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American Physicians Insurance Exchange v. Garcia
876 S.W.2d 842
Tex.
1994
Check Treatment

*1 AMERICAN PHYSICIANS INSURANCE Physicians

EXCHANGE and American Inc., Petitioners, Group, Service GARCIA, M.D., Respondent. Ramon A. D-1239.

No. Supreme of Texas. Court

March Rehearing Overruled June *2 duty to

duty or its Stowers2 to defend Garcia that the evidence conclusive- settle. We hold duty discharged its ly that APIE establishes Garcia, and that because to defend a settlement demand within never received limits, its policy its it did not breach Stowers to settle. We therefore reverse appeals render of the court of judgment in favor of APIE.

I Cardenas, Araminta

On March individually the Estate of and as Guardian of Cardenas, Vasquez Norma Cardenas Gustavo (“the Cardenases”) and Carmen Cardenas malpractice filed a medical lawsuit Original In their Peti- Garcia and others. tion, alleged the Cardenases that Garcia was guilty malpractice in his treatment of Gus- 3, 1980, ap- tavo Cardenas October proximately April malpractice 1982. The Winters, Barry Bishop, Jay J. Sam A. prescription claim arose out of Garcia’s Austin, Hunt, Thompson, Donald M. Lub- Navane, alleg- drugs, two Haldol and which bock, Antonio, George Spencer, peti- San for edly develop dys- tardive caused Cardenas tioners. kinesia, debilitating brain disease. The initially alleged Cardenases that “on or about Nicholson, Antonio, Charles San David A. 12, 1982, placed April Gustavo was Cardenas Krist, Houston, Slaughter, Ronald D. Pat physician.” the care of another At all Sr., Antonio, Maloney, respondent. San Petition, alleged Original Garcia times medical was insured CORNYN, Justice, opinion delivered the by Corpo- claims three consecutive Insurance Court, PHILLIPS, Chief (“ICA”) policies. ration of America Justice, GONZALEZ, HECHT and ENOCH, Justices, join. was covered an ICA Garcia grant Physicians malpractice insur-

We American Insurance “claims-made”3 medical (“APIE’s”) $100,000. Exchange’s rehearing, policy limits of In 1981 motion for ance with prior opinion judgment, withdraw our was covered under two con- Garcia following place.1 one-year policies, and substitute the We secutive ICA “occurrence” $500,000 providing him in cover- malprac- decide whether Dr. Ramon Garcia’s each with carrier, APIE, age.4 purchased tice insurance breached its not, case, coverage period disposition extend- we within a Given our of this need occurrences not, pretrial and do decide whether the non- back to a recited retroactive date. See Hart- - -, agreement execution between Garcia and the California, U.S. Fire Ins. Co. ford -, negated 2891, 2896, all un- Cardenases of Garcia’s L.Ed.2d 612 113 S.Ct. (Insurance der the facts of this case. Litigation). Because Antitrust brought a claims-made this claim ordinary care 2. The of an insurer to exercise terminating provide policy would not protect in the settlement of claims to its insureds coverage. against judgments limits is generically referred to in Texas as the Stowers policy, to a claims-made an occur 4.In contrast duty. Co. v. Stowers Furniture American Indem. "long-tail” coverage. policy provides rence (Tex.Comm'n App.1929, 15 S.W.2d 544 U.S. at -, Hartford,- at 2896. In 113 S.Ct. holding approved). words, "physical injury prop other if there is erty damage during policy period caused Typically, a claims-made covers occurrence,” injuries note but no claim is policy period see claims made infra $500,000 per applicable occurrence with a limit Garcia that its be- occurrence, allegations against you appeal. involved in this cause “all made oc- prior your coverage American curred On December several months be- Physicians.”5 Petition, they Original fore filed their Questions concerning notifying him *3 Cardenases sent Garcia a letter 10, negotiations. July plagued settlement On of their intention to file a lawsuit him 1985, Crossland advised the Cardenases’ law- negligent for treatment of Cardenas from yer, Maloney: companies Pat have “[T]he September present 1980 “to the time.” Gar- pro any elected to rate settlement or adverse reported cia this letter to APIE. On Janu- judgment equal verdict on an basis.” 3, 1984, ary APIE Garcia of his “[n]otified Evidently, Crossland mistook the insurers’ limited with for this inci- API[E] agreement legal equally divide his fees dent.” Garcia’s records indicated that any judg- an indication visits, January one of Cardenases’ office on split ment on that rather than would be basis 18, 1983, during policy peri- occurred prorated proportion coverage. in In this od. APIE therefore in an concluded internal stated, letter, “my same Crossland under- memo that the “lion’s share” of the Carde- standing agreement ... is that the this per- nases’ claim arose out of treatment $600,000,” ... total insurance available is policy periods. formed ICA’s earlier policy combined limits of the 1983 Accordingly, APIE advised Garcia that cov- $100,000 ICA claims-made for the erage solely under its on the turned year sought After settle- 1980.6 Crossland January 1983 office visit. insurers, authority in- ment from the he letter, As a result of the Cardenases’ 26, Maloney July formed on 1985: 20, 1984, APIE wrote to ICA on March Apparently confusion has arisen with re- “agree[ment] any confirmed their to share gard to the extent of the insurance judgment pro-rata settlement or on a cover- available.... age They agreed split evenly basis.” also legal fees incurred in Garcia’s defense. Although by represen- I have been advised ICA retained Ross and his Crossland law any tatives of APIE that I do not in man- primary responsibility firm to assume interests, represent ner their on in- based Garcia’s defense. APIE hired another attor- ... formation and belief Garcia was cov- ney “simply developments monitor the an that com- ered with copy this lawsuit.” APIE first received a $500,000.00. pany for 8, Original the Cardenases’ March Peti- 23, 1984, days tion on March three after it my understanding policies It is that these arranged for Garcia’s defense. aggregated cannot be totaled or coverage in amount manner to establish an subsequently The Cardenases filed five $500,000.7 petitions, alleged amended none of which attorney malpractice during policy period. the APIE made his first The Cardenases’ Eventually, July on APIE notified written settlement demand to Crossland on attorney policy period expires, insurer to made until after the that an retained provides coverage. still defend the insured owes the insured unqualified loyalty). pay 5. APIE continued to the costs of for one-half 13, 1985, defending August the suit until after the malpractice crossclaim 7.APIE filed signed August first on but amended, Judg- attorneys Final in the before or “Modified Crossland and its other Stowers ment,” signed August on 1985. indemnity seeking contribution and lawsuit pay; might required sums APIE, Although paid by Crossland was ICA and any questions jury charge did not but the include Garcia’s, APIE's, attorney. he was Crossland, regarding and thus the ex 1.06, 1.07, 1.08(f) Tex.Disciplinary R.Prof.Conduct responsibility APIE. See also him of onerated (1989), reprinted tit. Tex.Gov’t Code Ann., Exch., Physicians Garcia v. American Ins. (Vernon G, app. Supp.1994) (State subtit. A Bar 1991) (Tex.App. X., Antonio 9); S.W.2d (same case). 28 n. Employers Casualty § art. Co. v. — San Rules (hold- (Tex. 1973) Tilley, February letter, neuroleptic drugs, “until Maloney July made nas” the sub- $600,000, Lyons and condi- 1983.” testified a settlement demand of or March acceptance within ten trial the Cardenases’ sequent tioned the demand Stowers personal attorney, days. Original Clem attorney Garcia’s the Sixth Amended filed July urging Lyons, wrote to Crossland on urging he believed at his because Petition Maloney’s APIE to demand. accept plead- ICA and for the best interest to be Garcia’s insur- possible the maximum ings to invoke however, learning after On coverage for Garcia. ance $500,000 of an additional ICA with a limit, Maloney raised his demand $1.1 Garcia, case, Cardenas in- responded Crossland to this million. the court. court found was tried to by informing day creased demand same con- constituted course of treatment Maloney quoted in the letter that Gar- above *4 tinuing negligence beginning September $500,000. coverage This cia’s was limited to February ending and rendered and $500,000 letter also disclosed a second ICA $2,235,483.30 plus costs and judgment for policy. the terms of the Non-Exe- interest. Under trial, 29, 1985, day Maloney July the of On $2,235,483.30 judg- Agreement, cution million, again, raised his demand to $1.6 against executed ment Garcia could be acceptance 10:00 imposed a deadline for of Thereafter, personally. him day. Lyons a.m. the same also wrote Cardenases, solely capacity as Gar- their day urge accep- Crossland on of trial to name assignees, filed suit in Garcia’s cia’s tance of the million demand. $1.6 liability alleging that against his insurers APIE made offer at ICA and no settlement damages in the had suffered actual Garcia time. The record not indicate that this does $2,235,483.30judgment. of the amount any ever the Cardenases communicated set- suit, alleged that In this Cardenases $600,000, of tlement demand less than or that violated to defend the insurers their require was demand made that did not accept a their Garcia and Stowers jointly. to accept the two insurers reasonable settlement demand within APIE that there After informed Garcia Subsequent trial filing but before limits. policy, was no but before however, case, and the of this the Cardenases 29, 1985, Cardenases, trial on Gar- companies into two settle- entered cia, attorneys and their a non- entered into agreements. agreement, The dat- ment first agreement whereby execution the Cardenas- 1,1986, May released from all liabili- ed ICA agreed solely es to look and APIE for ICA malpractice ty in lawsuit and both any judgment might of that satisfaction $2,000,000.00. exchange for Stowers suit rendered Garcia. The non-execution 5,May agreement, the second dated Under agreement also for indemnified Garcia Agree- “Partial and entitled Settlement might judgment that in excess be rendered ment,” paid the and their APIE Cardenases actually amounts from ICA collected $500,000 attorneys agreement for not to their return, assigned any and APIE. Garcia con- APIE’s motion for a six-month contest might have against claims he APIE or ICA case, agree- their tinuance of Stowers to the Cardenases. against any paid ment to offset the amount trial, day filed On the the Cardenases liabili- judgment, further and their release of Original alleged Amended Sixth Petition ty any judgment million $2.5 malpractice first time for the that Garcia’s Physicians Ser- against APIE or American APIE’s into and thus into continued (“APSG”), Group, Inc. an affiliate of vice alleged That policy period. petition Thus, the received $2.5 APIE. Cardenases though Mrs. Garcia even Cardenas advised million for Garcia’s claims before Stowers her husband had adverse side suffered proceeded to suit even trial. “during drugs prescribed from Garcia effects jury begin- Sep- was to a from The Stowers suit tried the course of several office visits 1983,” jury ning November 1987. The found February or March tember 1980 (1) negligently Carde- failed to settle Garcia’s Gustavo Garcia “continued treat prior entry consisting judgment Septem- proportional APIE’s share of (2) petition ber the sixth jury, amended determined doubled alleged separate negli- and distinct 21.21, acts pursuant to article section gence committed APIE’s Code, attorneys’ Insurance fees. (3) policy period, denied appeals court of recalculated the Garcia, APIE failed to Garcia at defend $3,167,274.09. damages Cardenases’ at Un- case, the trial of the Cardenas assumption der the that Garcia’s limits failing APIE’s and APSG’s actions in to de- million, represented figure were $1.6 false, provide coverage fend and were mis- amount in excess of leading, deceptive practices acts or suit, interest, plus limits in 21.21, § violation of Tex.Ins.Code Ann. art. plus pursuant two times actual (Vernon (“article 21.21”), Supp.1994) and the Code, 21.21 plus article of the Insurance Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Pro- attorneys’ fees. 812 Because Act, tection Tex.Bus. & Com.Code Ann. partial settlement with the Cardenas- (Vernon 1987) (“DTPA”).8 § 17.50 $2,500,000 liability cap es established further found that each of acts these $500,000, required a credit of and because negligent, involved heedless and reckless dis- liability, ICA’s settlement shielded ICA regard rights, an un- constituted appeals court rendered business, practice fair in the insurance *5 $2,000,000. APIE against for unconscionable, proximate was a cause of damages, knowingly. Garcia’s and was done jury

