*1 DECISION been tax forfeiture have one there would appeal. action, not have this and we would facts, specific that on these We conclude court, utilizing specific district properly utilized Minn.Stat. partition when the State statute for 282.04, err, § subd. and did not either in involved, parcels one of is Minnesota equity, law or in when it ordered that this forfeited, up tax came is involved partition proceed. action parti- The rest of the practical best solution. Affirmed; motion denied. appointment of process, the commission- tion values, computation of will bene- ers and asking them to far more than
fit the Turtles building in cutting this
pay half the cost
half, rebuilding and 100% of the cost for then building” up the of “their so that
sealing end public to or their dangerous is
it
tenants, danger eyesore, and not a to not an nearby Minnesota’s tenants State building.” We af- apartment “new unit by six AMOS, minor, his and Robert mother findings on its of fact firm the district court AMOS, guardian, Patricia natural conclusion of law. and its Amos, individually, Appellants, Patricia county if this argues that court does ordering district court’s decision affirm the parti- CAMPBELL,
partition, this court should direct that Torrence Wendell partition al., Defendants, than by tion sale occur rather et However, parti- kind. the issue of whether partition appropri- in kind tion sale is present has not been ad- ate in the case Company Fire National Union Insurance court. As the Turtles dressed the district PA, Pittsburgh, garnishee, contend, parties oppor- have not had the Respondent. argument evidence and con-
tunity to way partition cerning partition, if the best No. CX-98-1921. partition is to done. The manner of be Appeals of Minnesota. under its Court still the district court and before jurisdiction. May Finally, county requesting at torney defending ap fees incurred in
peal. presents This a novel issue law say as a matter of law that it we cannot delay or purposes
was taken for the Also, county because the cites no
harass.
authority provide any docu and has failed to support request, decline
mentation attorney county’s request for fees. See 139.06, (provid Civ.App. R. P.
Minn. subd. seeking attorney ap all motions fees
peal “must sufficient documentation include appellate determine enable fees.”); appropriate Emerick amount of Sanchez, Howley
ex rel. (denying request (Minn.App.1996) par attorney appeal fees on where
costs authority explain
ty failed fees).
why was entitled to she
Campbell sexually appellant assaulted Rob- 1993, Campbell charged ert Amos. conduct, with three counts of criminal sexual appellant. his which included 1993, Campbell pleaded guilty to December *3 second-degree one count of criminal sexual Firm, Hechter, P.A., Thill Law Richard W. conduct. (for Park, appellants) Louis MN St. mother, July In and his Robert Amos Hart, Foley, A. M. Elizabeth William Amos, appellant guardian Patricia both as Geer, P.L.L.P., Minneapolis, Meagher & MN individually, and commenced lawsuit (for respondent) against Campbell, principal, and school’s asserted, Appellants district. school AMUNDSON, decided and Considered district, against negligent for hir- claims CRIPPEN, Judge, and Presiding Judge, supervision, negligent ing, negligent reten- ANDERSON, Judge. tion, rights, all and violation constitutional injuries emo- of which resulted OPINION de- tional distress. district tendered its ANDERSON, Judge. insurer, BARRY G. respondent fense to its National Un- Respondent Company. ion Fire Insurance challenge the district court July refused tender. In judgment awarding respondent insurance Shugart type approved court a Miller v. declaratory policy relief ex- carrier based settlement between the school district and correctly the district court clusions. Because $250,000. appellants for battery or policy’s ruled coverage, affirm. exclusion barred 1997, appellants In commenced September present garnishment re- action
FACTS summary spondent. Respondent moved for action was commenced to en- judgment, granted which was based on exclu- Miller-Shugart style agreement. force sions in the undisputed. material facts are district’s errors omissions school Minneapolis Public School policy insurance covered (school district) hired teacher Tor- District * * * any Wrongful Act Insured Campbell. further in- After rence Wendell any person for whose actions the other Camp- time vestigation, conducted from the only if legally responsible, Insured is but lawsuit, began until an work earlier bell * * * Wrongful occurs such Act first Campbell’s credentials discovered that was for performance of duties the School history, exemplary, less than included District. delinquency contributing to the conviction minor, previous suspension from a teach- A in the as “wrongful act” defined
ing position,
in a
and involvement
homosexu-
“any
alleged
duty,
ne-
breach
actual
stabbing.
employment by the
After
school
al
misstatement,
error,
misleading state-
glect,
district, Campbell was
transferred
solely in the
ment or omission committed
abusive con-
to school because of his
school
Dis-
performance of
School
duties
teachers,
which
duct towards students
following
trict.” But the
excluded
special-
third-grade
on a
included an assault
claims:
charged
for which he was
education student
(a)
allegations
involving
any claim
Campbell
fifth-degree assault.
was as-
with
* *
* * * erim|na]
*;
0r omissions
acts
suspensions
three-day
only one- and
sessed
* * *
(b)
arising out of
as
any
response
prior
to his
behav-
immediate
n * n ;
sault or
ior.
