American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith

ASSOCIATIONS, INC., AMERICAN TRUCKING et al. DIRECTOR, ARKANSAS HIGHWAY AND SMITH, DEPARTMENT, TRANSPORTATION et al. Reargued December 22, 1989

No. Argued 88-325. March Decided June O’Connor, J., delivered an of the Court and judgment announced JJ., Kennedy, J., Rehnquist, in which C. and White and opinion, post, Scalia, J., opinion concurring judgment, filed an joined. Brennan, Stevens, Mar J., opinion, which p. dissenting 200. filed a Blackmun, JJ., joined, shall, post, p. 205. With petitioners. the cause L. Frey reargued

Andrew An- Getter, Mark I. Levy, him on the briefs were Kenneth R. Daniel Robert Pincus, Barney, Peter G. Kumpe, drew J. Busker. and William S. Jr., T. Baulig, Laurie Digges, the cause for respond A. Raymond Randolph reargued I. With him on the briefs were Daniel Bruce ents. Prywes, Clark, Stewart, H. B. Robert S. Sha Herschel Friday, R. and T. Wilson, II, Christopher L. A. O. Robert Goodloe fer, * Parker. urging were filed for the Crow Tribe of *Briefs of amici curiae reversal Rosenfelt; on Taxation of by Daniel M. for the Committee State Indians by of Commerce Jean A. Walker and Wil- of State Chambers the Council Council, Peltz; Inc., by Richard A. D. for the National Private Truck liam Institute, Inc., Hirsch; by and for Tax Allen and Robert A. the Executives Timothy McCormally. J. urging affirmance were filed for the Common- Briefs of amici curiae Jr., Preate, Attorney Pennsylvania by D. General of et al. Ernest

wealth of General, Barbin, Deputy Attorney Knorr Bryan E. John G. Pennsylvania, judgment of the Court announced Justice O’Connor opinion, and delivered an which Justice, The Chief Jus- join. Kennedy and Justice tice White, in American In this we whether our decision case decide (1987), ap- Trucking Scheiner, Assns., Inc. v. prior plies highway retroactively of use to taxation date of that decision.

I Chancery petitioners brought of suit constitutionality County, challenging Pulaski Arkansas, Equalization newly Highway enacted Arkansas Use (HUE), Acts, No. Ark. Code Tax Act 1983 Ark. Gen. (1987) (formerly as codified Ann. 27-35-205 §§ 27-35-204, 1985)), (Supp. under Ark. 75-817.3 §§ 75-817.2, Stat. Ann. §8, Constitution, I,Art. of the Federal Commerce Clause required operating on Arkansas cl. trucks 3. The HUE tax Rovelli, Dep- III, General, Attorney and Louis J. Executive Deputy Chief General, respective their uty Attorney by Attorneys General for and Alaska, of Colo- Douglas Baily B. of Duane Woodard States follows: Jr., Curran, rado, Indiana, Maryland, Linley Joseph of E. Pearson of J. Nebraska, Minnesota, Spire M. of Humphrey H. III of Robert Hubert Island, B. Nevada, Joseph and E. of Rhode McKay Brian of James O’Neil Legislatures Meyer Wyoming; of for National Conference of State and by et Ruth and al. Benna Solomon Charles Rothfeld. by et al. John the State of California of amici curiae were filedfor Briefs Finn, California, Richard F. Attorney

K. of and Kamp, de General Van Jones, General, Coffill, Attor- Attorney Supervising Deputy Eric J. Jim Montana, Idaho, Racicot, Attorney Nicho- ney Marc General of General of Dakota, Mattox, Attorney Spaeth, Attorney North Jim General of las J. Utah; Dam, for Texas, Attorney and Paul Van General General of Amestoy, Attorney Jeffrey al. L. General of Vermont et the State General, N. Vermont, Viall, Attorney Peter and Thomas R. Assistant Perretti, Jr., Hamill, Dep- R. Attorney Jersey, Mary General of New General, Riddle, Attorney Attorney Acting General uty Nardi Clarine General; Connecticut, Comerford, Attorney D. Assistant and Jane Kentucky by Frederic Transportation Cabinet of the Commonwealth Reeder, Special Cowan, Kentucky, A. Assist- Attorney Stephen General General, Attorney Foley. K. and Patricia ant weight gross highways 73,281 80,000 and between with a alternatively, pounds pay, flat tax of or a $175 an annual trip permit per fee of in Arkansas or mile traveled tax of 5¢ Effectively, only per taxed the first HUE 100 miles. $8 by heavy highway that trucks, use annual miles of 3,500 pay advantageous point being it became at which trucks based Arkansas were Because flat tax of $175. highways many likely than miles on the more State’s to travel argued petitioners heavy State, trucks based out against impermissibly interstate com discriminated HUE greater per-mile by imposing truckers on out-of-state merce remedy imposed To on in-state truckers. than costs those argued petitioners alleged violation federal constitutional required § the Arkansas Constitution 16, 13, Art. paid. petitioners had See refund all HUE taxes State 1989). (filed App. Mar. 6, 12-13, Pending merits of their constitutional determination on the injunction placing sought preliminary challenge, petitioners prevent those revenues tax revenues escrow to all HUE treasury being being deposited and dis into the state from Chancery agencies. Court’s denial tributed to state injunction preliminary petitioners’ was af for the motion interlocutory appeal Supreme to the Arkansas firmed on Gray, Trucking Assns., Inc. v. 280 Ark. American Court. (1983). proceedings, After further 657 S. W. 2d constitutionality Chancery upheld HUE, Court Trucking Supreme American Court affirmed. the State Gray, W. 2d 759 Assns., Inc. 288 Ark. 707 S. Capitol Greyhound decisions

That court relied on our (1950), Mayflower Brice, Aero Transit Lines v. 339 U. S. 542 Mont., Railroad Comm’rs v. Board Co. (1947), Georgia Mayflower Public Transit Co. v. and Aero Comm’n, to hold that the flat Service portion was neither excessive nor unreasonable tax of HUE therefore, violate the Commerce Clause. so not, did explicitly rejected peti- Supreme doing, the Arkansas

173 argument Complete tioners’ in decision Auto Tran- that our (1977), sit, Brady, Inc. v. 274 had overruled the U. S. Mayflower Aero cases. line of appealed Supreme

Petitioners the Arkansas Court decision pending to this Court, and we held the case our decision challenge Scheiner, which a similar constitutional involved by highway to two flat use taxes enacted the Commonwealth Pennsylvania. Scheiner, 23, 1987, decided June unapportioned Court im held that flat taxes such as those posed by Pennsylvania penalize travel within a free trade among applied area con the States. The Court “internal sistency” Hardesty, 638, Armco Inc. v. test, see imposed “[i]f flat and concluded that each State privilege making taxes commercial entrances into for the territory, its is no conceivable doubt that commerce there among at 284. the States would be deterred.” appearing recognized ami We that Arkansas, that case, cus curiae in that was one of a number of States highway id., 17; had flat use taxes. See n. enacted Accordingly, dissenting). id., J., at 300-301 (O’Connor, days judgment deciding Scheiner, three we vacated the after Gray Supreme and remanded that of the Arkansas Court light Ameri case for further consideration of Scheiner. Gray, Trucking Assns., can Inc. v. 483 U. S. 1014 by sought expedite petitioners, ef who their On motion injunctive against fur to obtain relief forts the state courts pursuant to this tax, ther enforcement of the HUE Court’s Rule shortened 52.2, former Blackmun Justice Supreme time mandate to the Arkansas of issuance of our July that the mandate issue on 1987. and ordered thereupon sought enjoin further Petitioners collection tax an escrow of the taxes to be col HUE or to order Gray by pending lected reconsideration of the Arkansas Su accomplish preme seeking to this end were Court. Motions petitioners In an court, denied that returned here. acting opinion August 14, 1987, issued Blackmun, Justice possibil- significant there was Justice, concluded as Circuit Supreme ity find the Court would HUE the Arkansas failing or, that, that this under Scheiner tax unconstitutional probable jurisdiction and strike down the note Court would Gray, Trucking Assns., Inc. v. American tax. HUE chambers). (in concluded that, He further [petitioners] will not is a substantial risk because “there ultimately [HUE] tax is de- a refund if the be able to obtain petitioners ibid., would suffer “ir- unconstitutional,” clared injunctive reparable injury Ibid. relief.” absent Justice to “escrow the ordered Arkansas HUE therefore Blackmun the merits in until a final decision on collected, taxes to be Id., 1310. this case is reached.” spe Legislature met in the Arkansas 9, 1987,

On October replaced repealed it a tax, and with session, cial the HUE pay per requiring heavy mile of travel tax trucks to 2.5¢ highways. §§ 27-35-204, Ark. Ann. on Arkansas See Code (1987). opinion Subsequently, in an delivered on 27-35-205 Supreme reconsidered 14, 1988, March the Arkansas Court light it and ruled unconstitu- the HUE tax of Scheiner Gray, Trucking 295 Assns., Inc. v. Ark. tional. American to order court, however, declined 43, 746 S. W. 2d 377. The prior paid petitioners tax for all HUE taxes refunds to August escrow order. 14, 1987, Justice Blackmun’s petitioners Supreme that would be Arkansas Court reasoned only payments if that all their HUE tax entitled to refunds of retroactively. decision court were to our Scheiner Scheiner, it would so treat order to determine whether Supreme applied three-factor test we enunci State Court (1971). Huson, 97 ated Chevron Oil Co. established a the Arkansas court ruled First, respect highway use taxes to flat new rule of law with Mayflower overruling line cases. The Arkansas the Aero reasonably those cases in it relied on court concluded that against petitioners’ originally upholding Com- the HUE tax pro- challenge. Second, the court held merce Clause

[175] spective application purpose of Scheiner would effectuate the equal of the Commerce “to secure Clause treatment for inter and intrastate commerce and thus an create area of free trade among the states.” 295 Ark., 2d, S. W. at 379. regard, Supreme heavily In this the Arkansas Court relied Washington Supreme denying on the decision of the Court tax refunds because of its determination that our decision Tyler Pipe Washington Dept. Industries, Inc. v. State applied Revenue, retroac 483 U. S. 232 should not be tively. Corp. Department Revenue, National See Can banc) (1988)(en 878, 888, Wash. 2d 749 P. 2d (“It application is difficult to understand how retroactive encourage among would free trade the states since whatever app. imposed past”), chill was trade is in the on interstate Supreme dism’d, Third, the Arkansas inequitable that it refund held would be to order total already paid by petitioners of HUE taxes into the state treas ury. petitioners The court reasoned that because had driven heavy highways, their trucks on Arkansas refund total would an unconscionable windfallfar in of “allowthem excess recovery they may a fair for the discrimination have suffered due to the tax. It would constitute unfair treatment paid truckers who have the tax no Arkansas-based and seek Ark., 47, 2d, at 746 S. W. at 379. refund.” The Arkan money paid that determined, however, sas court HUE tax August into after Justice 14, 1987, escrow Blackmun’s petitioners money, refunded to as that order should be hav ing placed treasury, into the state not been had not been budgeted expenditure. spent or for future Justice Hickman believing petitioners dissented, were entitled to refunds certainly Scheiner was decided “or from the date no later July place asked, 1987, than when we were funds petition Ark., 2d, at 746 S. W. at 379. escrow.” On rehearing, petitioners request modified their remedial for urged paid Arkansas court to refund HUE taxes and they petitioners paid have had excess of taxes would been rehearing petition based the State. The was denied. thereupon sought a writ of certiorari from Petitioners They presented questions whether this Court. Scheiner applied retroactively whether, if and even should they retroactive, are still decision is not entitled Scheiner paid for taxes before we decided Scheiner for the to refunds year began or tax after Scheiner decision to refunds paid after the decision but for taxes before Justice granted petition escrow order. for cer We Blackmun’s the case tiorari, 488 U. S. 954 and consolidated with Corp. Division Alcoholic Bever 88-192, McKesson v. No. ages Regulation Dept. Fla., Tobacco, Business which today. p. ante, We affirm in also decide See 18. now we part, part, remand for further consideration. reverse II past in the we held state taxes unconstitutional When have practice deciding from the reme it has been our abstain holding. provided by the relief effects of such a While dial be in accord federal constitutional re the State must with quirements, McKesson, ante, at we 36-43, 51-52, see have determining duty ap courts with the initial entrusted state g., propriate Scheiner, 297-298; e. 483 U. See, relief. supra, Pipe, Tyler Vermont, Williams 251-253; (1985); Imports, Dias, Ltd. v. 14, 28 Bacchus (1984); Corp. Eagerton, S. 276-277 Exxon doing so have arisen from Our reasons for comity: perception in considerations federal-state based upon “[T]his it itself in this com- should not take plex tax to determine how to area of state structures holding: apply its “ essentially issues, which are issues of ‘These refund unconstitutionally imposition remedy a tax that for the against commerce, were not interstate ad discriminated federal Also, courts. constitu- the state dressed may with, intertwined or well be tional involved issues by, of state law. issues their obviated consideration may required all, if issues, of those Also, resolution inmade than so far has been of a record necessitate more them therefore, address reluctant, this case. We quot- Pipe, supra, Tyler at 252, in the first instance.’” ing supra, 277. Bacchus, addressed a state court has this, where a case such comity-based perception that has the same issues, refund requires that we in the first instance

