delivered the opinion of the Court.
July 16, 1930, petitioner claiming to be a creditor of respondent in an amount exceeding $7,000 filed a petition in bankruptcy against her in the United States district court for Massаchusetts. It is alleged that on March 18, 1930, she conveyed her property with intent to hinder, delay and defraud her creditors including the petitionеr and that she was insolvent. Respondent’s answer denied that she committed the alleged act of bankruptcy or was insolvent or that petitioner was a creditor or had a provable claim against her. The court heard the case on evidence taken by, and the report of, a special master, made findings of fact and adjudged respondent a bank *515 rupt. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 57 F. (2d) 829.
The substance of the findings, so far as material to our decision, may be briefly stated:
Under date of April 18, 1927, one Mogliani as principal and petitioner as surety executed a bond for $15,000 to the treasurer of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to secure, among other things, the payment of any judgment that might be obtained in an action against the principal for injury resulting to any person by reason of the discharge of fireworks by him at a public exhibition. The bond was made and delivered pursuant to Massachusetts G. L., 1921, c. 148, § 57 C, D. Acts, 1921, c. 500. Petitioner became surеty in accordance with an application executed by respondent and in reliance upon her agreement to indemnify it аgainst every claim or liability arising on the bond. The application and agreement were accompanied by a financial stаtement made by her showing that in addition to considerable cash she owned several pieces of real estate worth much more than the amount of the bond. September 26, 1927, one Beatrice Ricci was injured by fireworks discharged at a public exhibition under the directiоn of Mogliani. She sued him for damages and, March 4, 1930, got a verdict for $10,000. March 18 respondent conveyed all her real estate to onе Muollo, and on the same day he mortgaged a part of it and quit-claimed all to her husband to be held by the latter in trust for the benefit of their сhildren. These conveyances covered all respondent’s property and were made without consideration and with specific intent on her part to hinder, delay and defraud the petitioner, her only creditor. The verdict having been reduced, judgment was enterеd April 10, 1930, in favor of Ricci and against Mogliani for $6,650.48. Unable to collect from him, she demanded payment from *516 petitioner. And April 18, 1930, conformably to the statute, a suit on the bond was brought against petitioner to recover for her the amount of the judgment. Some time before it filed thе petition in bankruptcy petitioner paid to her attorney the sum claimed and judgment was entered against it for that amount.
The Circuit Court оf Appeals sustained respondent’s contention that to constitute an act of bankruptcy, a fraudulent transfer must hinder, delay or defrаud a creditor holding a claim provable at the time of such conveyance, and held that petitioner’s claim against respоndent was contingent and not provable until the entry of the judgment against Mogliani, and that therefore respondent committed no act of bankruptcy. And it directed the district court to dismiss the petition.
Unless required by the Act, the meaning of the word “ creditors ” as used in § 3a (1) is not to be restriсted to those whose claims are provable at the time of the fraudulent conveyance.
Section 1 declares: “ The words аnd phrases used in this Act and in proceedings pursuant hereto shall, unless the same be inconsistent with the context, be construed as follows: ... (9) ‘ сreditor’ shall include anyone who owns a demand or claim provable in bankruptcy, and may include his duly authorized agent, attorney, or рroxy.” 11 U. S. C., § 1. And § 3a contains the following: “Acts of bankruptcy by a person shall consist of his having (1) conveyed, transferred, concealed, or removed, or permitted to be concealed or removed, any part of his property with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors, or any of them.” 11 U. S. C., § 21a. The decision below shows that at common law the word “ creditors ” has a broader meaning. But the court construed the definition of creditor, § 1 (9), to be comprehensive and the word “ include ” to be one of limitation, the equivalent of “ include only,”' and to exclude every person not having a demand pres *517 ently provable. Its ruling that respondent’s transfer of her property to defraud pеtitioner was not an act of bankruptcy rests upon that construction.
In definitive provisions of statutes and other writings, “ include ” is frequently, if not generally, used as a word of extension or enlargement rather than as one of limitation or enumeration.
Fraser
v.
Bentel,
*518
There being nothing to indicatе any other purpose, Congress must be deemed to have intended that in § 3a (1) “creditors” should be given the meaning usually attributed to it when used in the сommon law definition of fraudulent conveyances. See
Coder
v.
Arts,
As the Circuit Court of Appeals, upon constructions of §§ 1 (9) and 3a (1) which we hold erroneous, disposed of the case without deciding other questions there raised, the decree will be reversed and the case will be remanded to that court for further consideration and proceedings in harmony with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.