The also found that ICA’s failure to II September prior settle the Cardenas to insuring profes In the of the clause negligent, in and reck- heedless liability Garcia, sional to it issued disregard of rights, less and an un- perform APIE contracted to two related obli practice fair in the business of insurance. gations: any against to defend claim Gar jury The concluded that ICA’s acts and omis- scope coverage, cia the if “any within of even done, knowingly sions were were unconscio- false, allegations of ... groundless, the are nable, proximate the and were cause of dam- fraudulent,” indemnify and to Garcia age to Garcia. damages him any against for awarded within jury further found APIE’s acts scope coverage up the of the to limits. percent, and caused 16 omissions and ICA’s Policy § APIE contractual I. These obli percent, damages 84 in awarded gations, along in language insuring the Damages against Cardenas v. Garcia. granting control over the clause insured’s $2,235,000.00 compensa- were assessed (“The insurer, see, e.g., to defense an id. (the tory damages judgment in amount of the Exchange right duty shall have the to suit), $250,000.00 exempla- seeking suit insured defend $250,000.00 ry damages, and “additional” third, damages”), give general such rise to DTPA. The court also ly duty recognized, implied insur $820,500.00. attorneys’ totalling awarded fees duty accept ers —the to reasonable settle within limits. settlement, ment demands Stowers Because ICA’s the court Furniture Co. v. American Indem. 15 only against judgment rendered APIE and (Tex.Comm’n App.1929, 547-48 APSG. The Cardenases elected have approved); holding Syver Kent D. solely jury see also rendered on the find- ud, Settle, ings Duty to that APIE and APSG had violated Va.L.Rev. (1990); II, Jerry, Insurance The trial court rendered 1117-26 Robert H. Code. Under standing (1987) (“all judgment against jointly APIE and Law APSG Insurance settle); $1,331,574.00, severally recognize duty Kelly amount of courts” H. 21.21, Code, Deceptive § 8. The Texas Insurance art. is a Trade Practices-Consumer Protec- practices, laundry deceptive incorporates list tion Act 21.21, Texas Insurance Code art. insurance 17.50(a)(4) § duty none of which involves the under a settle see & Com Code Tex.Bus. Ann. (Vernon 1987), liability Watson, policy. third-party Co. v. but Allstate Ins. does not address (Tex.1994). Likewise, practices. 876 S.W.2d 145 Id. Faith, Breach of Limiting Comment, malpractice lawsuit.9 Bad settle the Thompson, Liability a viola Extracontractual in Tex- duty not Insurers’ Stowers does constitute as, (1987); E. More Robert 21.21 or DTPA.10 SW.L.J. tion of article Keeton, Liability Responsi- Insurance and over, responsible any sepa not APIE is Settlement, bility 67 Harv.L.Rev. be Insurance violation rate DTPA or Code (1954). in this case is devoid cause the record engaged in APIE ever evidence that Although Garcia argues^ defined deceptive practice unfair or act or solely Stowers not lawsuit case is because statutes.11 in the Tex.Ins.Code relevant Deceptive Trade remedies under Practic 16(a) (Vernon 21.21, Supp. §§ Ann. art. es Act and art. 21.21 are cu Tex.Ins.Code. 1994). there was no violation We hold remedies, judg of other and the mulative 21.21. article of a ment below is couched terms violation 21.21, jury all article issues that A form the basis for the duty to is de defend Garcia the Stowers case involve breach duty solely by allegations or the termined either to defend asked, 11.Kelly support proposition that attempt Issue "Was such failure does practice decep- an unfair in the insur- settle ance?” business of unfair or breach of the Stowers is an asked, Similarly, Issue 13 "Was such practice tive in the business of insurance. any, provide coverage, if unfair failure Kelly, have violated both Stowers Allstate practice in the business of insurance?” Issue Allstate breached its Stowers the DTPA. asked, failure, any, to “Was such if defend Garcia duty by refusing accept demand. reasonable practice in an unfair Every the business of insurance?” Kelly, potential- S.W.2d at 607. Allstate presented other breach to the issue Signif- ly DTPA its actions. violated the other premised on the breach of one of these settle, icantly, sought Allstate refused to after duties. registry pay into its limits the court exposed leave insured in the event contends Vail v. Texas Bu Farm *6 judgment. Id. at also en- 598. Allstate Co., (Tex.1988), reau Mut. Ins. S.W.2d 129 754 counsel, couraged not its insured to hire Kelly, and Allstate Ins. Co. v. (Tex.App. Tyler 680 595 S.W.2d 1984, n.r.e.), neglected to inform its insured of the settlement support writ refd — jury findings rejecting to the that demand its reasons the demand his contention effect deceptive a failure to settle involves an unfair or until months the demand had over two after practice 600, should entitle him to recover under arti expired. Id. at 608-09. Whether of Vail, however, cle 21.21. involved an insurer's deceptive these constitute unfair or activities pay refusal to a claim under first- bad faith party a practices deter- the business is of insurance Vail, property policy. insurance 754 applicable mined and Insur under the statutes action, definition, by at 130. A S.W.2d Stowers generally See Allstate ance Board Orders. Ins. duty involves an insurer’s to settle covered Watson, (Tex.1994); Co. v. 876 S.W.2d 145 Tex. only lawsuit—a situation that can third-party arise under a (Vernon Supp.1994); & art. 21.21 1981 Ins.Code Ann. liability policy. Vail Thus 17.50(a)(4) § & Com.Code Tex Ann. .Bus. inapposite. is (Vernon 1987). Texas Insurance Code article Kelly v. Garcia's reliance on Allstate Ins. Co. practices, regulates 21.21-2 claim settlement also misplaced. Kelly, "generously also Allstate subject only the but is to enforcement State that, insurer, Application in its concedfed] 21.- Board 21-2, Ann. art. of Insurance. Tex.Ins.Code he, subject application of Texas the the Watson, (Vernon Supp.1994); § 1981 & 6 Deceptive Trade Practices Act ... and the [Texas express 148 & n. We no 876 S.W.2d at Respondents’ Answer Code]." Insurance to Peti concerning opinion between the difference 26, Application at Writ of Error All tioners’ "good "attempting” requirement faith” set- (Tex. Kelly, v. state Ins. Co. 680 S.W.2d 595 21.21-2, art. tlement under Tex.Ins.Code n.r.e., 1984), Ann. Tex.Sup. App. Tyler 28 writ ref'd — 2(b)(4), § of ordi- the common law standard (June (No. 1985) C-3731); 496 see also Ct.J. nary concerning third-party insur- 3-6, 39-62; care Application for Writ Ami- of Error Com- attempts lawsuit. er’s to settle covered cus Curiae Brief Texas Association Defense Stowers, (”[N]either Ranger Coun- pare S.W.2d at 547 and petitioners 15 at 3 nor the Counsel Guin, adequately ty 659 respondents this Mut. S.W.2d consider address Ins. Co. Consequently, standard) important question.”). (Tex.1987) (third-party ordinary the "writ care refused, designation Kelly no reversible error” County Fire Ins. v. National Mut. Arnold represent approval not of Stowers actions (Tex.1987) does and Aranda v. 725 S.W.2d Deceptive brought Trade Prac under Texas N.Am., 210, 213 Insurance Co. 748 S.W.2d and the Texas In tices-Consumer Protection Act standard). (Tex.1988) (first-party “bad faith” Code. surance pleadings against Argonaut filed cluding days, July July him. 24 to See the five Maupin, Ins. position Southwest Co. v. 500 S.W.2d which APIE took (Tex.1973); Heyden Newport Chem. policy. there was no its We Corp. v. Ins. Southern Gen. 387 S.W.2d conclusively therefore hold that evidence (Tex.1965). petition aIf not does discharged duty that APIE its establishes allege scope coverage, within facts Garcia, jury’s defend and the answers to the required not legally insurer is to defend contrary support. evidentiary have no suit its Fidelity insured. Guar. & Underwriters, McManus, Ins. Inc. B (Tex.1982). remaining question The is whether any pleading first time was filed appeals of the court of can be alleging malpractice during affirmed on the that APIE basis breached its trial, policy period day was the duty to settle the case. We start July when the filed Cardenases proposition with the that an insurer has no Original their Sixth Amended Al Petition. duty to claim settle a is not covered though agreed with ICA to share policy. generally under its Western Her costs, agreement—about the defense their Entertainment, itage Ins. Co. v. River which fully Garcia was informed which and to (5th Cir.1993) (holding F.2d that if he did object—assigned control over duty plead to defend is invoked solely defense ICA. Garcia’s links ings, possibility indemnity “the of future un duty corresponding to defend with the foreclosed”); der terms of defense, right consequent to control the Drechsler, Annotation, Allegations C.T. ly APIE could have assumed a volun Against Third Action Person’s Insured as tary duty by asserting right. to defend Liability Duty Determining Insurer’s to De Therefore, only legal ICA was under a obli (1956). fend, Thus, 50 A.L.R.2d gation until defend Garcia APIE had no to settle before the sixth urge any equitable Cardenases do not file, petition containing amended was on alle here, below, basis nor they did in the courts gations brought the Cardenases’ claim upon should be barred from scope coverage. within the relying legal principles regard on traditional duty to defend Garcia.12 Thus we petition Once the sixth amended conclude that APIE’s to defend arose filed, required APIE was to exercise “that only upon filing sixth amended *7 degree diligence of care and an ordi petition. narily prudent person in the would exercise management of his own in business” re-

Every witness who testified at the Stowers sponding poli- within to settlement demands trial, including attorney the and Cardenases’ Stowers, 547; cy limits. at S.W.2d see personal attorney, testified that also American Centennial Ins. Co. v. Canal vigorously represented Ross Gar- Crossland Co., (Tex.1992) Ins. 843 S.W.2d 485-86 during cia the trial. It is true (Hecht, J., concurring, joined by Phillips, that the disputed evidence was as to whether Cook, C.J., Gonzalez, JJ.); Cornyn, and APIE or entered “reentered” the once Ranger County Mut. Ins. 723 S.W.2d at petition the sixth amended was filed and its (Tex.1987); County Foremost Mut. Ins. was invoked under well-established Crossland, legal Co. v. Home Indem. 897 F.2d principles. But who was (5th Cir.1990). Generally, a by jointly retained the Stowers settle- insurers to defend Garcia, propose at no time abandoned Garcia’s de- ment demand must to release the testimony undisputed fully exchange fense. that is also insured in for a stated sum of defense, paid money, APIE in- share of Garcia’s but “the limits” substitute fleets, Although initially pled January estoppel an the- Garcia APIE notified APIE, ory against theory by not he waived this that his under the APIE was requesting included in that issue be the only one visit limited because office occurred charge. conclusively is estab- Nor this issue during policy period. the APIE because, re- lished as this record insurer. duty support is not for a sum certain. Stowers at 660. Id. by unless activated a settlement demand (1) met: the claim prerequisites three are negotia recognize that settlement We scope of against the is within the insured ne and that reasonable tions are adversarial coverage, the demand is within the bargaining hard gotiation often involves limits, are the terms of the demand duty describing the Stowers both sides. ordinarily prudent that insurer such an attempts to duty to make “reasonable as a it, accept considering likelihood

would settle,” Ranger not alter an insurer’s does expo- degree potential the insured’s within duty accept demands reasonable Keeton, judgment. to an Ranger sure excess impose policy limits. Nor does (discussing supra applicable accept at stan- duty settlement on an insurer care). limits, A limits to make dard of demand above in excess of or demand reasonable, proposals.14 In the con though trigger solicit settlement even does not or lawsuit, Stowers, of a evidence concern text Stowers Stowers to settle.13 S.W.2d defense, and investigation, trial Centennial, claims 547; at at American 843 S.W.2d negotiations conduct (plurality opinion). necessarily subsidiary to the issue of ultimate Ranger, stated that have a we insurers the claimant’s demand was reason whether ordinary care that includes “investi- circumstances, an under the such that able lawsuit, preparation gation, defense of ordinarily prudent accept it. insurer would attempts trial of the case and reasonable Although language relies on dissent 659; at Ameri- settle.” S.W.2d see also dictum, Ranger given that is that the Centennial, (plu- can 843 S.W.2d at negligence presented Ranger claim was rality Rang- concurring opinions) (citing claim, Ranger, 723 at Stowers see S.W.2d in “investi- er for standard of reasonableness quarrel we have notion defend, gating, preparing set- trying prereq demand not “an absolute a formal action”). tling party At the same uisite,” third holding at 876 S.W.2d time, however, the court noted that “there is liable for caused its mis insurer Ranger negligent no contention that other How conduct than Stowers breach. investigation ever, Fitch/Eagle remedy shifting trial of the law- risk the Stowers support suit.” 723 at 659. In of an excess onto insurer is S.W.2d insurer, inappropriate proof that judgment against absent the insurer the court cited presented opportunity with a reasonable accept evidence the insurer failed to judgment by settling prevent $19,500 personal settlement demand of applicable policy within the limits. $19,500 injury damages property dam- ages, or ... limits are otherwise “[i]f Here, opportunity to settle had limits settle within such less $500.00.” coverage only limit if it of Garcia’s within Ranger, 723 The evi- 659-660. multi- was mistaken its contention also had dence indicated the insurer policies not be In re- ple could stacked. *8 together multiple demand, linked the settlements of sponse to a million Crossland $1.1 though attorney, Maloney, insureds even the demand was sever- the Cardenases’ advised able, inform its and that the insurer failed to [ICA APIE] on “these the policies aggregated insureds of the terms of demand. We cannot totaled or be any to to in an legally held this sufficient evidence manner establish was Keeton, requires policy limits. liability policy com- within the See 13. A an insurance remain up pany indemnify only to the to an insured supra we the Stow- at 1148-50. Nor do address company. limits insured's contractual with that requires funding duty a from ers when settlement Thus, duty accept have no to over-the- insurers single multiple insurers and no insurer can fond question of limit demands. We do not reach the when, apply the limits that the settlement within ever, duty may triggered if if a Stowers particular policy. its willing- provides an insured notice of his or her accept above the ness to policy a reasonable demand accompanying settlement, See notes 17 & 18 limits, fond the such and to infra the would that the share of settlement text. insurer’s 850 $500,000.” Thus, Am., amount excess of 124 N.J.Super. Malo- A.2d 77 306 of

