244 F. 701 | 9th Cir. | 1917
(after stating the facts as above).
The law of Washington (Remington’s Codes and Statutes, §§ 5915, 5916) recognizes the separate property of husband and wife. In the case of the husband it is that which he owned before marriage and that which he acquired afterward by gift, bequest, devise, or descent, with the rents, issues, and profits thereof. In the case of the wife it is that which she owned at the time of the marriage or afterward, acquired by gift, devise, or Inheritance, with the rents, issues, and profits thereof. Section 5917 provides that:
“Property, not acquired or owned as prescribed in the next two preceding sections, acquired after marriage by either husband or wife, or both, is community property, but the husband shall have the management and control of the community personal property, with a like power of disposition as he was of his separate personal property, except that he shall not devise by will more than one-half thereof.”
Section 5918 provides that:
“The husband liar, the management and control of the community real property, but he shall not sell, convey, or incumber the community real estate, unless the wife join with him in executing the deed or other instrument of conveyance.”
The Supreme Court of Washington has held that any liability incurred by the husband in the prosecution of any business is prima facie a charge against the community, but that the presumption is overthrown by proof that the liability was not incurred, in a business of which the community would have had the benefit if profit had been realized therefrom (McDonough v. Craig, 10 Wash. 239, 38 Pac. 1034); that a guaranty by the husband for the payment of goods to be furnished a corporation of which he is a stockholder, being merely a contract of suretyship, creates a separate and not a community debt (Spinning v. Allen, 10 Wash. 570, 39 Pac. 151), yet, if the husband is an officer and stockholder of the corporation and becomes surety to pro
The plaintiff contends that Sandberg’s execution of the indemnity agreement resulted in benefit to the community property in this, that the construction company thereby was enabled to obtain the contract with the paper company, and thus to make money to repay to Sandberg his advances on the Kentucky building contract. But the contention is not sustained by the facts. There is no evidence that such was the purpose of Sandberg’s act,- or that he expected or derived any benefit to the community therefrom, and the fact was, as found by the court below, that at the time when Sandberg signed the indemnity agreement, the Kentucky building was substantially completed and paid for,-and the construction company was then in good financial standing.
It is contended that the judgment rendered in British Columbia on behalf of the paper company is conclusive upon the defendants herein, for the reason that they were notified and had an opportunity to defend that action. But such is not the record. Peter Sandberg had notice of the action, but Mrs. Sandberg had not, nor was she a party to the action, and the court below found that she had no knowledge of it.
The decree is affirmed.