MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Amgen, Inc. (“Amgen”) commenced this action against F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd., Roche Diagnostics GmbH, & Hoffman-La-Roche, Inc. (collectively “Roche/Hoffman”) seeking a declaratory judgment that Roche/Hoffman currently infringes or will infringe Amgen’s patents for erythropoiet-in (“EPO”). Am. Compl. ¶ 26 [Doc. No. 52], The patents at issue are U.S. Patent Nos. 5,441,868 (the “'868 patent”), 5,547,-933 (the “'933 patent”), 5,618,698 (the “'698 patent”), 5,621,080 (the “'080 patent”), 5,756,349 (the “'349 patent”), and 5,955,422 (the “'422 patent”). Id. ¶¶14, 26.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Amgen filed a complaint in this action on November 8, 2005 [Doc. No. 1]. On March 9, 2006, Ortho Biotech Products, L.P.’s (“Ortho”) filed a motion to intervene in this action on the side of Amgen.
See
Mot. to Intervene [Doc. No. 16]. On April 11, 2005, Roche/Hoffman filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
See
Mot. to Dismiss [Doc. No. 44]. Roche Diagnostics GmbH and F. Hoffman La-Roche Ltd. also filed motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdictional,
see
Roche Diagnostics Mot. to Dismiss [Doc. No. 38]; F. Hoffman-La Roche’s Mot. to Dismiss [Doc. Nos. 41], but later withdrew
III. MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
Roehe/Hoffman’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim attacks Amgen’s allegation of current infringement arguing it has not been sufficiently pled in light of the “safe harbor” provision of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). Def. Mem. at 1. The United States Code states that except as otherwise provided in title 35, whoever without authority “makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent ... infringes the patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
Section 271(e)(l)creates a limited exception to this provision.
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United States or import into the United States a patented invention ... solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
A. Alleged Facts
For purposes of this motion, all facts alleged in the complaint are taken as true.
Artwret Velez v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
“On information and belief, [Roche/Hoffman is] currently importing into the United States a pharmaceutical composition containing a recombinant human EPO product that Roche[/Hoffman] calls ‘Ro50-3821’ ” [referred to by Amgen as “PEG-EPO” and by Roche/Hoffman as “CERA”]. Am. Compl. ¶ 18. PEG-EPO/CERA contains glycosylated human EPO, to which Roche has attached a polyethylene glycol (“PEG”) polymer. Id. ¶20. PEG-EPO/ CERA, on information and belief, contains EPO as claimed in the '933, '080, '422 patents and produces glyeoslyated human EPO “by means of one or more of the processes claimed in the '868, '698 and '349 patents.” Id. ¶¶ 19, 21. The addition of PEG to glycosylated human EPO does not materially change the glycosylated human EPO contained in PEG-EPO/CERA. Id. ¶ 23.
On April 19, 2006, Roche submitted its Biologic License Application (“BLA”) with the United States Food and Drug Administration to sell pharmaceutical compositions containing PEG-EPO for the treatment of anemia associated with chronic kidney disease. 1 Id. at 27. “Upon information and belief, Roche has completed all Phase III clinical trials it believes necessary to support its application for approval in the United States.” Id. Roche announced that it expects to obtain regulatory approval to market and sell PEG-EPO in the United States within the next 12-14 months. Id. ¶ 28.
In addition to filing the BLA, upon information and belief, Roche/Hoffman has been making preparations to market and sell PEG-EPO in the United States, including:
a. Hiring key management, support, and sales personnel, including activelyrecruiting Amgen marketing and medical personnel involved in the sale and use of recombinant human EPO, to market and sell PEG-EPO upon receipt of regulatory approval to market and sell PEG-EPO in the United States;
b. Retaining outside consultants and vendors to assist in its marketing and sale of PEG-EPO in the United States;
c. Contacting potential customers, including large dialysis organizations (“LDOs”), to solicit interest in purchasing PEG-EPO from Roche upon regulatory approval in the United States; and
d. Completing construction and commencing operations of a new facility in Penzberg, Germany to manufacture the recombinant human EPO in PEG-EPO for export to the United States, at a reported cost of 182 million Euros.
