Ames v. Sundance State Bank, 850 P.2d 607

Ames v. Sundance State Bank

850 P.2d 607

Wyo.

1993

Check Treatment

*1 thеreof, equivalent script or the functional 12, 585; right 76 S.Ct.

Griffin, 351 U.S. on “the first represented counsel right,” granted as a matter of

appeal, 353, 356,

Douglas California, v. U.S. (1963); 814, 816, 9 L.Ed.2d 811

83 S.Ct. right provided to be with the effective counsel, Lucey, 469 Evitts v.

assistance 387, 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 105 S.Ct.

U.S.

(1985). anything short of a full

I believe that

transcript equivalent its functional ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍“adequate effective

incompatible suggest To otherwise

appellate review.”

ignores federal and local law as well both appellate

as the tenets of effective basic States, v.

advocacy. Hardy United See 424, 11 L.Ed.2d 331

375 U.S. 84 S.Ct. 70;

(1964); State v. Bearpaw, (1928);

Thomas, Wyo. 264 P. 1017 State, Wyo. Richardson (1907).

P. 1027 AMES, (Plaintiff), Appellant

Kenneth R. BANK,

SUNDANCE STATE (Defendant).

Appellee

No. 92-134. Wyoming. 1993.

Rehearing May Denied *2 Appel- prior to trial.

claim was withdrawn summary granted its motion for lee was and tоrtious the bad faith judgment on (the prior to trial claims interference materi- no issues of finding that there were appellee to be thereto and al fact relative law). judgment as a matter entitled amend appellant moved to Subsequently, again assert these two comрlaint to any claims, does not reflect the record The case went to taken thereon. action claims, i.e., breach trial on the other two promissory estoppel. loan commitment verdict, jury found In its De- agreement loan breached its bank by failing to appellаnt cember note, it is and that liable renew Darrah, Powell, Stephen Joseph E. estoppel, appellant by reason appellant. Casper, for Winship, R. « $375,000. fixing damages at Riggs, R. Sheri- Berger and Dan Robert appeal: on Appellant words the issues dan, appellee. for jury’s “I. Whether CARDINE, THOMAS, GOLDEN Before against weight overwhelmingly ROONEY, TAYLOR, JJ; and Ret.J. the evidence. District Court erred “II. Whether the ROONEY, (Retired). Justice ordering a new trial on considering in by plaintiff below from appeal This damages. Notwithstanding Jury’s Ver- Judgment District Court “HI. Whether defendant/appel- in matter in which dict summary judgment granting in erred appellant’s note lee bank refused to renew of the com- allowing amendment and not during several in had done 1989 as been claims for concerning Appellant’s plaint loans were previous years. The annual with contract intentional interference money providе operating made to relationships and bad faith.” business ranching Appellant’s lant business. them: Appellee words yearling ranching from a business evolved erred “A. Whether District operation and a operation into a bred heifer notwithstanding granting judgment in year, ap- breeding operation. cattle Each the verdict. offi- discuss the bank’s pellant would erred the District Court “B. Whether costs, budget, expected status cer his conditionally granting a new trial. in pay- required annual long term debts with District Court erred Whether the “C. debt, pre- ments, Farm Loan e.g., Wyoming summary judgment on claims granting in ovеr, carry and similar vious bank loan fact existed or no material issue of where financial sit- pertaining appellant’s items allowing the decided claims be years, a new note would then uation. For by an amendment raised a second time executed, payable year. shortly before trial.” complaint renewal, and the exist- appellee refused ing payment. called for note was JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING re- complaint alleged five claims for The THE VERDICT commitment, promisso- lief: of loan breach (First party)1 each issue of faith, ry estoppel, tortious bad recitеd, recently relationships, appellant As and business with contract repeated the standards for review of The last and severe emotional distress. issue, requirement "overwhelmingly” appellant misstates the By in his first use of the word any obligation did not include written in Such notwithstanding the verdict binding to finаnce McMahon, Wilson year than one for more business (quoting (Wyo.1992) Inter-Mountain Appellant himself so testified. future. Hughes, 812 Threading v. Baker par agreements between the The written (Wyo.1991)): 558-59 *3 relating to the terms of the loans con ties “ appellate court is faced ‘When given to only of nоtes sisted undertake a question, a JNOV we by They clear and appellant. were defer of the record without full review evidence cannot unambiguous. Extrinsic the trial court. to the' views of ence vary terms or determine an be used to their Atkins, 59, (Wyo. 61-62 v. 658 P.2d Cody expressed therein parties of the not intent 1983). determining a JNOV In whether rule). (the Kerper Ker parole evidence v. granted, consider should be motion (Wyo.1989); per, 780 P.2d 923 Lawrence that with the evidence is such “whether Capital Corp., 761 System Farm Credit credibility the weighing the of wit out (Wyo.1988). P.2d 640 nesses, considering the otherwise propеrly granted judg- The district court evidence there can be but weight of the notwithstanding the and the ment persons could conclusion reasonable against weight the jury verdict was * * v. Ma reached Erickson have If the ver- properly admissible evidence. (Wyo.1986). In P.2d 1186 gill, 713 appeal stand and dict had been allowed to fa consider the evidence our review we properly error reserved on was taken for nonmoving party, giving it to the vorable of admission of evidence viola- the basis Carey inferences. all reasonable the parole rule and of tion of the evidence Jackson, frauds, to reverse we would have statute cautiously sparingly A court should and appeal. and remand on The district Erickson, motions. JNOV the as it should. In its corrected situation ” at 1186.’ letter, opinion part: it said in and signed Ames the notes “When Mr. the Appellant argues that “one of may have had an security agreements he principal by jury determined the was issues or, likely, hope that expectation more However, parties.” of the the the intent to finance the bank would continue parties prevail cannot for en intent of indefinitely into the ranching operation agreement An of all contracts. forcement expecta- spite private future. performed by its terms is not to be understanding tions, that was not the (1) making year from the there within one meeting officers; no there was the bank agreement is in writ of is void unlеss provi- minds on that issue. Such of the charged ing signed by party to be and from the conspicuously is absent sion l-23-105(a) Wyo.Stat. with it. § It error to en- documents. was contract frauds). (the argument, In his statute of parties testimony contrary to the tertain appellant states that: agreement should not hаve written —I Appellant that the position “It is the sought vary which admitted evidence or contract was at least loan commitment and affiliated se- terms of the notes specif- agreement an oral curity agreements. Construction represented parameters court, аnd are jury ic terms is for the not contract generated by given by possible all of the documents only one construction records, docu- parties, primarily plain language the bank’s of the contract supplementation agreement including important was no ments. The[re] by primаrily money beyond un- the term of the notes documents lend of those language the notes dealing by the clear refuted evidence of the course of subject approval. Appel- were to bank practice standards which the advances lending corn- There was no brеach of admitted to be bound.” lee bankers appellee’s notwithstanding stated in first issue is as for reversal of word, Excluding the thrust of first issue. verdict. such misrepresentation. liqui- Goldstick. premature was there a [em- mitment nor phasis supplied]’ Regardless of a demand whether dation. (a hotly language, quoted was matter sell the herd made “The underscored bank) Court, qualifies approval by is that-no our