dictated abstention carefully disentangle state law from those of of federal issues apart questions deciding anything from law and refrain from By directly presented means we to us. these of federal law generally un interpreting we are laws with which state avoid deciding questions federal law un additional familiar and necessarily. Long, Michigan 1032, 1039-

Cf. eminently present clear case, it is In the fairly primarily appears on to rest court decision “state . . . .” with the federal law to be interwoven law, federal or Supreme Specifically, took the Arkansas Court Id., at 1040. might require, Arkansas law else that, whatever the view refunds if is not petitioners not receive tax could Oil. the test Chevron under retroactive of this whether a constitutional decision The determination applies is, whether the decision is retroactive—that before the date of the deci that occurred or events conduct questions When of state of federal law. a matter sion—is generally authority courts have the issue, state law are at retroactivity their own decisions. See determine Refining Co., R. v. Sunburst Oil & Northern Co. Great (“We (1932) think the federal has constitution 358, S. subject may [of upon whether state court de no voice effect]”). give retroactive its decisions The retroac cline to applicability a constitutional decision Court, of this tive question every bit as much of a federal as what “is however, provisions particular mean, constitutional themselves federal 178 they they guarantee, have been denied.” and whether

what (1967). Chapman 21 to order California, v. construing application con- uniform of decisions ensure the denying prevent requirements from and to States stitutional consistently federally rights, curtailing protected have we or retroactivity required to deci- state courts adhere our that (1973) Payne, g., Michigan v. U. S. 47 See, sions. e. applying (holding erred in North that the state court Caro- (1969), retroactively invali- Pearce, lina v. 395 U. S. 711 to resentencing proceeding occurring prior to a the date of date Pearce); Massachusetts, 393 in Arsenault v. the decision (1968)(holding in erred that the state court determin- (1963), Maryland, requiring ing an 373 U. S. 59 that v.White during preliminary represented by a counsel accused to be apply retroactively petitioner). hearing, did not recently Although that new the Court has determined retroactively procedure applied must rules criminal yet pending final, on review or not see all cases direct Griffith retroactivity Kentucky, 479 U. S. of deci- governed by “continues sions in the civil context to be [Chevron id., 8; in at n. see Oil],” standard announced Johnson, n. 12 537, 550, also United States Supreme decided case, In this the Arkansas Court only need Oil our decision that under Chevron presents ques- apply prospectively. This decision federal Supreme Chevron Oil Arkansas Court tion: Did the properly argu- correctly? petitioners at observed oral As only question before the Court this case. ment, is the Rearg. Tr. of 7-10. Oral retroactivity distinguish question important

It is question case the distinct remedial in this from issue involuntarily taxpayers p. McKesson, 18:When ante, issue precedents, existing pay under that is unconstitutional tax taxpayers entitled a mat- affected to what relief those law? Our decision McKesson indicates ter of federal requirements certain minimum that States sets federal law providing appropriate may relief. must meet but exceed respects, Arkansas in certain that, Because we decide misapplied Supreme therefore, and, Chevron Oil highway applies taxation of our in to some decision Scheiner pursuant case to remand this tax, use the HUE we must appropriate Supreme relief the Court to determine Arkansas light in of McKesson.

A applica- Using first the we consider test, Oil Chevron highway prior to June tion use of Scheiner to taxation year Scheiner, the HUE tax for 1987, the date we decided parts: ending That test has three 1987. June nonretroactively applied must the decision to be “First, by overruling principle of either law, a new establish may litigants past precedent relied, have clear on which impression by deciding whose resolu- of first or an issue clearly ... we Second, tion foreshadowed. was not by weigh case and demerits each must. . . the merits question, history looking prior its rule in to the retrospective operation purpose effect, and whether Finally, [must] operation. we retard its will further or by application, inequity imposed weig[h] retroactive produce substan- could where a decision of this Court retroactively, applied inequitable there is if tial results injustice avoiding ample or cases for basis our nonretroactivity.” holding hardship by S., 404 U. a omitted). (citations quotations internal meets the first test it that Scheiner We think obvious majority nonretroactivity. in that case and dissent Both very recognized little of the decision left that the Court’s major- standing. precedents Mayflower As the Aero line of upholding precedents can ity flat taxes no observed, “the every proposition longer support flat tax . . . the broad upheld highways using privilege must be a State’s for the clearly discriminatory on commerce effect if it has a even S., character.” 483 U. that commerce’sinterstate reason of only precedents vitality flat retain when taxes at 296. These collecting only practicable revenues from means “are ibid, present in Arkansas than it —asituation no more users,” Pennsylvania. id., at See also was (O’Connor, J., (“[T]he today directly dissenting) overrules hold Court Mayflowerprecedents); ings id., Aero at 304 of” the (Scalia, recognized dissenting). That the J., question Complete vital Auto Transit “called into the future upheld facially ity flat taxes,” cases that had neutral of earlier As we does not alter our conclusion. ob precedent “[i]f has Term, of this Court direct served last rejected yet appears application in on reasons case, to rest courts] [lower should fol decisions, other line of some directly leaving controls, case which to this Court low the Rodriguez prerogative overruling de own decisions.” of its Express, Quijas Inc., 477, 490 U. S. v. Shear son/American precisely what the State of Arkansas ar 484 This is Supreme origi gued Court did its and what the Arkansas holding Moreover, nal decision the HUE tax constitutional. May Aero with reliance that we cited the that court noted approval in Massachusetts v. United cases with flower year after we de States, 444, 435 U. S. 463-464 one Complete Ark., 497, Auto 707 S. W. cided Transit. Supreme correctly con 2d, at 762-763. The Arkansas principle “new of law” cluded that Scheiner established a aspects Mayflower overruling those of the Aero cases on enacting assessing and which the State of Arkansas relied tax. the HUE principle that established a new

The conclusion Scheiner juris in the area of our dormant Clause of law Commerce necessarily inquiry. prudence Florida does not end the See Governing Long, Arizona v. 487 U. S. Comm. 223, (1988); Annuity Compensation Plans Tax and Deferred Deferred Norris, (1983) (O’Connor, J., 463 U. equally pur- concurring). that us, however, It is clear to retroactive pose not dictate does Clause the Commerce equitable tilt considerations application that of Scheiner application. ob-We nonretroactive toward the balance “‘by its own Clause the Commerce that served by the interference free from of trade force created an area Exchange quoting Boston Stock atS., States.’” (1977). Petitioners Comm’n, Tax State application to will tend argue of Scheiner the retroactive several States violations which trade deter future free just have parochial As we strong to commit. incentives have entirely consistent tax was the HUE however, discussed, pur- Mayflower it is not the cases, line with the Aero prevent legitimate tax- state pose Clause theof Commerce Complete Transit, Auto See commerce. ation of interstate at 288. prong test, we Finally, Oil of the Chevron third under the application equities of Scheiner. retroactive consider the today once clear that McKesson makes Our decision under the Commerce invalid is held tax statute State’s provide obligated relief consistent Clause, State principles. process at 36-43. ante, See due with federal obligation, a constitutional under such comes When the State only play equitable considerations McKesson establishes scope delineating of that relief. limited role the most consider we had no occasion course, at 44-51. Of Ante, application in McKesson new law equities retroactive application only of settled involved that case because In precedent. ante, 31, n. 15. at See Clause Commerce ruling holding un- that a tax is light that of McKesson’s discriminatory constitutionally Clause under the Commerce provide obligations relief, to places on the States substantial decision should a new whether determination the threshold requiring retroactively at a hard look apply one, a crucial is unjust. this application At be would whether retroactive equitable con- question stage, is not whether the initial obligation provide for a outweigh relief to the siderations ante, at but whether violation, 44-45, cf. constitutional place. in the first violation there is a constitutional equities persuades us A of the careful consideration retroactively. McKesson, Unlike should not Scheiner virtually “was enacted tax scheme the State where Im- invalidated Bacchus the Hawaii scheme identical to (1984),” ante, at ports, 46, and 468 U. S. 263 Dias, Ltd. “hardly surprise at Florida claim thus the State could here scheme,” ibid., of the State invalidation courts’ implemented promulgated tax scheme reliance on and its light Mayflower precedents this Court. the Aero sup- good precedents, legislators have reason to these would pose not violate their tax would that enactment HUE uphold Constitution, the State States oath to the United every Supreme consider itself have reason to Court would precedents against by uphold the tax a con- those bound Similarly, challenge. tax authori- state collection stitutional relying justified have on state enactments ties been would particu- precedents Court, of this valid then-current under by larly upheld the enactments were where, here, highest State’s court. easily tax a State the invalidation its

Where can foresee may merit little see concern, its reliance statutes, interests By ante, contrast, because the McKesson, 44-46, 50. expected be that a decision of this State cannot foresee inequity precedents, Court would overturn established unsettling precedents ap- actions taken reliance on those Although point parent. the burden that retroac- application place on Arkansas cannot tive would precisely determined, it is that the invalidation of the clear disruptive potentially tax conse- State’s HUE would have required quences A if refund, and its State citizens. treasury, deplete the law, or federal could state thus state threatening operations plans. future current State’s Presumably, required the State would be McKesson, under portion of tax that would be and refund that calculate against interstate com- to discriminate found under Scheiner significant potentially adminis- attendant merce, with the clear, makes As McKesson would entail. trative costs that retroactively attempt provide relief to the State could also any taxpayers viola increasing to cure the favored taxes on administrative entail substantial tion. But too would this independent point into constitu run costs and could at some (“[B]eyond some ante, at n. 23 tional restrictions. See significant imposition temporal tax point of a the retroactive transgress oppressive may as to burden be ‘soharsh limitation’”). approach an Moreover, such constitutional taxpayers unfairly penalize for the fail- State’s would favored established would overrule ure to foresee that this Court may precedent. Although be able to States future require- stability by imposing procedural protect their fiscal taxpayer 45, 50, McKesson, ante, actions, ments on see inequities prospective safeguards not affect such do application be can Arkansas Nor retroactive of Scheiner. highest continuing rely after its on its statute faulted for to constitutionality upheld of the tax. state court retroactively applying sum, we conclude inequitable “produce Chevron results.” substantial would tax has of the HUE at 107. The invalidation Oil, operations. severely burdening potential the State’s for may largely violates when State be irrelevant That burden existing prece- under norms well established constitutional impose unjust think it But we dent. McKesson. See existing precedent in valid, relied on burden when the State Accordingly, implementing con- enacting we its tax. high- HUE taxation that Scheiner does clude ending way prior year the HUE tax 23, 1987,for use to June 30, 1987.1 June retroactively inequitable effects indicates that the Scalia 1 Justice Clause doctrine Commerce sign are a that our dormant

applying Scheiner coming “new matters applied “inherently and should not unstable” us,” 203-204, weighing in favor of than a factor rather post, before weigh equi- suggests that federal courts should The dissent only determining scope of relief a table considerations precisely backwards. award. This is court should federal plain equita previously discussed, makes As McKesson significance once a constitu are of limited ble considerations analysis ultimately As the dissent’s tional is found. violation sug g., post, 218-219, 224, n. 8, e. its clear, see, makes effectively gested approach of eliminate consideration would judicial entirely equities this, in a case such as when represented invalidating the taxation scheme State’s decision precedent. prior This is inconsistent with a clear break from ineq nonretroactivity and and work real doctrine would our many hardships in cases. uitable equities always argue favor that the