Id. ¶ 29.
B. Standard of Review
As this Court has noted, a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the plaintiffs pleadings, and, as a result, must be considered in light of the liberal notice pleading requirements of the Federal Rules.
See Andrews-Clarke v. Lucent Technologies,
C. Amgen’s Complaint Properly Alleges Current Infringement
Roche/Hoffman argues that because all of their allegedly infringing acts are protected from infringement by the safe harbor exemption, Amgen does not state a claim for current infringement.
2
Def.
This Court has previously noted that it is unclear “whether the [Section 271(e)(1) ] exemption is an affirmative defense, rather than a part of the statutory definition of infringement that [the plaintiff] must establish.”
Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.,
Amgen’s claim of current infringement is properly pleaded and the motion to dismiss pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) [Doc. No. 44] is DENIED.
IY. MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
Roche/Hoffman also argues that any claims of future infringement must be dismissed due to the failure of Amgen to present an “actual controversy” as required under the Declaratory Judgment Act. Def. Mem. at 12.
A. Standard of Review
Once a defendant challenges the jurisdictional basis of a claim under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of proving jurisdiction.
Aversa v. United States,
A party may also challenge the accuracy of the jurisdictional facts asserted by the plaintiff and “proffer materials of evidentiary quality in support of that position.”
Id.
at 363. In this instance, the
B. Actual Controversy Requirement
For a court to have jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, there must be a “true, actual controversy”—the conflict must be real and immediate.
Lang v. Pacific Marine & Supply Co.,
(1) the defendant must be engaged in an activity directed toward making, selling or using subject to an infringement charge under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) ... or be making meaningful preparation for such activity; and
(2) acts of the defendant must indicate a refusal to change the course of its actions in the face of acts by the patentee sufficient to create a reasonable apprehension that a suit will be forthcoming.
Id.
Even when an actual controversy exists, the court has substantial discretion to decline jurisdiction, as the “statute provides that a court ‘may declare the rights and other legal relations of an interested party.’”
Wilton v. Seven Falls Co.,
1. Evidence of An Actual Controversy
Based on Roche/Hoffman’s own admissions, the companies are engaged or are engaging in the following activities regarding the drug at issue:
Ongoing clinical trials for the treatment of anemia in cancer therapy patients, Def. Mem. at 14;
The completion of Phase 3 clinical trials for the treatment of anemia of chronic kidney disease patients and analysis of data from those trials; at least one of the trials will continue to provide additional safety data, Decl. of Iris Kingma-Johnson ¶ 9 [Doc. No. 46];
The filing of a Biologies License Application for the drug in issue—CERA/ PEG-EPO for the treatment of anemia associated with chronic kidney disease on April 19, 2006., Decl. of Howard Suh ¶ 3 [Doc. No. 51] 5 ;
The announcement of this filing by a press release entitled “Roche Submits Application with FDA to Market C.E.R.A. for the Treatment of Renal Anemia”, Id., Ex. A—News Release.
In addition, Amgen has submitted evidence that Roche/Hoffman is hiring “key management, support, and sales personnel,” Am. Compl. ¶ 7.
See
Decl. of Michael R. Gottfried (“Gottfried Decl.”), Exs. 10-12 (Roche job postings for management and marketing positions for CERA/PEG-EPO). Roche/Hoffman does not contest that they are hiring such personnel to manage pre-clinical and clinical trials and “to develop marketing and sales strategies
Roche/Hoffman admits in its brief that the companies are constructing a facility to manufacture the drug, indicating that this is a necessary part of the FDA approval process “because the sponsor must present detailed information about the facility in which the drug will be manufactured”; and that the company has been contacting large dialysis organizations to attract patients for clinical trials. Def. Mem. at 15-16.
In determining whether the first prong of the “actual controversy” test is satisfied, courts consider the nature of the acts and whether they suggest that infringement is sufficiently immediate.