ney curiam), position (Ct.App.Div.1973)(per part, was informed insurers’ aff'd (1974). limits, light 323 495 In concerning N.J. A.2d policy the advised Maloney the that fact was informed of the of the demand would to he have make to position concerning policy insurers’ the lim trigger duty. Maloney the Stowers elected its, duty it unclear the is how additional the proceed disputed assumption to on the impose dissent would differs the lower aggregate policies. he could the Conversely, court’s rule in Rova Farms. dissent point elected to bear the risk that its proposes step tendering concrete short of incorrect, might of view have been take, policy the limits that an insurer could liability could result in any judg- excess potential in which an the excess Maloney ment. Because his raised demand exists, preclude a Stowers law million, opportunity APIE had no $1.6 suit. Because the “reasonableness” policy settle within its stated limits. offering action than other the limits The dissent contends that APIE breached would remain indeterminate until the conclu its duty despite Stowers receiving never a trial, parties sion of the second and both $500,000 demand, relying Ranger, while on a any negotiation would take this into ac- fact predicated decision on a demand within the count, approach the dissent’s would be indis applicable policy Although limits. the dis- tinguishable expressly from a rule that shift interpretation sent’s of Ranger, “a formal ed principal this burden. The commentators ... settlement longer demand is no an abso- in this area have identified few cases that prerequisite,” (empha- lute at 863 876 S.W.2d possibility even the of a breach of consider added), appears enough, sis innocuous settle within absent demand application Ranger dissent’s to the facts is Geoege policy limits.16 See 14 J. Couctí & problematic. dissenting justices assidu- Cyclopedia Anderson, Ronald of Insurance ously they maintain that do not mean (2d § Supp.1993); 51:17 ed. 1982 & 7C Law argue making Appleman that the burden Berdal, &Walter F. John Allen offers Only should be shifted to the insurer. (rev. § Law and Insurance Practice jurisdiction one apparently supports a rule Supp.1993); ed. Shipley, 1979 & W.E. Anno impose general that would such a duty.15 tation, Duty Liability Insurer Settle or (1955).17 Compromise, Rova Farms Resort v. Investors Ins. Co. 40 A.L.R.2d 168 appellate opinion Although 15.The intermediate in Rova two are cases mentioned in Couch, Am., Farms Resort v. Investors Ins. (Supp.1993), § Co. Cyclopedia of Insurance Law 51.17 N.J.Super. (Ct.App.Div.1973) 306 A.2d superficially support appear the rule the only predi- case we have identified that has analysis proposes, dissent on closer neither case judg- cated an insurer’s for an excess proposition. turns on that Lumber Thomas general duty ment of a on breach to make (Fla. Casualty mens Mut. So.2d settlement offers It is claimant. unclear App.1982), appellate judg court affirmed a opinion Jersey Supreme from the New insurer, ment based on a verdict for the but Jersey duty truly Court whether the New suggested dictum insurer be liable Farms, insured-operator extensive. In Rova for failure to make an v. Black offer. Smith injuries property of a resort sued for sus- well, Kan.App.2d 791 P.2d guest during diving tained accident that (1989), the court held that an offer of its insurer’s quadriplegic.” him rendered "almost total shortly limits after commencement of Despite urging A.2d at 498 n. 1. underlying would not its lawsuit “cure” fail attorney insured’s insurer offer accept ure to de unconditional within-limits $50,000, $12,500. offered limits of Id. prior mand claimant made to the commence concerns, Among its other the court was troubled imposes ment of the lawsuit. Neither case for obvious reasons the insurer’s solicitation insurers an affirmative to make settlement of a contribution to settlement from its in- offers, risk a committing sured without its own limits. *9 limits. 3; Shipley, Id. 323 A.2d at 502 n. see W.E. & also Annotation, Duty Liability to Settle Insurer of 168, 17. A few courts have held for a (1965). insurers liable Compromise, 40 A.L.R.2d 205-08 circumstances, breach the of of to settle the absence a Jersey Under the such New Su- However, within-limits demand. these cases preme by Court held a demand that settlement generally by plaintiff involve affirmative the "prerequisite misconduct the is not an absolute for negoti- finding the have than insurer to subvert or terminate settlement insurer to acted other good supra Syverud, A.2d faith.” Id. 323 at 505. ations. at & nn. See 1166-68

851 Considering economy, negotiating the incen- standpoint judicial limits. From the the party, conclude that tives for each we question the of a rule that would we wisdom dispute favoring early resolu- public interest require the the insurer to bid itself to shift the supports our decision not tion a the claimant absence of commitment making offers under settlement burden policy case can be settled within the Keeton, supra See onto insurers.18 Stowers virtually 134-139; certain. supra are the rea- substantial excess at 592-93. For Jerry, 18, below, By requiring to an ineffective disagree insurers observe we sons see note infra limits, waiving policy pain Fulton any reading would on all the cases that ritual represents no-demand unwary. trap require for the make a insurers rather than claimants to Farms, at A.2d settlement offers. See Rova 323 Requiring make settlement the claimant to 505; Property Casualty v. Prudential & Powell encourage to earlier settlements. demands tends (cit- Co., 12, (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1991) 14 584 So.2d insurer, the insured the the claimant owes Unlike Farms); Casualty ing Co., Spray v. Continental Rova additional and cannot face no Stowers (1987); 156, 40, Or.App. P.2d 44 86 739 a second or become a defendant in lawsuit risk Co., Co. v. Ins. Puritan Ins. Canadian Universal settle, refusal no matter how unreasonable. for to 84, (E.D.Pa.1984) F.Supp. (citing 87 Rova 586 However, the claimant stands to benefit substan- 188, Reed, Farms); Pa.Super. v. 428 Shearer 286 satisfy tially and increase the assets available 635, Farms); (citing A.2d 636-38 Rova judgment by committing settle a rea- for Co., Family v.Alt American Mut. Ins. 71 Wis.2d policy within limits if the insurer sonable amount 340, 709-10, 706, 237 N.W.2d 712-13 rejects the If claimant such demand. the makes (claimant Farms) (citing de made several Rova negotiations, early a demand in the settlement Holecek, mands); v. 542 536 Coleman F.2d accept either the demand or the insurer must (10th Cir.1976) ) (citing (duty n. 6 Rova Farms be able to do so assume the risk that will not case); Woodford, Ariz.App. Fulton defend v. 26 potential presenting real for an later. In cases a (1976) (criticizing P.2d Rova 545 983-84 strong judgment, excess insurers have a incentive imposing duty a Farms but nevertheless to offer acceptance accept. Early the to liability not settles high policy potential limits when "there is a possibility subse- case but obviates the recovery high potential [ex- claimant and a quent litigation altogether. Stowers Rowland, damages”); cess] State Auto. Ins. Co. v. Conversely, proposing if the burden of settle- (1968). 427 Tenn. S.W.2d 33-35 insurer, policy limits the then ment within is on Bohemia, Co., Both 506, Inc. Home Ins. 725 F.2d v. delayed in favor of settlement. the incentives shift (9th Cir.1984), Oregon v. Eastham First, the if the insurer offers less than Co., Auto. Ins. Or. 540 P.2d limits, reasonably anticipate the can claimant (1975), held for the rather the in- insurer than approaches, the increase as trial so that long offer will sured. presents genuine a risk of an case above, Many every of the cases other case judgment. a excess For insurer stand on cites, mis dissent involve either affirmative such circumstances is to below-limits offer under negotiations, conduct in insurer or an liability for its risk excess fore, recalcitrance. There- opportunity rejected settle within "play will have an incentive to claimant reasoning many limits. anticipation chicken” with the insurer in actually cases above is consistent with our hold equal offer the eve of trial will either the final on duty by that an insurer cannot breach price limits or the insurer’s reservation —(cid:127) tendering a settlement offer. also Commer the case could rea- the most the insurer thinks Liberty cial Co. Union Ins. Mut. Ins. purposes. sonably be for settlement worth (Mich. 1986) (citing Rova N.W.2d Second, limits if the insurer tenders proposition Farms for the that an "fail date, insurer’s earlier than the trial the claimant will not ure to solicit or initiate settlement [demands] necessarily accept the offer. One reason is be negotiations when circum warranted has now "floor” cause insurer established determining a factor stances” is to consider negotiations and must stand offer or for faith); insurer in bad Ameri whether the acted liability unreasonably with later risk excess for Centennial, (plurality at can S.W.2d drawing its the claimant bears offer. Because opinion). losing opportunity for little risk of settle inappropri- limits, particularly We think it would be the claimant has no incentive to retroactively impose liability ate until he or she determines whether settle formality. pretrial liability failure to observe new other than defendant’s assets months, predated Ranger by so Cardenas trial six worth collect would make an "attempts complicated by ing. have could not had notice This further fact is Rang- upon. satisfy dictum the relies assets available to settle” dissent evidence of the er, Moreover, liability estab the extent relevant before 723 S.W.2d is not lished, Ranger negotiation Prods. Wilmoth Limestone Stowers and process, formalize (Tex.Civ.App. capable writ perfectly we think claimants are - Waco insurance, n.r.e.), liability except transmitting demands ref'd suitable settlement Finally, after the undiscoverable until the other side. remains without assistance from finally See Tex.R.Civ.P. resolved. reject we the Fulton v. formulation Woodford 166b(2)(a), (f). unlikely particularly when settlement is because *10 1137-53, 1162-73; ever, Syverud, at supra stacking we consider issue. If correctly 1149-53,1160-72. right reject asserted generally RichaRD A. even reasonable demands POSNER, OF LAW ECONOMIC ANALYSIS limits, then it cannot be liable. (4th 1992). issues, then, remaining ed.

are Maloney correctly whether APIE or identified the amount of insurance Ill available, correct, Maloney and if wheth- following table illustrates the relation- position er APIE’s was reasonable under the Maloney’s ship of settlement demands to the verdict, light circumstances. how- policies: limits of the available insurance

