174 Ky. 456 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1917
Opinion op the Court by
Affirming.
This action was originally instituted in the Pulaski circuit court by Marion Meece, Jr., then a voter and resident -taxpayer of Pulaski county, in his own right, and on behalf of all other taxpayers of the county, against the appellant, IT. C. Anderson, superintendent of common schools of Pulaski county, and his co-defendants, the county judge and justices of the peace of Pulaski county, named in the petition as composing the fiscal court of Pulaski county, seeking to recover of the appellant, H. C. Anderson, for the benefit of the
Appellant and his co-defendants filed a special and general demurrer to the petition as amended. The circuit court overruled the general demurrer, but being of the opinion that the county judge and justices of the peace composing the fiscal court, were unnecessary and improper parties to the action, sustained the special demurrer and caused their names to be stricken from the petitioii as defendants. Shortly thereafter, the appellee, W. Sherman Burton, a resident voter and taxpayer of Pulaski county by intervening petition, concurring in the averments of the petition, as amended, asked to be made a party plaintiff to the action, which the court granted. Following’ which the plaintiff, Marion Meece, Jr., left this State to take charge of a school in the State of Georgia, which fact being made known to the court, it ordered that the name of Marion Meece, Jr., be stricken from the petition as a plaintiff and that of the appellee, W. Sherman Burton* substituted therefor. ■
Appellant, by answer, traversed the allegation of the petition as amended. Appellee filed a general demurrer
We have so frequently declared the mandatory character of sections 161-235 Constitution and applied their provisions that it is deemed unnecessary to do more than cite a few of the cases in which they have been considered. Piercy v. Smith, &c., 117 Ky. 990; McNew v. Commonwealth, 123 Ky. 115; McNew v. Nicholas county, 125 Ky. 66; McCracken County v. Reed, 125 Ky. 420; Spalding v. Thornbury, 128 Ky. 533; Thomas v. Hager, 120 Ky. 428. In other words, the law is well settled that where the salary of an officer is fixed before or when he goes into office, it cannot be thereafter changed during the term for which he is elected. So when the fiscal court of Pulaski county on December 8th, 1913, which was after appellant’s election as county school superintendent and before his incumbency of the office, fixed his salary for his four years’ term of office at 8 cents per capita for each pupil child in Pulaski county, that limited his salary to 8 cents per capita for each pupil child.in and for each year of the four years, constituting his official term. Consequently, when the fiscal court, following its reorganization resulting’ from the November election, 1913, attempted, on January 13th, 1914, by the order then made and entered of record, to fix appellant’s salary at $1,200.00 per annum, they were endeavoring illegally to undo what had previously been legally done, December 8th, 1913.
It is, However, insisted for appellant that the order of the fiscal court of December 8th, 1913, was void and, therefore, appellant’s salary was never fixed by the fiscal court until January 13th, 1914. This contention is based upon the claim that the salary allowed by the order of December 8th; 1913, was fixed under and by virtue of section 4419 Ky. Statutes, which, it is argued, was repealed by the act of 1912, now section 4399 Ky. Statutes. We are unable to sustain this contention. Section 4419 Ky. Statutes does, it is true, provide that the salary of the superintendent as fixed by the fiscal court shall be not less than 8 nor more than 20 cents for each pupil child, or in amount less than $400.00 nor more than $1,500.00
It is our conclusion that the order of December 8th, ■1913, is valid, and that of January 13th, 1914, is void, and that appellant was not entitled to the excess of salary received by him under the order of January 13th, 1914, in the years 1914 and 1915, aggregating $729.20.
We find no merit in appellant’s contention that the - appellee, W. Sherman Burton, was’ without capacity to maintain the action. The cases of Sparks v. Robinson, 115 Ky. 453, and Whaley, &c. v. Commonwealth 110 Ky. 154, relied on by appellant do not sustain his contention. In those cases the recovery of an excessive tax levied and collected was sought in behalf of the plaintiff taxpayers, the recovery to be distributed among them. Hence it was important that the one or more of the plaintiffs, bringing the action for themselves, and on behalf of other taxpayers of the county, should be able to show that the interest they had in the recovery was of so substantial a character as to entitle them to represent the class for which the recovery was sought. In the instant case the appellee is not asking for the return of' any money to himself or other taxpayers that was illegally received by appellant by way of salary. What is sued for and recovered will go into the county treasury fop the use of the county, which entitles any taxpayer of the county, though he pay only a poll tax, to maintain the action in behalf of himself and all other taxpayers thereof. DeHaven v. Hardinsburg Graded School, 164 Ky. 511.
Judgment affirmed.