Lang,
In
Glaxo v. Novopharm, Ltd,
the Federal Circuit held, in direct contradiction to the theory that exempted acts cannot be considered, that a defendant’s systematic attempts to meet the applicable regulatory requirements- — the filing of an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA applica
“Some of Novapharm’s acts that form the basis of the declaratory judgment action are of course protected from liability for infringement under § 271(e)(1)---- Nevertheless, the protected status of Novapharm’s activities leading to its submissions to the FDA does not by itself prevent the district court from considering Glaxo’s request for declaratory relief because such relief is directed to the time after the ANDA is approved, when § 271(e)(1) no longer provides shelter against infringement liability. ... [Allegations sufficient to establish a case or controversy] may include, ... imminent FDA approval and actual threats of future infringement. Therefore, the district court properly exercised its discretion to hear Glaxo’s declaratory judgment action, even though the action was premised in part on actions protected under § 271(e)(1).”
Id. (emphasis added).
Further, the acts of constructing a manufacturing facility and hiring key personnel are not acts covered by the Section 271(e)(1) exemption because, as stated before, they are not acts of “making, selling, or offering to sell” the infringing product under section 271(a). As in Glaxo, where preparing to import the product was considered in determining jurisdiction, preparing to make or sell the product may also be properly consider as meaningful preparation; and these acts, in no way implicate the section 271(e)(1) exemption.
Roehe/Hoffman’s completion of several clinical trials and, more importantly, the filing of their Biologies License Application for CERA/PEG-EPO, although protected by section 271(e)(1), are significant indicia of an “actual controversy.” These acts, coupled with the construction of a manufacturing facility and the hiring of key personnel, whose purpose is, in part, to develop marketing and sales strategies together establish the existence of the immediacy required by Lang.
Roehe/Hoffman also argues that Amgen cannot rely on
Glaxo
for the proposition that the filing of an application establishes the immediacy necessary for jurisdiction because
Glaxo
involved the filing of an ANDA application' — an application for approval of a generic drug — and the process for approval is shorter for those applications. Def. Rep. at 10-11. Roche/Hoffman has submitted evidence that approval of an ANDA application could take between 22 and 24 months.
See
Suh Decl. Exh. 4 (Median Total Approval Time for Priority and Standard NME’s and New BLA’s for 2004 — 24.7).
But see
Suh Decl. Exh. 5 (Median Total Approval Time for BLA Applications in 2004 19.77 months). Amgen argues that approval of the application will likely be between 10-13 months because of the FDA’s performance goal to review and act on 90% of all new “Standard” drug applications in 10 months,
see
Suh Decl. Ex. 6 — PDUFA Reauthorization Performance Goals and Procedures at 1, and that the FDA has been meeting this goal, with median approvals for new Standard Applications in 2003 being 13.8
An approval date that is 20 to 24 months away can be considered sufficiently imminent by this Court. Two years is not the “years away” described in Telelectronics where clinical trials had only begun three months prior to the filing of the complaint. The systematic attempts of Roche/Hoffman to meet the regulatory requirement coupled with the acts of hiring key sales and managerial personnel and constructing a manufacturing facility are sufficient to satisfy the first prong — “meaningful preparation” to engage in the alleged infringing activity.
The “reasonable apprehension” test is also satisfied in this case. As early as August 1993, William Burns, Global Pharmaceuticals Head for Roche, stated that Roche is prepared to face patent litigation from Amgen and is quoted as saying “Knowing Amgen from having worked with them over the years and having observed them over the years, I think that we should expect that they will take us to court. Growth by litigation has been almost a byline of the company.” Gottfried Deck, Ex. 20; Roche Will Challenge Am-gen in U.S. EPO Market; Oncology Business Growing, “The Pink Sheet”, FDC Reports, Vol. 65, No. 031, at 23 (August 4, 2003). In the same article Burns indicated the company’s expectation to enter the U.S. EPO market with the allegedly infringing drug. Id. Amgen has on several occasions publically stated that it is quite certain that CERA infringes its patents and that Amgen intends to defend those patents. Id.; Gottfried Deck, Ex. 14; Q3 2003 Amgen Earnings Conference Call, October 21, 2003 at 6, 12. Business analysts have also been predicting litigation, labeling the probable action a “battle royal” that will be the “mother of all biotech patent cases.” Gottfried Deck, Ex. 18; Amgen — Peer Perform: Shifting the Focus From Medicare To Emerging EPO Competition — CERA Battle Will Like Be Intense, Bear Stearns Equity Reseach at 1, April 20, 2005 (predicting litigation in 2007); see Roche & Amgen: Taking CERA Seriously, Berstein Research Call at 10, October 15, 2002 (predicting that litigation could start at any time). The evidence suggests a refusal of Roche to change course in spite of threats of litigation from Amgen and predictions of litigation from outside parties.
