748 P.2d 1060 | Utah | 1987
Lead Opinion
American Salt seeks review of a Public Service Commission (PSC) order dismissing its verified complaint.
American Salt harvests salt from the Great Salt Lake. By early 1984, the surface of the lake had risen to such a level as to endanger American Salt’s ability to recover sufficient amounts of salt to satisfy its markets. In order to supplement its inventory, American Salt purchased additional salt from Amax.
In April 1984, American Salt contacted W.S. Hatch Co. (Hatch), a Utah common carrier,
Approximately four miles of the eleven-mile route were over a public road. Accordingly, the hauls were subject to the jurisdiction of the PSC.
Pursuant to the parties’ agreement, Hatch hauled salt from April 16 until May 2, 1984. Subsequently, a dispute arose between the parties, and Hatch brought suit in federal district court to recover hauling charges based upon its general commodity tariff.
American Salt then filed a verified complaint with the PSC that sought relief from the imposition of Hatch’s general commodity tariff. This request for relief was based in part on the fact that Hatch had made several special commodity rate salt hauls
Hatch in turn filed a motion with supporting affidavits seeking dismissal of the complaint. In September 1985, the administrative law judge who heard Hatch’s motion filed his report and proposed order, which included findings of fact and conclusions of law. The report and order, which granted Hatch’s motion, were adopted by the PSC, and a subsequent application for rehearing was denied.
American Salt contends that the PSC had the authority and duty to grant its requested rate relief. It first claims that application of Hatch’s general commodity tariff in this case is unreasonable and unjust because (1) Hatch will recover a windfall profit, (2) having Hatch haul the salt at the general commodity rate makes no “economic sense” since the hauling charges will cause the cost of the salt to exceed its retail value, and (3) Hatch told the PSC that a lower rate was just and reasonable with respect to the Morton Salt hauls, and the PSC allowed Hatch to charge Morton Salt a special commodity rate. American Salt claims that by denying its requested relief, the PSC allowed Hatch to charge an unjust and unreasonable rate in violation of state law.
The findings of fact and conclusions of law provide in part:
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Commission finds that there is no genuine issue as to the following material facts:
1. The haul performed by Hatch for American Salt was made, in part, over a public road of the state of Utah.
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4.At the time of the haul, Hatch had a salt tariff on file that had been properly submitted to and approved by this Commission.[3 ] The Public Service Commission has examined and approved Hatch’s salt tariff on numerous occasions. The Commission has found the salt tariff to be just and reasonable.
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7. No application was made to this Commission to change the tariff rate applicable to this haul.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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3. Under the law, American Salt is charged with the knowledge that any haul over the Utah public highways is subject to the laws of the state of Utah and, therefore, to the applicable tariff provisions on file with and approved by this Commission.
4. The salt tariff on file with the Commission is fair and reasonable, and Hatch is legally required to collect the charges for transportation services as provided in said tariff.
5. Any oral or written agreements to charge a rate higher or lower than the published tariff rate, even assuming that such was agreed to by Hatch and American Salt, is void and unenforceable.
6. Any agreement or representation by Hatch that it would accept less than the applicable tariff rate in payment for its services, assuming such agreement or representation was made, is also void and unenforceable.
7. American Salt is required under the laws of the [sjtate of Utah to pay the tariff rate for the transportation services performed and other charges as set forth in said tariff....
The real question before us is whether these findings and conclusions should be disturbed. Since American Salt does not contest the three quoted findings that control the resolution of this case, we turn to
Because the basic responsibility for controlling utility rates is vested in the Commission and not in the courts, the legislature has narrowly prescribed our review of Commission orders that are attacked as allowing unreasonable or discriminatory rates.
All charges made, demanded, or received by Hatch for hauling services performed over public roads must be just and reasonable.
A just and reasonable rate is one that is sufficient to permit a utility to recover its costs of service and earn a reasonable return for its enterprise.
When a shipper requires a special rate due to irregular circumstances surrounding an isolated shipment, the proper course of action is for the common carrier to apply for a special commodity rate.
