delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is а proceeding brought in the Court of Claims by petitioner to recover a balance of $144,238.03 alleged to be due from the government under сertain designated contracts. The government filed a general traverse, and
*477
a counterclaim for a deficiency income and excess-profits tax assessment in the sum of $191,403.77. The taxes were for the year 1918, and were assessed on the 14th day of June, 1924. The court below found thаt the government was indebted to petitioner upon the contracts in the sum of $119,413.04. Upon the counterclaim the court found that the tax liability оf petitioner was $82,701.29. Upon this latter sum, it allowed interest, at the rate of
6%
per annum from the date of assessment, in the sum of $58,607.64, bringing the total allowance upon the counterclaim to the sum of $141,308.93. Judgment was given against petitioner for the difference between that sum and the sum due under the сontracts, namely $21,895.89. The opinion of the court will be found in
In the argument hеre, both parties proceed upon the theory that interest was allowed under the Revenue Act of 1918, c. 18, 40 Stat. 1057, 1083, § 250 (e). 1 The government cоntended below that under that section it was entitled to interest at the rate of 1 per centum per month instead of 6 per centum per аnnum. It abandons that *478 contention here, but insists that it is entitled to at least the interest allowed by the court below.
It will be seen that under the findings, the governmеnt was indebted in 1924 to petitioner in the sum of $119,-413.04, against which there was at the same time a just counterclaim of $82,701.29; so that if the account had beеn adjusted at that time instead of 12 years later, the government would have been obliged to pay petitioner the difference betweеn these two sums, or $36,711.75. The inequity of allowing the government interest for 12 years under these circumstances, so as to bring the petitioner in debt to the gоvernment in the sum of over $21,000, is so gross as to be shocking.
We have said
(United States
v.
The Thekla,
Section 250 (e),
supra,
provides for the allowance of interest where the tax remains unpaid after the datе when it is due and “for ten days after notice and demand by the collector.” The court below found that on June 14, 1924, the commissioner made the аssessment “and duly notified plaintiff with regard thereto.” It made no other finding in respect of that matter. The government contends that the finding which was madе means that
*479
the commissioner set in motion the normal administrative machinery which resulted in a notice demanding payment, and relies upon thе presumption of official regularity as being sufficient to make this finding the equivalent of a finding of notice and demand by the collector.
Pacific States Co.
v.
White,
But we are dealing here not with a presumption, but with a specific finding; and that finding should be examined in the light of the pleadings.
Luckenbach S. S. Co.
v.
United States,
In the memorandum supplementing the original opinion, thе court below said: “The record fails to show that any demand was made and we can not presume that it was. On the contrary, in view of the faсt that plaintiff at the time was claiming that the defendant was indebted to it in a sum larger than the amount of the tax, it is more probable that no such dеmand was made.” While it is true that this court is not at liberty to refer to the opinion for the purpose of eking out, controlling or modifying the scope of the findings, 2 the rule is not absolute and does not preclude reference to the opinion for all purposes whatsoever. It is wеll established that in case *480 of ambiguity, extrinsic aid may be sought in order to settle the meaning of a statute or a contract. We see no rеason why the principle of that rule does not permit reference to the opinion of the court in order to clarify the meaning оf a finding otherwise in doubt. The government suggests that in such case the proper course is to remand the case to the Court of Claims in order that that court may supplement and clarify the finding and, if necessary, take additional evidence to that end. Of course, that sometimes has bеen done; but where, as here, the finding, the pleadings and the opinion of the court, taken together, clearly show that § 250 (e) in the particulаr under consideration was not complied with, it is unnecessary to follow that procedure.
This proceeding was originally brought in 1922. The deficiency assessment was made while the case was pending. The counterclaim of the government was first filed in, 1926, and an amended counterclаim in 1927. Under these circumstances we see no reason for remanding the case upon the mere chance that the government may bе able to furnish evidence which it has failed to furnish during more than a decade of litigation, and especially in respect of a claim which at the bar the government frankly conceded to be inequitable.
The judgment should be reversed with directions to enter judgment for petitioner, without an allowance of interest upon the counterclaim, in accordance with the foregoing opinion.
Reversed.
Notes
Sec. 250. (e) If any tax remаins unpaid after the date when it is due, and for ten days after notice and demand by the collector, then, except in the case of еstates of insane, deceased, or insolvent persons, there shall be added as part of the tax the sum of 5 per centum on the amоunt due but unpaid, plus interest at the rate of 1 per centum per month upon such amount from the time it became due: Provided, That as to any such amount which is the subject of a bona fide claim for abatement such sum of 5 per centum shall not be added and the interest from the time the amount was due until the claim is decided shall be at the rate of % of 1 per centum per month. . . .
Stone
v.
United States,