126 Ala. 194 | Ala. | 1899
This case is the remaining one of four suits at one time pending between the Alabama Iron & Steel Company and. its creditors, in vrhieh .there wras a common receivership. The other three suits have each been dismissed without trial, but the receivership, together with certain intervening claims to property in the recever’s charge, still survives to be disposed of with this suit. i
The litigation originated under circumstances substantially as follows: The Alabama Iron & Steel Company, a domestic corporation, was, for several years, engaged in the manufacture and sale of charcoal pig iron. The appellant, the American Pig Iron Storage Warrant Company, a corporation having its principal office in New’ York city, did a warehouse business which consisted mainly in the storage of pig iron. Its yard, No. 38, was located near the furnace of the Alabama Iron &
Until May 26th, 1894, E. T. Peter was the Storage Company’s local yardmaster. He was also a director in and the manager of the Furnace Company. On May 21, 1894, he, as a director in the Furnace Company, claiming to act by authority of its board of directors, filed a bill
Under that bill T. J. Peter, who was the president of •the Furnace Company, and the father of that complain•ant, was appointed receiver, and as such took charge of ■rhe Furnace Company’s unpledged property, and' subsequently where a question arose ■ involving the validity-of the warrant pledges, he, acting under orders of the court, took charge of the Storage Company’s yard and the iron therein, consisting of about 10,300. tons. .
The filing of that bill was followed by the filing in the same court of three others including..the .present one, wherein different creditors of the Furnace Company sought to reach its property, one of them charging that the first suit was brought collusivelv to hinder creditors. 'To each of these suits the receivership was extended under chancery rule 112. While they were pending two ..intervening petitions were filed, one by E. H. Pfaff, setting up a claim as pledgee of the Furnace Company to 700 tons of iron held by the receiver in the storage yard, and the other by L. and E Lamar, Minthorne Woolsev and Frank Moore claiming a lien by receiver’s certificates on iron manufactured by the receiver.
From a decree on demurrer to one of the original bills an appeal was taken and was determined in this court. See McKeever v. Ala. Iron & Steel Co., 112 Ala. 134.
In October, 1897, each of the original suits except the present one was dismissed without trial but without prejudice to the intervening petitions referred to; and they, together with this suit, were tried and decreed on jointly, and are jointly involved in this appeal.
During the pendency of the several suits, upon petitions of the appellant Storage Company and other warrant holders, orders of'court were made and carried into effect, paving the several warrant holders .except the Storage Company, by sales to them of the iron appar•entlv covered by their respective warrants. Under the .same decretal orders, the Storage Company was like
Joseph Verchot brought this suit and thereafter lie having died, it was revived, in the name of his executrix.. It seeks to enforce a pledge of 700 tons of iron alleged (o have been made to him by the Furnace Company as security for money loaned on its seven notes each reciting a pledge of 100 tons of designated iron and further reciting that “any excess in the value of said collaterals or surplus from the sale thereof beyond the amount due hereon shall be applicable upon any other note or claim held by the holder hereof against us now due or to become due or that may hereafter be contracted.” It is alleged in substance that after the iron was so delivered in pledge it was under the direction of the furnace company’s president wrongfully removed into the storage warrant yard where interests in it were claimed by other parties defendant.
The demurrer to the bill was properly overruled. Verchot not, having possession of the iron could not pursue the ordinary way of enforcing his security bjr a sale of the iron, and his sale if it could be made would be embarrassed by the conflicting claims upon it. In such case equity has jurisdiction to determine the rights of rival claimants and to enforce the pledge by judicial sale.—3 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1231; 18 Am. & Eng. Encyc. Law, 674; Sharp v. Bank, 87 Ala. 644; Freeman v. Freeman, 17 N. J. Eq. 44.
There was nothing in the pendency of other creditors* bills to preclude him from proceeding by original bill instead of by intervention under those bills.—McKeever v. Ala. Iron & Steel Co., supra.
, The statutes requiring chattel mortgages to be in writing and 'authorizing their registration have no application to a pledge. A pledge differs from a mortgage in that the pledgee must have possession"and the pledgor the legal title of the property, while a mortgage passes the title to the mortgagee and may allow possession to-
Notice to the public of the pledgee’s interest in. the-property is sufficiently given by the possession which m us t resi do in the pledgee. Such possession,, however, to. be effective either for notice or to give validity at law to the pledge must be complete, unequivocal and exclusive of the pledgor’s possession in his own right. Jones on Pledges, § 40; Casey v. Cavaroo, 96 U. S. 467; First Nat. Bank v. Caperton, 74 Miss. 857; 60 Am. St. Rep. 540.
As bearing on the question of what constitutes such possession the reported cases are numerous; but those* which can be relied on as express authority are few, since each case is determined upon its- peculiar facts.
In this case it is clearly proven that under the agreement of pledge between the Furnace Company acting by its president and Verchot, a particular spot of ground belonging to that company and located apart from its own iron yards ivas tendered by the president and accepted by Verchot for his use and that a quantity of iron was placed thereon, piled in 100' ton lots and marked with paint with Verehot’s initials. There is nothing to show that-any power was reserved or allowed to the Furnace-Company or its officers or employes either-to repledge, sell, use, or have charge of the iron after it was so placed.
