134 P. 553 | Utah | 1913
Lead Opinion
This proceeding is based on the provisions of Corrrp. Laws-1907, section 3796, to revoke the probate of the last will and testament of one Paul Anderson, deceased. The action was instituted by the widow of the deceased in her own behalf and also as guardian ad litem on behalf of her infant son,. Hay Anderson, of the age of three years, who, with herself constitute the only heirs at law of said decedent. The grounds upon which she sought to revoke the probate of said will were want of testamentary capacity on the part of decedent, and
Iiebei’ Anderson, both as executor and in his individual capacity as a beneficiary under the will, was made a party to the proceeding, and John Anderson was also made a party as residuary legatee under the will. Heber Anderson filed an answer as executor to the petition, and he and John also filed a joint answer thereto which, after admitting the execution of the will, the death of Paul Anderson, and' the probate of said will, denied all of the material allegations of the petition.
Upon the issues thus joined, a trial to a jury resulted in a general verdict in favor of petitioners, and in special findings in which the jury found that Paul Anderson was possessed of testamentary capacity when he made and executed the will in question, but further found that certain provisions therein ■contained were procured through means of undue influence practiced upon him by his brothers aforesaid. The court sustained the special findings of the jury, and entered judgment revoking the probate of those portions of the will which the jurors found had been procured by means of undue influence, and upheld the decree admitting said will to probate in all other respects.
Heber Anderson as executor appeals, and he and John, individually, also appeal from that portion of the judgment revoking and setting aside the probate of said will. Numerous errors are assigned by appellants, but those relied on are in substance as follows:
(1) Error in overruling appellants’ motion for nonsuit at the close of respondent’s evidence; (2) error in refusing to charge the jury at the close of all the evidence that there was no evidence to sustain the finding that the will or any part thereof was procured by undue influence; (3) error in admitting and excluding evidence; (4) error in charging the jury, and in refusing to charge as requested by appellants; (5) error in rendering the judgment revoking in part the probate of the will; and (6) that there is no evidence in support of the verdict of the jury and its special finding upon the issue
In view that the jury specially found that the decedent was possessed of testimentary capacity when he executed the will in question, and since no one excepts to said1 finding, we must proceed to dispose of the appeal upon the basis that the decedent was of sound mind, or that he possessed the necessary mental capacity to make the will in question. The evidence upon that branch of the case will therefore be referred to only in so far as the same may be material and relevant upon the question of undue influence.
Tbe witness further testified that after that she did not see either Heber or John until a considerable time after Paul bad gone to tbe hospital for tbe purpose of having an operation performed; that be went to tbe hospital for that purpose on May 2, 1909, and tbe operation was performed on June 28th thereafter. She also testified that although she-saw her husband on tbe day tbe will bears date, yet be did1 not inform her that be bad made a will, and that she did not know that be bad made one until after bis death. It was also-shown by other evidence that a few days before tbe doctors-intended to perform an operation upon Paul, which tbey considered a serious one, Heber came to tbe hospital to see bim^ that Heber went to Mr. Marks, an attorney at law with whom he was acquainted, and requested Mr. Marks to go to the hospital to see Paul about making a will; that Mr. Marks said be could not spare tbe time to go to tbe hospital, but requested Heber to go and get memoranda or notes from Paul in which be should state tbe property, tbe devisees, and tbe disposition
• The will bears date on the 27th of June, 1909, and Haul was successfully operated upon tbe day following. A second operation was performed upon him about two weeks later, after wbicb Haul improved in health somewhat and left tbe hospital some time in July and went to bis home in Murray, and a short time thereafter went to Clifton, Idaho, from whence be returned in a bad condition, again went to tbe hospital, where be died in October 13, 1909. It was also shown that Mrs. Anderson, tbe petitioner, knew little or nothing concerning Haul’s affairs or tbe value of bis property;
The petitioners also produced the will in evidence, which-so far as material here, is in substance as follows: The decedent directed that all of his property, except the specific devises, be converted into cash as soon as that could be conveniently done. He gave to Rose L. Anderson, his wife, one-third of all the property remaining after payment of debts and defraying the necessary expenses of administration, and in addition thereto she was given all household furniture and goods. Heber Anderson is given all the mining stocks and claims against mining companies. The infant son of the decedent is given $1,000 for care and maintenance, to be paid for that purpose at the rate of $6.25 per month to be paid from the date of testator’s death until the full amount with interest is exhausted. Said infant son is given the further sum of $4,000-, or, in case there is not that amount remaining in the estate, then the full amount remaining, which is to be paid to him when he arrives at the age of twenty one years. The testator directs that in the meantime the amount devised to said infant be invested .at interest, which interest shall be used for the purpose .of giving him a “college education in the schools of the State of Utah.” It is also provided that no part of said interest shall be paid until said infant “shall have become regularly installed in a college course for col
After producing substantially the foregoing evidence in support of the allegations contained in the petition, the petitioners rested, whereupon appellants interposed ¡a. motion for nonsuit upon the issue of undue influence for the reason that there was no evidence in support of that issue. The court denied the motion, and appellants offered evidence in answer to that adduced by the petitioners. We shall not attempt to do more than refer to those parts of appellants’ evidence which were offered to explain the inferences which petitioners sought to draw from certain acts and circumstances, and we shall limit this statement of the evidence to such facts as were in no way questioned or disputed' by the petitioners.