disputed by the the fact detail the important to force and clarifies more taken the ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍bank action was language general of the Restatements due on were pаyment before *4 promise. years The unambiguous old year, more than as contend- ation for tion. his to quately and (Wyo.1992), Case No. er promissory estoppel. Reimilong [Remi avoided under [1978]). In B & W tract issue.” tled to a long] Frauds. ed forceable as violative of this issue is position. doctrine of “The Statute Shield by It said Yet Ames, Crolla, to Accordingly, properly Mfg., Again, be in promissory estoppel would appellant’s its considered with reference 576 P.2d 461 of Frauds Inc., opinion addressed this Glass, plaintiff’s theory necessarily N.O.V. Wyoming Supreme district defendant is ^[829] 91-123, contention the Statutе of letter: Inc. v. Weath on the con- problem (Wyo.1989 ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍court ade be decided conten favors [809], unen- enti- of is Hayes & Arguable a tion’ could bind the bank to context of specified none woefully to the transaction. stat[e] ambiguous promise, his wise promissory estoppel сould rest. Like- statement does not meet the are too statements that the bank would “fund anof officer that statements attributed to a deceased bank Ames), even if operation” (considered a similar unambiguous a claim for vague Griffith vague. ongoing negotiations, he promisе to of would “stick in a form basis situation It was thus said: the essential the loan It was made the 1989 promise. light to ‘fund as a ‘The is most favorable the court necessary officer made requirement statement is year with” Ames continue not an In estoppel.’ terms dealing such a in and it opera- whiсh un- to to in principle extended the the Uni money indefinitely and lend to Ames re- form Code of Frauds gardless profitability Commercial Statute of the of his ranch provision. doing security regardless so it restated of the he would and page supply regardless doctrine able to and [at 5]: “ ability repay not the loan. It is unam- ‘Promissory estoppel in is a doctrine is biguous, nor it even reasonable. corporated of contracts. law clarity When contrasted with the (Second) Restatement Contracts § precision written notes affili- (1981). Judge provided Posner has a emеrged as a ated documents re- description considered succinct it parties negotiations, sult of the is “If unambiguous the doctrine: an clearly alleged evident that state- made in promise is circumstances cal simply ment is unenforceable and could reliance, culated to induce and it does reasonably upon by be relied Ames so, promisee if can hurt as a result here.” the manner he has asserted damages.” recover Goldstick ICM (7th Realty, 788 F.2d Cir. standpoint, From a common sense banks 1986). Promissory estoppel recog would be reluctant to renew notes even as once, (1) nized both sword and a shield—a legally if the renewal obli- itself Equita renewals, of action and gated cause a defense. them to further or make relative, estoppel (2) is a ble close but it is if examination fi- .borrower’s nances, requires proof budgets, etc., doctrine that obligated a tort so itself breach, inducing causing them, (3) or if a combination of both resulting damage. Wyo them. First obligated actions so these ming Mudge, Bank v. 748 P.2d THE CONSIDERATION OF (Wyo.1988). DAMAGE AWARD allegedly The contract interfered