853 we need not determine Despite coverage To decide this case APIE’s insistence that $500,000, nev- was limited to the Cardenases indemnity policies provided many how er made demand than less policies, covering coverage. The consecutive $600,000.19 if this demand were rea- Even periods, could not be “stacked” distinct sonable, triggered it unless no Stowers single a claim involv- multiply coverage for applicable policy within the limits. assuming that injury. Even ing indivisible satisfy could this The Cardenases’ demands “occur- covered under all three Garcia was “policy requirement only things if two limits” duty to settle policies, APIE’s Stowers rence” continuing malprac- were true: triggered. was never multiple triggered coverage poli- tice cies,20 triggered the limits of each “Claim Occurr Simply because provide could be “stacked” to throughout several extends aggregate limit. ence”21 1987, 380, technically (Tex.App. 383 19. Because the Cardenases' claim — Dallas writ) theory). (explaining "pure was not covered under the APIE until manifestation” trial, day $1.6 among of million settlement to select We believe it would be unwise potentially triggered own, tests, could have a Stow- demand when the out these or formulate our duty. ers require case does not resolution of come of this Therefore, present purposes, we issue. require 20. This case does not us to decide which deciding occur assume without that all three triggered. policies parties were Nor have policies policy, 1982 rence 1981 ICA —the identify appropriate us test asked to deter policy, policy. provided ICA and the 1983 APIE — policies triggered by which mine single "continuing” of several are Garcia. We occurrence. note however, passing, that courts the nation across Occurrence,” de- of art 21."Each Claim term considering coverage trigger con issue for adap- appears policy, to be an fined in the tinuing disagreed considerably occurrences have "occurrence,” a art stan- tation term of from of See, Indus., years. e.g., Eagle-Picher in recent liability policies, to the dard-form commercial Co., 110, Liberty F.Supp. Mut. Inc. v. Ins. 523 unique malpractice of medical characteristics (D.Mass.1981) (applying "pure” or 118 “strict language policy. in the APIE risks and other triggers coverage rule which manifestation” upon typically is defined in the follow- "Occurrence” discovery injury), actual of 'd modi as aff ing manner: 12, (1st denied, Cir.1982), fied, 24 682 F.2d cert. 1028, 1279, 460 U.S. (1983); 103 S.Ct. 75 500 L.Ed.2d accident, including repeated An continuous or Indus., Eagle-Picher Liberty Inc. v. Mut. general exposure substantially con- the same Co., (1st 12, Cir.1982) (applying F.2d 24 Ins. 682 ditions, bodily injury prop- which results or triggers relaxed "manifestation rule” which cov damage erty expected nor that is neither in- erage policy period during in first which discov standpoint of the insured. tended denied, ery injury possible), cert. 460 U.S. repeated exposure or to substan- Continuous 1028, 1279, (1983); 103 S.Ct. 75 500 L.Ed.2d tially general con- the same conditions shall be Forty-Eight Insurance Co. N. v. Am. Insula arising out of one occurrence. sidered as tions, Inc., 1212, (6th Cir.1980) F.2d 633 1223 See, Michigan Corp. e.g., Chem. v. American (applying "exposure" triggers rule cover which (6th Co., Home 728 F.2d 378 Assurance age policy period exposure which 1984); Corp. Cir. Keene v. Insurance Co. N. occurred), injury reh'g, 'd F.2d cause 657 aff Am., (D.C.Cir.1981) (Ap 667 F.2d 1053-55 (6th denied, Cir.), 814 cert. 454 U.S. 102 A); Forty-Eight pendix v. Insurance Co. N. Am. (1981); S.Ct. 70 L.Ed.2d 650 Porter v. Amer Insulations, (6th 633 F.2d Cir. (5th (fol Cir.) Optical Corp., ican 641 F.2d 1128 1980) B). (Appendix denied, rule), lowing "exposure” cert. 454 U.S. contrast, Claim means (1981); "Each Occurrence” 102 S.Ct. 70 L.Ed.2d 650 acts or "each act or occurrence or series of Liberty Co. v. Mut. Ins. American Home Prods. (S.D.N.Y.1983) arising occurrences out one event.” (ap F.Supp. 1497 language Policy § trigger II.C. The APIE plying “injuiy-in-fact” rule which sets scope injury point body’s defines of "Each Claim Occurrence” personal when de cases occurrences,” "overwhelmed”), are include series of acts or "[a] fenses tions, aff'd modifica (2d 1984); Corp. apparently Keene to have a effect F.2d Cir. intended (D.C.Cir. of N.Am., repeated exposure" Insurance Co. 667 F.2d 1034 the "continuous or similar to 1981) ap poli- (applying "multiple" “triple-trigger” unifying directive in commercial requires coverage poli proach meaningful under all in the that is cies—but in manner exposure during period continuing malprac- example, cies For medical medical context. denied, manifestation), cert. U.S. operation an ex- frequently involves tice (1982). S.Ct. L.Ed.2d event A tended course treatment. independent grounds of precedent involve numerous Texas has limited on this issue. "repeated negligence Corp. that cannot unified Dev. Ins. Dorchester Safeco *12 (E.D.Mich.1978), periods tions, per-occurrence 1230, not F.Supp. does raise the 451 1243 (6th indemnity 1212, cap 'd, 633 F.2d 28 every policy.22 established in 1226 n. aff (6th Cir.1980), jurisdiction reh’g, Even on 814 embracing 657 F.2d the broadest aff'd denied, Cir.), 1109, cert. 454 coverage U.S. 102 S.Ct. trigger multiple rule has held that 686, (1981); 70 L.Ed.2d 650 Air Prods. & coverage permit does not an insured to Chems., v. Inc. Accident & Indem. multiple policies “stack” the limits of that do Hartford Co., 762, (E.D.Pa.1989); F.Supp. 707 774 overlap: not Co., Uniroyal, F.Supp. v. Inc. Home Ins. 707 surprisingly, policies explic- Not do not (E.D.N.Y.1988); 1368, 1391-94 Owens-Illi- itly provide applying of means nois, Co., Casualty Inc. v. Aetna & Sur. 597 injuries limits of that are cov- 1515, (D.D.C.1984); F.Supp. Chicago 1524 by multiple policies. ered Keene claims Co., F.Supp. Ins. v.Co. Indem. 566 Pacific indemnity that is entitled to full for each (“Plaintiffs (E.D.Pa.1982) 954, 956 contention injury up of provided sum the limits coverages Pacific’s successive by policies. the applicable doWe not policies annual should be ‘stacked’ before agree. principle indemnity implicit of play excess into [the] is called must be policies requires poli- that successive rejected.... physician’s The fact that the single injuries. [continuing] cies cover alleged proper diagnosis failure to make a however, principle, require That does not may years have extended over several does applicable Keene be entitled to “stack” gave not mean that the failure rise more policies’ liability. limits To the extent malpractice.”); than one claim of Continental possible, we have tried to construe the Co., Casualty Co. v. Medical Protective 859 policies way such that the insurers’ 789, (Mo.App.1993) (citing S.W.2d 792-93 obligations continuing inju- contractual [for Freeman, Zipkin v. 436 763-64 ries are occurrences] the same as their (Mo.1968) (en banc)). injuries. obligations for other Keene is by The Stowers claim Garcia and the nothing Therefore, entitled to more. we assumption rests Cardenases on the only policy’s ap- hold one limits can Garcia had three times more insurance than ply injury. may to each Keene select the purchased. during he At no time the four policy under which it is to be indemnified. coverage years policies relevant did two Forty- N. Am. [Insurance Co. v. Cf. Thus, overlap. at no time the four ], Eight Insulations 633 F.2d at 1226 n. 28. years carry liability did Garcia insurance Am., Corp. Keene v. Insurance Co. N. 667 per-occurrence greater with a limit than (D.C.Cir.1981) (emphasis $500,000. F.2d 1049-50 purchase malprac- did denied, added), cert. 455 U.S. 102 coverage, S.Ct. tice million as $1.5 (1982); 71 L.Ed.2d 875 see also Insur he might purchasing have done excess or Forty-Eight ance N. Am. coverage,23 Co. v. Insula- umbrella he therefore conditions,” Div.1987) exposure substantially (discussing the same insurer’s settlement within deductible); but "a Casualty that nevertheless constitute series of acts limit insured’s Co. Ins. v. Inc., that are related and form a Country Nursery, occurrences” Town & Pre-School 147 single malpractice claim. Ill.App.3d 498 101 Ill.Dec. N.E.2d 1177 (1986) (same). Policy language such as “occurrence” or “Per generally Claim Occurrence” measures See, e.g., Chicago Ins. Co. Indem. deductibles or self-insured retentions as well as Pacific Co., (E.D.Pa.1982) F.Supp. See, (discussing e.g., limits. Owens-Illinois v. Aetna coverage dispute Co., primary in a between Casualty excess F.Supp. & Sur. insurers); ("If (D.D.C.1984) Olympic and excess Ins. exposure each to the claimant’s Employers Surplus product Co. Ins. regarded separate Lines must as a occur (1981) (dis Cal.App.3d Cal.Rptr. 908 ... rence O-I must a deductible each absorb cussing coverage 'multiple excess when had four asbestos claimant’s lawsuit.... This insured layers primary interpretation effectively deny above two occurrence’ would larger policies); O-I see also American Co. v. because the deductibles are Centennial Ins. (Tex. any single successfully than the amount of Ins. 843 S.W.2d claim Canal J., date."). 1992) (Hecht, brought concurring, Phillips, generally joined by ... American Gonzalez, C.J., Cook, JJ.) (discuss Cornyn, Home Co. Assurance v. Hermann’s Warehouse Corp., N.J.Super. (Ct.App. ing primary insured A.2d 903 insurer’s settle when in- assignee of the injured plaintiff, not claim to benefit from million $1.5 sured, temporally poli- recovering dam- coverage by stacking precluded distinct is not cies. the existence ages from the insurer in- plaintiff covenant between Although triggering multiple policies from the insurer. seek relief sured provide multiple funding sources and would turned to several different Now court has thereby effect on have considerable Physicians issues for its decision—American APIE, contribution claims between ICA *13 (APIE) duty defend Exchange’s Insurance it cannot lead to the conclusion that Garcia’s im- an has avoided issue and to settle —and “continuing” Claim Oc- coverage total of the state. jurisprudence the portant “Per currence exceeds the Claim somehow discharged that APIE every policy The court now holds limit he Occurrence” stated the duty at purchased. defend Dr. Ramon Garcia its malpractice and that since of case trial the single triggers If a more occurrence demand received settlement never policy, covering policy pe than one different parties suing policy from the within limits riods, applied then limits have different malpractice, APIE could not Dr. Garcia for case, times. In such a the in different duty to I have breached its settle. Stowers indemnity sured’s limit whatever should be discharged to de- agree that APIE applied single point at the limit time dur until fend Dr. in the trial Garcia coverage periods triggered the 13,1985, judgment August after the first policies highest. when the insured’s limit was However, I signed August on dis- generally position is The insured the best (1) agree the court’s characterization of with identify policy policies24 that would the (2) case, solely with the as a Stowers coverage. applicable maximize lim Once the APIE did apparent court’s conclusion that identified, policies all is insurers whose are at- duty to make not breach its reasonable triggered funding must allocate of indem tempts settle it never received a because among nity according limit themselves limits, settlement demand within its subrogation rights. their acknowledge failure to with court’s even case, had a this reprehensible handling APIE’s of Dr. Gar- $500,000 limit of no he matter which coverage his APIE cia’s under might an have selected. never had ignore ques- with court’s decision to $500,000. opportunity to settle for There concerning not to execute. tions covenants fore, settling. it cannot be held liable for not judgment appeals the court of reversed and here rendered that I.

respondent nothing.25 takes mal- dispute originated This in a medical HIGHTOWER, Justice, joined by Cardenas, practice brought Araminta suit SPECTOR, DOGGETT, GAMMAGE and individually guardian estate as Justices, dissenting. (Cardenas), against Dr. Cardenas Gustavo 31,1992, had Garcia. Dr. Garcia treated Gustavo this an

On December court issued years, opinion period over a of several this cause held that Cardenas reformed, judgment. si- purchased temporally the trial court's Our has concurrent excess cov- supra erage); Syverud, (analyzing concerning any at 1193-1207 lence issues addressed in ex- in context of reinsurance and settle prior opinion he or the dissent should not our insurance). cess agreement as resolution of understood reasoning opinions. in those issue or 23, multiple policies we note 24. As observed at process Although allo- we have discussed the may provide aggregate limit under certain cating indemnity among costs mul- or settlement circumstances, purchased such as if insured insurers, tiple opinion not address what does excess concurrent insurance. duty imposes responsibilities when the Stowers companies, insur- two or insurance express opinion grounds more 25. We on the other ers, affirmed, appeals jointly fund a upon or reinsurers must settlement. which the court of during which purchased coverage time Dr. Garcia mal- which indicates in the amount of practice $500,000.00 $1,000,000.00 the Insurance Cor- each claim and (ICA) poration of America and APIE. aggregate. my understanding annual It is effective date of Dr. agree that we to share January 1983. On De- pro aon rata basis. 23, 1983, attorney cember for Cardenas legal expenses We will share a 50/50 sent Dr. Garcia asserting: a letter “This my It understanding basis. further claim arises out of the treatment Mr. filing ... [Ross firm] Crossland’s bewill September Cardenas from pres- 1980 to the an Answer on behalf Dr. Garcia.1 ent time and the treatment Mr. Cardenas copy Dr. Garcia was sent a of this letter. drugs with the Haldol and Navane inAlso March APIE retained its own period.” that time On December independent attorneys monitor devel- Dr. concerning Garcia contacted APIE opments in' keep the lawsuit order *14 attorney. letter from Cardenas’ At significant develop- APIE about advised time, APIE was notified or became aware ments. Between June and October by that Mr. Cardenas had been Dr. treated file following APIE’s contains the statements January Garcia on which was within by Chandler, physician Jack Dr. a who was fact, coverage period. represen- APIE’s In chairman of APIE’s board at that time: affirmatively tative of APIE stated Dr. 3,1984 January on Garcia that he had cover- tough be This will case to defend. age for the treatment of Mr. Cardenas on Both responsible Mittler and Garcia are January 1983: continuing for Haldol. Hard tell when symptoms dyskinesia developed of Tardive Notified Dr. coverage Garcia of his limited surely thought but if either doctor had with APIE for this incident. He took out diagnosis, they stopped have would his on API[E] 1-8-83. The incident drug. in question in began September 1980. Dr. it, Garcia last 1-18-93— but API[E] would cover this last vis- appears treated the Dr. Garcia’s pt. his office previous on Apparently [*] [*] Cardenas [*] [*] treated with the [*] [*] continuously drug January until [Haldol] insurance carrier has the lion’s share 18, 1983.... It very will be difficult to this incident. imagine Doctors Garcia Mittler not by medical suit was filed having pay something on this case. early Cardenas Dr. Garcia in March original petition Plaintiffs first amended filed plaintiffs’ original petition 1984. The did not January allege any 1985 did not treatment allege any treatment which during occurred coverage peri- which occurred APIE’s Crossland, period. Ross od. ICA, who by had been retained filed an - answer on behalf of Although ICA. Mr. April Dr. informed Garcia ICA, Crossland was retained APIE and plaintiffs original petition first amended agreed to defending ICA share the costs of request punitive included for an award following

Dr. Garcia indicated in the letter punitive damages damages and that were not from APIE to ICA: policy. APIE further in- covered his requested Dr. telephone plaintiff This will follow our formed Garcia that conversation 16,1984 $2,270,000 captioned damages March case. I award which ex- attaching copy coverage daily $500,000 am of our ceeded his and that limits of A coverage.” letter from Obviously, contrary ICA APIE also reflected the court’s agreement assertion, and stated: "This will confirm our language agreement in no agreement that will we divide the costs of de- way assignment over evidences an of control equally, any fense in this action and will share defense from APIE to ICA. porportionately rendered [sic] our (the purposes, loss for evaluation any date of personally he could liable be denied) the liability which is still herein $500,000. more Plaintiffs second and than pro rate elected to companies have original May petitions filed third amended on an verdict or adverse settlement allege any did treatment which oc- equal basis. coverage period. during APIE’s On curred Crossland, represent- Mr. who June arrangement understanding of this My APIE, Dr. on behalf of ICA and ed companies is that between the two Lyons, Mr. whom Dr. Garcia had

wrote Clem for settlement insurance available total informing expense, him retained at his own adverse satisfaction as follows: $600,000.00. therefore Dr. Our client Ramon Garcia has attorney made a On Cardenas’ separate companies two $600,000.00upon Mr. demand of applicable might to this claim. The response Apparently no Crossland. Company policy with Insurance of America fact, made settlement demand. to the $100,000. single has a claim limit of even con- never record indicates $500,- is a from Dallas API[E] settling the case. sidered 000.00 limit. I have been advised those inability companies that to the to es- due II. regard tablish an “date of occurrence” with original petition fourth amended Plaintiffs claim, arrangement has been *15 22, allege any July did not filed on made share to the risk. during APIE’s treatment which occurred companies will essence two share coverage period. Plaintiffs fifth amended any pro on settlement or verdict a rata 28,1985 July original petition on did not filed up aggregate basis to the total and limits during allege any which occurred treatment $600,000.00. policies of 24, 1985, July coverage period. On trial, Dr. days five APIE notified Gar- before copyA this letter was sent APIE’s own of to coverage no under his 10, cia there was that attorney. independent On June policy, stating representative Mr. of Crossland wrote a ICA stating “I have with that broached settlement just of the most We have been advised plaintiffs attorney. He indicates that he in the [sic] recent Ammended Petition get figure to me in the near will back with captioned lawsuit. above Crossland, July future.” On Mr. you allegations against arise from represented on of

who Dr. Garcia behalf ICA during plaintiff to the treatment rendered APIE, plaintiffs attorney, and wrote the 3,1980 through April of period October stating 14, 1982, by plaintiff was treated when the Garcia, I have been informed that Dr. no Dr. There have alle- Fernandez. been action, in styled above defendant gations the treatment rendered for by companies was two different insured January you visit on office with appli- during the time frame could policy cable this suit. The insurance Corporation America

with Insurance of $100,000.00, previously of had a limit as allegations against you stem from As the interrogatories. indicated answers prior inception rendered treatment Physicians policy your of insurance was with The second of with American 8, 1983) API[E], (January headquarters Exchange in Dallas. The with Insurance $500,- policy for coverage were no under this limits there is this claim. 000.00. lawsuit, investigation of this by companies Early in the

