92 N.J.L. 204 | N.J. | 1918
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This action was brought against á tenant to recover double the yearly value of the demised premises for a period during which, it is alleged, the tenant willfully held
Sections 27 and 28 of the statute are substantially counterparts of those of 4 Geo. II., c. 28, § 1, and 11 Geo. II., c. 19, § 18, respectively, the latter providing that where the tenant gives notice of his intention to quit, and does not comply, he shall pay double the rent he would have paid, the distinction being that if the tenant holds over after his notice to quit he shall pay double rent, but if the tenant holds over after demand of possession by his landlord he is liable, not for double rent, but for double the yearly value. In this case the suit is for double the yearly value, and the testimony shows that the tenant’s term, as expressed in its lease, had expired June 30th, 1916, and it was bound to surrender the premises on that day, or within such reasonable time thereafter as would permit the removal of reserved fixtures; that the landlord demanded delivery of possession July 6th, 1916; that defendant did not surrender until December 30th, 1916; and, therefore, if the holding over was willful, the plaintiff was entitled to double the yearly value of the1 premises from July 6th, 1916, to December 30th, following, as was held in Cobb v. Stokes, 8 East 357, the willfulness beginning with the written demand.
The consideration of the second ground of'appeal, which relates to instructions given to the jury, requires a short resume of the facts. The plaintiffs, by a written agreement dated September 26th, 1904, and a supplemental one dated March 14th, 1905, let to defendant the premises which this controversy involves, for a term expiring June 30th, 1915; on March 7th, 1914, another agreement was entered into by the plaintiff and defendant by which the original letting was extended from June 30th, 1915, to June 30th, 1916, upon the same conditions, except an increase in the rent from $6,750 and taxes, as reserved in the original and supplemental leases, to $10,000 and taxes. Under this agreement the defendants were to surrender possession on June 30th. 1916, subject to the right to remove, at the termination of the term, all fixtures, gas works, holders and appurtenances erected on the lands by defendant during the term, the buildings erected to become the property of the lessor. In
The president of the defendant company testified that he had an honest belief that Ms company did not have to surrender possession as demanded, because he had every reason to believe that the plant would be sold or leased to his company, notwithstanding the demand for possession on July 6th, 1916, and their previous inability to agree upon terms, as well as the fact that defendants had commenced the removal of its fixtures before the expiration of the lease to another location, which it was preparing for the continuance of its business. Such a belief to he available must be an honest bona fide one. based on facts from which such an inference can be drawn. “A tenant cannot relieve himself by the mere statement that he believed he had a right to hold the premises. He must furnish reasons sufficient to induce a jury or court hearing the case to believe he had a right to remain in possession.” 16 R. C. L. 1171, § 692, and cases cited.
We have not been referred to a case, nor can we find any, which holds that the mere statement.of such a belief is a sufficient excuse. Reasons for the belief must appear, and the jury are entitled to find whether they are sufficient to justify it, and it was clearly error to- limit the jury in the .present case to the question of defendant’s belief, for it was their province to say whether it was an honest belief, based upon facts which would reasonably justify it.
The judgment below is reversed.
For affirmance — Hone.
For reversal — The Chancellor, Chief Justice, Swayze, Trenchard, Parker, Bergen, Minturn, Kalisch, Black, White, Heppenheimer, Williams, Taylor, Gardner, JJ. 14.