206 Conn. 16 | Conn. | 1988
This appeal entails an examination of the circumstances under which a judgment debtor, by use of a writ of audita querela, can obtain relief from a final judgment awarding monetary damages to a judgment creditor. The defendant, Sears, Roebuck and Company, filed its application for a writ of audita querela alleging that the plaintiff, Laurie L. Ames, was threatening to cause execution to issue on a judgment in her favor in the amount of $175,000. Because the plaintiff had earlier received a payment of $25,000 from other alleged tortfeasors, the defendant claimed that its postjudgment payment of $150,000 had fully paid and satisfied the outstanding judgment. The trial court, Hurley, J., after a hearing, denied the defendant’s application for the writ and ordered payment of the balance due on the judgment. The defendant has appealed. We find no error.
For the purposes of this appeal, the facts of the underlying litigation can be briefly summarized. On August 10, 1978, the plaintiff was seriously injured when she accidentally fell off a riding lawnmower. The
As Judge Hurley’s memorandum of decision in the present proceedings attests, the issue of the pretrial release of the Nordstroms, and their payment of $25,000, was addressed at three different junctures in the trial of the underlying litigation. The defendant first sought, unsuccessfully, to amend its pleadings to file a special defense relating to the Nordstroms’ settlement. The defendant then attempted, again unsuccessfully, to have the settlement admitted into evidence before the jury. Finally, the defendant relied on the settlement in its posttrial motions to have the verdict set aside and for a remittitur. The trial court, Vasington, J., denied these motions.
In its appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant challenged only one of these adverse rulings relating to the Nordstrom settlement. It contended that the settlement should have been put before the jury because the governing statute, General Statutes § 52-216a,
Subsequent to the Appellate Court decision, the defendant paid the plaintiff $150,000 and interest. When the plaintiff refused to discharge the judgment without a further payment of $25,000, the defendant filed the application for a writ of audita querela whose merits are presently before us. In its application, the defendant sought an adjudication that, in light of the $25,000 Nordstrom settlement, the plaintiff’s judgment should be “declared to be wholly satisfied and discharged, and all proceedings under any writ of execution be stayed . . . .” The trial court, Hurley, J.,
In the defendant’s appeal from this judgment, it maintains that the trial court erred in refusing to apply the common law rule that amounts paid in settlement to a plaintiff by a joint tortfeasor must be credited against any judgment obtained by the plaintiff against other joint tortfeasors. Dwy v. Connecticut Co., 89 Conn. 74, 95, 92 A. 883 (1915). The plaintiff responds that such a claim of error may not be raised by a post-judgment writ of audita querela unless the defendant can show some matter of defense or discharge that postdates the judgment, and that the defendant in this case has failed to make the necessary showing. As did the trial court, we agree with the plaintiff.
The ancient writ of audita querela has been defined as “a writ issued to afford a remedy to a defendant against whom judgment had been rendered, but who had new matter in defense (e.g., a release) arising, or at least raisable for the first time, after judgment.” A. Leff, “The Leff Dictionary of Law: A Fragment,” 94 Yale L. J. 1855, 2101 (1985); see also Black’s Law Dictionary (5th Ed. 1979) p. 120; 7 J. Moore, Federal Practice (1987) § 60.13; E. Stephenson, Connecticut Civil Procedure (1981) § 209. Because the writ impairs the finality of judgments, the common law precluded its use in cases in which- the judgment debtor sought to rely on a defense such as payment or a release that he had the opportunity to raise before the entry of judgment against him. Wintle v. Wright, 151 Me. 212, 213-14, 117 A.2d 68 (1955). “No authority has been cited to suggest that the writ of audita querela was ever available to present issues which were presented before the entry of the judgment attacked by the writ.” Ameri
The defendant has not challenged the proposition that a writ of audita querela depends upon a showing of “new matter in defense . . . arising, or at least raisable for the first time, after judgment.” A. Leff, supra. Although the defendant has not fully articulated the grounds for its alleged right to audita querela relief, it appears to be proffering two separate reasons why it has properly invoked the writ. First, the defendant maintains that its postjudgment payment of $150,000, and the plaintiffs subsequent insistence that another $25,000 was due and owing, for the first time made it possible to raise the issue of whether the defendant’s payment would constitute full satisfaction of the plaintiff’s judgment. Second, the defendant claims that it was precluded from an earlier appellate challenge of the relationship of the Nordstrom settlement to the trial court’s denial of its posttrial motions for a remittitur or to have the judgment set aside, because of its justifiable reliance on a judicial construction of § 52-216a that was subsequently changed. Although we find neither of these arguments to be persuasive, they warrant separate consideration.
The defendant’s argument that its postjudgment payment of $150,000 triggered a right to invoke audita querela is based on its claim that the $25,000 Nordstrom settlement, as a matter of law, constituted partial satisfaction of the outstanding judgment of $175,000. Whether that statement of law is sound is not, in our view, an issue that first arose at the time when the
The defendant’s alternate argument is that its attempts to litigate the effect of the Nordstrom settlement were unfairly hampered by its reliance on a judicial interpretation of the relevant statute, § 52-216a, that this court has subsequently changed. At the time of the trial in this case, this court had construed § 52-216a to direct a trial court to consider a pretrial release “[i]n making its postverdict determination on the issue of any claimed excessiveness or inadequacy” in the amount of damages awarded to a plaintiff. Peck v. Jacquemin, 196 Conn. 53, 71, 491 A.2d 1043 (1985). The defendant claims that it relied on Peck when it decided not to pursue in the Appellate Court the merits of the trial court’s denial of its posttrial motions addressed to the amount it had been ordered to pay
We need not decide today whether the defendant is correct in its application of the principles of Alfano and Peck to the circumstances of this case. This matter does not come to us on direct appeal from the judgment rendered by Judge Vasington. The question before us is whether, even if there has been a change in the legal principles governing pretrial settlements, such a change entitles a judgment debtor to posttrial relief in audita querela. We conclude it does not.
The parties have cited no case, nor have we been able to find one, in which this question has been addressed with respect to the writ of audita querela. In the federal courts, audita querela has been superseded by the provisions of Rule 60 (b)
There is no error.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
General Statutes § 52-216a, as amended to the date of trial in 1984, provided: “reading of agreements or releases to jury prohibited.
For civil actions accruing on or after October 1,1986, the governing statutes have been amended to require the reduction of a damages award in a personal injury or wrongful death action by amounts received from collateral sources, including joint tortfeasors. See General Statutes §§ 52-225a, 52-225b. These amendments are inapplicable in this case because the accident occurred on August 10, 1978.
Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant part: “Relief from Judgment or Order ....
“(b) mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party’s legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons; (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from*24 the operation of the judgment. . . . Writs of . . . audita querela are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.”
There may well be different considerations when the question is not relief from a monetary judgment but modification of the terms of an injunction governing future conduct. F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure (3d Ed. 1985) § 12.14, p. 680; 2 Restatement (Second), Judgments (1982) § 73, comment c.