Petitioners further retroactively applying when those decisions would decisions entity. They rely only governmental on Owen v. a burden (1980), prop City Independence, S. for of permitted governments not to local should osition that ” [they begotten. have] liability injury Owen for “disavow only applicable That our here. case is not to considerations Congress question a whether intended munici addressed brought immunity good pality from actions have faith § simply in Owen con- under 42 1983. Our decision U. C. legislative through a its that statute consideration of strued traditionally municipal- immunity history and accorded § the forerunner of 1983 was enacted. ities in when scope S., at delineation of the liabil- 635-650. Our govern- permit against ity designed a statute suit under guidance provides little for and officials deter- mental entities way mining Indeed, our own decisions. the fairest raise, nonretroactivity. parties do not and this case As does vitality our present, any question regarding the continued dormant developed ap- jurisprudence, which the Court has Commerce Clause half, nearly century Cooley a see v. Board Wardens plied for sug- Philadelphia, 12 How. 299 we decline to address that Port of gestion here. Owen,

the policy concerns involved are quite distinct. we discerned that according municipalities special immunity from for liability violations constitutional would not rights best serve the §of if goals even those rights had not been clearly established when the violation occurred. Such a determination makes merely like indi municipalities, private viduals, responsible anticipating developments the law. We noted that such would motivate each liability of the city’s elected officials to “consider whether his decision comports with constitutional mandates and . . . a risk that weigh violation result an award of might from the damages public Id., at 656. treasury.” This does not when a analysis decision breaks with clearly a of precedent, type departure which, by definition, officials could not nor public anticipate Rodriguez de have any responsibility to See anticipate. Quijas Express, Inc., Shear son/American v. 490 S.,U. 485. whether a decision should be retro- determining applied

actively, this Court has consistently given great weight the reliance interests of all affected in the parties by changes g., Cipriano City e. Houma, law. See, 701, v. 395 U. S. of (1969) 706 cities, (“Significant would be on hardships imposed if bondholders, and other connected with utilities municipal effect”). our decision today were full retroactive To given the extent of a bur- retrospective application decision dens a government’s or out its ability plan carry programs, the application all of the constituents. injures government’s These concerns have informed the Court’s long retroactivity decisions. The Court has used the of technique prospective a to avoid dis- overruling (accompanied by stay judgment) g., scheme, see, e. Northern abling Congress’ bankruptcy Pipeline Pipe Co., Construction v. Marathon Line Co. 458 U. S. 88 and has refused to invalidate retrospec- the administrative actions and the Federal tively decisions of Buckley Valeo, Commission, Election see v. The Court has also declined to provide substantially disrupt which would remedies

retrospective Lemon See, e. g., and functions. programs governmental (Lemon II) (“[S]tate (1973) of Kurtzman, S.U. on a rely deal are entitled with whom they ficials and those faith and statute, good enacted valid state presumptively unlawful”) see also opinion); (plurality no means plainly (“[U]nder (1964) Sims, cer 533, 585 377 U. S. Reynolds election is where an circumstances, impending such as tain already machinery election imminent and a State’s a court justify might considerations equitable progress, effective relief immediately withholding granting case, existing even though apportionment legislative Allen v. State invalid”); was found scheme apportionment (1969). The Elections, Bd. retrospective lawful under then- tax that had been invalidation of state disrup threatens a similar current precedents Therefore, our refusal governmental operations. tion of that was lawful invalidate retroactively legislation here to in accord with our determinations previous when enacted is new constitutional decisions. how best to effect to give

B and after the date of our Scheiner some decision, Before 1, July HUE taxes for the tax year beginning petitioners paid ruled that the State’s 1987. The Arkansas Supreme constitutional until the date collection of these was payments escrow order. It therefore declined of Justice Blackmun’s 1987-1988 HUE taxes not into any paid to order refunds that refunds they escrow. Petitioners entitled to argue even Scheiner is not to be if retro applied of these payments tax were made to se because these HUE actively payments trucks on Arkansas driving heavy high cure the privilege and June 1988. Petitioners July 1, between ways whether Scheiner that to the col applies argue question taxes should on the “occur depend lection of 1987-1988 HUE or the of the taxed enjoyment rence of the taxed transaction

[187] benefit, not the remittance of the tax.” Brief for Petitioners (filed 18, 1989). petitioners Jan. Otherwise, contend, sim ilarly taxpayers situated 1987-1988HUE will receive differ depending solely fortuitously ent remedies on the date taxpayers agree. the individual remitted the tax. We retroactivity It is, course, a fundamental tenet of our prospective application principle doctrine that the of a new begins announcing princi law on the date of the decision ple. g., Long, See, e. Florida v. at S., 237-238; Norris, concurring); S.,U. J., (O’Connor, supra; II, Lemon Oil, Chevron Phoenix v. 99; Kolodziejski, This tenet of retro- activity, however, does not define the conduct to which Schei prospectively applies: taxing ner Does it to the flat highway highway use or to the collection of taxes for use apparent after the date of that decision? We think it applies highway to the flat taxation of use after the regardless date of that decision. This is true of when the actually taxes for such use were If had collected. Arkansas highway occurring collected HUE-like taxes for use before required payment prospective date, tax of this decision pre Court that such taxes were unconstitutional would not collecting, clude the State from the date of that deci after highway sion, taxes for use that occurred the decision before very principle applies was announced. same where, here, the converse is true. Because we hold Scheiner to apply only prospectively, highway permis flat taxation was highway sible for use that occurred before the date of our de contrary give cision but not after. A rule would States a perverse incentive to collect taxes far in advance of the occur penalize rence of the taxable transaction. It would also immediately States that do not collect taxes, but neverthe plan operations assumption they less their on the will ul timately collect that have case, taxes accrued. this taxpayer advantaged in is the sense that certain of its tax payments under an were made unconstitutional statute and order; case, in in the converse may hypothetical

remedies it continue may is the sense that advantaged the State after the our decision its tax to be finding collect taxes date of cases, In both as petitioners unconstitutional. prospectively is note, the critical event for “the oc- correctly prospectivity not the transaction, underlying payment currence (filed therefor . . . .” Brief for Petitioners Jan. money II, 1989). Cf. Lemon supra. that those HUE taxes paid Thus are correct petitioners the 1987-1988 tax of whether year, regardless the State for Scheiner, we were before or after announced they paid the conclusion that not applies protected In this the Arkansas Supreme only prospectively. regard, were entitled to Court’s refunds holding petitioners for the 1987-1988 HUE taxes arose from mis- they paid of Chevron Oil. From the face of the State application can Court’s we discern no reason from Supreme opinion apart of the force of Chevron Oil that caused this misapprehension for 1987-1988 HUE tax re- deny petitioners’ request it to Supreme funds. of the Arkansas Accordingly, aspect must be reversed. opinion Court’s

I I I The dissent claims that our decision treats the today peti- favorably tioners this case less than the taxpayers Scheiner, post, 211-212, at our challenges retroactivity fundamentally doctrine dissent asserts inequitable. that not does only judicial integrity require new decisions to all cases on direct pending review, but also that we have consistently practice followed this civil Post, claims. raising cases constitutional 212-218. The insists that Chevron Oil dissent further does not enunciate it rather, an exercise of principles retroactivity; merely Post, remedial our 219-224. As we powers. explain below, First, these miss the mark. as we arguments today Scheiner, an resolve issue not considered we have neither unfairly litigants in disfavored the nor favored the Scheiner litigants our decisions Second, a review of before us now. retroactivity consistently applied the shows that have we approach rather than the doctrine in Chevron Oil enunciated suggested by recharacterization The dissent’s the dissent. underpin- precedents disregards of our both the theoretical nings led and the concerns that Oil doctrine Chevron develop con- Third, the retain this doctrine. Court to equated trary has never assertion, to the dissent’s Court principles. retroactivity principles Fi- remedial its with retroactivity nally, doctrine the different functions of our reject spheres lead us to the dissent’s the criminal and civil nonretroactivity in the doctrine invitation to abandon our arena. civil arena as we did the criminal that.today’s unjust decision is because The dissent’s claim differently taxpayers from the tax- it in this case treats the payers unpersuasive. post, Scheiner, 211-212, ruling taxpayers challenged on the a state court’s taxpayers constitutionality in this statutes; of certain tax nonretroactivity ruling challenge on the case a state court’s nothing has done more a decision of this Court. This Court separate each case. than resolve the issues raised judgment Scheiner, of the Su- In the Court reversed Pennsylvania upheld preme the constitu- which had Court of tionality Pennsylvania we “de- tax statutes. After of two presented us,” issue cided the constitutional Pennsylvania Su- then remanded the case to 298, we ap- ruling preme should be consider whether our Court “to ” plied retroactively Id., other remedial issues. and to decide retroactivity any or re- decide issues of at 297. We did not taxpayers guarantee nor our decision lief; did retroactively or the Court’s decision state court would provide any particular Scheiner, the relief. On remand of Pennsylvania Supreme the issue Court was free to consider retroactivity just court did as the Arkansas state case. already passed Supreme has on the