I have been informed both Creighton from Ms. difficulty you letter ascertaining received that due to APIE, of our coverage by office which she advised Mr. of denial I Kambic of ICA of dates longer and am representing no manner coverage your policy with American July began their interest.” After things Physicians. agreed pay She settle- 26, 1985, happen rapid pace. July at a On pro ment or coverage on rata attorney Cardenas’ discovered that there basis, and an effort to if determine our policies were not one two but ICA with cov- coverage applicable, agreed she $100,000.00 $500,000.00 erage and in- share the cost of defense with ICA to $1,100,000. creased its settlement demand to duplicity legal eliminate Through work. day, Later in- same Mr. Crossland discovery, this we have now reached the attorney that formed Cardenas’ there were point all allegations where made policies but coverage two three ICA with you prior your coverage occurred $100,000.00, $500,000.00 $500,000.00: Therefore, Physicians. American there Apparently confusion has arisen with re- your policy. afforded under gard to the extent of the letter, By copy advising we are Mr. conjunction available in I with this case. Lyons, Pressley Mr. Crossland and Mr. ICA, inquiry by made have further providing you ICA to continue with cover- way you, response of information to age and a defense in this matter. your July by way letter of addition, 24, 1985, APIE’s inde- supplementation further to In- to Answers pendent attorney notified Mr. Crossland that terrogatories, I would like to indicate the following: period January For

This will my also confirm discussions with through January 1981, Dr. Garcia was July 24, you on wherein I informed Policy covered Insurance No. ICA you that APIE believes that no $100,000.00. P332080 the amount exists held Therefore, period January through For the you this claim. are incorrect in January Dr. your previous covered assertions and understand- *16 $500,000.00 ing by Policy that ICA Insurance No. P332081 in an additional of cover- age know, $500,000.00. you period existed. As the the amount For the act, January 8, 7, 1983, covered errors or through January omissions by during made policy peri- Dr. Garcia the by Dr. Garcia was covered ICA Insurance inception od. The date the $500,- Policy No. in P332082 the amount of 8, January APIE was 1983. All of the 000.00. allegations Plaintiffs which have been Although by I been represen- have advised petitions made in the most recent relate to any of APIE that I not in man- tatives do allegedly acts omissions made dur- and/or interests, represent upon ner their based through 1981 and the date of belief, information and I believe that for Therefore, allega- there would no be January through period the Janu- relating any tions Dr. conduct of Garcia 7, 1984, by ary Dr. Garcia covered was by Any previous while insured APIE. ar- company in insurance with that the rangement concerning statements about $500,000.00. amount of possible sharing pro any in on a rata basis or dependent settlement my understanding policies It is that these finding coverage of actual for the alle- aggregated any or in cannot be totaled gations being which were made coverage in an manner to establish amount during pendency Plaintiff of this law- $500,000.00. contrary, in To the excess of allegations suit. no such Since relate to my present belief in the event is that any occurring during act omission and/or any liability that should find policy period, the APIE no there is cover- Garcia, against Dr. it will neces- that be age to Dr. afforded Garcia for this lawsuit. finding sary to have a further as to 24, 1985, appropriate injury date of determine July Also on Mr. Crossland notified my understanding Dr. Garcia that and limits involved. “[i]t occurring alleged petition treatment any may aris- regret I confusion that have during period. my statements APIE’s regard previous en with $100,000.00 concerning policy. At pleadings to his After Cardenas amended suit, filing of law time of the this poli- negligence APIE’s allege acts allega- company believed that [ICA] terms, independent attorney ver- cy commencing in tions arose from treatment “you’re that bally Mr. Crossland informed such, company September of 1980. As they’ll payroll because API[E] back on the $100,000.00 policy understood obligation now” to defend [APIE?] have an I applicable Again, claim. would independent its attor- neither APIE nor but any regret have arisen confusion that his ney informed Dr. Garcia from this assessment.2 July Also on had been “reinstated.” covenant not July attorney in- Cardenas executed a Cardenas’ On $1,600,000. exchange against Dr. Garcia demand to execute creased settlement assignment against all of claims response his Apparently no was made to either July APIE and ICA.3 At the medical settlement demand. Also on trial, Lyons Mr. original his sixth amended Dr. Garcia was defended Cardenas filed CARDENAS, However, assertions, contrary of ARAMINTA to the court’s rendered in favor July rep- Individually of the ESTATE letter and Guardian Mr. Crossland's did not limits, concerning position DR. RAY- resent APIE’s OF GUSTAVOCARDENAS because, actually authority anything A. of what is settlement else MOND GARCIA excess reasons, among longer carrier. other Mr. Crossland no collected from represented the interests APIE and was no n n n n « kt longer defending Dr. behalf Garcia on of APIE. Plaintiff, CARDENAS,Individually ARAMINTA July Mr. Dr. On Crossland notified OF GUSTAVO and as Guardian CARDENAS, ESTATE my understanding as of "[i]t agrees indemnify and further APIE, coverage by longer I am the denial of GARCIA, DR. A. his hold harmless RAYMOND representing manner their Fur- interest.” executors, assigns and and and and heirs thermore, Mr. Crossland not write did his firms, persons, professional all other associa- authority seeking 1985 letter after corporations privity him tions or from APIE. damages, against any all future claims arising expenses out of treatment costs assign- 3. The covenant not to execute and the provided A. GUS- of DR. RAYMOND GARCIA ment of Dr. Garcia's claims years during the Carde- TAVOCARDENAS Mr. were in one "As- ICA included document entitled professional his care. nas signment of Interest Cause of Action and foregoing For in consideration Agreement Designating Subject Execu- Assets proceeds promise to the look things, Among other the "document” stat- tion.” liability policies described above satisfaction *17 ed: may any judgment be these Plaintiffs entitled of GARCIA, against RAY- A. DR. DR. RAYMOND CARDENAS,Individually and as ARAMINTA sells, transfers, assigns, sets MOND A. GARCIA Guardian of the OF GUSTAVO ESTATE CARDENAS, and delivers to ARAMINTA over Individually and LAW OF PAT MA- CARDENAS OFFICES the ESTATE OF and as Guardian of LONEY, hereby agree P.C. and covenant OFFICES OF CARDENASand LAW GUSTAVO against judgment should DR. RAYMONDA. executors, P.C., MALONEY, adminis- PAT their GARCIAbe obtained in the above-referenced benefit, trators, assigns, and and for their use execution, cause, they levy or issue shall money any all now due or and or sums of sum including garnishment any process, or other GARCIA, all owing and DR. RAYMOND A. assets, any judgment against or abstract of claims, demands, and of action of whatso- causes any description, property, kind DR. of or of nature, Defendant, DR. kind which ever and exception RAYMONDA. GARCIAwith the sole GARCIA, has, had or now or A. has RAYMOND may policies the or of Attorneys against or have Defense or ICA Defendant, RAYMONDA. GAR- which DR. API[E], person persons, any and each or other or CIA, as have with ICA insured thereunder them, severally, jointly any or of whether and API[E]. and/or of, loss, damage arising injury or out or for him, by action or or causes of cause sustained of, to, relating arising, growing con- agreed out or or ARAMINTACARDE- It is further NAS, handling claims of ARA- Individually ES- with the and Guardian of the nected as CARDENAS, CARDENAS, Individually and as Guard- MINTA TATE OF GUSTAVO will indem- OF GUSTAVOCARDENAS nify extent ian of the ESTATE DR. RAYMONDA. GARCIA the against judgment might DR. RAYMONDA. GARCIA. of amount by 29,1985, However, Mr. appeals. ap and Crossland. court of On the court parties agreed jury try peals appeal to waive a refused to it to the mal and allow Cardenas, Throughout practice judgment. APIE case before the court. bench trial, independent attorney pres- (Tex.App. Antonio — San (“We n.r.e.) 1986, writ ref'd participate ent in the conclude that courtroom but did not APIE, rejected having right participate in the Apparently immediately trial. before court, Crossland, in the trial argument, right waived chal final Mr. on behalf of ICA, $100,000 lenge judgment in by v. Garcia offered Cardenas Cardenas to settle the error.”). May 1987, 2, writ of In Dr. rejected. August case. The Garcia offer was On $500,000 agreed payment and APIE in the trial court awarded Cardenas $2,235,000 exchange agreement Dr. not to malpractice against on the claim contest APIE’s motion for a six-month con Dr. Garcia.

tinuance, $500,000 payment an offset of the against any future and a total lia III. bility cap Along way, million. Dr. $2.5 August On Dr. Garcia4 suit filed pleadings neg Garcia amended his to include against alleging ICA APIE in negligence and contracts, ligence, breach of the insurance handling defending his claim and him the (false, misleading violations of DTPA and malpractice medical In suit. November acts, deceptive practices unfair in the busi findings the trial court filed its fact ness insurance and unconscionable and of law the malpractice conclusions action), course of violations of articles 21.21 Among suit. things, other the trial court and 21.21-2 (including Insurance Code continuing found Dr. “committed regulations the rules and of the State Board negligence acts of in his treatment and care by or applicable of Insurance made issued September of Gustavo Cardenas from 21.21), During article and bad faith.5 February 1980 to 1983.” The trial suit of the “bad faith” Dr. appealed Garcia was ICA on “Assignment in November of Inter Apparently behalf of Dr. Garcia. APIE was Agreement Desig est Cause Action and longer participating directly nating Subject Assets Execution” —the —either indirectly May Dr. Garcia’s In defense. covenant not to execute —was admitted into —in 1986, Dr. Garcia and ICA settled the mal- evidence. case was submitted practice $2,000,000. faith” “bad suits negligence, gross negligence, on DTPA appeal suit was dis- (including and Insurance Code violations joint parties. false, deceptive missed motion of the Sub- misleading prac acts tices, sequently sought appeal practices the mal- of in unfair business practice judgment by writ error surance and an unconscionable course of ac- breaching 4. The suit filed Cardenas Dr. Garcia's their contract of insurance to assignees. provide under the him defense; provide a breaching fiduciary duty to act their original petition, In his seventh amended Dr. good provide coverage faith under the *18 alleged, among things, Garcia other that APIE GARCIA; policy a and defense to DR. following particulars: was liable in the (8) coverage providing a In not and defense (1) bargain, negotiate failing In to and settle amended; petition after Plaintiff Cardenas’ limits; applicable policy case the (9) settle; the within failing negotiations carry In to on to (2) failing In (10) to advise DR. GARCIA failing investigate the of In to facts the potential judgment exposure of and an case filed Cardenas to determine that cover- beyond policy; existed; the limits of the age policy the under (3) failing (11) $500,000.00 In advise settle- failing to DR. GARCIAof the In to tender as and on if the provided policy ment offers made the effect him of to Plaintiff accepted; applied judgment offers were not to and con- toward the (4) bargain, failing good tinuing pay In act in faith to to refuse under of to to settlement; insurance; negotiate and and effectuate (5) (12) withdrawing coverage abandoning In DR. GAR- DR. GARCIA the defense of defense; failing provide prior with a CIA the trial of case him. and him (ii) tion). (1) it the insured that will defend negli- advise jury The found prior gently subject Dr. a reservation of its failed to settle Garcia’s insured (2) 30, 1985, September sixth Cardenas’ one more right deny coverage on or petition alleged separate and dis- amended specified grounds; by Dr. negligence tinct acts of committed (iii) coverage grounds deny on during policy period, APIE’s Garcia either not covered under the claim is Garcia, (4) coverage APIE denied to Dr. has that the insured breached or APIE failed to Dr. at the trial defend Garcia condition; or case, and APIE’s actions Cardenas provide failing coverage and defend (iv) appears if rescind false, misleading, deceptive or acts or were fraud, procured through policy was practices. jury further The found each fact, the insured’s mutual mistake or negligent, acts in heedless these mate- misrepresentation or concealment of disregard rights, reckless of Dr. Garcia’s an application. rial in the facts business, practice unfair in the insurance an R. BARRY R. & THOMAS action, OSTRAGER unconscionable action or course NEWMAN, proximate damages, ON Dr. HANDBOOK INSUR- cause of knowingly. § and done awarded Dr. ANCE 2.01 COVERAGE DISPUTES $2,235,000 (6th 1993). damages, apportioning However, Garcia undisputed it is ed. percent to ICA perform of these that APIE failed percent to APIE. Dr. Garcia elected re- concerning coverage. duties under 21.21. cover article The trial court period, rec- During the sixteen month judgment rendered for Dr. Garcia totally take ord indicates that APIE failed to $1,331,574.00plus post-judgment amount of Dr. action to determine whether Garcia Among things, interest. other the court of policy. had no coverage under his There was trial appeals modified the court’s allegations investigation con- facts to increase the amount of the cerning no coverage. There was reservation Dr. Garcia and otherwise affirmed trial agreement. rights or non-waiver letter judgment. court’s sought independent coverage