(Second party) issue of each appellant with here is оne between and the Wyoming Farm Loan Board. It is letter, contend opinion In its the district appellant’s ed that the failure to renew part: said in ability loan interfered with “Finally, though even it is not neces- payment make on a loan from the Board. decision, I feel I must tell sary to the only lеgal Not can the lack of nexus be compelled I feel counsel that would negate presence tween the two loans new trial on the issue of dam- interference, “improper” any inter damages ages any event. The would permitted good ference is if made in fаith year limited to one at the have to be protect an economic interest. Four reasonably most and could not have been Gold, Construction, Inc., Nines Inc. v. 71 jury. Per- in the amount awarded if haps justified the award could be (which re- a tort case would have were Bad Faith shоwing

quired a of an intentional mis- *5 clearly representation of fact—a matter A tort claim of faith” can assert- “bad upon appearing), but not a contract only by party ed a to a contract or a theory.” party beneficiary third to an enforceable McCullough contract. v. Golden Rulе Ins. necessary this issue is not Inasmuch as Co., (Wyo.1990); 789 P.2d 855 Darlow v. to the decision of the district court or to Exchange, Farmers Insurance decision, our need not action on (Wyo.1991);Herrig Herrig, address the issue. appel- supra, As reflected lant did not have enforceable contract INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE rеquiring appellee with the bank the renew- AND BAD FAITH CLAIMS party al of his note. Nor was he a third (Third party) issue of each beneficiary a contract between supra, appellee’s As noted motion for party. lee bank and another summary judgment granted ap- was as to fact, there was no issue of Since pellant’s faith claims of bad and tortious ruling district court did not err its on the Subsequently, appellant interference. filed legal questions resulted in the complaint a motion to amend the to real- summary judgment on the tort claims claims, lege hearing the two and a held was amendment of its refusal to allow states, thereon. As “the lower complaint such claims. include ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍denying court never entered a formal order Affirmed. amend, the motion to but allowed the case proceed only on the contract two theo- CARDINE, Justice, dissenting. ries, throughout and mаde it known concepts trial that tort would not be al- I not with- would reverse lowed.” (JNOV). standing the I have no problem examining the bor- with bank Intentional Interference finances, requiring financial state- rower’s pointed by appellee, out ments and But when the bank As estab disclosures. opеration ranch lish a claim for intentional becomes involved in the contract, plaintiff requirements concerning has the bur advice and run, showing den of the existence of a con numbers and kinds of leas- livestock tract, (2) knowledge ing pasture, obtaining long-term the defendant’s loan сontract, (3) Board, improper the intentional and from the Farm Loan and the sale of livestock, may then become a the bank the ranch operation in the

participant that would obligations and duties

and incur acknowledge that exist. I

not otherwise concerning occurred be-

the facts what disputed— hotly parties these

tween disputed facts was resolution these jury.

for the that if the

Finally, the trial court stated appropriate, it would have

JNOV were not question of

granted trial a new That, me, preferable

damages. I dis- Consequently,

result case.

sent. (Plaintiff), BROWN, Appellant

Teresa Laramie, AVERY; City

Officer *6 (Defendants). Wyoming, Appellees

No. 91-249. Wyoming. Kloeckner, Cheyenne,

Mary T. for lant. Gen., Atty.

Joseph Meyer, B. John W. Gen., Renneisen, Deputy Atty. and Dennis Gen., Coll, Atty. Sr. Asst.

Avery. notes significance in this case. and is of See only partial 1989. In fact December also, Inc., Hayes Griffith, Capi v. GE & payment made on December Corporation, -F.Supp. -, tal (with paid the for- and the balance (N.D.Ill), Opin Memorandum WL 135246 bank) considerable bearance of the for a Order, ion & Oct. Moreover, any time after the due date. “In this case there ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍is no evidence oper- ranching to fund agreement Ames’