As the Arkansas question tax statutes unconstitu- the Arkansas whether Petitioners’ claim here is not before us. tional, that issue retroactivity distinct issue of second, involves the generally considered civil we have arena, Scheiner. retroactivity separate problem, question one a be law-changing decision itself. in that need not be resolved Unger, Corp. g., 456 U. S. e. Foods See, Consolidated (Court (1982) concurring) prop- J., 1003 (Blackmun, light erly in and remanded a case for consideration vacated Corp., 456 U. S. of Kremer v. Chemical Construction (1982), argue “respondent will be free to remand, but on Simpson apply retroactively”); v. Union Kremer should (1964) (reserving Cal., Oil Co. of prospective-only application question of the rule an- whether warranted). opinion might Thus, in that we had nounced retroactivity obligation of Scheiner to consider the no Today which issue, we consider and resolve that has case. properly presented raised in this case. been consistently applied has The claim that this Court dissent’s pending retroactively cases which are new decisions to civil of our review is an inaccurate characterization on direct proposal that we sub fact, it is little more than a cases. retroactivity theory The silentio overrule Chevron Oil. Justice Harlan’s identified dissent was formulated Donnelly, v. Estate concurrence United States (1970). Post, at 214-215. Justice Har- 286, 295-297 urged adopt rule that a new decision would lan the Court to a parties pending always apply direct un- cases on review challenge beyond either because the “the transaction is less parties rights limitations has run or the have statute of by litigation judicata.” res and have become been fixed retroactivity Presumably, rule of would at 296. S.,U. Kentucky, courts. See also constrain lower Griffith (“As practical matter, course, a we can- S., at 323 apply pending on direct review and not hear each case responsibility by judicial in- new fulfill our rule. But we retroactively structing apply rule the new the lower courts to final”). approach pre- yet If had to cases not the dissent’s retroactivity question would ever vailed in no arena, the civil only arise: A have to determine whether case court would properly apply was if current law. How- and, so, before it reveals that this Court ever, review of our civil decisions determining approach has when to followed a different only. prospectively decisions retroactivity principles underlying civil Court’s criminal and civil cases doctrine can be distilled from both considering concludes that a When the Court this issue. retroactively, law-changing applied its decision should not be usually perception applica- that such decision on its based disruptive effect on those who tion would have a harsh and prior g., Oil, e. See, relied on law. Chevron protect interests, the Court at 107. In such reliance order operative conduct or events first identifies and defines the by Lower courts that would affected the new decision. pending considering applicability decision to the of the new operative con- If the cases are then instructed as follows: law-changing decision, a duct or events occurred before prevailing apply the time of the con- the law at court should operative after the If occurred duct. conduct or events any precedent be un- would decision, so that reliance on old generally justified, apply a should the new law. See court Techniques Pro- Schaefer, The Control of “Sunbursts”: (describ- (1967) spective Overruling, 42 Rev. 631 N. Y. U. L. ing technique). expressly in criminal this doctrine a

The Court relied on Delaware, As the v. 213 case, Jenkins S. prior decisions to Jenkins had observed, Court number of retroactively “point apply rule when declined to new point law enforce- is, initial “the at which reliance,” yet proscribed,” upon practices relied not ment officials prior the date of the law- 7, at n. occurred to id., 218-219, 192 States, Halliday e. United v. g., See, decision.

changing (1969) (new guilty rule not 831, applicable 394 S. 831 U. decision); Desist law-changing before date of pleas accepted (1969) (new States, rule ap- 254 United v. conducted before date of surveillances electronic plicable (1968) Alaska, Fuller U. decision); law-changing (new introduced tainted evidence be- rule not applicable Jenkins concluded that decision). law-changing fore date of reliance’” in making on the element of ‘“focusing attention with the fun- was “more consistent nonretroactivity decisions enunciated con- newly for not justification applying damental n. retroactively.” principles stitutional supra, Schaefer, at 646. quoting on the the civil reasoning has relied same

The Court election provisions, In state invalidating arena. decisions or events that should not be has focused on conduct Cipriano its decisions. law-changing invalidated Houma, for the Court example, 395 U. S. 701 City of Louisiana’s bond-authorization provisions struck down Protection Clause. violative of the How Equal elections as who re expectations parties ever, frustrating to avoid should not invali law, the Court held that courts prior lied on or if the authorization election bonds bond date a State’s e., if the i. had not been been election completed, had process state law and bonds were ready under timely challenged in Cipriano. before the date of decision See issued, to be (“[W]e our decision this case prospec id., will under where, law, it state is, only That we will apply tively. election result has not expired, the challenging the time for law by within the time state for specified in cases brought or Thus, which are not final. yet the election and challenging to will where the authorization issue apply decision not the on the date this decision” is legally complete the securities of added)). the Court looked to the state Although (emphasis when the authorization proc determine limitations period did not hold that this period the Court ess was complete, protection raising equal adopted should as a time bar for challenges Rather, in federal the to state elections court. ready prior only the Court held that bonds for issuance Cipriano date of could under the rule es not be invalidated Similarly, v. Kolod tablished in that decision. in Phoenix ruling ziejski, its at the Court that S., 213-215, held that the unconstitutional state election laws at issue were retroactively applied should authoriza not be where the bond process completed prior tion date the had been to the of (“[O]ur in id., Court’s See decision this case decision. general obligations apply only

will bonds to authorizations of 23, 1970, that are as of the date this deci not final June (1975) sion”). Stone, 421 also Hill v. U. See (holding apply law-changing decision should that prior final where authorization to issue securities became decision). to the date of practice focusing operative on conduct

The of Court’s retroactivity implicit In or in decisions. our other events England Examiners, 375 Bd. Medical v. Louisiana State rule a a new Court established party court’s remitted to the state courts district absten- subsequently return the district court tion order could not voluntarily litigated if he had his claims state court. federal pending rule to case before Court did not prior law it, the individuals there had relied on because litigating Id., federal claims state court. their Elections, at 571- 422. Allen v. State Bd. pur aside elections conducted 572, the declined to set operative election as the event—the laws, suant to invalid preceding the decision been valid under law elections—had applicability considering de- the retroactive Allen. When defining newly the Court has limitations, statutes of cisions the old limitation action taken reliance on focused on the litigant period—usually, filing an action. Where prior timely limi- under filed a that would have been claim period, held the new statute the Court has tation not his Saint Francis Col would bar suit. See limitations (1987); lege Al-Khazraji, Chevron Oil, at 107-109. not the indicate, the Court has followed dis-

As these cases sphere. approach the in the In none of cases dis- civil sent’s the factor that critical for cussed above did Court indicate determining applicability of a was retroactive decision judicata precluded principles res or a time bar time when retroactivity litigation. the Court’s doctrine Rather, further apply litigants obliged if them old law to before courts to prior operative occurred to the new de- conduct or events had merely apply these case, In we well-established cision. oper- retroactivity. principles Here, we define the of civil highway flat taxation of use re- ative conduct as Arkansas’ pre-Scheiner Supra, at on cases. 186-187. liance this Court’s retroactively apply to invalidate then decline to We prior highway to the date of decision. taxation on use striving precedents, our the dissent to recharacterize equating apply a not to a rule makes error of decision ret- remedy. roactively judicial Post, a with the choice of plain McKesson, there is an As makes 219-220. the Court applies important constitutional decision a difference. Once process, equitable not invalid, a due and renders state tax scope generally of relief of- considerations, dictate the will retroactivity decisions, whether Nor this Court’s fered. do support sphere, or criminal dissent’s assertion civil retroactivity principle. is a remedial In- that our doctrine (1973), specificallyrecognized II, 411 deed, Lemon retroactivity helpful, principles but that the Court’s were scope remedy: controlling, deciding federal not [expressed guidelines v. Walker, in Linkletter “Those applying retroactivity our doc 381 U. S. 681 helpful, problem trine] are but the of Linkletter its precisely progeny now is not the same before us. considering will we we Here, whether reviewing judg law in constitutional rule criminal new prior ments of conviction obtained under a standard; the problem essentially relating of the instant case is one appropriate scope equitable of federal remedies, a problem arising from enforcement of a state statute dur ing period before it had been declared unconstitu temporal scope injunction tional. True, of the has brought parties dispute Court, back to this and their play underlying calls into values not unlike those Link- progeny. letter and its But however we state the issue, the fact remains that we are asked to reexamine the Dis proper imple trict Court’s evaluation of the means of menting equitable (opinion an Id., decree.” at 199-200 J.) (citation omitted). Burger, C. application principles retroactivity may While of the they prin have remedial effects, are not themselves remedial ciples. Any judicial decision will affect the relief available to parties evidentiary ruling one of the court; before the even an may regarding have some remedial However, effect. rules retroactivity, regarding pro like decisions the mechanics of govern cedure, are distinct from remedial decisions which “may plaintiff conversely what a court do what it for can do to the defendant.” York, Bauman, K. J. & D. Ren (4th 1985); dleman, Remedies Dobbs, ed. see also D. Law of (1973)(“The questions Remedies 3 substantive whether the plaintiff any right any duty, has or the defendant if has and so very questions what is, it different from the remedial questions remedy preferred, whether or that is and what is”). remedy defining op the measure of the A decision adjudicated erative conduct or events that will be under old specify appropriate remedy. not, law in itself, does an Especially light today’s holding in McKesson, the dis retroactivity sent’s view that the doctrine of civil is a reme principle surprise many ap dial would commentators,2 2See, Corr, g., Retroactivity: e. Study Supreme A Court Doctrine (1983); Applied,” Vadis, Traynor, Quo “As 61 N. C. L. Rev. Prospec Question Overruling: Responsibility, tive A Hastings of Judicial L. J. pellate Federal Courts: Note, see Confusion courts, Retroactive-Prospective Application Test of the Chevron 117, 128-136, and state courts Ill. L. Rev. Decisions, 1985U. exactly what this Oil to be have considered Chevron always or set it to be: doctrine understood has applied past precedent determining should be when rules is better such, As Chevron Oil the court. to a case before part decisis, of stare rather of the doctrine as understood part This is how nonretro law of remedies. than activity Cardozo Great first characterized Justice was Refining Co., 287 U. S. R. Oil & Co. Sunburst Northern Considering power to its a state court’s 358 only, prospectively asserted: Justice Cardozo own decisions whether this division have no occasionto consider “We a sound or an un of a decision is in time of effects application decisis the doctrine of stare of sound unsound, or there is to the common law. Sound known right protected the federal of a involved it no denial defining A the limits of adher . . . state constitution. may precedent make a choice for itself between to ence operation principle and that of relation forward of highest may say of its It that decisions backward. though none the less for overruled, later are law court, Id., at 364. intermediate transactions.” Donnelly, at Estate See also United States of relatively (Harlan, concurring). cir- In rare J., those precedent overruled, the where established cumstances past nonretroactivity a to adhere to allows court doctrine of precedent in order to avoid cases, in a number of limited parties “jolting expectations to a transaction.” Ibid. of concurring judg- opinion in the See also Justice Scalia’s Although post, declines ment, at 204-205. Justice Scalia Non-Retroactivity: Critique A and a (1977); Beytagh, Ten Years Schaefer, (1975); The Control of “Sun- Proposal, Va. L. Rev. 1557 L. Prospective Overruling, 42 N. Y. U. Rev. 631 Techniques bursts”: nonretroactivity, rely understanding his on our doctrine of judge him stare decisis leads to conclude that a who dis- agrees overruling prior precedent with must vote a decision uphold validity [in pre- “action taken reliance on overruling cedent] occurred.” at 205. Post, before the As prospective overruling discerned, Justice Cardozo allows principle they respect courts to of stare decisis even when impelled light change understanding. are the law in of new proposing retroactivity In that we extend the doctrine re- cently sphere adopted cases, in the criminal to our civil adopting per dissent assumes that Court’s reasons for se retroactivity Kentucky, rule U. S. 314 Griffith equally applicable in the civil context. are But there important applica- distinctions between the retroactive tion of civil and criminal decisions that make the Griffith compelling sphere. rationale far less the civil retroactivity adopting per In se rule of cases, criminal single justification: what, essence, relied on was a Griffith proce- that it was unfair to different rules of criminal pending dure to two defendants whose cases were on direct expound- time. id., review at the same See 322-323. ing theory, explain why pendency the Court did not of a defendant’s case on direct review was the critical factor determining applicability for of new decisions. It is at arguable, pointed least as Justice White out in dissent, speed proceed through that the at which cases the criminal justice system key determining should not be factor for identically may whether “otherwise situated defendants be (inter- subject Id., to different constitutional rules.” at 331 omitted). quotation nal marks Nor did the Court consider whether the reliance interests law enforcement officials application ineq- would make the retroactive of new decisions although key uitable, this a factor had been consideration prior g., e. See, Delaware, cases. Jenkins v. atS.,U. Denno, 220; Stovall 388 U. S. fo- cusing solely pendency on the of a case before court of either the defendant on the reliance interests

rather than implicitly rejected government, the rationale or the Griffith retroactivity prior new decisions should doctrine: that of our expecta- retroactively applied as to frustrate the so be not prior parties justifiably on law. had relied who tions of analysis be understood con must Court’s Griffith retroactivity period During much of our in which text. new rules of criminal evolved, most of the Court’s doctrine expanded protections procedure available to crimi had supra, generally Beytagh, n. 2. There nal See defendants. appli that retroactive the Court determined fore, whenever inequitable, the inwas, of a new rule would cation according government’s reliance interests more effect, receiving weight the benefit defendant’s interests than the g., Coin See, e. States v. United States of the rule. United concurring) (1971) Currency, J., & (Brennan, procedural (“[ W]hen has cast new rule no substantial a guilt upon reliability crimi of determinations doubt rule effect a cases, we have denied the retroactive where nal ‘impose contrary . . . would a substantial burden decision .’”) (quoting upon judicial system . . . Williams the . . (1971)). adoption States, United Griffith’s retroactivity per a can thus be understood as se rule of a providing expanded pro approach rejection in favor of of this protections to criminal this new defendants. Under cedural yet any theory, had conviction become defendant whose regardless given benefit a new decision final should be might place on enforcement law of the additional burden authorities. analogous adopting per se reasons rule of