• Referring to the making of the will, Ueber Anderson testified that Paul requested him to come to Salt Lake City at the time he was in the hospital and intended to have tbe operation performed; that he came pursuant to said request; that he knew nothing about Paul’s intention to make a will until informed by him, and that it was Paul who requested
After adducing substantially the foregoing evidence upon the subjects we have referred to, both parties rested, and appellants offered two separate requests to charge the jury, which in substance are as follows:
(1) That there was no evidence adduced to sustain a finding that the decedent did not possess testamentary capacity when the will was made, and that the jury should return a verdict upon that issue in favor of appellants; and (2) that there was no evidence upon which to base a finding that the will or any part thereof was procured through undue influ-' ence, and that the jury should find that issue in favor of appellants. The court refused the foregoing requests. The jury having found that the decedent possessed testamentary
We have attempted- to set forth with as much particularity as is possible within tbe limits of an opinion all tbe salient facts tbat were produced in evidence by tbe petitioners against tbe will. Is there anything in what we bave set forth tbat can be dignified by tbe name of evidence which in any way tends to show undue influence practiced upon tbe decedent, or from which it may legitimately be inferred that be was influenced to make any kind of a will by any one ? Is it not beyond all peradventure of a doubt that whatever inferences are permissible from Heber’s acts and conduct are just as likely to bave emanated from pure brotherly motives to assist Paul as from motives bent upon influencing him in tbe disposition of bis property in accordance with Heber’s will? One is almost shocked by tbe assertion that tbe kindly offices of one brother to another, when the latter is in distress, may, without any tangible facts, be contorted into evidence showing sinister motives. If wills can be set aside by courts upon the ground of undue influence upon proof such as is presented in this case, then any will may be assailed in any case where tbe decedent was sick for any length of time, and was so situated tbat bis immediate relatives were concerned in bis welfare and made any attempts whatever to alleviate bis suffering or to comply with his expressed wishes or requests. What is said tbat Heber did, or what is inferred be did, as shown by this record, cannot be tortured into evidence supporting tbe charge tbat be practiced undue influence upon Paul.
“In the lace of this showing, which we have set forth in mere outline, there is no basis for the claim that the will was procured to be made by the undue influence of the proponent. ‘Undue influence, however used, must, in order to avoid a will, destroy the free agency of the testator at the time, and in the very act of the making of the testament. It must bear directly upon the testamentary act.’ ” In re Higgin’s Estate, 156 Cal. 257, 104 Pac. 6.
Tbe foregoing oases are also directly in point upon tbe proposition tbat, where tbe evidence is as it is in tbe case at bar, it is tbe duty of tbe courts to uphold tbe will. Tbe Supreme' Court of Kansas in a very recent case (Ginter v. Ginter, 79 Kan. 721, 101 Pac. 634, 22 L. R A. [N. S.] 1024) lays down tbe rule in these words:
“To vitiate a will there must he more than influence. It must he undue influence. To he classed as ‘undue’ influence it must place the testator in the attitude of saying, ‘It is not my will, hut I must do it.’ He must act under such coercion, compulsion, or constraint that his own free agency is destroyed. The will or the provision assailed does not truly proceed from him. He becomes the tutored instrument of a dominant mind, which dictates to him what he shall do, compels him to adopt its will instead of exercising his own, and hy overcoming his power of resistance impels him to do what he would not have done had he been free from its control.”
See, also, 1 Underbill on tbe Law of Wills, secs. 125, 128, 129, and 130. Tbe doctrine as laid down by tbe Supreme Court of California, as above indicated, is adopted and approved by tbis court in Miller v. Livingstone, 31 Utah, 415, 86 Pac. 338. Upon tbis question it should always be remembered tbat no bard and fast rule can be laid down wbicb shall control in every case. Each .ease must, to a very large extent, be determined! upon its own facts and circumstances, and in arriving at a conclusion tbe foregoing general rule should always be kept in mind.
Recurring now to tbe provisions made for tbe infant son. Let it be conceded1, for tbe purposes of tbis decision, that tbe amount set apart for tbe support of tbe child, either before
This case bas been twice tried already. If no evidence bas been produced to sustain tbe contentions of tbe petitioners on two trials, it is not likely tbat any can be produced upon a third trial. Moreover, tbe facts and circumstances surrounding tbe testator and tbe making of tbe will show tbat no other evidence than tbat which bas already been produced can be obtained. It would therefore not only be needless, but a wasteful expenditure of tbe estate’s funds to prolong this litigation. Tbe estate should be preserved for tbe widow and tbe child and not wasted in needless litigation.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the district court of Salt Lake county, with directions to set aside the general verdict of the jury and the special findings made upon the issue of undue influence; to substitute therefor a finding that the will was not procured by undue influence, and make conclusions of law, and enter judgment sustaining the will and the probate thereof in all respects.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
I think there is sufficient evidence to support the special findings and verdict, and for that reason dissent.