(c)
bodily injury
any
arising out of
placed at
claim
Campbell
Morris
n n n .
Elementary
In late
School.
Park
battery”
ambiguity
Based on
“assault or
“must
not create an
where
that all of
fact
claims none
in order
exists
to afford
to the
assault,
were based
Progressive
the district
insured.”
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Met
appellants’ garnishment
dismissed
action
calf,
(Minn.App.1993).
prejudice
and on the merits.
Appellants challenge the district
ISSUE
application
court’s order as to the
respondent’s
Do
exclu-
policy’s exclusions. The
is on
burden
employee’s
sions bar
for the
as-
applicability
insurer
establish the
of an
sault?
Corp.,
exclusion. SCSC
N.W.2d at
311—
strictly
interpreted
Exclusions are
ANALYSIS
*4
Hennings
insurer.
v. State
summary
appeal
judg
On
Co.,
680,
Farm Fire & Cas.
N.W.2d
438
683
ment,
reviewing
a
court must determine
(Minn.
(Minn.App.1989), review denied
June
appli
whether the
in its
erred
1989).
9,
If the insurer demonstrates the
any
cation of
law and
are
whether there
applicability of an
then the insured
genuine
issues
material fact. State
proving
exception
bears the burden of
(Minn.
French,
2,
Cooper
4
460 N.W.2d
SCSC,
the exclusion.
at
536 N.W.2d
314.
1990).
doing,
a reviewing
so
court views
reasoning
exception
is that
“re
in
light
“the evidence
most favorable to
coverage,
stores”
and the insured bears the
party against
judgment
grant
whom
proving coverage.
burden
ultimate
Id.
Bellomo,
758,
ed.” Fabio v.
504
761
N.W.2d
policy
by respondent provided
issued
(Minn.1993).
coverage
basic errors and omissions
for a
interpre
This
focuses on the
“wrongful act” of the school district. The
policy.
tation of an insurance
Under
“wrongful
ordinarily
term
act”
been un
has
law,
facts,
Minnesota
established
insur
encompass
derstood
intentional as well as
ance
issues and the construction
negligent
Independent
misconduct.
Sch.
interpretation
policy
questions
and
of a
are
697,
No.
Dist.
Eveleth v. St. Paul Fire &
Jenoff,
of law.
Inc. v. New Hampshire Ins.
Co.,
(Minn.
576,
Ins.
Marine
515 N.W.2d
579
Co.,
260,
(Minn.1997);
558 N.W.2d
262
1994) (citing
Dictionai’y
Black’s Law
1612
Graff,
582,
Haarstad v.
517 N.W.2d
584 (6th ed.1990)).
policy
similarly
at issue
(Minn.1994).
This court is not bound
a
wrongful
“any
defined
act
actual
as
or
n n *
question
district court’s decision on a
of law.
alleged
duty,
breach
neglect,
error
Frost-Benco Elec. Ass’n v. Minnesota Pub.
in
performance
of duties
the School
Comm’n,
(Minn.
639,
Utils.
642
District.”
1984).
analysis
argu
that,
parties’
Appellants
of the
argue
because the
requires
begin
general
ments
this court
policy
provide
intent of the
was to
agreement
review of them
wrongful
insurance
acts
administrative
—the
policy.
district,
“An
provision
insurance
is to
employees
including
of the school
interpreted according
plain,
superintendent,
be
its
superintendent,
both
assistant
ordinary meaning
per
and
principals,
what a reasonable
and
this court should focus on the
position
son in the
employees
insured would have
conduct
such
and how the ex
apply
understood
to mean.”
Sys.,
it
Retail
Inc. v.
clusions
that conduct.
(Minn.
Cos.,
735,
CNA,
respondent
Ins.
737
reason
should
cover
App.1991) (citing
age
Mut.
Farmers Home
Ins.
because the school district’s administra
Lill,
(Minn.1983)),
Co. v.
637
employees
negligent
hiring
tive
were
in both
(Minn.
1991).
Aug.
assailant,
review
retaining
Campbell,
denied
Unam
who
biguous language in an
employee
must was
a covered
not
under the dis
plain
that,
be
ordinary meaning.
puted policy. Appellants argue
accorded its
Corp.