A common motor carrier’s request for a special commodity rate predicated upon irregular circumstances must be sought and approved prior to the hauling for which the tariff is requested. This concept was thoroughly explained in Utah Department of Business Regulation v. Public Service Commission,
We do not disagree with Complainant’s characterization of the result in this case as being harsh and, at least from its perspective, unfair. Complainant contracted to pay — and doubtless budgeted accordingly — one amount only to find that when time came for payment, it owed three or four times what it had anticipated. The only basis for the increase in charges is the fact that the service was performed over a public and not a private roadway; the increase was not based upon increased costs to Respondent.
Notwithstanding our sympathy for Complainant’s predicament, we are constrained by the force of case law relevant to the issues here to sustain our earlier order; nothing offered in the Application for Rehearing suggests that the case law has changed. The tariff rates must be charged, and collected unless prior specific authorization from this Commission is obtained. In the event that it is demonstrated that a carrier is intentionally misleading shippers to his pecuniary advantage, the Commission could and certainly would reconsider the fitness of such a carrier to hold an operating authority; however, that does not change the policy and requirement of law concerning tariffs and Complainant cannot be helped.
(Emphasis added.)
American Salt, however, relies on Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-20(1) (1986) to support its contention that the PSC had the power to grant what is, in effect, retroactive rate relief.
We think it plain from the language of the statute that the power of the commission to order reparations is limited to cases where charges have been made in excess of the schedules, rates, and tariffs on file with the commission, or discrimi-nations made under such schedules. That was the view [previously] taken by the commission itself, and approved by this court.16
The case of Bonfils v. Public Utilities Commission,
The commission erred, also, in denying that the rates established by the Railroad Commission for the said two periods must be accepted as the reasonable rates for those terms. The law creating said commission determines the question.
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These orders are findings or decisions of the commission, and are clearly within this section, and thus binding upon the successor of the old commission.
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It follows that the orders fixing rates were binding upon respondents....19
Certainly, Bonfils is not authority for the proposition that section 54-7-20 grants the PSC authority to allow retroactive rate relief.
In passing, we note that as for the proposition that it is entitled to rate relief, American Salt’s reliance on Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Utah Public Service Commission
In this case, the general commodity tariff was the only tariff on file which could properly be applied to the shipments in question. The Commission could not order reparations under the statute.
American Salt next claims that despite the PSC’s authority to act, the PSC violated its duty to prevent discriminatory rate practices by denying the requested relief. The argument is that by denying such relief, the PSC allowed Hatch to charge American Salt more than it charged Morton Salt for essentially the same hauling service. American Salt relies upon Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-3-8 (preferences and discriminatory practices prohibited), 54-3-6(2), and 54-3-7 (1986) (common carriers must extend uniform contracts to shippers).
The problem with American Salt’s argument is that it bases its claim of discrimination on the difference between Hatch’s general commodity tariff and the special commodity rate approved for the Morton Salt hauls. When a shipper is subject to the same circumstances underlying a special commodity rate, it cannot claim it has been discriminated against because it is charged a general commodity tariff where the shipper’s carrier has not applied for a special commodity rate prior to the hauling in question. Ruling otherwise would create a loophole in the fundamental principle underlying the statutory scheme pursuant to which the PSC controls utility rates: all ratemaking must be prospective.
Moreover, a ruling in favor of American Salt would be at variance with the broad authority granted the PSC to police utility rates
Other shortfalls in American Salt’s position become clear when it is analyzed under the facts of this case. At oral argument, counsel for American Salt explained that salt is a very competitive commodity. Were we to rule in favor of American Salt, every other salt haul transacted pursuant to Hatch’s general commodity tariff would be subject to a claim of discrimination based upon the cut rate offered American Salt. After each salt shipment conducted by Hatch, the shipper could claim that it was discriminated against based upon the competitive nature of salt. When the common carrier sued in a court of law to recover its published and approved tariff, the shipper could turn to the PSC, where it would be entitled to a hearing and a review of the PSC’s decision while the common carrier suit languished in court. It is totally unreasonable to suggest that the legislature intended such a state of affairs under title 54. Were it so, the PSC would in effect have to establish individual rates for each salt shipper, “a wholly uneconomic and impracticable, if not impossible, task.”
The fact that the Commission did not make a finding concerning discrimination is insignificant. As stated above, the Commission recognized the principle of law controlling this case and properly applied the same. Thus, this is not a case where the findings are not “sufficiently detailed to demonstrate that the Commission has properly arrived at the ultimate factual findings and has properly applied the governing rules of law to those findings.”