There no party retroactivity Either in the civil context. before may application from the of the Chevron Oil court benefit likely favor civil defendants New decisions are not rule. any protect- plaintiffs; policy nor there reason for over civil litigants ing Moreover, even a class of over another. one deprived party full of a new is of the retroactive benefit who In case, decision some relief. this for may example, receive invalidation of petitioners by are benefited prospective that Scheiner is the Arkansas tax and a ruling applicable in taxation use after the date of decision that case. of highway defendant, hand, The on the other is inter generally criminal ested in the reversal his remedy: one conviction. only in his prospective invalidation of a rule relied on securing the criminal in any way. conviction will not assist defendant Nor that nonretroactivity does criticism gives Griffith’s benefit of a new rule to a “chance but then beneficiary” “per similar cases to flow unaf subsequently by mit[s] stream of (citation rule,” S., omitted), fected 479 U. at 323 new have force in civil context. the dissent echoes Although post, it be aimed at criticism, 211-212, fairly only this at may in those cases which the Court reversed conviction decision and later defendant determined law-changing g., e. see, that the rule would not be applicable retroactively, States, Desist v. United Stovall at n. S., 254-255, 24; 394 U. supra, Denno, cite a at 300-301. The dissent has failed to civil treatment has single inequitable case which comparable In case, provide occurred. Court did example, Scheiner that was denied the peti benefit to the litigants supra, here. at 188-190. to the dis Contrary tioners See post, our use of the civil retro assertions, 211-212, sent’s treatment of does not result activity principles unequal As Chevron makes Oil clear, similarly situated litigants. “ ” of the doctrine is to avoid or purpose ‘injustice hardship’ civil who have relied on law. 404 litigants justifiably prior Cipriano City Houma, S., at 107 (quoting 706). aim, of this two situ parties similarly light ated if on the old law the date of the law- both relied before A who has not relied on the old litigant decision. changing has, law situated a relevant to one who similarly way is not of whether both cases are on direct review. pending regardless context, in the civil unpersuasive As rationale Griffith’s we see no reason to abandon the Chevron Oil test. The Con- pro application prohibit of decisions does not

stitution spectively only, g., Stumes, e. 465 U. see, Solem v. (opinion (1984); supra, States, at 651 v. Williams United J.); held that nonretro has this Court ever nor

of activity White, requirement this III Court the Article violates Compare adjudicate only Stovall or controversies. cases Walker, 381 Linkletter v. Denno, with supra, States, at 256 622, n. and Desist v. United atS., retroactivity utility dissenting). (Douglas, our The J., disrup- inequitable cushioning the sometimes doctrine “ineq- law-changing is clear. tive decisions effects alleges by the are illu- caused doctrine uities” dissent sory. we decline the dissent’s invitation reasons, For these precedent. longstanding our abandon disposition apart

Accordingly, respects in all from its judgment payments, we affirm the HUE tax 1987-1988 Supreme Court.3 Arkansas precisely position not, however, in a to determine

areWe petitioners are of the relief to which the nature and extent payments. That HUE tax deter for entitled their already observed, lies have with state mination, we re instance. We therefore reverse and courts in first Supreme aspect to the Arkansas case mand permit appropriate relief, it to determine the not order today peti McKesson, our with decision inconsistent payment HUE of 1987-1988 taxes whether made be tioners’ after date of decision. fore or our Scheiner

So ordered. concurring judgment. Scalia, Justice agree with that Arkansas should not I O’Connor Justice imposing Constitution Ar- to have violated the its held (HUE) Highway Equalization our Tax before de- Use kansas Trucking Assns., Scheiner, Inc. in American cision McKesson, ante, 29-31, appellate jurisdic the Court’s we state in As one the Eleventh Amendment. a case such as this is barred tion in (1987),yet U. S. 266 should be held to have violated the Con- imposing stitution in that tax after Scheiner was announced. My diverge reasons, however, from hers in a fundamental way, requires explanation. which some perception prospective share Justice de

I Stevens’ cisionmaking incompatible judicial with the role, which is say prescribe what the law is, not to what it shall be. The very framing purport today— of the issue that we to decide “apply” whether our decision in Scheiner shall retroac tively—presupposes creating a view of our decisions as opposed declaring law, already what the law is. Such contrary understanding view is judicial to that of “the only Power,” U. Const., Art. III, § 1, which is not only common and one, traditional but which is the one that justify denying can in courts force and effect to the uncon duly legislatures, stitutional enactments of elected see Mar (1803)—the bury very v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 exercise of judicial power governmental in asserted Scheiner. To hold a Act to be unconstitutional is not to announce that we it, forbid but that the Constitution it; forbids and as in when, case, constitutionality placed of a state statute is in issue, the question “applies” is not whether some decision in of ours way applies; question that a law is whether the Constitu interpreted tion, as in that decision, invalidates the statute. change year year; Since the Constitution does not from since it does not conform to our decisions, but our decisions supposed interpreta to conform to the notion it; that our particular tion in Constitution decision could take prospective form does not make sense. Either enforcement (which of the statute at issue Scheiner occurred before our there) decision was unconstitutional, or it if not; was, was it then so is enforcement of all identical statutes in other States, occurring whether before or after our if it decision; and was wrong, not, then Scheiner was and the issue of whether to “apply” that decision needs no further attention. case and elsewhere Scheiner, and in that

I dissented “nega my disagreement registered the so-called with have jurisprudence one, it is but of which Clause tive” Commerce supra, destabilizing, Scheiner, at typically instance. See Pipe dissenting); Tyler Industries, Inc. J., 303-306 (Scalia, Washington Dept. Revenue, 232, 483 U. S. State (1987) dissenting concurring part J., (Scalia, my (by disagreement part). than more view rests on This alone) “‘quag jurisprudence is a mine that that no means quoting Portland Ce id., States mire,’” 259, Northwestern (1959), has Minnesota, that it ment v.Co. “‘arbitrary, conclusory, with the con and irreconcilable been century, inception in last text,’” since its stitutional quoting Currie, n. D. The Constitution Supreme 1789-1888, Years The First Hundred Court: age. only p. I be it worsened with and that has self-consciously jurisprudence us, takes lieve that this judicial avowedly, beyond The text from itself. role only provides authority in this field take our to act we which regulate “Congress Commerce have Power . . . To shall that among § 8, Art. Const., I, States,” . several . . Congress, nothing power grant to more than a It is cl. 3. grant Congress as to cannot be read and that courts; not the comparison being a casual States, of the as even exclusive Tyler Pipe provisions I See of Article will reveal. with other supra, Clause, there Industries, at 261. The Commerce regulation thought prohibit may properly state to fore, be indirectly—that only to the extent that Con is, commerce powers pre-empts gress’ of its Commerce Clause exercise Supremacy 2. legislation Clause, VI, Art. cl. under state regulation prohibit does a certain form of state we When saying, any in effect, statute, we are federal not conflictwith presume Congress’ that, the exercise silence from that we prohibit commerce-regulating means to function, it of its regulation. There is other no 262-263. state (according legislation way explain that would how state “negative” jurisprudence) our Commerce Clause violate the Constitution can nonetheless be authorized a federal stat- Congress “disagree[s]” appraisal appro- ute if with our priate role of the in the Scheiner, States relevant field. See supra, at 289, n. 23.

Presuming congressional quite law from silence is differ judicial interpreting apply ent from the normal task of ing determining applying text or common-lawtradition. principal question The asked, course, is what would a regulator reasonable federal of commerce intend—which is question legislator no different from the a himself must ask. explains, why body That I think, no of our decisional law has changed regularly “negative” ju as our Commerce Clause risprudence. Change state, is almost its natural as it is the legislation constantly changing natural state of in a national economy. explains why “nega That also our exercise of the ultimately tive” Commerce Clause function has cast us essentially legislative weighing imponderable— role of balancing importance of the State’s interest in this or (an importance that different citizens would assess differently) against degree impairment of commerce. g., Corp. Dynamics Corp. e. See, America, CTS (1987);Edgar Corp., U. S. v. MITE (1982); Church, Inc., Pike v. Bruce 397 U. S. 137 “negative” inherently unpredict Commerce Clause is able-unpredictable just applied because we have its poorly inconsistently, requires standards or but because it us legislature, and the lower courts to accommodate, like inevitably shifting economy. variables of national What expounding it ever is that we are in this area, it is not a Constitution. “negative” jurisprudence

Because our Commerce Clause is inherently repeatedly upsetting it in unstable, will result expectations. My of settled in fellow dissenters consequence present seek to avoid this in the case—or, more precisely, extending consequence beyond seek to avoid this Scheiner, all to before the Court State

the unfortunate — by embracing a rule of laws that had similar other States appeal decisionmaking. to that prospective There is some “negative” approach field: If we Commerce Clause in the why legislative judgments, essentially making not make (subject, prospectively legislative fashion, e., i. them case-or-controversy require- to the limitation course, surely requires § III, which retro- Article cl. ment of immediately parties activity respect before the to the with Court)? adopt because, I have I that solution decline fundamentally is be- a mode action above, such discussed “negative” although judicial power—and yond Commerce wrongs decisionmaking a well, do not make is as two Clause right. I conclude that it not follow that must

But does pr taxes were unconstitutional. Arkansas HUE e-Scheiner “negative” my disagreement with this Court’s Com Given only thing possi jurisprudence, the that could merce Clause bly Scheiner’s status as me to such conclusionwould be lead Although “negative” precedent. I will not Commerce coming us, matters before decisional theories to new Clause say, respect is for the needs of stabil decisis—that stare normally ity legal system—would me cause to adhere in our already to the uncon rendered as to a decision this type stitutionality particular law of state law. The here of a indistinguishable Scheiner, I so would nor from that is acquiesce mally suppress my earlier view of the matter Something opinion it is unconstitutional. the Court’s respect position wrong, I if must take that with however, present pre-Scheiner in the case. Believ taxes issue impose fully ing taxes, I entitled to that Arkansas was penalize for hav make the fifth vote to it nonetheless would period (pre-Scheiner) ing during when our so even done lawfully opinions I im do so—and would announced it could pose injustice decisis, inis, of stare the name protecting expectations. That would be settled interest of option Though absurd. I not believe I have the of sus do pending judicial decisionmaking, principle of retroactive stare decisis is a command. I doctrine of flexible do not understanding requires think that a sensible of it me to vote contrary my the law view of where such a vote would only impose upon litigant liability wrong, I think a to be but litigant’s upset expectations would also settled because the earlier decision for which stare decisis effect is claimed (Scheiner) prior law. That turn overruled would the doc against very purpose trine of stare decisis for which it ex appropriate, I ists. think it other I think words—indeed, necessary—for judge it him a whose view of law causes (at overruling persist position dissent from an in that least case) necessary disposition where to the his vote is of the respect overruling with to action taken before the occurred. Accordingly, I would affirm the decision below re with spect imposed pre-Scheiner, be to Arkansas’ HUE taxes my they I cause view were constitutional. would reverse imposed respect the decision below with to Arkansas’ HUE taxes pos they were unlawful virtue of cheiner because t-S judgment I decision. thus concur of the Court. Stevens, Brennan,

