. By аction in equity plaintiffs challenge validity of an amendatory city zoning ordinance. Trial to the court resulted in a decree denying relief prayed and they appeal. We affirm.
In 1955-Cedar_Rapiés-arlop'fé3~a comprehensive zoning plan. Section 414.3, Code, 1966.
The property here involved was thereby classified R-2 Residential, as was some of the surrounding land.
Other nearby and adjacent realty was at the same time zoned B-l or Commercial.
About November 1, 1967, the tract here concerned was zoned B-l Neighborhood Shopрing District by amendment to the aforesaid comprehensive plan.
Briefly stated, propositions asserted by plaintiffs on appeal are, trial court erred in upholding the challenged ordinance on the basis a fair difference of opinion exists as to whеther it is, (1) unreasonable, discriminatory, arbitrary, or capricious; (2) in accord with the city’s comprehensive plan; and (3) related to health, safety, morals or general welfare of the community.
These assignments are so interrelated as to dictate they be considered accordingly.
Among exhibits certified to us is a plat, here reproduced to aid in visualizing the area involved.
Diagonal lines denote the rezoned parcel.
I. As a case is heard in the trial court it is generally so considered on appeal. Buda v. Fulton, Iowa,
*742
II. We have repeatedly held zoning is an exercise of police powers delegated by the state to municipalities, and to be strictly construed. See Plaza Recreational Center v. City of Sioux City,
However, in the enactment of such ordinances, including amendments thereto, a city or town exercises vested legislative powers attended by a strong presumption of validity, which means if facially valid, and reasonableness of thе enactment is fairly debatable, it must be allowed to stand. Code section 366.1; Smith v. City of Fort Dodge, Iowa,
Stated otherwise, courts will not substitute their judgment as to wisdom or propriety of action by a city or town council, acting reasonably within the scope of its authorized police power, in the enactment of ordinances establishing or revising municipal zones. Brackett v. City of Des Moines, supra; 101 C.J.S. Zoning § 324, page 1121; 58 Am.Jur., Zoning, section 23, page 954; and Rhyne on Municipal Law, section 32.4, pages 828, 829-830.
Furthermore, we said in Plaza Recreational Center v. City of Sioux City, supra, loc. cit.,
More recently this Court held, a zoning ordinance is generally sustained as a valid exercise of police power in the interest of public peace, order, morals, health, safety, convenience, and the general welfare of a cоmmunity, the prime consideration being its general purpose, not the hardship of individual cases. Jersild v. Sarcone,
Also, in the Plaza Recreational Center case, supra,
And in McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 1965 Rev. Vol. 8A, section 25.296, page 353, is found this comment: "The ~rule that the burden of proof is on one as *743 serting the unreasonableness, invalidity or unconstitutionality of an ordinance is applicable with respect to zoning ordinances and amendments thereto. In other words, unless a zoning ordinance is invalid on its face, the burden of alleging and proving facts to support the claim of its invalidity is on the party asserting it.”
Finally, on the matter of fundamental precepts here applicable it must be understood zoning is not static, any existing restrictions being always subject to reasonable revisions with changing community conditions and needs as they appear. Brackett v. City of Des Moines,
III. Looking to the рhysical conditions and uses of land in the subject area, an examination of the plat reproduced above discloses the rezoned tract is bounded by Mt. Vernon Road on the north; 36th St. S.E. on the east; private commercial property on the west; and residеntial on the south.
Additionally, the record reveals a business establishment is located at each corner of the intersection of 36th St. S.E., and Mt. Vernon Road, to-wit: drug store, professional building, car wash, and service station.
The commercial tract, west of and adjacent to the subject rezoned land, has for years been occupied by a small neighborhood grocery store. This and the questioned shopping center form a contiguous rectangular area consisting of about 3.4 acres.