It was not essential for the delivery to be made at the* time of the contract and the pledge took effect upon subsequent delivery made in performance of the contract. Nobles v. Christian-Craft Grocery Co., 113 Ala. 220; Denis on Contracts of Pledge, § Í36. Considering the character of the property involved, its delivery must be taken as vesting complete possession in Verchot thereby validating the pledge. The cases of Allen v. Smith, 10 Mass. 308, and Summer v. Hamlet, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 76, may be referred to as analogous in principle.
It is proven that T. J. Peter, president of the Furnace Company, had active charge of its affairs and that by his-direction iron was taken from the Verchot yard and placed in the Storage Company’s-yard, and there is noth
As to the quantity of iron delivered to Yerchot on the yard assigned to him and likewise -as to the quantity ' thence removed into the. Storage Company’s yard the -evidence is not clear. Those matters being" referred to the register he ascertained that the entire 700 tons were so delivered and removed. The testimony is not in accord as to the quantity removed, neither does it accord as to the time of removal, and the weighing books in -evidence are not shown to have been accurately kept. The testimony can be best harmonized upon the supposition that removals in different quantities occurred at ■different dates and that all of such acts of removal were not known to each witness. So viewed the evidence supports the register’s findings.
The demurrers to the intervening petitions show no tenable grounds. Such petitions are not required to conform to all the technical rules applicable to pleading as between the principal parties. When filed by leave -of court other parties in interest are entitled to notice and an opportunity to defend, hut the petition need not name them as -defendants and it needs n© formal prayer lor process. •
It was ascertained by the Register upon a reference that 300 tons of iron was by direction of the Furnace Company’s president removed from the Plumb yard into the Storage Company’s yard and that 200 tons of same remained on that yard the warrants -describing same being held by the Storage Company, and that a warrant describing the other 100 tons ha-cl been issued to an innocent holder for value, and that this last mentioned 100 tons had been removed from the State but that there had been another 100 tons substituted and held in lieu of it in the storage yard.
Though a pledgee does not acquire the legal title to the pledged property, and though relinquishment of his possession will ordinarily defeat the pledge, yet the pledgor cannot accomplish such defeat by wrongfully retaking possession—Way v. Davidson, 12 Gray (Mass.) 466; Palmctag v. Doutrick, 59 Cal. 154. Verchot and Mrs. Plumb, in-whose place Pfaff now stands, being without fault, might have recovered possession from the Furnace Company when the iron was taken by it or its representatives from their respective yards; and the same right of action lay against the Storage Company after it was held in its .yard.- Neither the .Storage.Company nor its .warrant'holders, either with or without notice of the pledge,'could acquire any'greater interest
The Lamar, Woolsey and Moore petition involves only matters pertaining to the receivership. Receiver’s certificates were issued by T. J. Peter the first receiver, pursuant to a decretal order authorizing him to borrow money thereon, to pay charges and make repairs on the furnace property and to convert accumulated raw material into iron, and providing that the certificates should be a lien on the iron to be made by the receiver and its proceeds. These petitioners intervened in the original suits as owners of certain of these certificates, for the protection and enforcement of their respective liens on the remaining receiver m)ade iron, which except about 40 tons they -alleged had been wrongfully placed in the Storage Company’s yai$ by1'the receiver.
Upon a reference to the register he- ascertained that about 300 tons of the receiver made iron had been so placed during the administration of receiver Peter. After examination of the evidence taken and reported by the register, we cannot affirm that he-erred in this conclusion. Upon that and other issues submitted to the register evidence documentary and oral was taken and appears voluminously in the record. It would be profitless here to discuss it in detail or to pass specifically upon objections to parts -of the-evidence. The rule is settled that the admission by the register of incompetent testimony, will not reverse a -decree which i-s supported by competent testimony, and that the findings of the register upon testimony taken before him will not be set aside when like testimony would support-a jury’s verdict .
Whether the chancery court has power in cases like the present to subordinate pre-existing liens to those of
To preserve.andmake valuable the Furnace Company’s property the court had power in the interest of that company and its creditors to direct the discharge of threatening incumbrances and to have its accumulated raw material changed into a marketable product. Beckwith v. Carroll, 56 Ala. 12. It could authorize its receiver to contract debts for such purposes even without the issuance.of certificates and to make them a charge upon the furnace property.-Thornton v. H. A. & B. R. R. Co., 94 Ala. 353. It had likewise power to designate a mode for borrowing and for repayment of the money out of the iron to be manufactured by its use, and to transfer the lien so created to other iron which by the order of the court, acquiesced in and acted upon by the parties, had been substituted for that allowed to be removed from the yard.
We discover nothing inequitable in the apportionment made by the decree of expenses incident to the receivership. The evidence shows that those expenses were reasonably incurred by the receiver chiefly in affecting the issuance and registration of the second series of receiver’s certificates issued at the instance of the appellant Storage Company among others, and in employing a watchman to guard not only the furnace property but iron in the storage yard which may have been as expressed by the appellant’s petition for its sale “in danger of being taken away by irresponsible parties.” It was proper to prorate such expense between the two companies according to the value of their respective properties needing such protection.
In the matters assigned for error there is nothing which should reverse the decree. It will be affirmed at cost of the appellant Storage Company..