Justice with whom Justice Jus- tice Marshall, and Justice Blackmun join, dissenting. presents

This tax case two issues: whether the flat features Arkansas HUE tax violate the Commerce Clause petitioners the Federal if and, so, Constitution whether ordinarily pure entitled to a tax refund. The former is question ap law, federal our resolution of which should be plied uniformly throughout while the latter is Nation, question today, plurality mixed of state and federal law. The analysis. deceptive simplicity, however, inverts that With plurality constitutionality rules that the vel non of the flat particular tax state in a could turns on whether officials State anticipated have that such a tax would violate the Constitu availability a refund, of ante, 181-182,1but that the at tion, required ante, 177, law, under state if otherwise even law, matter of federal determination, as a own rests on our disruption retrospective a threaten of relief would whether governmental operations. analysis That Ante, at 185-186. wrong entitled an ad Petitioners are both counts. on judication constitutionality tax the Arkansas under of of the regardless understanding of federal law of current our best legislators. question good of of the Arkansas faith today remedy in Mc hand, on the addressed refund, or other Tobacco, Beverages Corp. Division Alcoholic Kesson v. of p. Regulation pt. Fla., ante, 18, Business De of of by by in the the state court decided, us, but should contrary sup plurality’s conclusion is instance.2 The first by misreading nothing ported of the than a Court’s more opinion Huson, 404 U. S. 97 Co. Chevron Oil I Equalization Highway Tax Act Use Arkansas enacted (HUE), Ark. Ann. Acts, 685, Ark. Code 1983 Gen. No. Act, in March 1983. The §§ 27-35-204, 27-35-205 against July 1983, on discriminated 1, effective which became higher by taxing effective tax them at a interstate carriers operated Vehicles of the which intrastate. rate than carriers weight required display Act class covered were Operation evidencing compliance the tax. of with certificate constitutionality by contrast, of a agrees that Scalia, 1 Justice understanding of analyzed light of our current must be state statute Ante, at 200-201. Constitution. today Corp. v. Division Alcoholic Bever opinion McKesson Our Fla., ante, Tobacco, Regulation 39-40, Dept. Business ages and require the State to re Federal does not makes clear that the Constitution unconstitutionally petitioners, from tax that was exacted fund the entire discriminatory adjust the tax to only portion or otherwise to refund the but they nondiscriminatory. do not contend here it Petitioners render any of federal law. See Brief for greater relief as a matter are entitled to Petitioners 38-39. subjected user to vehicle in violation of the Act criminal 27-35-205(k). § graduated

sanctions and to a scale of fines. challenging The Act contained no method for tax assessments protest. making payment or under May Act,

On before the effective date of the HUE $1,775,000 but after some tax revenues had been coll County petitioners ected,3 filed suit the Pulaski Chan cery challenging constitutionality Act under state law and the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitu tion, 1, § 8, Art. cl. 3. Arkansas adheres the common-law voluntarily paid rule that taxes cannot be recovered. See County Searcy Stephenson, Ark. S. W. 2d (1968); Brunson v. Board Directors of Crawford (1913). County, 24, Petitioners, 107 Ark. 153 W. 828 S. provision gov however, invoked the Arkansas constitutional erning illegal arguing exactions, Const., 16, § 13, Ark. Art. Supreme law, that, as a matter of state under the State ruling Cash, 494, in Little Rock v. 277 Ark. Court’s recent (1982), (1983), 644 1111 denied, S. 229 cert. 462 W. 2d U. S. taxpayers paid who their taxes after the date of the com plaint paid have their taxes involun should “be deemed to tarily.” 506, 2d, 277 at 644 S. W. at 234. Their sub Ark., that had been stantive constitutional claims tracked those Pennsylvania in raised to a similar tax enacted truckers Trucking Bloom, Assns., 1980. See American Inc. v. 77 (1983). Pa. 575, Commw. 466 A. 2d 755 Chancery petitioners’ pre Court denied motion for a liminary injunction, concluding that the tax was constitu 2 merits, tional. Record 764. After a trial on the the court opinion April ruled the State’s favor. an delivered Supreme holding 1986, that the tax affirmed, State Court Mayflower was under in Aero constitutional our decisions Georgia Comm’n, Transit Co. v. Pub. Serv. 285 3 they Petitioners do not contend that are entitled to a tax refund for paid voluntarily prior these taxes which were to the institution of this lawsuit.

208 (1935), Mayflower Rail- Transit Co. v. Board Aero (1947). American Mont., U. S. 495 332 road Comm’rs Trucking Gray, 2d 759 Ark. 707 S. W. Assn., Inc. v. (1986). Supreme Simultaneously, Pennsylvania Court respect to that State’s stat- with a similar conclusion reached Trucking Scheiner, Inc. v. 510 Pa. Assns., American ute. A. 2d 838 Pennsylvania jurisdiction probable case, in the noted We Trucking Scheiner, Assns., Inc. U. S. American see pending Arkansas case our decision and held the judgment 1987, we reversed In June Scheiner. concluding Supreme Scheiner, that that court State constitutionality Pennsylvania’s upholding erred unapportioned Truck marker fee and axle tax. American ing id., Scheiner, see also Assns., 483 U. S. Inc. 297; dissenting). that the J., We reasoned (O’Connor, they “ex Clause because the Commerce flat taxes violated hydraulic pressure ert[ed] on interstate busi an inexorable ply that enacted the within the State nesses to their trade ‘among Id., several States.’” rather than measure (quoting Const., I, § 8, cl. We re Art. 3). argument jected of stare decisis re that considerations sup appeared quired of cases that to a series adherance Mayflower port Aero cases —the tax. Insofar as the the flat Supreme upon Court had relied— which Arkansas the cases Pennsylvania judgment authority provided of for the the precedents Supreme held that those could “no Court, we proposition every longer support . . . that flat tax the broad using highways upheld privilege State’s must be for the clearly discriminatory it effect on commerce if has a even interstate character.” reason of that commerce’s for of various therefore remanded consideration We 296. issues. remedial Scheiner bore on the constitu- our resolution of

Because challenged tionality in we case, remanded of the taxes light Supreme reconsideration to Arkansas Court it opinion. Trucking Gray, Inc. Assns., American Supreme Arkansas remand, U. S. 1014 On constitutionality not the taxes as- did reconsider the prior sessed Rather, that, to Scheiner. it held as a matter ruling federal law, our Scheiner was not retroactive applied highway did not use to taxes assessed and prior Trucking Assns., American the date of decision. (1988). Only Gray, Inc. v. Ark. 746 W. 2d 377 Scheiner, to the indeed taxes assessed the date of after after order, the date of Justice taxes which Blackmun’s Supreme collect, State had continued to did the State petitioners presented Court hold that a meritorious constitu plurality today explains, judg challenge. tional As the Supreme ment of the Arkansas Court constituted a decision might require, petitioners that “whatever else Arkansas law could not tax if is not retroactive receive refunds Ante, under the test of at 177. The HUE Chevron Oil.” simply tax was not unlawful until the date of Justice Black theory, Supreme if mun’s order. Under the State Court’s repealed the State was had the statute on date Scheiner the Constitu decided, State would have never violated adjudica petitioners tion, and an would have never obtained tion that the taxes were unconstitutional.

I I past we cases, decades, numerous civil over the several give have an- declined to “retroactive effect” to decisions nouncing arising Those from fed- cases, “new” rules of law. involving application eral court and of limi- of statutes scope equitable required us relief, tations and the have not may distinguish retroactivity the two senses which may used. A decision be denied “retroactive effect” occurring prior sense that conduct to the date of decision judged may law, under current or it be denied “retroac- independent principles of law tive the sense that effect” may provide current law. limit the relief that court under 210 arising both the substan court, from federal

Since, a case scope applicable a of conduct and the to course tive law present questions, permissible it has been un relief federal retroactivity. necessary distinguish two senses to requires court, us state us case, This which comes to from expressly distinguish retroactiv for the time to between first retroactivity ity as a remedial a choice-of-law rule and principle. arising from federal court both Whereas cases subject plenary applicable type to law and relief more lim review, in cases state court our mandate is from Corp. Muller, 207, v. 296 U. 210 See Fox Film S. ited. (1935); City Memphis, Wall. 590 Murdock v. 20 on matter of of a state court a substantive The decision presents pure question, Martin v. a federal see federal law (1816); a decision as Lessee, 304, Hunter’s 1 Wheat. 345 presents question appropriate remedy a mixed of state and Although constrains law. the Federal Constitution federal remedy may provide, see McKesson, a the minimum State (1968); p. Massachusetts, v. 5 Arsenault 393 ante, 18; gives Chapman 21 v. 386 U. S. California, authority particular to review a decision that a this Court remedy constitutionally compelled, Delaware v. Van see is (1986);Michigan Payne, v. Arsdall, 475 U. S. 673 (1973),4 ordinarily power it not limit the State’s does give greater that a fed remedial effect than which decision g., Imports, provide. See, e. Bacchus Ltd. eral court would (1984); Angeles Ly n. 14 Los Dias, 263, 277, 468 U. S. (1983); Chapman, ons, (Harlan, dissenting); Bank v. Iowa-Des Moines National J., ante, at contrary notwithstanding, see plurality’s assertion expansive proposition that federal law Payne for the does stand propo may provide, only more narrow a State but limits relief particular remedy that is constitu that court’s decision sition a state course, case, question. In this tionally a federal required itself erroneously petitioners complain court decided federal state retroactivity remedial applying from own prevented law the court its principles.

