159 Ga. 58 | Ga. | 1924
(After stating the foregoing facts.)
This being an interstate shipment, the rights and liabilities of the parties are to be determined by the acts of Congress, their construction by the Supreme Court of the United States, the original contract of shipment, and common-law principles applied by that court. Southern Express Co. v. Byers, 240 U. S. 612 (36 Sup. Ct. 410, 60 L. ed. 825, L. R. A. 1917A, 197); G., F. & A. R. Co. v. Blish Milling Co., 241 U. S. 190 (36 Sup. Ct. 541, 60 L. ed. 948); Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Yesbik, 146 Ga. 769 (92 S. E. 527).
This brings us to consider the acts of Congress applicable^ to the present controversy. The act of March 4, 1915 (c. 176, 38 Stat. 1196), known as the Cummins act, requires the carrier, receiving property for transportation in interstate commerce, to issue .a receipt or bill of lading therefor; and provides that the carrier “shall be liable to the lawful holder thereof for any loss,^ damage, or injury to such property caused by it.” This act further provides that the carrier shall-be liable “for .the full actual loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it, . . notwithstanding any limitation of liability, or limitation of the amount of recovery, or representation or agreement as to value in any such receipt or bill of lading, or in any contract, rule, regulation, or in any tariff filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission.” By the act of August 9, 1916, c. 301, 39 Stat. 441, known as the Cummins amendment, it is provided that the part of the act of March 4, 1915, fixing the carrier’s “liability for full actual loss, damage, or injury, notwithstanding any limitation of liability or recovery, or representation or' agreement or release as to value, and declaring any such limitation to be unlawful and void, shall not apply, first, to baggage carried on passenger-trains or boats, or trains or boats carrying passengers; second, to property, except ordinary live stock, received for transportation concerning which the carrier shall have been or shall hereafter be expressly authorized or required, by order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, to establish and maintain rates dependent upon the value declared in writing by the shipper or agreed upon in writing as the released value of the property, in'which case such declaration or agreement shall have no other effect than to limit liability and recovery to an amount not exceeding the value so declared or
To make such declaration or agreement of value effective and binding upon the shipper, it it not essential that the writing containing such declaration or agreement be signed by the shipper. It is sufficient if the carrier’s receipt or bill of lading, given to the shipper on receipt of his goods for shipment, contains such declaration- of value, or agreement as to the released value, and the shipper accepts, receives, and acts upon such receipt or bill of lading. The receipt or bill of lading becomes binding upon the shipper by his acceptance .thereof, he being presumed to know and accept the terms and conditions of the written receipt or bill of lading. Missouri &c. R. Co. v. McCann, 174 U. S. 580 (19 Sup. Ct. 755, 43 L. ed. 1093); In the Matter of Bills of Lading, 52 I. C. C. 671; American Railway Express Co. v. Lindenburg, 260 U. S. 584 (43 Sup. Ct. 206, 67 L. ed. 414).
If in the present case there was such declaration of value, or an agreement as to the released value of the goods shipped, then the shippers could not escape the effect of such declaration or stipulation by bringing an action of trover for the recovery of the goods shipped, thus treating as a conversion the loss of the goods by the carrier and its refusal to deliver them on demand. If a suit could not be maintained for damages against the carrier for loss of the goods, then an action of trover would not lie for a recovery beyond the declared or stipulated released value. G., F. & A. R. Co. v. Blish Milling Co., 241 U. S. 190 (supra). “The effect of a stipulation in an interstate express receipt, that liability ■is limited to $50 for any shipment of 100 pounds or less, can not be escaped by suing in trover and laying the failure to deliver as a conversion.” American Railway Express Co. v. Levee, 263 17. S. 19 (44 Sup. Ct. 11, 68 L. ed.).
Applying the above principles, the trial judge erred in giving the jury the instruction of which the express company com
This brings us to consider the serious and troubling question in this case;’and that is, whether the shippers made such a declaration of the value of their goods or agreement as to their released value as will prevent them from recovering their full value. To enable 'the express company to establish its defense in this case, it is fundamental and essential that the shippers either declared the value of their property or agreed with the company as to its released value, at the time the contract of shipment was entered into. Said declaration or agreement must be made to appear, before a carrier can successfully claim the benefit of such a limitation, and relief from full liability. Cincinnati &c. R. Co. v. Rankin, 241 U. S. 319 (36 Sup. Ct. 555, 60 L. ed. 1022, L. R. A. 1917A, 265). The undisputed evidence is that the shippers made no such declaration or agreement when their goods were delivered to the carrier for transportation. When they were so delivered, the company’s agent prepared and signed a receipt therefor. This receipt did not contain any declaration of the shippers as to the value of the goods; but did contain an agreement as to their released value. But the shippers knew nothing about its preparation and execution, and the same was not delivered to them until four or five months after the shipment was made. At that time the goods had been lost, and the shippers got this receipt for the,purpose of enabling them to trace the shipment or to make a claim for.the value of the goods if they were lost. On the trial of the case the shippers. introduced this
Judgment affirmed.