APIE never denying opinion. explanation APIE’s TV. 24,1985 coverage July was that Plaintiffs on the malpractice After suit was filed in July original petition fifth amended filed on March APIE sat back for almost six- allege any not treatment which did providing teen months Dr. with un- during coverage period. occurred APIE’s coverage policy. conditional his However, plaintiffs origi- beginning with the fact, representative affirmatively of APIE petition nal filed in 1984 and continu- March January Dr. stated to Garcia on 1984 that pe- plaintiffs original first amended he had for the of Mr. treatment January 1985,plaintiffs tition filed in second However, January on Cardenas on petitions original amended filed third July days malprac- five before the original May plaintiffs amended trial, fourth unexpectedly tice without July ending petition 1985 and filed notice informed Dr. Garcia that “there original petition plaintiffs under this for this claim.” with fifth amended concerning coverage an insurer filed on Cardenas did has been described follows: allege any occurred treatment which coverage period. APIE knew as notice When insurer first receives insured, allegations in the pleadings much about the a claim suit *19 July promptly one of the in as it on insurer must take March 1984 did following Furthermore, April actions: in APIE informed orig- plaintiffs Dr. Garcia that first amended receipt

(i)acknowledge of the notice and petition request for an award inal included a provide the that it advise insured will cov- punitive damages that dam- punitive erage; ages were not covered in policy. ary his APIE January 1983 and Dr. Garcia also Dr. plaintiff informed Garcia that covered an in policy re- was APIE insurance quested $2,270,000 $500,000.00, an award of the amount of that Dr. damages in Garcia $500,000 which Mr. in his policy during his treated Cardenas office the exceeded limits of period policy January on personally and that he and that could liable for January the was $500,000. 1983 visit covered under damages However, more than fact, policy. APIE allegations In gave every Dr. Garcia indication that pleadings did not allege he coverage had unconditional poli- under his —which during treatment which occurred APIE’s cy for sixteen months unexpectedly and then coverage period only factor APIE coverage “withdrew” days his five before tri- —were coverage in denying July considered on fact, al. In vice-president APIE’s of claims Contrary assertion, court’s Dr. admitted at trial that allegations in the coverage Garcia’s his APIE under was pleadings only were the factor considered in conclusively established. denying coverage 1985. I find this treatment of Dr. Garcia and APIE’s

handling of Dr. coverage Garcia’s under V. his policy reprehensible; however, apparently doctrine, Under Stowers6 an insurer approves handling court of APIE’s of Dr. duty owes its insured the to exercise rea- coverage policy. under his determining sonable care whether to settle claim the insured within the Furthermore, the court asserts that Dr. Ranger County limits. Mutual Insur- not assert that APIE was es- Guin, (Tex.1987), ance this topped deny that Dr. coverage Garcia had expanded obligation court an insurer’s to in- request his because he did not investigation, clude the insured of this issue be included the court’s case, preparation defense, and trial of the charge. APIE further asserts that issue attempts as well as reasonable to settle: conclusively established because “APIE January [Dr.] notified Garcia on An insurer’s its insured is not poli- that his under the APIE limited to the narrow boundaries contend- cy Ranger because [that limited one office ed a “Stower’s visit Doctrine” only upon period.” occurred the APIE case can be based insurer’s mistakenly equates failure to settle a claim following insured January statement to Dr. when claimant offers settle within Garcia on limits], rather extends to the “limiting coverage:” his range agency relationship. full Notified Dr. Garcia of his limited case, investigation, that includes prep- with APIE for this took incident. He out lawsuit, aration defense of trial of his policy on API[E] 1-8-83. The incident attempts the case and reasonable to settle. question began September 1980. Dr. this incident. insurance carrier has the lion’s share in it, but Garcia last treated the 1-18-93— it appears API[E] would cover this last vis- Dr. Garcia’s pt. in his office on previous for an award of negligent breached Ranger [*] contends breach n contract and there is no basis of an exemplary damages. n agency at most it [*] relationship n merely [*] A Apparently court mistakenly believes independent tort for constitutes of Dr. notification Garcia’s “limited cov- point an action for will lie. This erage with APIE for this incident” was the of law has been well-settled since this legal equivalent rights. O’Daniels, of a holding reservation Court’s Williams However, (1871). undisputed it is Janu- between 35 Tex. 542 holding approved). 6. G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem- (Tex.Comm'n nity App.1929, 15 S.W.2d 544 *20 (3) limits, 659-60;7 against bid Ins. excess of its Id. at see American Centennial (4) itself, to (Tex.1992) first settlement offer Ins., make the v. Canal 843 S.W.2d (5) (“The party, or make unilateral opposing duty ordinarily as insurer’s to act an addition, Rang- In under settlement offers.8 prudent person management in ex- business Guin, for- County a er Mutual Insurance investigation, claims tends to trial defense is within limits mal settlement demand negotiations.”); and settlement American trigger longer prerequisite an to absolute Ins., (Hecht, Centennial 843 S.W.2d at- duty make an insurer’s reasonable J., joined C.J., concurring, by Phillips, Gon- Essentially insurer tempts to settle. an (Under JJ.) zalez, Cornyn, and Cook Stowers something to facilitate reasonable must do Ranger, an and carrier “is and attempts to and not sit back settle subrogated rights equitably to its insured’s absolutely nothing. do ... primary a insurance carrier jurisdictions recognized several have Other negligently investigating, preparing de- duty an make rea variations of insurer’s fend, trying settling party ... [a] third attempts Syver to settle. See Kent sonable action.”). Ranger Even the dissent Coun- Settle, ud, Duty to 76 VA.L.REV. ty recognized Mutual Insurance v. Guin an (1990). Resort, Rova Inc. Farms duty to insurer’s enter into reasonable settle- America, Co. v. Investors Insurance negotiations: ment (1974), 474, 323 A.2d 495 the New Jer N.J. duty companies Insurance Texas have a Supreme recognized an insur sey Court ordinary defending to exercise care in law- duty to explore er has an affirmative settle duty suits insureds. This includes possibilities: ment duty to enter into reasonable settle- a thor- “[a] decision not to settle must be negotiations ment accept honest, or to a reason- intelligent objective oughly and able settlement offer. This doctrine is uti- test- one. It must be a realistic one when necessarily expertise protect judg- lized to ed assumed insured from a company.” [quoting Bowers v. Cam- ment excess of limits. Association, Ins. den Fire N.J. (Gonzalez, Ranger, J., at 661 (1968) expertise A.2d This must ] dissenting). Consequently, this court has ex- case, applied, given be to a consider- panded acting duties to insurer’s include bearing upon all ation of the factors ordinarily prudent person as an in business advisability protec- of a settlement for the management the Stowers —whether of the While of the tion insured. the view making doctrine not —to include reason- attorney one carrier or its as attempts to able settle. This include could factor, important good faith evaluation duty good to make a faith effort includes requires more. It consideration case, evaluate settlement value of a verdict, range of anticipated of the investigate explore possibili- settlement adverse; strengths should be ties, opposing to discuss settlement of all of the weaknesses evidence known; party so presented enter into reasonable settlement either side far history particular geographic contrast, negotiations. an insurer’s nature; area in cases of similar ordinarily prudent person act as an appearance, persuasiveness, and relative management business to make reasonable claimant, insured, appeal likely require attempts to not that an settle does trial. and the witnesses at insurer settle for more than its limits, accept a settlement demand [*] [*] [*] [*] n [*] Furthermore, plaintiff prohibited retroactively Ranger 7. The court has altered County making Mutual Insurance Guin so demand within holding an insurer’s to its insured limits. —that "investigation, preparation includes for defense lawsuit, trial of the and reasonable attempts to settle”—has been into transformed mere "dictum.” *21 864 (9th Cir.1984); Exchange better view that the is insurer has an Farmers Ins. v. 612, 1359, duty explore Schropp,

affirmative 222 Kan. 567 1365- pos- to settlement P.2d (1977). generally 66 sibilities. See Commercial Union Liberty Co., Ins. 426 Co. v. Mutual Ins. (citations omitted); Id. 323 A.2d at 503-06 127, 161, (1986). Mich. N.W.2d 393 165-66 Family Co., Alt v. American Mutual Ins. 71 Resort, In Rova Farms Inc. v. Investors 340, 706, (1976); Wis.2d 237 N.W.2d 712-13 America, 474, Insurance Co. 65 N.J. 323 Co., Maine Bonding v. Centennial Ins. 298 (1974), Jersey Supreme A.2d 495 the New (“In 514, (1985) 1296, Or. 693 P.2d 1299 recognized Court that a also settlement de- conducting of a claim defense an mand within an longer limits is no insured, including investigation, negotia- prerequisite: absolute tion, claim, litigation the insurer must use such care would have been used unrealistic to [I]t would be believe ordinarily an prudent insurer prerequisite finding with no such an offer is applicable limit to the the insurer to have acted other than claim. The good insurer faith. The better view is negligent failing is to settle when duty explore insurer has an affirmative to exists, opportunity an choosing to settle if in worst, possibilities. settlement At ab- not to settle taking it would an be unreason request sence of a formal to settle within is, able risk —that risk that would involve policy merely one factor to con- is chances results out of unfavorable reason light surrounding sidered in circum- proportion able to the chances of favorable stances, good on the issue of faith. results.”); Spray Casualty v. Continental Co., 156, 40, (1987); Or.App. 86 P.2d 739 43 (citations omitted); Id. 323 A.2d at 505 Cole- Property Powell v. Casualty Prudential & (“the Holecek, duty man v. 542 F.2d at 537 Co., 12, 14 Ins. 584 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. So.2d hinge settle of a does not the existence (“Where 1991) clear, liability injuries is plaintiff’); settlement from the v. offer Alt so serious that a in excess of the Co., Family American Mutual 237 Ins. likely, limits is an insurer has affirma 712-13; N.W.2d at Powell v. Prudential duty negotia tive to initiate settlement Co., Property Casualty at & Ins. 584 So.2d tions.”); Holecek, 532, (“The Coleman v. 542 F.2d 14 lack formal offer of a to settle does (10th (Kansas Cir.1976) law) (“[T]he 537 duty preclude finding Although bad faith. to settle arises if carrier offer of settlement was once would initiate considered necessary duty of a element to settle ... negotiations settlement on its own behalf prerequisite offer to not a settle is potential liability equal were to that of its imposition for an bad insurer’s insured.”); Ins. Co. Puritan v. Canadian settle, merely faith but one refusal Co., 84, F.Supp. Ins. 586 Universal 87 considered.”); Bohemia, factor to be Inc. v. (E.D.Pa.1984) (“The view, however, better (“[A] Co., Home F.2d at 512 firm Ins. 725 duty insurer has an affirmative prerequisite settlement offer ‘is not a re explore possibilities.”); v. Self covery every important but is an case’ Co., F.Supp. AllstateIns. 345 196 determining factor in whether the insurer (M.D.Fla.1972). See Fund Ins. v. Fireman’s Co. Secu refused in bad to settle a claim faith within Co., rity Ins. N.J. A.2d limits.”). Exchange Farmers Ins. (1976) (“Security ignore chose its obli 1365-66; Schropp, at 567 P.2d State Auto honest, gation intelligent to make an Rowland, mobile Ins. Co. v. S.W.2d good faith evaluation of the case for settle- 33-35. See also American Home v. Her weigh purposes probabilities ment and to Warehouse, mann’s N.J. 563 A.2d manner.”); a fair Automobile State Ins. (1989). 446-47 Rowland, 221 Tenn. Co. (1968); Abstract Guarantee & Title VI. Casualty v. Interstate Fire & 228 Kan. (1980); Bohemia, duty 618 P.2d The court an insurer’s describes accept

Inc. v. Home Ins. F.2d 511-12 settle as reasonable limits, every opportu- APIE had geous within statement! settlement demands $500,000.00,but attempt to settle for degree nity of care and to exercise *22 any facilitate set- diligence attempts made to ordinarily prudent person which an it never faith good APIE never a his own made management would exercise of tlement. value responding de- to evaluate settlement business to settlement effort (3) case, pos- limits, duty investigated explored the policy a of never mands within and settlement, discussed settle- ordinary sibility care that at- never includes reasonable en- coverage opposing party and never tempts to within the settle insured’s ment with negotiations they gaged after receive a formal de- in reasonable settlement settlement policy opposing party. The court asserts within limits. The court further with the mand settle duty” opportunity an insurer’s APIE never had an asserts that “Stowers $500,000.00 by received activated a unless because APIE never settlement demand (1) policy within three conditions the claim a formal settlement demand exist — coverage, fixated on the scope is within the limits. The court remains insured (2) limits, a within policy requirement the demand is within the and settlement demand (3) policy that an the terms demand are such limits. ordinarily prudent accept insurer it. would Ranger following The court asserts that require- The court seems to be fixated on the making the burden of settlement would shift a ment of formal settlement demand within apparently the insurer. The court offers to policy limits and is unable make the con- rigid process as a envisions the settlement ceptual rigid shift from the and formalized procedure plain- in which the and formalized requirement of a Stowers formal settlement “legal the first tiff has the burden” to make policy Ranger demand within limits to the demand the insurer has settlement and person an ordinarily prudent to act as respond the settlement de- “burden” management in business to make reasonable However, attorney who has mand.9 attempts analy- Under to settle. the court’s knows, negotiated and a lawsuit ever settled sis, an insurer has no to act as an process rigid and the settlement is not person ordinarily prudent in business man- fact, procedure. everyday, formalized agement attempts make reasonable to set- plaintiffs, to fa- defendants and insurers act good tle to act in or even faith until by attempts to cilitate reasonable settle — receives a formal settlement within demand making good faith effort to evaluate plaintiff. policy from the limits other case, by investigating settlement value of

words, exactly an insurer can do what settlement, exploring possibility and did in case—since it never received opposing by discussing settlement with the formal settlement demand within party by engaging in settle- and reasonable limits, justified doing absolutely APIE was opposing party— negotiations ment with the nothing. APIE never even considered requirement the mechanical of a for- without possibility or af- either before policy limits. mal settlement demand within malpractice responded ter trial and never Furthermore, mistakenly inex- the court and to any of settlement demands. Cardenas’ requiring an plicably seems to believe that per- attempts justify ordinarily prudent fail- as an