Given that the test for the existence of an actual controversy is satisfied, the Court is warranted in exercising jurisdiction over this declaratory judgment action. As stated previously, however, the Court, in its discretion, need not exercise jurisdiction. This Court stated in Hoechst:
Even assuming that the Court has jurisdiction, however, numerous considerations militate against exercising that jurisdiction. Not only is FDA approval uncertain, but the process or the product itself may be altered during the interval in ways that are material to an infringement analysis. Any declaration issued by this Court now may be rendered moot by such alterations.
More important, subjecting the Defendants to an infringement litigation at present may run afoul of the Congressional policy underlying the section 271(e)(1) exemption.
Although, it is true that Amgen seeks only a declaration of its rights, which would not preclude continuing exempt activities, the use of the declaratory action could easily become a tool of harassment and intimidation for use in discouraging early efforts at competition. Because the Defendants in this case will violate the law only if they stepoutside the protective safe harbor that Congress has created, this Court is hesitant to invade that harbor under the auspice of declaratory relief.
The Court then ruled that the Hoeehst case be administratively closed, to be reopened upon motion of either party for good cause shown. Id. at 113. The Court further noted that “the issuance by the FDA of a product license presumptively would show good cause, since the section 271(e)(1) exemption would cease to apply.” Id. The Court also indicated that other events prior to FDA approval may also constitute good cause. Id.
Although the Court was concerned about its ruling being rendered moot by FDA revisions, the Court in Hoeehst was more concerned with invading the protective safe harbor. In Hoeehst, this Court made its ruling on a motion for summary judgment, holding, consistent with what discovery revealed, that all the defendant’s current acts were protected by the safe harbor provision. Id. at 109-113. The Court has made no such ruling in this action and, faced with a motion to dismiss, must presume — based on Amgen’s allegations — that Roche is operating outside the safe harbor exemption. Accordingly, the Court will not decline jurisdiction over this case at this time. The motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) [Doc No. 44] is, therefore, DENIED.
V. MOTION TO INTERVENE
As noted above, Ortho Biotech Products, L.P. (“Ortho”) has moved to intervene in this action on the side of Amgen. See Mot. to Intervene [Doc. No. 16],
A. Facts
On September 30, 1985, Ortho signed a license agreement with Amgen that encompasses the art claimed in the product patents at issue. The agreement grants Ortho an “exclusive license to make in one location, have made and use LICENSED KNOW-HOW, LICENSED PATENTS, and LICENSED PRODUCTS in the LICENSED TERRITORY in the LICENSED FIELD and to sell LICENSED PRODUCTS in the LICENCED TERRITORY.” Decl. of Harman Avery Gross-man [Doc. No. 18] (“Grossman Deck”), Ex. 1 (“Product License Agreement”) at 11 (Art. 2.01(a)). The “LICENSED FIELD” includes broad rights in EPO for human use except for dialysis and diagnostic purposes. Id. at 5 (Art. 1.10(a)). The “LICENSED TERRITORY” includes the United States. Id. at 7 (Art. 1.14(a)). Amgen does not seriously dispute that the patents and products at issue in the underlying suit are within the scope of Ortho’s license. See Amgen’s Opp’n to Ortho’s Mot. [Doc. No. 34] (“Amgen’s Opp’n”) at 8-9. In addition, the agreement contains an arbitration clause providing that “any dispute [that] should arise between the parties hereto as to the ... enforceability ... of this AGREEMENT ... be settled by arbitration.” See Product License Agreement at 44 (Art. 10.07).