SCSC
v. Allied Mut.
apply,
Ins.
the exclusions
do
be
(Minn.1995).
Moreover,
negligent hiring
cause the
and retention did
injury
battery or
and what
-the
or
tween the
caused
in either
assault
not result
determining
“primary
whether
before
negligence”
should be covered under
fact
analysis
suggested
is without
Appellants’
“pri-
If the
act is also
causal
this court
law. While
support Minnesota
i.e.,
mary,”
policy, then
covered under the
reviewing an insur-
explained that when
has
or
the act is covered
is excluded because of
court’s function
to ascertain
policy the
ance
an exclusion such as
case. Id.
par-
the intentions of
give
effect to
at
N.W.2d at 600.
Invs.,
ties,
Inc. v. Cred-
Kabanuk Diversified
interpretation is
Such an
consistent with
Ins.
Gen.
(deferring
Engeldinger,
case law. Soon after
App.1996)
exclusion),
again
including
Oct.
reviewed an exclusion
review denied
1996),
unambig-
phrase “arising
of’
reiterated that
out
in Rausch
Beech
we have also
(Minn.1979).
Corp.,
language
given
plain
be
ion Fire Ins. 426 claim both the (1993), negli- bodily-injury S.E.2d to conclude that exclusions. gence claim on an assault based should focus assault-or-battery As to the negligence and not those exclusions only analysis, of’ set forth injuries. that bar assault or their such earlier, dispositive, but also Minnesota courts foreign distinguishable case law is both type have faced this of exclusion in other unpersuasive. upheld contracts and In both them. Roloff (Minn. Minn., Taste of Durham, In Pub. Board Educ. and of App.1992), review denied Oct. Pennsylvania Superior Court and the North 1992), City Minneapolis, and Ross v. of Appeals Carolina Court confronted similar (Minn.App.1987), 912-13 review policies errors and omissions issued re- 1987), Sept. denied this court ex spondent local school districts. re- amined exclusions for assault or bat sponse arguments similar to those raised tery opposed arguments un as here, both application courts barred the negligence principles. der in favor
identical exclusions
school
Ross,
this court
trial
reversed the
negligence
boards’
claims. But both courts
judgment
coverage, ruling
court’s
that the
exclusively
ruling
were
on the insurer’s
battery,
action was based on an
defend,
as
duty to
broader
issue not
opposed
negli-
to the trial court’s reliance on
controversy.
Educ.,
in this
Board
Pub.
gence.
269 sions, injuries the immediate cause of “if Additionally, the claim fails because in the exclu- constitutes the conduct defined bodily injury exclusion. policy’s of the sion, all coverage is defeated for insureds.” lit “bodily injury” has received definition Fund courts, Mork Clinic v. Fireman’s Ins. 575 presum by Minnesota tle attention (Minn.App.1998). 601 There is physi N.W.2d ably definition is clear —a because justifiable apply no reason the exclu- act. an external caused cal manifestation (ana sion. Meadowbrook, 419 at See distress lyzing duty defend emotional permitted appellants’ We are not to isolate bodily injury, failure to and insurer’s claim as ignore negligence fact claim and did not include claim defend suit because original of action and the both cause to fit with physical manifestations “sufficient premised school district’s settlement were bodily injury coverage”). policy’s in the injury. recently reit rejected previously courts have Minnesota that, interpreting erated insurance con similar to insurance claims tracts, may not courts “isolate” events for injury Fa bodily exclusions. See relying on coverage purposes. Ins. Co. v. Auto-Owners Minn, ber, 822-23 250 N.W.2d at (Minn.1996). Ap Todd negligence for coverage for claim (denying original complaint and final pellants’ settle injury when ex caused school bus ment with the school district focused on the “ injury ‘bodily arising out cluded injury resulting from the sexual assault. n * * bus”). use’ of the The settlement was reimburse and medical ment emotional distress ex between causal connection argue penses. that such To reimbursement in- injuries Campbell’s can be assault only negligence challenges is demanded Minnesota under Minnesota law. ferred The case the school common sense. bodily an intent cause have inferred courts have existed but for the district would not in- of law whenever an as a matter result, bodily As a assault and person. sexually another party sured assaults denies because exclusions Williams, v. Farm Fire & Cas. Co. State arising to claims (Minn.1984); also All- see bodily injury. (8th Steele, 74 F.3d state Ins. Co. Cir.1996) (inferring to cause intent ground, appel a final alternative On holding); injury under Farm R.W. State that, respondent repre argue lants because *7 (Minn.1995) T.F., 869, 872-73 wrongful would covered sented that acts be (inference an intention- that sexual assault is of ex the the doctrine reasonable “ act, negligently as- al ‘because one cannot application the pectations prohibits (citation omitted)). Appel- sault another’” policy’s exclusions. bodily not for a