90 F. 598 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Northern Ohio | 1898
There is a motion by Fred Walker, one of defendants, to vacate the service of subpoena upon him as the president and chief officer of the Wire Drawers' & Die Makers’ Union No. 3, and to dismiss the bill as to that union, and also as to the Wire Drawers’ & Die Makers’ Union No. 1, and to strike their names from the record, for the reason that there is no law or precedent for suing a voluntary association by its name, or for obtaining jurisdiction over it by service of a summons on one of its officers. There is also a demurrer by the same Fred Walker, “for the reason that the facts staled in said bill of complaint do not constitute a cause of action against said defendants.” The title in the caption of this demurrer is as follows: “The American Steel & Wire Company, Complainant, vs. Wire Drawers’ & Die Makers’ Union No. 1, of Cleveland, Ohio, Defendants.” This pleading probably follows the form used under the state code of practice, which is wholly inapplicable here, and it is altogether inartificial, according to our equity rules and practice. If it were in proper form, not being verified by defendanl, nor certified by counsel, as required by equity rule 31, it must be wholly disregarded, if it be permissible at this stage of (he proceeding, and on this application for a preliminary injunction, to hear it at all. National Bank v. Insurance Co., 104 U. S. 54, 76; Furnace Co. v. Witherow, 149 U. S. 574, 13 Sup. Ct. 936; Secor v. Singleton, 9 Fed. 809. It lias not been set down for hearing by the plaintiff according to equity rule 33; and the defendant's remedy, on failure of the plaintiff to so set the demurrer for argument,' is regulated by rule 38. Or, for the fatal defect above 7>ointed out, the plaintiff may disregard it, and take a pro confesso, at the proper time, under equity rules 18 and 19; or move to strike it from the hies. Goodyear v. Toby, 6 Blatchf. 130, Fed. Cas. No. 5,585, and the cases last above cited. Hence, any disposition of this demurrer now would be premature, and I only refer to it because it is presented by counsel as having a bearing upon the application for a preliminary injunction. If it suggested an entire
The bill is unquestionably defective, and there is an application to amend it, which should be considered along with this motion. While alleging that they are “voluntary associations,” the bill sues the two unions as if they were suable entities, as corporations are, and the subpoena issues against them as such. There is not an averment in the bill which undertakes to reach them otherwise than by this general suit against them. It is too plain for any argument that they cannot be so sued. The right to sue and be sued is a corporate franchise, must be granted by legislation, and voluntary associations only possess it under the circumstances mentioned in Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 10 Wall. 566. This bill does not, by its allegations, connect any of the defendants with these unions, unless the caption, which is equivocal in this regard, may be taken to aver that all the defendants named therein are members of them. If so, no distinction is made between’the two, showing which of the defendants are members of the one and which of the other. The punctuation of the caption, however, would indicate that the defendants are sued individually, and not as members of the unions. It reads thus: “The American Steel & Wire Company, Complainant, vs. Wire Drawers’ and Die Makers’ Union No. 1, of Cleveland, Ohio, and Wire Drawers’ Union No. 3, of Cleveland, Ohio, of the Federated Wire Trades of America; the respective members of said unions; Walter Gillette; E. A. Cliff; F. Marquardt; and many others, similarly named, to the number of 86— Defendants.” This would seem to indicate that the two unions were sued respectively, then “the respective members of said unions” in solido, and then the individuals named as individuals, and not as members or representatives of the unions. The allegations of the bill do not help this in any way. The individuals are not averred to be officers or members of the unions, or to have any connection with them, except in the eighth paragraph it is related that “certain committees [of which the defendant Gillette was a member] from said unions have called upon the officers and agents of your
The subpoena and rule to show cause follow the identical words of: the caption, and command (he appearance of the defendants in those words. The return No. 2 of the marshal states that he served the process on “Wire Drawers’ Union No. 1 by delivering a copy of the bill to R. Heiden, treasurer of said union, the president of said union not found in my district”; and his return No. 1 states that he served the process on “Wire Drawers’ Union No. 3 by delivering a copy to Aug. Maltois, vice president of said union, the president of said union not found in my district.” Both of these officials are named as defendants, but neither in his official capacity, and there is no allegation of the bill connecting them with the unions. The amendment that is asked cures this defect of substantial and specific allegation very thoroughly, but counsel of the defendants object to its being filed now, and insist that the proof shows that Gillette is not the president of this union No. 1, but only a member of the executive committee of the Federated Wire Trade, another and distinct organization, not sued by this bill. But, however that may be, the amendment avers that Gillette is president of the Union No. 1 and Walker of Union No. 3, and now specifically states that Cliff, Marquurdt, Hank, Heiden, and about 40 others named in the amendment are members of these voluntary associations, and asks that Gillette and Walker, the respective presidents, and the named members, be made parties “as representing said two voluntary associations and its membership, as fully as if each member thereof were made a party defendant hereto.” It also avers that the membership is numerous, that all of them are not known to the plaintiffs, and that it is impracticable to make them all parties to this bill. Counsel for defendants say, in their brief, that some 10 persons named in this amendment are not members of these unions. That would seem quite immaterial when there are 30 members left to represent the whole; but. technically, we cannot try that question now, and in this maimer, and only on a proper plea in abatement, which is a sufficient answer to the suggeslion, as also it is to that about Gillette not being the president of Union No. 1.