Finally, the agreement provides a protocol in the event of infringement by third parties:
Either party shall promptly notify the other party of any infringement of any LICENSED PATENTS ... and shall provide the other party with all available evidence relating thereto. AMGEN and ORTHO shall then consult with each other as to the best manner in which to proceed. AMGEN shall have the right, but not the obligation, to bring, defend and maintain any appropriate suit or action. If AMGEN requests ORTHO to join AMGEN in such suit or action and ORTHO agrees to so do, ORTHO shall execute all papers and perform such other acts as may be reasonably required and may, at its option be represented by counsel of its choice. AMGEN shall pay ORTHO its reasonable expenses (including its attorney’s fees) in connection with any such suit or action.... In the event AMGEN fails to take action with respect to such matters within a reasonable period, not more than six (6) months, following receipt of such notice and evidence, ORTHO shall have the right, but not the obligation, to bring, defend and maintain any appropriate ... suit or action .... Absent an agreement between the parties to jointly bring any action or suit hereunder and share the expenses thereof, any amount recovered in any such action or suit shall be retained by the party bearing its expenses thereof.
Product License Agreement at 38-39 (Art. 8.02) (emphasis added). Here, Amgen opposes Ortho’s intervention in this action.
B. Discussion
Ortho argues that it should be allowed to intervene as of right under substantive patent law and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 24(a) provides for intervention as of right:
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: ... (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant’s ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
Rules 24(a)(2) and 19(a)(2)®, which provides for involuntary joinder of necessary parties, were intended to be counterparts.
Pujol v. Shearson Am. Express, Inc.,
Under substantive patent law, only a patentee may bring an action for patent infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 281. A successor in interest to the patent — an assignee — is treated as equivalent to the patentee for those purposes,
id.
§ 100(d), as are exclusive licensees with “all substantial rights”,
Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A.,
To be an exclusive licensee with all substantial rights, one must possess at least the right to make, use, and vend patented products, to sue for infringement, and to sublicense at will.
Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Miracle Optics, Inc.,
Though it is true that the Court must look to the substance of an agreement in order to determine its effect on a party’s standing, see Vaupel, 944 F.2d, at 875, the Court reads a grant of an “exclusive license to make in one location, have made and use LICENSED KNOW-HOW, LICENSED PATENTS and LICENSED PRODUCTS in the LICENSED TERRITORY in the LICENSED FIELD and to sell LICENSED PRODUCTS in LICENSED TERRITORY” to be exactly what it says it is: an exclusive license. This is quite sufficient for joint standing purposes.
Amgen’s citation to such cases as
Vaupel
and
Fieldturf, Inc. v. Southwest Recreational Indus., Inc.,
The decision that Ortho has standing to sue, however, does not answer the question of the hour: Is Ortho a necessary party to Amgen’s suit? More generally, is an exclusive licensee a necessary party to an infringement action brought by the patent owner?
In the seminal case of
Independent Wireless Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp.,
The sensible judgment behind these statements is that the motivation behind the
Independent Wireless
decision usually is not implicated in a case where a patent owner brings suit without the exclusive licensee. The reason a patent owner should be joined in a suit brought by an exclusive licensee is judicial economy and justice: to prevent the potentially pernicious effects of two or more (possibly inconsistent) lawsuits involving the same patent.
See Independent Wireless,
Ortho argues that the recent case of
Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Miracle Optics, Inc.,
The Federal Circuit reversed both rulings. First, that court held that Contour did not assign all substantial patent rights to Chic. Id. at 1340-44. The holding explained that keeping a reversion in the right to sue was sufficient to deprive Chic of an effective assignment. Id. at 1342-43. Based upon this judgment, the conclusion naturally followed according to established patent law: As the patent owner, not only was Contour a proper party, it was a necessary party. Id. at 1343.
The court then went on to analyze As-pex’s standing to sue.