The hauls made by Hatch for American Salt were made over a public road and were therefore regulated.
American Salt also contends that Hatch contracted to obtain a special tariff and breached the covenant to American Salt’s detriment and suggests that Hatch misrepresented or misled American Salt concerning the applicable charges. Because the PSC did not have the authority to grant American Salt’s requested relief, we need not address these issues.
Affirmed. No costs awarded.
WE CONCUR:
. Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-2-1 (Supp.1984) (amended 1985, 1986 & 1987), -6-1 (Supp.1985) (repealed 1986).
. Utah Code Ann. § 54-6-3 (1974) (repealed 1986).
. Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-6 (1986) provides in part that a common carrier subject to title 54 may not engage in hauling "until its schedules of rates, fares[,] charges and classifications ... have been filed and published_”
. See Mountain States Legal Found, v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 636 P.2d 1047, 1051 (Utah 1981).
. Cf. id. at 1051.
. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-2-1(30) (Supp.1984) (amended 1985, 1986 & 1987), -3-1 (1986), -6-1 (Supp.1985) (repealed 1986), -6-2 to -3 (1974) (repealed 1986); see also Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-4-4(1), (3), -7-20 (1986).
. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-2-1(30) (Supp.1984) (amended 1985, 1986 & 1987), -4-1, -4-4 (1986), -6-1 to -4 (1974 & Supp.1985) (repealed 1986); see also Utah Power & Light Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 712 P.2d 251, 252 (Utah 1985); Fuller-Toponce Truck Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 99 Utah 28, 33, 96 P.2d 722, 724 (1939).
. See Utah Dep't of Business Regulation v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 614 P.2d 1242, 1248 (Utah 1980).
. Utah Dep’t of Business Regulation v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 720 P.2d 420 (Utah 1986); see also Utah Dep't of Business Regulation, 614 P.2d at 1248; Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4(3) (1986); but see Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-1 (1986) (amended 1987).
. See Mountain States Legal Found., 636 P.2d at 1054-55, 1057; Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-1 (1986).
. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-3-3, -7, -4-1 (1986), —7—12(4)(b)(i) (1986) (amended 1987).
. 720 P.2d 420.
. Id. at 423-24.
.The provision provides:
(1) When complaint has been made to the commission concerning any rate, fare, toll, rental or charge for any product or commodity furnished or service performed by any public utility, and the commission has found, after investigation, that the public utility has charged an amount for such product, commodity or service in excess of the schedules, rates and tariffs on file with the commission, or has charged an unjust, unreasonable or discriminatory amount against the complainant, the commission may order that the public utility make due reparation to the complainant therefor, with interest from the date of collection.
. 73 Utah 139, 272 P. 939 (1928).
. Id. at 141-42, 272 P. at 940 (citations omitted); see also Utah-Idaho Cent. Ry. v. Public Util. Comm’n, 64 Utah 54, 57-59, 227 P. 1025, 1026-27 (1924).
. 67 Colo. 563, 189 P. 775 (1920).
. Id. at 564, 189 P. at 775 (emphasis added).
. Id. at 574, 189 P. at 779.
. See Denver & Rio Grande R.R., 73 Utah at 142, 272 P. at 940.
. Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-1 (1986).
. Mountain States Legal Found., 636 P.2d at 1053.
. Id. at 1052.
. See Utah Code Ann. § 54-6-3 (1974) (repealed 1986).
. Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-6(2) (1986) provides, in pertinent part:
No common carrier shall charge, demand, collect or receive a greater or less or different compensation for the transportation of ... property, or for any service in connection therewith, than the rates, fares and charges applicable to such transportation as specified in its schedules filed and in effect at the time; nor shall any such carrier refund or remit, in any manner or by any device, any portion of the rates, fares or charges so specified, except upon order of the commission as hereinafter provided, or extend to any person any privilege or facility in the transportation of ... property except such as are regularly and uniformly extended to all persons.
See also Union Pac. R.R. v. Sterling H. Nelson & Sons, Inc., 552 P.2d 649 (Utah 1976).
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring):
I concur. It is my understanding that the last paragraph of the Court’s opinion