It. is also objected that the amendment cannot now properly be made to serve the purposes of this application for injunction, but that it must take the regular course, by having process issued, notice served, and a new application for injunction made in that behalf. As 1 have repeatedly said in many judicial judgments, the federal statute of amendments is the most liberal and imperative since the ancient and beneficent statute of jeofails. Rev. St. § 954. It commands that the court “may at any time permit either of the
As to the suggested necessity for process before the amendment can be effective, that objection overlooks the fact that we are not proceeding on this application for a preliminary injunction upon the process of subpoena, but upon the notice prescribed in the rules ordered by the circuit judge, and especially designed for this hearing. ' The subpoenas issued are not returnable until the first Monday in November next, while this rule to show cause against an injunction pendente lite is returnable now, and the process demanded by this objection may be hereafter had in due time, according to the equity rules, for all other purposes. Meantime, however,, as already shown, the amendment, if allowed to be filed, must stand good for the present purpose, and becomes as effective as the original bill on the hearing of the application for preliminary injunction. It would be, hoAvever, proper practice to postpone this hearing for a further notice or another rulé to show cause against the amended bill, if the circumstances required it. If altogether new parties are to be made, having no notice of this hearing, postponement would be essential; but such is not the fact, in the substantial particulars.' The notice already given to parties on the record has been sufficient to bring the unions here, and we are now dealing-with their mótion to be dismissed. Being here for that purpose, they are available for all the purposes of this interlocutory application for an injunction, one of which is to receive and submit to any amendment of the bill that may be granted in aid of the application. Other circumstances might require that the hearing should be postponed to admit the parties for some defense against the amendment not now open upon this interlocutory hearing; but they do not exist. Most of these defendants, and especially the chief officers, if not all, who are named in the proposed amendment to the bill, have been here defending against the claim for an injunction, and the facts relating to the share their unions have taken in the strike have been put in evidence as fully as they desired to present them, or as they would be at any delayed hearing, and quite as fully as is at all necessary for any defense they could properly make against an interlocutory injunction. Indeed, I am not sure but
And I may as well now dispose of another objection pertinent here, as well as to the general defense, though it has not been presented as an objection to the application for leave to amend the bill as proposed. Counsel has prepared elaborate and useful schedules of this small army of defendants, showing those who have answered, those who have been served and not answered, those who are out of the jurisdiction as shown by the proof, those who have not been served at all, and about whom nothing is shown, those against whom there is no evidence in the affidavits tiled, those “who have been seen once only in the vicinity,” and those who have been seen “more than once.” By this process of cancellation and elimination we have a showing that only 13 — a corporal’s guard, comparatively— are up for “government by injunction.” All this would be very well if this case were on final hearing',’ and the question were one of perpetual injunction. Then such elimination would be necessary on the plainest principles of equitable remedy and practice. But not so now. It is premature labor and consideration, for none of the parties can be now dismissed from the record, nor should the preliminary injunction be withheld for any of the reasons suggested by the schedules, as will presently be shown. Nor do 1 'overlook the forcible argument and suggestion of counsel that practically, in a case like this, a preliminary injunction ends ilie strike. If yon “break the strike” by a preliminary injunction, it is urged, there is nothing more to litigate about. This may be true if the strike be then wholly abandoned, but otherwise it is not true, and its chief force is in the grave duty imposed on the court of careful consideration to see that no preliminary or other injunction issues, unless according to the law and right of the case. That responsibility is not oppressive in its weight, as it should not be, for tire reason that no court: can or should shirk it, whatever others may be allowed to do in other branches of governmental action, but is always felt alike in all cases as a potential inducement to careful judgment, whether at