Id.
at 1344. It started by citing
Independent Wireless:
“For the same policy reasons that a paten-tee must be joined in any lawsuit involving his or her patent, there must be joinder of any exclusive licensee.”
Id.
(citing
Independent Wireless,
Ortho claims that Aspex requires Ortho’s joinder in the present suit. Regardless whether it was Chic or Aspex which was the exclusive licensee, one of them was, and as such, it was a necessary party to the action. Despite decades of implicit (and sometimes explicit, see supra) court interpretations that exclusive licensees are not necessary parties in suits brought by patent owners, based on the Federal Circuit’s recent ruling in Aspex, Ortho’s argument is well taken. At least one commentator has recognized Aspex’s holding just so:
A party who holds an exclusive license to at least one of the exclusionary rights in the patent will have standing to join with the patentee as a co-plaintiff. Indeed, not only does the exclusive licensee have the right to join a suit brought by the patentee, the Federal Circuit has held that the exclusive licensee must be joined.
Robert A. Matthews, Jr., 1
Annotated Patent Digest
§ 9:47 (2006) (emphasis added). Such a rule ostensibly furthers the goal of preventing multiple concurrent or seriatim lawsuits that was articulated by the Supreme Court in
Independent Wireless
in support of its adoption of the reverse rule. Even though an exclusive licensee may not sue alone, it arguably could force a paten-tee to join its suit involuntarily.
See Independent Wireless,
The Court reaches this conclusion with some hesitation. 10 The Federal Circuit in Aspex did not give any indication that it was making such a significant statement regarding the law of patent standing. Patent owners can divide their bundle of rights not only into separate exclusive licenses to make, sell, and use the patented item, but also divide each of those licenses into exclusive licenses of infinite geographical or temporal scope. Requiring all exclusive licensees to join patent infringement actions could complicate litigation exponentially. Throwing so many property “sticks” into the fire of litigation risks creating an unmanageable conflagration.
Recognizing this, one commentator has noted that “[i]t is possible that circumstances, such as an agreement whereby the exclusive licensee waives its right to join a suit brought by the patentee and agrees to be bound by any determination rendered in that suit, would negate the requirement that an exclusive licensee be joined in the suit, since the policy goal of precluding the possibility of multiple lawsuits would be achieved.” Matthews, supra, § 9:47. This Court agrees. Not only is a contract exception to the rule of Aspex logical, it is likely necessary to the efficient administration of patent infringement suits. A patentee simply must be able to draft license agreements so as to preclude their exclusive licensees from being deemed necessary parties to any patent infringement actions it may bring.
In this case, Amgen and Ortho have entered into a license agreement which purports to put Amgen in the driver’s seat in actions relating to infringement of the licenced patents, giving it the right to exclude Ortho from such suits.
See
Product License Agreement at 38 (Art. 8.02). Ortho, however, contends that the required consultation prior to the filing of any such suit did not take place here; thus, Ortho should nevertheless be allowed to intervene.
See
Motion Hearing (May 10, 2006) [Doc. No. 82], Tr. at 8-9. The dispute over Ortho’s right to intervene, therefore, is, at root, a contract dispute — • the type of dispute which must be arbitrat
Normally, this Court is fully competent to entertain and decide issues of contract interpretation. Federal policy, however, overwhelmingly favors arbitration,
see Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co.,
C. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Ortho’s Motion to Intervene [Doe. No. 16] is DENIED without prejudice, subject to the determination of the issue of contract interpretation by an arbitral panel.
SO ORDERED.
Notes
. The primary difference between the original complaint and the amended complaint is that the original complaint does not contain this assertion that Roche/Hoffman filed this application. See Compl. ¶ 27 (discussing the anticipated filing of Roche/Hoffman's BLA application). The complaint was amended so that this information could be included in Amgen’s claim. PL Opp’n at 2 n. 2.
. It was initially unclear from Amgen’s opposition whether it was pressing its allegation of current infringement. In directly addressing Roche/Hoffman’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, Amgen sent mixed messages:
Roche’s argument that Amgen’s Complaint fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted is meritless. The Complaint (and First Amended Complaint) sounds in declaratory relief for future infringement. Thus, Roche's complaints about Amgen's failure to allege actual infringement and that Roche’s activities all fall within protection of the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor are irrelevant. Moreover, contrmy to Roche’s assertion, Amgen has never conceded that Roche’s meaningful preparations to infringe fall within the safe harbor.
