137 Ky. 414 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1910
— Reversing.
The appellee, Adams, alleging that he was injured by the negligence of the appellant company “in furnishing him an unsafe place in which to work and in furnishing him with unsafe appliances with which to' work,” sought to recover from the appellant company $1,995. Upon a trial before a jury he was awarded $1,500. The judgment for this amount we are asked to reverse chiefly for the reason that the jury should have been peremptorily directed to return a verdict for the tobacco company.
The facts are these: The tobacco company had a warehouse in Cynthiana in which it prized tobacco in hogsheads. After the tobacco had been put in the hogshead, it would be placed on a low four-wheeled truck and hauled to the place in the warehouse where the screws used in prizing were located. On the occasion that appellee was injured he.was in front of this truck pulling it by means of an iron rod, and two other colaborers were behind pushing the truck. When appellee, thus engaged, reached a place on the floor at the tobacco press where it was intended to stop, the truck stalled, and in an effort to start it appellee slipped and fell on his hip and side, bruising him quite severely, but not breaking any bones. At the time and place he slipped and fell the floor was wet and somewhat slippery, caused by the rain then falling, which leaked through a defective roof over the press floor. There was also two worn places in the floor made by the wheels of the truck that were one-fourth or one-half inch deep. The accident happened about half past 9 in the morning, and after appellee and his colaborers had been engaged in this work some two hours and a half.
On cross-examination he was asked: Q. Was it dry when you went there? A. Yes, sir. Q. And it got wet after you went there? A. Yes, sir. Q. Did you see it? A. No, sir; I didn’t see where I fell. I saw it further out on the floor. Q. You saw other places wet? A. Yes, sir. Q. Why do you say you slipped, if you didn’t see the wet place? A. It was wet, or I wouldn’t have slipped. ■ Q. If there was a wet place and you had noticed, you could have seen it,.couldn’t you? A. Yes, sir; if I had been noticing. Q. The rain came down from where? A. Where the pipe ran out above where the hogshead sets. Q. Where were you standing when you slipped? A. At that place where the hogshead ought to set. Q. You were pulling when ydu slipped? A. Yes, sir. Q. Were the other men pushing? A. They were supposed to be pushing. Q. You had been walking backwards and forwards over this place, and hadn’t seen the wet place? A. Yes, sir. Q. .How many times did you pass over that place that morning? A. I don’t know how many times I passed over it. Several times I suppose; hut I went in backwards, and out at the sides, and, when I stopped, the hogsheads were setting where the wet place is.”
John Rorer, who was assisting in pushing the hogsheads, said he was behind the hogshead six or seven feet from Adams, who was in front of it. “Q. When did the truck stop with reference to the time Adams fell — how short a time before he fell? A. Well, I don’t know. We were trying to shove it
Pearl Ginn testified: “Q. What kind of place was it where Adams fell? A. It was wet. Q. What made that place wet? A. It leaked down from above where the screw went through the roof. Q. Did it leak
This was all the evidence for the appellee as to the condition existing at the time of the accident. It appears from this evidence that with the exceptions of the fact that the roof leaked, and there were some slight ruts in the floor made by the wheels'of the truck, the premises as well as the appliances were safe. So that the question is: Did the fact that the roof leaked and there were some slight depressions in the floor make the place unsafe to such an extent as to authorize a recovery in this case. We think not. The fact that there were worn places in the floor did not cause Adams to fall, unless it can be said that these places made it harder to' move the truck, and consequently required greater effort on the part of Adams and his colaborers, and that this extra exertion in some way contributed to his fall. But evidently the worn-out places had little to do with Adams falling. ■ The place at which he fell was slippery on account of the rain, and in the exertion required to move the trucks his feet slipped on the wet floor, causing him to fall. If the floor had not been wet, it is not probable he would have fallen. There is no pretense that Adams could not see the floor and its condition. He does not say he did not know of the depressions in the floor, but says that he did not know the floor was wet at the place he fell, although he did know it was wet in other places. Why he did not know it was wet at the place he fell is not apparent. It was in the daytime, and there is no intimation that the building was not well lighted. The leak in the roof was immediately over the place he fell, and
But the effort is made to bring this case within the rule laid down when the servant works under an assurance that defective places or appliances will be repaired; and so we will look into this phase of the case. But, before doing so, it may be well to notice that there is no pretense here that the request was made to repair the roof or the floor because of any apprehension that accident or injury might follow the failure to repair. It was not anticipated when the request was made, or when’the assurance was given, that the employe would be injured if the repairs were
As we' understand the rules in reference to the protection of the servant when he continues in an employment after he has called' the attention of the master to the fact that the premises or appliances are defective or unsafe, and has an assurance that they will be repaired, they may be summarized generally as follows: (1) If the place is intrinsically dangerous or if the appliances or implements to be used require skill or care in handling to prevent accident or injury, the servant may depend upon the assurance of the master to repair; but if the place is not intrinsically dangerous to work in or about, and the appliances or implements in use are simple in character and those used in ordinary employments, and such as do not require any particular care or skill to .operate or handle, the promise of the master to repair will not render him liable if he fails to do so. (2) The servant must have been induced by the assurance or promise to continue in the employment. (3) If the promise or assurance is that the repair will be made by a specified time, the servant may continue to work on the faith of it until the time speci
These propositions are supported by the decided weight of authority. They have in one form or another been declared by this court in Louisville Hotel Co. v. Kaltenbrun, 80 S. W. 1163, 26 Ky. Law Rep. 208; Reiser v. Southern Plan. Co., 114 Ky. 1, 69 S. W. 1085, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 796; Bell & Coggeshall Co. v. Applegate, 62 S. W. 1124, 23 Ky. Law Rep, 470; Breckinridge Co., Ltd., v. Hicks, 94 Ky. 362, 22 S. W. 554, 15 Ky. Law Rep. 143, 42 Am. St. Rep. 361. In 26 Cyc. 1209, they are thus stated: “Where the master or some one acting in his place promises to remedy the defect complained of, the servant by continuing in his employment for a reasonable time after such promise does not assume the risk of injury from the defect, unless the danger was so patent that no person of ordinary prudence would have continued work. This rule does not apply in cases of ordinary labor, with common implements
It is manifest that the conditions did not exist in this case upon which a servant has the right to depend upon the assurance of the master, and no importance is to be attached to the fact that a request was made to repair the premises or an assurance given that they would be repaired. We are well satisfied that the defects in the premises at which Adams was working were not of such a character as to authorize a recovery. If the fact that Adams fell was not due to an accident that may happen at any time or place without reference to the safe or unsafe condition of the premises, then it well comes within the rule laid down in Shemwell v. Owensboro & Nashville R. Co., 117 Ky. 556, 78 S. W. 448, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 1671; Wilson v. Chess-Wymond Co., 117 Ky. 567, 78 S. W. 453, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 1655; Duncan v. Gernert Bros. Lumber Co.., 87 S. W. 762, 27 Ky. Law Rep. 1039, and other cases along this line.
The motion for a peremptory instruction should have been sustained. Wherefore the judgment is reversed, with directions for a new trial in conformity with this opinion.