Since adoption of the cоmprehensive or master plan in 1955, noticeable changes have taken place in the southeasterly part of Cedar Rapids. As a result of relatively recent migrations, territory located within existing boundaries, once denominated agricultural, has become residential. Concurrently the residential population in that area south and east of the subject rezoned tract has increased substantially. Mt. Vernon Road has been widened from a two lane highway to a four lane heavily traveled thoroughfare, and 34th St. S.E. remains one of the city’s main north-south arterial avenues. One hundred sixty off-street parking stalls are now provided in the combined commercial properties located south and east of these two intersecting streets, with ingress and egress limited to the two adjacent east-west roads.
Incidentally, population demands have compelled some communities to acquire more land by annexation. See City of Bettendorf v. Abeln, Iowa,
In the face of such apparent condi-i tions, it is not only proper but highly es-l sential that our municipal officials periodically review and update zoning regulations Welfare of the people, present and future will not permit adoption of a passive attitude in these matters.
Moreover, common experience discloses highly concentrated stores and shops, catering to public needs, are often a convenience, if not a necessity, in or near populous residential areas. Municipal planning in that direction cannot ordinarily be held incompatible with any previously enаcted comprehensive plan. See Plaza Recreational Center v. City of Sioux City,
With regard to the matter of zoning as related to variant trends in burghal living habits this court said, in City of Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co.,
IV. In keeping with the urbanization of once sparsely populated areas, retail business methods have also changed. As stated by an editor’s note in
However, this does not mean mutations in living and business habits alone provide an adequate basis for indiscriminate municipal establishment of commercial districts or shopping centers in residential areas, absent any benefit to the health, safety, morals or general welfare of the community. See in this regаrd Code section 414.3; Hermann v. City of Des Moines,
But that situation is not present in the case at bar. Here the rezoned property is adjacent to an existing cоmmercial district. A uniform development plan to improve the property by permitting establishment of a shopping center, with controlled traffic access and off-street parking, was duly approved by the city authorities. As previously indicated the now construсted center provides, among other things, a drive-in banking office. It is contemplated use of this and other available facilities by those living in the vicinity will lessen traffic congestion in the central business district. Other benefits to the people may reasonably be expеcted to flow from establishment of the subject shopping district.
V. Even so, plaintiffs argue there are other more suitable locations available. We do not propose to engage in any extended exploration of that subject.
As heretofore revealed courts will not, in matters of this nature, invade the province of a city or town council. Once it appears a zoning ordinance or amendment thereto is reasonable and inures to the benefit of the people, the judiciary is without authority to dictаte choice of location. For reasons previously given that is a matter ordinarily to be resolved by the local legislative body.
Incidentally, plaintiffs belatedly argue aesthetic factors are persuasively involved in the case at bar. We have еxamined some authorities on that subject and find they accord no significant support to plaintiffs’ cause. See in this regard, Stoner McCray System v. City of Des Moines,
*745 VI. It is also contendеd defendant city here engaged in prohibited spot zoning. We are not so persuaded.
This statement in McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 1965 Rev. Vol. 8, section 25.-115, pages 309-310, serves to succinctly refute the foregoing claim: “Under the usual provisions of the zoning laws shopping and business centers at convenient locations in residential districts generally are permitted, as is rezoning for this purpose. They do not constitute invalid ‘spot’ or ‘island’ zoning where their existence, location and extent are reasonable. Nor are they nuisances per se.” With regard hereto see also Keller v. City of Council Bluffs,
VII. We find no merit in the propositions urged by plaintiffs in support of a reversal.
It is evident defendant City of Cedar Rapids acted within the scope of its authorized police power in establishing the controverted shopping center classification. The ordinance is not invalid on its face, and nothing in the record before us discloses any plausible basis upon which to hold the zoning change was аrbitrary or unreasonable.
In fact there are cogent circumstances which tend to support the propriety and wisdom of that municipal legislative enactment with which we are here concerned. This being fairly debatable the ordinance must be allowed to stand. Trial court correctly so held.
Costs on this appeal are taxed to plaintiffs.
Affirmed.