PI. Opp'n at 19 (emphasis added).
Amgen also states that the declaratoiy relief it seeks is not directed at activities falling within the Section 271(e)(1) exemption. Id. at 16.
Roche/Hoffman interpreted Amgen's statements in its opposition as a concession that there is no claim for current infringement and asked that its motion to dismiss as to existing
. The Court did not resolve this question in
Hoechst
but presumed the exemption to be an affirmative defense in ruling that the defendants' alleged acts of infringement fell within the safe harbor exemption and that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment.
. Indeed, the International Trade Commission opinion submitted by Roehe/Hoffman also refers to Section 271(e)(1) as providing an “affirmative defense.” International Trade Commission’s Initial Determination Granting Respondents' Summáry Determination Motion No. 568-1 That There Is No Violation of Section 337 ("Initial Determination”) at 4.
. Roche/Hoffman does not expect to file a BLA for CERA for the treatment of anemia in cancer patients until 2009. Def. Mem. at 14.
. In support of this position, Roche/Hoffman submitted to the Court an initial determination by a hearing officer for the International Trade Commission ("Trade Commission”) that, upon a record equivalent to that for summary judgment, Roche/Hoffman’s acts with regard to CERA/PEG-EPO are within the Section 271(e)(1) safe harbor.
See
Initial Determination at 1, 23. This Court may not consider this in its determination of Roche/Hoffman's Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Such a determination most be based solely on the allegations in the complaint. With respect to the Rule 12(b)(1) motion, though this Court has reviewed the hearing officer's well-reasoned opinion, this Court accords no weight to the fact-finding made by the hearing officer. The hearing officer based his ruling on documents and deposition testimony which are not before this Court.
See, e.g.,
Initial Determination at 15-18 (citing deposition transcripts). This Court will proceed with what evidence is before it at this time. The ruling of the Trade Commission is permissive only,
Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp.,
. The infringement statute allows an action for infringement where an ANDA application is filed, but this applies only to claims directed to drugs or methods for
using
drugs.
See
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2). Since section 271(e)(2) could not provide jurisdiction over claims directed to methods for
making
drugs, Glaxo's claim of infringement could not be based on section 271(e)(2) had to be based on the Declaratory Judgment Act.
Glaxo,
. Assignment of a patent must be in writing. 35 U.S.C. § 261.
. Unlike a patent assignment, a patent license need not be in writing.
Waymark Corp. v. Porta Sys. Corp.,
. Hesitation is especially warranted in the present case, which involves the very patent, the very parties, and the very Product License Agreement which has been twice before the Federal Circuit without a word regarding Or-tho’s status as a necessary party. See
Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Genetics Inst., Inc.,
. This same result would be obtained, minus Amgen’s required showing, were the Court were to analyze Ortho’s motion to intervene under normal Rule 24 analyses. "[T]he exclusive licensee may in most cases intervene to protect [its] rights.... ”
Holliday v. Long Mfg. Co.,
Ortho meets the requirements for intervention as of right under Rule 24(a): an interest in the litigation which could be impaired or impeded by its absence and which (allegedly) is not adequately represented. Possessing an exclusive license in a patent provides the licensee a “sufficiently close relationship to the dispute between the litigants” and an interest which is “direct, not contingent.”
Conservation Law Found, of New England, Inc. v. Mosbacher,
Rights may be waived, though, and the Product License Agreement granting Amgen control over patent infringement litigation appears to do just that. See Product License Agreement at 38 (Art. 8.02). As detailed above, however, there is some dispute regarding how that clause is to operate. This dispute must be arbitrated.
Likewise, given the Court’s conclusions with respect to Ortho's right to intervene, it follows a fortiori that Ortho would be permitted to intervene under Rule 24(b) — absent the existence of Article 8.02 in the Product License Agreement.