211 (1931). Bennett, 284 U. S. 239 The remedial effect a deci given sion law should is in the first of federal constitutional (citing ante, instance a matter of state law. See at 176 Tyler Pipe Industries, Scheiner, S., Inc. 297-298; Washington Dept. v. Revenue, 232, 251, State 483 U. S. (1985); (1987); Vermont, Williams Imports, Exxon Dias, 276-277; Bacchus Ltd. v. atS., (1983)). Corp. Eagerton, 462 U. S. principles disposition

Those the and elucidate of Scheiner explain why appropriate In a similar result is here. Schei substantially a the Arkan ner, we held that flat tax similar to tax That decision sas HUE violated the Commerce Clause. only question resolved the then before lawfulness of us—the flat, years no fed tax assessed for 1980to 1986. Since presented challenge eral rem constitutional was to the state edy opportunity and to deter since the State had not had appropriate mine the we law, under state relief federal and reversed the and state determination the merits court’s on ruling remanded the case for it “to consider whether our applied retroactively remedial should be other and to decide added). dispo (emphasis issues.” 483 U. Our at 297 remedy in the sition left the state room to its own court and instance but the force mandate first not to avoid of our challenge “in the first the taxes declare under constitutional place.” Ante, at 182. judgment disposition appropriate

A similar here. Our un tax is leaves no doubt that the Arkansas HUE Scheiner ruling concluded, As constitutional. Blackmun Justice application petitioners’ ac of an escrow on for establishment “substantially by challenged petitioners count, the taxes Pennsylvania unapportioned in effect “to that similar” inter deter Scheiner,” taxes invalidated in work “to flat Gray, Trucking Assns., Inc. v. commerce.” American state Supreme Court 1306, 1308-1309 State plurality today acknowledges, Arkana held, Pennsylvania tax, taxes, like flat violates s's HUE exerting pressure the Commerce Clause command of trade within state their ply businesses on interstate boundaries. HUE tax also violated the Arkansas my opinion, Scheiner and petitioners before our decision

Constitution Like the taxpayers that effect. to a decision to are entitled the constitu- timely challenged in itself, petitioners would have pre- the state flat tax. Petitioners of tionality Scheiner in the invalidated Pennsylvania if the tax vailed if had not enacted, litigation been or that never case had They did. their litigation Court until after reached our first. because we decided simply should not lose of the Commerce Scheiner, understanding applied we our Pennsylvania Supreme the retroactively, reversing Clause flat tax uncon- that was highway a similar judgment Court’s further the case for consideration and remanding stitutional issues. at 297-298. We should 483 U. of remedial of our same here. accidental timing follow the course and cases currently pending in two filed timely decisions such a differ- and has in the not, past, produced should the respective litigants. the law applicable ence

III dictate process of fairness and legal Fundamental notions on rules to all similar cases applied that same should be justifiable and the finality review. Considerations of direct a rule that have are ordi up surrounding expectations grown in our res rules of narily properly given expression and stare decisis. When legal rights parties judicata “ ‘of determined, public policy have been finally principles the matter not be open dictate private peace’” law. Feder in the time there is a relitigation every change Moitie, Stores, Inc. v. ated Department 401 Co., Hart (1981) Supply Co. Railroad Steel (quoting (1917)). time, however, At the same when U. S. have not been deter- legal finally rights parties “simple justice,” atS., law, mined a court of requires rule, be evenhand- law, a rule of even a “new” explained edly applied. As Griffith Blackmun Justice Kentucky, we endorsed Justice when U. S. retroactivity: subject Harlan’s views on failure to ours, and now view, “In Harlan’s Justice apply newly rule to criminal constitutional declared pending basic norms review violates cases on direct princi adjudication. a settled First, it is constitutional only adjudicates ple ‘con ‘cases’ and that this Court § 2. III, Art. Unlike Const., troversies.’ See promulgate legislature, constitu- new rules of we do not procedure Rather, criminal on a broad basis. tional adjudicate requires judicial that we nature of review usually specific the vehicle cases, and each case becomes have de- rule. But after we for announcement of a new integrity of selected, rule in the case cided a new judicial requires all that rule to that we review pending Harlan Justice on direct review. similar cases observed: “ re us on direct ‘If not resolve all cases before we do understanding governing light con of in of our best view why principles, we should it is difficult to see stitutional any adjudicate truth, the Court’s case at all. . . . so adjudicat disregard power law of current assertion already ing the full not run before us that have cases simply appellate quite an assertion review, is course of adjudication not one of constitutional function is that our Mackey legislation.’ States, v. United in effect of but [(1971)] concurring (opinion [667,] 679 401 U. S. judgment). application violates the of new rules

“Second, selective similarly principle treating defendants the situated of States, [244,] See Desist v. United same. [(1969)](Harlan, dissenting). pointed As we J., problem Johnson, not with in United States out pending is applying on direct review new rules to cases inequity when chooses that the Court results ‘the actual similarly many defendants should be situated of which beneficiary’ rule. S. [537,] of new the chance [(1982)] original). Although (emphasis in 16n. apply- inequity for a time had tolerated retroactively we ing review, cases on direct new rules to an has come end.’ ‘The time for toleration noted: Id., at 322-323. Ibid.” reasoning the force of its case, a criminal but was Griffith properly The Court has no more con- so limited.

cannot authority than in criminal cases civil cases stitutional disregard similarly litigants situated law or to treat

current legal requires differently. principle In both, adherence to rights litigants with in accordance determine the we understanding law. That current un- current of the our best derstanding may judicata judicial principles res and

include legislatively prescribed of limita- decisis and statutes stare may repose. protect It tions that interests reliance recognizes damages reliance inter- a law also include party that a has been made ests. But once a determination prop- properly rule new decisional before the Court and a play erly repose no role interests of should law, states rights parties. determining legal Justice the substantive retroactivity explained as a the distinction between Harlan recognition principle of reliance as an choice-of-law principle damages a new determination after element applied: has been law impulse rule nonretro- to make a new decisional “The upon least, the same consid- rests, in civil cases at active namely decisis, stare that lie at the of erations core parties jolting expectations to a transaction. of avoid precedent is I made, to abandon Yet once decision principles justification applying for determined see no they wrong, otherwise, or to liti- be constitutional be gants may in who are or still come to court. The critical determining in factor when a new decisional rule should applied prior to a transaction consummated to the de- my point is, view, cision’sannouncement at which acquired degree finality has such a transaction of rights parties that the should be considered fro- zen. as in the criminal field is, Just the crucial moment cases, for most the time when a conviction has become my supra, final, dissent, see Desist so the civil area beyond that moment should be when the transaction is challenge either because the statute of limitations has rights parties by litiga- run or the have been fixed judicata. Any uncertainty tion res and have become en- gendered by approach I should, think, be deemed part of the risks life. equitable

“To the extent that ex- considerations, for ample, I ‘reliance,’ relevant, would take this into ac- appropriate count in the determination what relief is any given are, course, case. There circumstances change jeopardize when a in the law will an edificewhich reasonably prevail- was ing constructed on the foundation of may

legal Thus, doctrine. it be that the law of reme- example, permit dies but not an rescission, would damages party himself award of to a who finds able public avoid a once-valid contract under new notions of policy. Simpson Co., Cf. v. Union Oil 377 U. S. point . . . The essential is that while there is

flexibility remedies, the law of this does not affect the underlying principle substantive that short of a bar of res judicata should limitations, or statute of courts prevailing decisional rule to the cases before them.” Donnelly, v. Estate United States (1970)(concurring opinion). today, consistently applied principles we have these Until litigant challenged where a has the constitution- civil cases 216 City Cipriano Houma,

ality v. or local law.5 of state of (1969), example, a Louisi- struck down for we 395 S. 701 U. right only property taxpayers gave the vote ana which law approve revenue bonds the issuance of in called to elections legislators utility. municipal who en- The Louisiana “good suppose,” ante, at provision reason the had acted adopted in first when it was it was constitutional 182, that string of 1921, but a subse 1910 and and reenacted 1880 preceding quent five had effected a sea Terms the decisions change this Court’s law no substantial than less election Brady, Complete Transit, v. 430 S. Auto Inc. U. decisions respect (1977), to the under effected with and 274 good standing Clause.6 faith of the Commerce legislators nonethe- State, reliance interests of the and the that a different rule of constitutional convince us did not less, applied than that to the Louisiana statute law should rule date of decision. to be the on the we understood which might application Although our of decision “retroactive” 5Indeed, qualified immunity predicated is on the as law our whole retroactively. apply In Owen v. “new” law decisions sumption that even (1980), example, we held a munici City Independence, 445 U. S. 622 established, principles process weeks after violating of due pality liable for Roth, conduct, Regents Colleges 408 U. 564 in Board State v. S. its immunity. municipality’s qualified rejected the claim to Our necessarily predicated view a court upon the that Owen decision considering law in effect at the time of decision in whether should plurality is Although the techni has violated the Constitution. State cally decisions should al that Owen did not hold that constitutional correct ante, 184-185, case, ways Congress apply “retroactively,” 1983, contemplate § surely did that state ac enacted 42 U. C. not S. achieve, retroactivity, through judicially doctrine of tors could crafted liability damages on immunity only from but also from denied them Qualified Immunity Congress. Rudovsky, Cf. Doctrine floors of Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Supreme Court: Judicial (1989). 23, Rights, Rev. Pa. L. County, Avery v. 390 U. Midland S. 6 The decisions were Elections, (1966);and (1968); Harper Virginia Bd. Sims, Reynolds 377 U. produce hardship,’” (quoting “‘injustice at 706 or Refining Co., 287 Great Northern R. v. Sunburst Oil & Co. (1932)), sufficiently pro- U. S. those concerns were 358, 364 by holding law, tected as a matter of federal the deci- that, apply sion the authorization to issue the se- need not “where legally complete on the date of this decision.” 395 curities is U. S., at ruled that the lower court which had re- 706. We jected timely challenge plaintiff’s in error and the filed was apply state the “where, law, our would under decision expired, challenging time in for the election result has not or specified by brought chal- cases the time state law for within yet lenging final.” Ibid. the election and which are not Kolodziejski, 204 over the Phoenix v. U. S. Stewart, Harlan, and Chief Justice dissent of Justice Justice limiting Burger, the the invalidated an Arizona statute property taxpayers in elections to authorize franchise to real general Again, legislators obligation have bonds. the would provisions had uncon- little reason to believe that the were por- in stitutional when enacted 1930. Justice White, by opinion joined the Harlan, tion of Justice reaffirmed retroactivity approach Cipriano. The decision would “apply general obligation only bonds for to authorizations this decision.” 399 that are not final as of . . . the date of timely challenge plaintiff’s S., was at 214. Since “retroactively” Id., at to her. filed, the case would authorizing “[i]n chal- the case of States Moreover, 214-215. lenges period, all elections elections within a definite bond by prior held to the date of this decision will not be affected challenge grounds by this decision unless a on the sustained brought period speci- this decision has been or is within the Id., Stone, fied law.” at 214.7 See also Hill v. state (1975). 289, that, matter, The stated as a remedial States with no Court also elections, period challenging prior to well-defined bond bonds issued open challenge of an action would not be on basis commencement Harlan, joined portion who this of its decision. 399 U. at 214. Justice plainly Kolodziejski, petitioners Cipriano and Under adjudication tax the Arkansas HUE vio- an entitled to after our decision Constitution both before lated the timely filed and Their case Scheiner. lawsuit was yet taxes is not final. The to us the assessment comes requires give justice that we administration of evenhanded applied rule that we the benefit of the same decisional them taxpayers in Scheiner. in favor of