lants’ claim would exist but that court has clarified the applies We find the exclusion expectations provide does not test reasonable bodily appellants’ claim is based on because ignore policy or opportunity to exclusions Campbell’s injuries from assault. sustained to a rewrite exclusions that “conform result might prefer.” Board not insured have denied that sexual of America, meaning Regents Royal of Ins. Co. not fall within the assault does of (Minn.1994). Furthermore, they argue But the N.W.2d either exclusion. apply the reason negligent hiring dominant cause of this court has refused to was the expectation doctrine when an assault or injury. Respondent’s intent to exclude able battery arising was not hidden from the intentional acts of exclusion claims capital clearly appeared bodily injury was marked and assault or or from Eveleth, heading OR BAT at 579 ized entitled “ASSAULT explicit. See Ross, that, company in- #6.” (suggesting if TERY EXCLUSION 914. The exclusions in this case intentional from con- N.W.2d at tended to exclude acts so). tract, clearly heading “EX marked under the explicitly have done Fur- were it should apply thermore, recently There no basis to explained this court that CLUSIONS.” expectations in this case “arising reasonable doctrine focusing out of’ exclu- cases and to do so would overlook clear and unam- dealing demotion. are not We here with biguous policy language. arguments a supporting regarding record purchaser’s understanding type-of- of a damages representations
DECISION related to that topic, or the cause for or unambiguous policy Based on clear and reading broad of in light of exclusion language, properly denied premium of cost appellants’ coverage claim. Affirmed.
3. CRIPPEN, Judge (concurring specially) This case shows cause for a more cautious analysis of causative-act exclusions like the 1. National Union clause claims aris- analysis I concur in result and in the of ing battery.” out of “assault or It should not in the exclusion National Union for encompass misconduct of school staff that “any arising bodily injury.” claim out of This negligent hiring, supervision, results from unique exclusion because deals with retention conduct —serious errors of school arising suffered, out claims of a certain harm represent lapse officials that in their funda- namely, bodily injury. It contrasts with the mental day-long mission learn- more common exclusion “arising for claims is, for environment children that among out of’ a certain act or course action that things, reasonably other safe. suffering leads to the harm. some majority concludes, Heretofore, As the notwithstanding reported imprecisely have the fact employ that the trial did that emerges doctrine from cases ground summary judgment, this for ap- dealing with exclusions on pellants’ injuries Thus, claims are for inflict- of’ certain example, conduct. dicta, ed explanatory course sexual misconduct and written the author of injuries. emotional flowing concurring harm those opinion, from we have observed applied
that these exclusions
when the con-
duct stated in the exclusion was the “immedi-
injuries.
ate” cause of
Mork Clinic v. Fire-
may
legal
This conclusion
involve
conse-
man’s Fund Ins.
the Rausch court in each case. Id. ined a matter of fact preferred the “fundamental” The court
647. FARM STATE INSURANCE “inci- cause, that were distinguishing causes COMPANIES, Respondent. ruling, as “significant.” The or less dental” causation, it, pur- placed saw No. C3-98-2098. original in “the activi- poses of the this entire matter arose.” ty out of which Appeals of Minnesota. Court noted, breach, the court was The contract May “inextricably intervening cause but with the use of aircraft.” interwoven my opinion, analysis says, in Rausch analysis fact-specific look should importance
carefully weight at the producing in
scrutinized cause Mortenson, “causal nex- language vitally important. temporal- nex-
us” is
us, demonstrates, may require pri- Rausch cause, the one
mary attention to earliest inju- causing begins the course of events
ries. approach the
Using the more considered mistake, employed, court has it is opinion, nexus be- my to find the closest student. the teacher and abused
tween responsibility of to the district officials overwhelming, “fundamental”
students is an determining or not
consideration whether will be safe while school.
children of the case con
The factual circumstances negligence, more
trast with the incidental stage
example, of those recreational who Minn., Taste
events. See v. Roloff (Minn.App.1992), review denied 20, 1992); City Minne Oct. Ross re
apolis,
(Minn.App.1987),
view denied monitoring respon of staff is a
selection supervisory
sibility greater than other Steele, 74 F.3d
roles. See Allstate Ins. Co. Cir.1996) (8th (parent supervision). duty
And the of school officials to students personal than the duties of
more direct *9 who
many employers toward those are their contact with staff.
occasional