is about to cross an intersection with the roadway on which the motorist is traveling.Matkovich v. Penn Central Transp. Co. (1982),
The FRSA clearly preempts measures by municipalities to regulate railway use, even though the measures concern matters, such as speed of trains, in which local government has a direct interest. Baltimore Ohio RR. Co. v. Piqua (1986), S.D.Ohio case No. C-3-85-312, unreported, 1986 WL 8254. Johnson v.Southern Ry. Co. (W.D.N.C. 1987),
The parties have each offered extensive analysis employing an abundance of precedent in support of their arguments for and against preemption. None is directly controlling of the facts or law before us. After a complete review, we are persuaded that Ohio's common-law rule is not preempted by the federal and state regulations concerned. Our holding is based on three considerations.
First, the usual tests for preemption of state law by federal law pursuant to the Supremacy Clause do not support a conclusion that Congress intended the FRSA to preempt Ohio's common law. The statute makes no express preemption of state law. Also, there is not a sufficient basis for implied preemption; though the pattern of regulation indicates a strong federal interest, Section 434 permits other regulation by the states. Lastly, there is no actual conflict between regulations requiring the use of crossbucks and permitting speeds up to sixty miles per hour and appellants' argument that reduced speed and additional markers were a reasonable part of appellee's duties to Anderson. Compliance with both requirements is not impossible.
Second, by delegating federal authority to regulate grade crossing safety to the states, Congress demonstrated an intention to employ the body of the law of a state to meet federal regulatory purposes. (In contrast, the FRSA evidenced no intention to permit municipal speed regulations, and they are preempted.) The body of state law thus incorporated into the federal regulatory scheme includes the common law of a state. In Ohio, that common law has held that compliance with grade crossing regulations does not relieve a railroad of liability to private persons injured as a result of negligence. Matkovich v.Penn Central, supra.
Third, the safety measures urged by appellants are consistent with the purposes and objectives of the FRSA. If adopted they would improve, rather than detract from, railroad safety. Further, while they may constitute an *374 exception to the "nationally uniform" pattern of regulation, they would constitute an ad hoc exception to that pattern limited to reduction or elimination of an essentially local safety hazard at one crossing and would not be an undue burden on interstate commerce. Neither would an award of damages in tort constitute an undue burden.
Appellee CSX also argues that the claim of unsafe speed is preempted by the rules of the Federal Railroad Administration at Section 213 et seq., Title 49, C.F.R. Those rules have been construed to permit CSX to operate its train at sixty miles per hour through this crossing, far in excess of the forty-five to forty-eight miles per hour traveled at the time of the collision. However, those regulations are concerned with track and roadbed condition, train markings, employee rules, inspection, and the like, and do not encompass the duties alleged in the complaint. Enforcement of the common-law duty of CSX to use ordinary care in the operation of its trains by traveling at a lower speed will in no way "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress" (Fidelity Fed. v. de la Cuesta, supra,
Appellants' assignment of error is sustained.
The decision of the trial court granting summary judgment to appellee CSX Transportation is reversed. The matter will be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
Judgment accordingly.
WILSON and BROGAN, JJ., concur. *375