> by implication, analysis plurality rejects and, our applies Cipriano Kolodziejski, and instead decisions respect approach to federal statutes of that we with took Huson, U. S. 97 limitations Chevron Co. v. Oil operative plurality “[i]f the conduct or that, The states law-changing decision, a court the occured before events apply prevailing the conduct,” at the time of should the law may party “[e]ither a court ben at that before ante, 191, and application Ante, Oil rule.” at efit from the of the Chevron constitutional, ante, The assessment of HUE taxes was 198. legisla- the it was enacted the state 182, at because at time good to believe it to be constitu- have had reason tors would collected, at time it was state authorities were and, tional the precedents justified relying of in the Court. on then-current logic, if the the tax was con- Ante, at 181-182.8 Under same express any contrary it opinion, did views to those of the not understand to Donnelly, expressed in v. Estate 397 U. which he had States United of 286, addition, us, it is In as this case comes conceded that timely provision petitioners’ pursuant state challenge was filed payments. challenging tax plurality potential liability to which Although the makes much of the law, or might subject be the Due Process Clause state it State under the determining appropriate duty relief” the end that the “initial admits us, courts, ante, 176, that, as the case comes to state at lies with the place application of would on Ar that the retroactive “the burden event, Ante, any precisely determined.” 182. kansas cannot under the Process Clause or if were to be held liable Due even the State decision such a law-changing prior sidered unconstitutional Contracting Co., 302 U. S. as James v. Dravo or (1937), Brady, Complete Transit, Inc. Auto 430 U. S. held liable even though, would still be the State

presumably its con- Constitution, of the under our better understanding If distinc- duct lawful. the plurality’s proffered was entirely rules retroactivity tion the same is to be accepted, Griffith to civil plaintiffs. must defendants as apply to civil Ante, at 198-199. anomalous approach— for this support sole plurality’s law which

that case is that the law to a particular applicable to the case- faith to be applicable believe parties good “the that states is citation to a footnote single Griffith by area civil . . continues to be retroactivity. governed Huson, Oil Co. Chevron standard announced footnote (1971).” n. 8.9 The readi Griffith, majority’s however, support does not Oil Chevron re- and its progeny ng.10 Close examination liability through law, plurality the State of state should not absolve be lawful. determining its conduct to backdoor of treatment of plurality’s it 9 Although one would not surmise from by the challenged both issue, has been applicability of Chevron Oil 23-24, 12; Respondents parties, Petitioners Brief for see Brief for see, case, g., e. Brief for National Conference amici on both sides 11; National Private Amici Brief for Legislatures et al. as Curiae State Council, Inc., 6. Amicus Curiae Truck as (1967), Michigan v. California, 386 U. S. 18 Chapman do 10 Nor Massachusetts, (1973), 393 U. S. 5 Payne, 412 and Arsenault in plurality’s approach. Chapman any support for the provide undermines, rather and thus remedy for a constitutional violation volved a analysis. presented we a federal plurality’s What said supports, than the ante, at incompletely by plurality, the passage quoted question in the a 177-178, stand when State a for a crime should “[w]hether was conviction S., constitutionally rights.” 386 U. guaranteed accord federal has failed to court, The state under a similar situation. presented at 21. Arsenault constitutionally re remedy that was retroactivity, denied a guise the of whether a was unclear as to Finally, Payne, the state court quired. by the Federal Constitution. remedy required was particular principle for a remedial the those cases establish veals that by equitable not, discretion federal courts of exercise applicable principle plurality to all a choice-of-law states, the Ante, at 191. on review. cases direct controversy private a between two involved Oil Chevron application litigants the statute of limitations for ac- of over At Lands Act. the the Outer Continental Shelf tions under long line a of federal- the was initiated there was time lawsuit admiralty holding law doctrine of court decisions injury applied personal Act, to suits under laches initially challenge the at and the defendant did not U. special circum- Id., at In those of the action. 99. timeliness interpretation the Act did not our stances, ruled that we admiralty apply incorporate retroac- would not doctrine tively plaintiff’s suit. Remedial considerations bar analysis. dispositive a court We stressed that to our were establishing considering effect a decision the retroactive principle issues such as of law should consider remedial new inequity purpose question rule in and the and effect application, imposed id., 106-107, at and held retroactive underlying purpose the Lands Act’s to the that “devotion absorption weighing equities re of state law and a application quires of limi nonretroactive the state statute Co., Id., v. Lukens 109; see also Goodman Steel tations.” (1987)(applying new limitations rule previous party retroactively which there no law on when was rely). inequitable It most would have been was entitled rights’” plaintiff “‘slept on have held that the had his during period in which neither he nor the defendant could applied to the case. known the time limitation that have S., 108. inter- did not its Insofar as Court Chevron Oil pretation parties Court, before the of federal law to the contrary adopting a un- the lower court’s decision affirmed derstanding even law, that case does not address federal presented by problem case, ad- and was which is

221 disparate similarly dressed Harlan, Justice of treatment of parties. thing situated It is one for a court to address issues indispensable judgment delay that are not to its or to the is- judgment;11 quite suance of a apply reasoning it is another for it to refuse to necessary judgment

in one case that is to its virtually in a identical case. fundamentally,

More however, Chevron involved the Oil application of a statute limitations, an area over which the historically equitable federal courts have asserted discretion tolling, to craft rules of laches, and waiver. Bowen v. See City (1986);Zipes York, New 476 467, U. S. 479 v. Trans (1982); World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. Burnett 385, 398 v. (1965); New York Co., Central R. 380 U. S. 424 Braun v. (1870)(“It Sauerwein, 218, 10 Wall. 223 seems, therefore, to running may be established, that the of a statute of limitation itself”). suspended by be causes not mentioned in the statute proceed upon “presumption Statutes of limitations that extinguished they litigated claims are whenever are not proper prescribed period, they forum within the take away ground complaint, they all solid because rest on the negligence party Hanger Abbott, or laches of himself,” (1868); 6 532, Wall. when “none of the reasons on which possibly apply,” id., the statute is founded can at 539-540, equitable the federal courts have exercised discretion to sus- pend running period conformity of a limitations with “policy underlying [the] limitations,” Burnett, statute of supra, explained: at 434. The author Chevron Oil later providing “[T]he mere fact that a federal statute for substan- Huson, respect, (1971), In that Chevron Oil Co. v. 404 U. S. 97 is one in a line of eases which the Court has announced new rules for the future only, refusing parties them even to the before the Court. See Valeo, (1976); Buckley England also v. Louisiana Examiners, State Bd. Medical 375 U. S. In Northern Co., Pipeline Pipe Construction Co. v. Marathon Line applied retroactively, the Court held its decision should only judgments prior but entered to the the sense date of decision upset. would not be

222 upon liability institution time limitation also sets a

tive power of the courts to federal not restrict of suit does under certain of tolled the statute limitations hold that purpose.” legislative not inconsistent with circumstances Pipe 414 Utah, 538, v. U. S. Co. American & Construction J.). (1974) (Stewart, federal courts have no When the 559 equitable has au- have held a federal court no discretion, we retroactively. thority See Firestone a law to refuse to Risjord, S. 379 449 U. Tire Rubber Co. v. & “retroactivity” into a similar cases fit our The remainder of Al-Khazraji, College 481 v. U. S. In Saint Francis mold. (1987), “[t]he again recognized rule is that usual 604 we once with the accordance be decided federal cases should (citing existing id., decision,” of at 608 law the time Gulf Corp., 486, n. 16 453 U. S. Co. v. Mobil Oil Offshore Housing Authority (1981); Thorpe Durham, 393 v. U. (1969); Peggy, 1 Cranch 268, 281 States v. Schooner United (1801)), “counselled] found that Chevron Oil 103, 110 but against application limitations deci statute retroactive (emphasis S., at 608 sions in certain circumstances.” added). deciding the correct statute of limitations Without respondent’s period claimwas ourselves, we held clearly timely filed estab time barred because it was under By contrast, v. Lu law the Goodman lished Circuit. (1987), gave Co., kens 656 we retroactive ef Steel 482 U. S. of limitations suits fect to our decision on the statute clearly § 1981—which 42 overruled estab under U. S. C. complain law in the time the lished Circuit—because precedent ing brought party clear suit there no Circuit was rely. it was 482 at 662-663. on which entitled College Francis and Lukens Steel Co. make clear that Saint principle alter the that consummated Chevron Oil does not analyzed the best current understand transactions under ing decision, the law at the time of but rather establishes equitable principle particular to the exercise of discretion.

223 relied, Allen v. which Chevron Oil upon civil cases Elections, Shoe, Hanover State Bd. (1969), 544 U. S. Machinery Corp., Inc. v. United Shoe (1968), 392 U. S. 481 Simpson Reynolds Sims, v. (1964), v. Cal., Union Oil Co. of (1964), 377 U. S. 13 as well as those Long, Florida it, cases which relied upon have Governing Tax An Arizona Comm. for Deferred nuity Compensation Norris, Plans Deferred Kurtzman, and Lemon v. U. 411 192 S. U. S. (1983), 1073 (Lemon II), (1973) of a concerned not the application have id., rather rule, new at but statutory constitutional or when should award applying relief that a court federal Mohammed, Caban 441 also v. new law.12 See (1979) These cases are J., dissenting). 416 (Stevens, Harlan con which, explained, all in as Justice cases remedy See United be appropriate. reliance might sideration of 12 overruled upon the criminal cases were Chevron also relied Oil relied on The other civil cases Kentucky, v. 479 U. S. 314 Griffith Houma, City 395 U. S. 701 by Oil—Cipriano v. the Court in Chevron of Bank, (1969), 308 Drainage v. Baxter State U. County District Chicot Co., Refining 287 (1940), & 371 R. Co. v. Sunburst Oil Great Northern cases, City Du (1932), municipal Gelpcke bond U. S. 358 and of (1866); County, 294 (1864);Havemeyer v. Iowa 3 Wall. buque, 1 Wall. 175 McClure, (1871), provide support for 10 511 no Wall. and Railroad Co. supra, at 215-217. As to the other Cipriano, see judgment here. On Oil, why explained none of by Harlan has civil cases cited Chevron Justice today: by reached the Court support them the result (1864), only 1 175 holds that state City Dubuque, Wall. “Gelpcke v. of by particular provisions of may compelled in some situations courts only. prospectively rules . . . apply certain new Federal Constitution Co., Refining & 287 U. S. R. v. Sunburst Oil Great Northern Co. (1932), imposes no barrier to a merely the Federal Constitution holds that prospectively rule apply a new state common-law state court’s decision prec- final assertion of answer to the dissenters’ only. Is it not sufficient County Drainage District v. Bax that Chicot support point out edential Bank, judg a collateral attack on a civil was 308 U. S. 371 ter State Mackey judicata effect?” entitled to res already final and ment otherwise (1971) States, concurring judgment (opinion v. United part). dissenting part (concur Donnelly, S., at 296-297 U. Estate States v. of problem ring plurality II, opinion). in Lemon As the stated scope equitable appropriate remedies” of of “the federal implicated issue choice-of-law from the distinct added). equity, (emphasis “In S., at 199 case. rigid and look to the absolutes else, courts eschew nowhere inescapably practical involved rec- necessities realities and notwithstanding competing onciling that those in- interests, Id., id., see also 201; have constitutional roots.” terests Donnelly, (citing at 296-297 Estate at 199-200 (Harlan, concurring)). J., unquestionably the Com tax violates Arkansas HUE might from that conclu results follow merce Two Clause. the Due assessed violates If the retention taxes sion. today Corp. in McKesson under our decision Process Clause Dept. Beverages Tobacco, Alcoholic v. Division petitioners Regulation Fla., 36-43, ante, Business impose remedy. The freedom to various to a State’s entitled requirements procedural refund mechanism suffi on the planning. any ciently in sound fiscal meets state interest not 44-45. If of the taxes does violate the retention Ante, state but violate the constitu Clause, Process does Due petitioners provision governing illegal exactions, tional matter of law. The State has to relief as a state entitled illegally right provide taxes and make its relief for exacted equities judgment deter free from this Court’s own unduly burdensome. that such relief would be mination from a violation of fun we think relief either event—whether remedy unfair choice damental fairness to be or State’s unjust warrant to substitute our to the State—we have no judgment or law the Due Process Clause state for what require. would

V apply only need I in Scheiner hold that our decision would challenging the tax has law, the time for under state where, specified by brought expired, within the time or cases yet challenging tax, the decisions are not state law for Supreme did not reach the issue final. The Arkansas Court remedy under state law be whether a was available refund prevented retro cause view that federal law of its erroneous paid application to taxes active our decision prior I escrow order. to the date of Justice Blackmun’s Supreme the Arkansas would remand the case to therefore petitioners are entitled to whether for consideration today in Mc law or under our decision relief under state Tobacco, Beverages Corp. Alcoholic Kesson Division p. Regulation pt. Fla., ante, 18. Business De respectfully I dissent.

Case Details

Case Name: American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith

Court Name: Supreme Court of the United States

Date Published: Jun 4, 1990

Citation: 496 U.S. 167

Docket Number: 88-325

Court Abbreviation: SCOTUS