The court insurer to act management making by stating ure action rea- to take son business opportunity attempts require never had an settle for its sonable settle would (1) $500,000.00. of- an outra- to make unilateral settlement This is insurer limits — $100,000.00 $500,000.00 light The court also states fact with "[i]n $500,000.00 Maloney posi- was informed of the insurers' Mr. and APIE’s limit discovered However, [concerning policy limits]....” tion July policies Maloney on 1985? ICA’sthree “position” concerning policy limits is the $100,000.00, $500,000.00 $100,000.00 referring ICA’s limit and court to? $500,000.00 $500,000.00 com- and APIE’s limit $500,000.00 limit Mr. communicated to APIE’s Maloney July Maloney 1985? to Mr. on municated July policies 1985? two ICA’s (2) fers, literally plaintiffs offer the limits in until when filed the every potential which the for an petition alleging sixth for the amended first exists, to bid time acts of within APIE’s itself in the absence of a commitment period. Since the covenant not to execute claimant that the case can be settled within signed and the trial commenced the limits, to make the first settle- day, same APIE contends that it could not opposing party. ment offer to the The court any duty have breached to settle the case. I mistakenly inexplicably also seems to disagree. plaintiff prohibited believe that the *23 First, duty I APIE believe that created making a settlement demand within prior July to settle 29—when none other- addition, In limits. the court asserts that by providing wise would have Dr. requiring ordinarily an insurer to act as an existed — coverage Garcia with unconditional under his prudent person management in business policy for sixteen months from March 1984 making attempts reasonable to settle would July by totally failing until reduce to take negotiate the incentive to a settle- encourage early any ment and action to settlement. In determine whether Dr. Garcia fact, requiring insurers to act to coverage policy, facilitate had under his actual- attempts reasonable encourage to settle will ly assuming control of the defense ICA. early litigation settlements and reduce and APIE that after admits suit was filed plaintiffs, settlement costs which will benefit March APIE and into a ICA entered insureds, insurers, purchasers liability in- agreement agreeing letter to divide costs of taxpayers surance and who subsidize much of any defense and settlement or verdict on a justice system. cost the civil pro expressly rata basis. It did not disavow coverage days until five before trial. Furthermore, the court has mischaracter- fact, error, application in its for writ of solely ized this case as a Stowers Al- case. APIE admitted that though parties appeals and the court of terminology, use that this case is not a suit pro- APIE evidence showed that had brought solely under the Stowers doctrine. coverage vided defense and to Dr. Garcia Dr. alleged negligence handling Garcia his prior filing to the of the Fifth Amended defending claim and him in the medical mal- During Petition. period the one-week be- suit, practice breach of the insurance con- tween the Fifth and Sixth Amended Peti- tracts, (false, violations of the DTPA mislead- tions, assigned Dr. his interest acts, ing deceptive practices unfair in the policy. assignment This terminated business insurance and unconscionable obligation part further on APIE action), course of violations of 21.21 articles protect Dr. Garcia from an “excess” (including and 21.21-2 of the Insurance Code place. that could not take Nonethe- regulations the rules and of the State Board less, provide APIE continue to did a de- applicable by of Insurance made or issued coverage fense and to Dr. con- Garcia and 21.21), under article and bad faith. The ease pay tinued defense costs. Evidence of negligence, was submitted to the prior actions to the Amended Sixth gross negligence, DTPA and Insurance Code Petition, however, is irrelevant and had no false, (including misleading violations and de- probative duty value since there was no ceptive practices, practices acts or unfair provide coverage until the Sixth Amended the business of insurance and an unconscio- undisputed Petition filed. The evi- action). nable course of Dr. Garcia elected to APIE provide dence discloses that did cov- Obviously recover under article 21.21. erage filing and a after the defense solely brought case is not a suit under the Sixth Amended Petition. Stowers doctrine. application further stated in its for

VII. writ error that of its attor- “[statements ney] clearly that APIE had re- responsibili- established contends it had ty duty coverage provide a thus no to settle— sumed its and did de- —and fact, added). demands. settlement Apparently Cardenas’ (Emphasis fense.” independent that neither the indicates provided record position APIE’s is that pos- APIE ever considered filing attorney of the sixth nor to Dr. Garcia before the or after before legally sibility either petition but since it was not of settlement amended Furthermore, there is obligated coverage, malpractice it had no trial. provide APIE’s failure to attempt to settle. at least some evidence after efforts attempt reasonable plaintiffs offered to There is evidence that petition dur- amended filing of the sixth for the total amount of cover settle the case assignment trial. The age represented by Mr. to be Crossland did not and the Cardenas Dr. Garcia between available, policy lim APIE’s which included arising duty to Dr. Garcia terminate its. APIE’s involvement raised the stakes thus did not terminate policy, settlement, creating any potential duty. More- opportunity to breach coverage. responsible if settle as it were occurs, over, faith regardless of when the bad Robertson, Ranger Ins. Co. v. damages from the bad faith —the (Tex.App. writ ref'd — Austin *24 typically against the insured —will (insurer n.r.e.) deny cover estopped was this until after in cases such as not accrue age undertaking the defense uncondi after and release. assignment months). Fur tionally period for a of seven thermore, clearly pursue APIE had a have settled argues APIE that it could not plaintiffs settlement efforts after reasonable is, ICA; independently the case petition, amended but filed their sixth the combined at all times demanded plaintiffs and, fact, attempts made no settlement There is no of the two insurers. policy limits possibility of set never considered evidence, however, that APIE ever offered logical why There Dr. tlement. is reason addition, In two policy limits. its individual assignment of his tort claims should jointly responsible insurers 29, 1985, duty. July terminate this On to avoid their should not be allowed try parties agreed jury to waive a argu- attempts to settle make reasonable in- Although the court. APIE’s case before independently have ing that neither could dependent attorney believed that as soon as the case within their individual settled waived, finding was particularly un- argument limits. foregone conclusion and that ICA should agreed to divide persuasive since it with ICA settle, independent attorney nor neither pro on a rata basis. costs of possibility APIE ever considered the of set- Apparently tlement. APIE was confident VIII. negligence

that no or causation would be Dr. Garcia APIE’s cov- found issue, considered The next which was addition, 31, 1985, erage period. 31, opinion, concerns 1992 our December attorneys into judge the trial called the assignee injured plaintiff, as the whether an and told them that he wanted the chambers insured, recovering precluded from that he case settled because he was afraid insurer the existence damages from the might punitive damages against Dr. Gar- find in- plaintiff and the a covenant between attorneys reported cia. The that Cardenas the insurer. sured to seek relief $1,600,000.00 demanding and ICA and inappro- companies will at times Insurance judge was offering The trial were $0. case, thereby ex- to settle priately refuse attorneys to talk to their furious and told the liability in excess of insureds to posing their attempt to settle. ICA decided clients and Syverud, Duty Kent policy limits. See spite offer. make no settlement 1113, Settle, n. 15 & 1120 76 VA.L.REV. comments, judge’s the record indicates trial Roberts, (1990). Agree- also Bob 1126 attorney independent nor that neither the and Insureds Between Claimants ments possibility of set- APIE ever considered Af- Insurers, BAR By STATE any of ter Misconduct responded never tlement and 868 SUING, YMCA, OF 504-05; DEFENDING AND See 552 S.W.2d at Foremost TEXAS— Co., County

NEGOTIATING WITH INSURANCE Mut. Ins. 897 F.2d at 760. (hereinafter (1991) COMPANIES B-24-26 Roberts). remedy problem, To many IX. states, Texas, including allow an insured to In Samson v. Transamerica Insurance assign any claim insurer ex Co., 220, Cal.Rptr. 30 Cal.3d 178 change for a covenant not to execute. See (1981), P.2d 32 Supreme the California Court County Foremost Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home allowed the insured to recover the entire (5th Co.,

Indem. 897 F.2d 759-60 Cir. underlying amount of judgment despite 1990); Young Men’s Christian Ass’n the existence of a covenant not to execute. (YMCA) v. Standard Ins. 552 S.W.2d The court stated: (Tex.Civ.App Worth . —Fort repudiated “[W]here the insurer has 1977), curiam, writ per n.r.e. ref'd obligation defend[,] defendant (Tex.1978); Brown, S.W.2d 246 Reagan M. may, of fraud without absence forfeiture of Defending Against Deal, the Sweetheart right indemnity, his settle with the TEXAS—SUING, STATE BAR OF EN DEF plaintiff upon possible, the best terms tak DING AND NEGOTIATING WITH (Zander ing a covenant not to execute.” v. INSURANCE COMPANIES 1-18 Texaco, Cal.App.2d Inc. (hereinafter Brown); Ranger Superior 561; accord, Johansen, Cal.Rptr. Arizona, Coach Sales and Service [v. State Auto. Ass’n Inter-In California (1974); Ariz. Ivy P.2d supra, surance Bureau] 15 Cal.3d Cal.App.2d Automobile Ins. Pacific 744; Cal.Rptr. fn. 538 P.2d (1958). *25 320 P.2d 147 Comunale, [v. Traders and General Ins. supra, 654, 661-662, Co.] 50 Cal.2d 328 The use of a pro- covenant not to execute 198). “exposes P.2d the insurer When its vides strong insurers with a give incentive to policyholder sharp person to the thrust due consideration-to the interests of its in- liability” by breaching obligations, al YMCA, 504-05; sureds. See 552 S.W.2d at indulge insured “need not in financial Rawlings Apodaca, 151 Ariz. 726 P.2d ” (Critz masochism.... v. Farmers Ins. (1986). The necessity of such (1963) Group, Cal.App.2d particularly apparent covenants is when an 401). Cal.Rptr. insurer provide has refused to a defense: In such a situation, the YMCA rule is [******] protect adequately.

needed to “[B]y insured executing assignment, he at- tempt[ed] only Where the insurer refuses to tender a to shield himself from the defense, protect danger company.... exposed the insured often can him- to which the (Id. 401). only p. Cal.Rptr. self with a him.” at covenant not to execute. self-interest, covenant, He acted in his own Without such a after the insured ei- coverage, Transamerican’s denial of as he pay ther would plaintiffs have to every right Any resulting had to do. dam- enough to settle their claim or would have age by to Transamerican was not caused himself, to incur though defense costs even Yagel’s supposed by misconduct but Trans- contractually responsible the insurer is for intransigence. american’s own payment of such costs. Were a covenant not to execute to absolve insurer of Cal.Rptr. Id. 178 636 P.2d at 45. liability, plaintiffs would have no incentive Thus, Supreme imposed the California Court to enter into such a covenant. judg- for the entire amount of the though ment even the insured had entered County Foremost Mut. Ins. 897 F.2d at agreement into an not to execute. (citations omitted). Without the avail- ability covenant, of such a there pretrial To hold otherwise would make cov- nothing failing to deter an insurer from functionally enants not to execute obsolete give regard due to its insured’s interests. because minimizing the in third-party voring and claimant would have no settlements