We come now to the further objection to this amendment that it does not yet contain tlie specific allegations necessary in a bill to charge a few persons as the representatives of the many. Equity rule 48, allowing parties to be left out of the bill where they are too numerous, has already been referred to, but it should be read along with the series of rules beginning with rule 47 and extending to and including rule 54, from which it will be seen that the practice is carefully designed to regulate such suits according to the kind of classes which are sued, ordinarily; but there is not any specific provision for suits against unincorporated or voluntary associations. And there does not seem to be any uniform practice in the method of suing such societies. All that can be said is that, technically, it is a suit against the members individually, and not in solido against the company, as in the case of incorporated societies. The chief officers, for purposes of suits, represent a corporation, generally, and they may so represent a voluntary association; but there is no technical requirement that process shall be served on them exclusively or generally, though by a natural analogy that would be a convenient method to adopt in suing a voluntary association or in bringing a suit for it. But the association may, and often does, appoint or select its own agencies for bringing its suits, formally or informally, by a selection of such as, for the occasion, it chooses to adopt. In suits against it the plaintiff is left to get along as best he can by aid of the rule allowing a few of the mass to be selected as representatives, and by aid of the court in ordering that the proceedings shall be conducted according to the particular circumstances and the particular nature or purpose of each suit, all absent parties not actually served with process being protected by the modification contained in the reservation of equity rule 48, already commented on, so far as the courts of the United States are concerned. Mandeville v. Riggs, 2 Pet. 482; Beatty v. Kurtz, Id. 566, 584; Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 10 Wall. 566, 570, 574, 575; Smith v. Swormstedt, 16 How. 288, 302; Ayres v. Carver, 17 How. 591; McArthur v. Scott, 113 U. S. 340, 395, 5 Sup. Ct. 652; U. S. v. Old Settlers, 148 U. S. 427, 480, 13 Sup. Ct. 650; Hotel Co. v. Wade, 97 U. S. 13, 21; Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425, 431; West v. Randall, 2 Mason, 181, Fed. Cas. No. 17,424 (volume 29, p. 722); U. S. v. Elliott, 64 Fed. 27, 35; Oxley Stave Co. v. Coopers’ International Union, 72 Fed. 695, 697; Railroad v. McConnell, 82 Fed. 65, 88; Fost. Fed. Prac. §§ 45, 47, 48, 108; Beach, Mod. Eq. Prac. §§ 65, 66; 1 Daniell, Ch. Prac. (5th Ed.) 272. The case of West v. Randall, supra, is a very full exposition of the practice by Mr. Justice Story, who refers to voluntary associations among the
The proposed amendment fully conforms to the practice as displayed in the foregoing cases. From the very nature of the case, there are sufficient of the members of the unions to defend this suit, and enougli to answer all practical purposes of the orders and decrees tha t may he asked against them. The fact of numerous membership and the necessity for proceeding against a few are stated, and the court can see that those mentioned fairly represent the whole. The fallacy of the objection made is in supposing that the required “representative” capacity resides in some official or authorized representative quality, attaching by reason of the action of the union itself in conferring it. As plaintiffs that might be required, as a reading of the above cases will show, but as defendants it is not. It depends on the facts in each case, and the court will regulate that matter by its decree, according t:o circumstances, and will insist that those brought in shall fairly represent the whole, according to the nature of the relief sought and the peculiarities of the association. In a case of an organized strike of laborers it is fair enough if ihe leaders of the strike be brought in to represent the organization, no matter what their official relation to their society may be. The result is that the motion to vacate the service of the process and rule to show cause against the two unions, which was reserved at the hearing, must be denied, and the plaintiffs have leave to file their amendment, after it has been properly verified by oath. The demurrer will stand over for future proceedings, according to the rules of practice in that behalf. Ordered accordingly.