Defendant Titan Insurance Company appeals as of right the grant of summary disposition and judgment entered in favor of plaintiff Amerisure Insurance Company in this no-fault case. We conclude that the trial court correctly determined that, under the terms of the insurance policy at issue here, Titan was the insurer of the operator of the motor vehicle involved in the accident and therefore liable to provide no-fault benefits under MCL 500.3114(4)(b). We affirm.
BASIC FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The facts in this case are not in dispute. Bernard Coleman, Tonya Paige Coleman,
Reginald was injured in the accident and submitted a claim for personal injury protection (PIP) benefits to Titan. When this was denied, Reginald submitted a claim to the Michigan Assigned Claims Facility, which assigned it to Amerisure. On August 30, 2005, Amerisure filed a complaint against Titan and Reginald in the Oakland Circuit Court. Amerisure asserted that Titan was the insurer in higher priority than Amerisure for payment of PIP benefits to Reginald pursuant to MCL 500.3114 and sought reimbursement for payments Amerisure had made to Reginald. Following motions for summary disposition, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Amerisure in the amount of $106,116.74, and Titan appealed.
ANALYSIS
We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(0(10). Dressel v Ameribank,
The rules of statutory interpretation require the courts to give effect to the Legislature’s intent. Universal Underwriters Ins Group v Auto Club Ins Ass’n,
A person who suffers bodily injury while the occupant of a motor vehicle and who has no available insurance policy of his or her own or through his or her family must claim PIP benefits from the insurer of the owner or the registrant of the vehicle occupied or the insurer of the operator of the vehicle occupied. MCL 500.3114(4). In this case, Reginald had no available insurance of his own or through his family, and the owner and registrant of the occupied vehicle, Fleming, was also uninsured. MCL 500.3114(4)(a). MCL 500.3114(4)(b) provides that, when there are no insurers with a higher priority, a person suffering accidental bodily injury arising from a motor vehicle accident while an occupant of a motor vehicle shall claim PIP benefits from “[t]he insurer of the operator of the vehicle occupied.” The term “insurer” is
We conclude that, under the clear terms of the policy, Titan was Bernard’s insurer. Although Tonya (not Bernard) was the “named insured” in the policy, the policy states that “[i]n return for your premium payment, we agree to insure you subject to all the terms of this policy” and broadly defines “you” and “your” to mean “the ‘named insured’ shown in the Declarations and the spouse if a resident of the same household.” Further, in the part relating to no-fault coverages, the policy defines “insured” as including “[y]ou or any family member.” Bernard qualified as a person insured by Titan under the policy pursuant to both of these definitional sections because he was the spouse of Tonya residing in her household and, therefore, one of her family members at the time of the accident. Thus we conclude that, for purposes of MCL 500.3114(4)(b), Titan was the “insurer of the operator of the vehicle occupied” by Reginald at the time of the accident and therefore liable for the payment of PIP benefits.
Titan argues that this Court has determined that the language of MCL 500.3114(4) requires that the owner, registrant, or operator of the vehicle occupied must be a “named insured,” citing Amerisure Ins Co v Auto-Owners Ins Co,
MCL 500.3114(4) provides that a person who suffers bodily injury while the occupant of a motor vehicle and who has no available insurance policy of his own or in his family shall claim PIP benefitsfrom “[t]he insurer of the owner or registrant of the vehicle occupiedd” or “[t]he insurer of the operator of the vehicle occupied.” MCL 500.3114(4)(a) and (b). The owner, registrant, and operator of the Ford Explorer was Whitworth, and he did not have a policy of insurance with Auto-Owners. Accordingly, Anthony could not claim PIP benefits from Auto-Owners by virtue of this plainly worded statute. [Id. at 15.]
Thus, in contrast to the present case, Amerisure did not consider whether the operator of the motor vehicle, Jeremy Whitworth, was within the category of persons insured by Auto-Owners under the terms of its policy. There was no argument that, while the policy named only Whitworth Borta, Incorporated, as the “named insured,” Auto-Owners was nonetheless Jeremy Whit-worth’s “insurer” for purposes of MCL 500.3114(4) under the policy. Amerisure is simply inapposite to this case, in which the policy does not limit its coverage only to the “named insured” but, instead, through its plain wording extends coverage to Bernard, the resident spouse of the named insured.
Titan points to the statement in Amerisure that “there is simply no authority for the proposition that the insurer of a vehicle involved in an accident must pay PIP benefits under the circumstances present in the instant case, when no named insureds were involved in the accident.” Id. at 16 (emphasis in original). However, that statement was made in response to the argument that, “even if MCL 500.3114(4) [was] inapplicable,” Auto-Owners was required to provide PIP benefits because of wording in its policy regarding benefits for accidental bodily injury arising out of the use of a motor vehicle. Id. at 15-16. As is demonstrated by the emphasis on the word “vehicle” in the passage relied on by Titan, the Amerisure panel was merely applying the well-established rule that “PIP coverage applies to the insured person, and not to the motor vehicle.” Id. at 16, citing Madar v League Gen Ins Co,
We further note that to adopt Titan’s view of the statute would require reading into it a qualification that simply does not exist. The statute states that the “insurer of the operator of the vehicle occupied” is liable to pay benefits; it does not impose that requirement only in cases in which the operator is a “named insured” under the insurer’s policy. While Titan argues that, in the absence of a limitation of that sort, insurers will be subjected to no-fault liability in far too many situations, that is a policy argument that should be addressed to the Legislature for possible amendment of the statute. Cervantes v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co of Michigan,
In light of our conclusion that Titan was liable for the payment of benefits under MCL 500.3114(4)(b), we need not consider Amerisure’s argument that Titan was liable because the Plymouth Spirit was a “temporary substitute” vehicle under the Titan policy. We affirm.
Notes
We disagree with Titan’s argument that, under Rednour v Hastings Mut Ins Co,