[t]he agree arrangement potential damages. See Bak sured’s Rainbo incentive (Tex. personal protect the insured’s assets Stafford, would Co. v. 787 S.W.2d execution, agreement 1990). Furthermore, such “[pjublic permit from extinguish potentially would the insured’s ting proscribing weapons tactical devel assets, most valuable his cause action oped by should be claimants insurers Third-party against the insurer. claimants in shaped by public influences: two proceed have no choice but to would settlements, encouraging terest judgment against the insured. This would fairness, is, equalization of the contend- judicial result a waste of resources strategic advantages.” Farmers ers’ Critz v. purpose preserve no other than to Group, Cal.App.2d 41 Cal. Ins. failing cause of inchoate action for to set- (1964). Rptr. When Dr. as tle. signed exchange his claim execute, for a not to he was able covenant Ashley, Stephen Physi- American Garcia v. his the Cardenas turn dispute settle Exchange: Insurance cians More the wrongful ing his insurer’s conduct into Merrier, Report 7 Bad Faith Law bargaining strength dealing with the (Sept.1991). claimant. considerations are Public allowing recovery Another behind injured by allowing an better served claimant judgment despite for the existence party engaged to collect who from not of a covenant to execute is deterrence: false, misleading deceptive acts damages com caused those important The final we fact which extract —the pany the victim of acts— than those the cases is that of deterrence. —rather the insured.10 relationships par- contractual in which one

ty primarily sought protection has or secu- rity profit advantage, rather than con- X. provide tract fail to ade- addressing We are of no Texas aware quate compensation provide fail to but also pretrial to exe the effect of a covenant not a substantial deterrence breach *26 stemming damages cute on from the insur party who a derives commercial benefit negligence Whatley City er’s or bad faith. v. relationship. place, from the In the first Dallas, (Tex.App. 758 S.W.2d they offer motivation whatsoever for — Dallas denied) County writ and Foremost Mu the insurer not breach. to v. Home tual Insurance Co. Indem. (em- Rawlings Apodaca, v. at 575 726 P.2d (5th Cir.1990) directly appli F.2d 754 are not phasis original). in were no If there recov- expressed cable—in both cases courts ery judgment, for the excess there would be a opinion “no to whether credi of an for breach of the con- more incentive damages may against an tor recover insurer performance. tract than its against poli in awarded its insured excess person cy limits for the insured is not Pretrial covenants not to execute should be encouraged public policy ally negligently a fa- liable insurer has acted as matter of if Morris, Although many Ariz. 741 P.2d this is different from Ass'n case ("To involving personal pretrial relieve himself of covenants not execute cases (such may persuaded judgments) exposure, enter insured be as settlement or consent be agreement stipulation any type in into almost cause the issues were by er_”). hopes vigorously adversary proceeding, the insur- contested which the claimant bind in an type involving pretrial in of case real concern we are aware cases cove "The judgment] may always energeti between the [or execute be is that nants not to not may actually repre adversary proceeding. not cally in claimant and the insured contested length worth Consequently, permitting sent an determination of the the insured "settle” arm’s Physi sign plaintiff's injured a claim." Steil Florida with the claimant before trial and (Fla. Reciprocal, may present Ins. 448 So.2d a con cians' covenant not execute real Dist.Ct.App.1984). Services cern for the insurer. See United Auto. Whatley, damages12

or in bad 758 S.W.2d at 310 the were caused the insurer’s faith.” added). Furthermore, (emphasis wrongful n. 6 jury See Foremost Coun conduct. if the existed, determines that no ty Mut. Ins. 897 F.2d 759 n. 7. injured nothing creditor or claimant takes Whatley, upon based the circumstances agreed against since he has not to execute case,11 in that appeals the court of character- the assets of the insured. ized the insured’s claim that the insurer argue plaintiffs agree- Some would that a wrongfully failed to defend him as a breach judgment against ment not to execute a a of the insurer’s contractual to defend its assets, personal exchange defendant’s insured. at 306-07. Subse- assignment of defendant’s bad faith quently, appeals the court of held that “the claims, damages eliminates bad faith [pretrial] adjudged covenant not to enforce arising judgment. disagree. from that I damages against the insured does not bar recovery from the insurer within its plaintiffs A agreement not execute a However, limits.” Id. at 310. “the same judgment against personal a defendant’s as- apply recovery against rule does not to allow sets, exchange assignment for an of defen- an insurer in excess of limits.” Id. claims, dant’s bad faith does not eliminate The court stated that allow the creditor “[t]o damages aiising faith bad from that to release the insured from for such judgment. pays If a defendant an excess damages effecting without the release judgment, thereby obtaining judgment a re- give of the insurer would the creditor and lease, the value of the defendant’s bad faith power unilaterally insured the to extend claim her his or insurer is not dimin- liability.” Obviously, the insurer’s Id. ished. The result should be no different pretrial judg- covenant not to execute on a when the defendant obtains relief from the (or give injured ment does not the creditor cash, by paying but trans- claimant) power and insured the to unilater- ferring a valuable asset —his or her tort ally liability. Liability extend the insurer’s Assume, example, claim. that Dr. Garcia imposed if will finds that the assigned had his claims APIE and faith, negligently, insurer acted in bad party exchange to a third ICA for suffi- DTPA pay malpractice judgment violation of the or Insurance Code and cient cash to credit, Apparently paid judgment person's the insured never claimed that the can harm negligently failing acted insurer or in bad faith in that: underlying to defend him in the suit. presence judgment against the in- [t]he problems ordinary sured will cause him case, type 12. In this the insured’s borrowing. No bank or bank officer can ex- underlying judg- include the amount of the plain person the FDIC that the whom damages. example, ment and additional physician For money or he wants to loan substantial is not significant suffers harm when an insur- *27 going pay judgment. ever to have to off the entry er’s bad faith leads to the of an adverse get Nor can the insured most bankers to stand judgment. Amicus Curiae Texas Medical Associ- that kind of heat with their loan commit- may ation asserts that foreseeable harm include: tees .... If the insured is late as to other prepare and 1. The loss of the fair chance to obligations, may even file involun- creditor present a successful defense or reach settle- [against tary bankruptcy proceedings the in- prior ment to trial. they count the as a sured] because resulting 2. Harm from stress caused debt. negligent failure to defend or bad insurer’s Campbell See Roberts at B-26-27. See also v. faith failure to settle. Co., 840 P.2d aggre- State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. 3. Possible exhaustion of insured’s 130, (Utah gate professional liability App.1992). may lim- 139 Harm arise in insurance aggregate policy example, If the limits are its. insured's rendi- other contexts as well. For professional under a "claims made” exhausted may neg- malpractice judgment tion of a medical policy, physician would atively impact physician's reputation and the exposing personal property be his assets and to standing community in both the medical and the satisfy any other adverse or settle- short, large. community at In an individual still ment. many damages of harm. suffers forms Curiae, Medical Brief of Amicus Texas Associa- addition, the existence of the un- tion

871 Reciprocal, Physicians’ Ins. Florida Dr. Steil v. The fact that to the Cardenases. (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984); Shook 448 So.2d 589 judgment should satisfy the used that cash to (Fla.Dist. Co., 498 498 So.2d v. Allstate Ins. in the hands of prejudice the tort claim not Ins. Transamerica v. Ct.App.1986); Samson no different party. The result is the third 343, 220, Cal.Rptr. 636 Co., 178 30 Cal.3d claim assigns the bad faith Dr. Garcia when Crowther, Ill. (1981); 101 Bishop v. 32 P.2d for a exchange directly to the Cardenases 341, 1021 933, 428 N.E.2d Ill.Dec. App.3d 57 execute, in this to as he did covenant not 729 (1981); N.W.2d Shugart, v. 316 Miller case. (Minn.1982); Auto. Ins. Co. Farm Mut. State 198, 948, 953 593 P.2d 122 Ariz. Paynter, v. (A XI. not execute is not to (App.1979) “covenant to permit the insurer which would a release pretrial Many permit the use of courts v. But escape obligations.”). see Huffman Damron v. not to execute.13 See covenants Co., 292, 193 N.C.App. 17 Peerless Ins. 151, (1969); Sledge, Ariz. 460 P.2d 997 105 257, denied, 774, 773, 283 N.C. cert. S.E.2d 347, 163, Bertram, Griggs 88 N.J. 443 A.2d v. (1973) (Under the terms of 195 S.E.2d 689 (even (1982) executed though the insured 174 not judgment and the covenant the consent pretrial not to assignment and a covenant legally execute, the insureds “were execute, agreed judgment] [or “a settlement plaintiffs.”); obligated pay in this may against an insurer be enforced Griffith, 107 Ga. Casualty v. American Co. ... if in amount and situation it is reasonable (“[T]he 549, 224, 552 App. 129 S.E.2d faith.”); good Kagele v. Aetna entered Life not' recovery sought is principal amount of 90, Co., 194, Wash.App. P.2d 40 698 & Cas. it is not shown be recoverable because (1985); Nat’l Ins. 92 Greer v. Northwestern legally obli petitioner amount which Co., 1244, 191, P.2d 1251 109 Wash.2d 743 promise of the defen- gated pay, and the (1987); Royal v. Ins. Co. Amer- Lancaster petition pay as the such sums dant ica, 62, 371, 726 P.2d 374 302 Or. damages.”); obligated pay in er would (“Whether of a assignment was made Ins., 755 v. Real Estate & Freeman Schmidt judgment to come judgment in existence or a Cir.1985) (“an (8th 135, insured F.2d 138 into existence is not determinative wheth- has not to execute protected a covenant assignee main- er or not the insured’s obligation pay sum compelling no company. against the insurance thus, tain an action injured the insurance party; Rather, insurer.”); language of the covenant is de- Ben imposes obligation no on the (N.D.Ala.1 terminative.”); White, 793, F.Supp. Auto. Ass’n 511 795 United Services dall v. 981).14 (1987); Morris, 113, 246 154 Ariz. 741 P.2d v. 62, America, addition, Royal Or. 726 overwhelming majority Co. 302 ter v. Ins. (1986); permit pretrial post-trial Ass’n v. courts use Services Auto. P.2d 371 United and/or See, e.g., (1987); v. Morris, not to execute. covenants Zan 741 P.2d 246 154 Ariz. Metcalf Co., 468, 126 Acc. Ind. 176 Neb. & Co., Cal.App.2d 66 Casualty 259 Hartford Ins. der v. Bertram, (1964); Griggs v. 88 N.J. N.W.2d 471 (1968); v. Transamerican Cal.Rptr. Samson 561 (1982); Family 443 A.2d American Cal.Rptr. Ins. 30 Cal.3d Kivela, (Ind.App. 408 N.E.2d 805 Mut. Ins. Co. (1981); Royal Globe Ins. LaRotunda v. P.2d 32 (Minn. 1980); Shugart, 316 N.W.2d 729 Miller v. Ill.App.3d 42 Ill.Dec. Mercado, 1982); First Nat’l Indem. Co. v. Crowther, (1980); Bishop 101 Ill. N.E.2d 928 1974, writ); (Tex.Civ.App. — Austin App.3d 428 N.E.2d 57 Ill.Dec. Co., Wash.App. Kagele & Cas. v. Aetna Life *28 Co., (1981); Surety 416 v. American Coblentz Co., 194, (1985); Crabb v. Nat’l Ind. 698 P.2d 90 Cir.1969); (5th Gray v. Grain Dealers F.2d 1059 (1973); 222, Ammerman 205 N.W.2d 633 87 S.D. (D.C.Cir.1989); 1128, Ins., F.2d 1133 Exch., 187, Mut. 871 22 Utah 2d 450 P.2d v. Farmers Ins. Ins., 416 F.2d (1969); Steedly & Lancashire v. London Co. v. Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 460 State 198, (6th Cir.1969). (App.1979); v. Peerless Paynter, 948 But see Ariz. 593 P.2d 259 122 Huffman 773, Reciprocal, 292, Physicians’ Co., 448 Ins. N.C.App. Steil v. Florida cert. 193 S.E.2d 17 Ins. 1984); (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. (1973); v. All Shook denied, So.2d 589 689 195 S.E.2d 283 N.C. Co., (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 498 So.2d 498 state Ins. Ga.App. Griffith, Casualty 107 Co. v. American 1986); Fleming, Kan. 799 P.2d 247 Glenn White, (1963); Bendall v. 549 129 S.E.2d Co., (1990); v. Northwestern Nat’l Ins. 79 Greer (N.D.Ala.1981). F.Supp. 795 511 (1987); Lancas- 743 P.2d 1244 109 Wash.2d

872 coupled assignment

In Greer v. National Insur- with an Northwestern and settlement Co., agreement, an insurer liable to an Supreme Washington ance the Court not); injured claimant even if the insured stated: Crowther, Bishop v. 57 Ill.Dec. at 428 majority” jurisdictions permit A “slim Crowther, (quoting 1024 Bishop N.E.2d at injured plaintiff damages an to recover Ill.App.3d 47 Ill.Dec. 415 from the despite insurer the existence of a (1980)) (“The 599, 605 execution N.E.2d plaintiff covenant between the and the in- which determines of defendant’s assets will to seek only sured relief from the insurer. satisfy judgment. agree- to An be used the limiting majority specific ment execution to assets This rule is the rationale based on relating not [such insurance] to does ne- an that when insurer has refused defend gate damages.”). insured, position argue its it is in steps protect the insured took to him- public policy in- Based considerations self should inure to the insurer’s benefit. cluding judicial economy, en- the interest settlements, adequate couraging providing (citations omitted). P.2d at Accord protection of providing insureds and insurers Physicians’ Reciprocal, v. Florida Steil Ins. strong give with a incentive to consider- due (“[W]e at 448 So.2d that the carrier hold insureds, ation interests of I would to the necessarily not exonerated because injured plaintiff, assignee hold that an as the [the insured] Walker was able obtain his insured, precluded is not from recover- discharge own from liability in course of ing damages by the from the insurer exis- reaching agreement Steil in [the with a covenant plaintiff tence of between the jured Clearly, claimant]. the intent of Steil to seek the in- insured relief carrier.”); and Walker was not to surer. release 500; v. Allstate at

Shook Ins. 498 So.2d (“While Shugart, Miller v. at 732 N.W.2d XII. pay any true that not defendants need argues had since Dr. Garcia thing, judgment it is also true that the effec received million settlements ICA $2.5 liquidates tively personal defendants’ liabili APIE, damages his I were satisfied. hold, therefore, ty. plaintiff may We disagree. garnish seek collect on that insurer.”); proceeding against ment Ka First, erroneously that the assumes gele v. Aetna & Cas. P.2d underly- applied should be settlements Life (in the context of a not to covenant execute rather than as a dollar-for- defendant, Although pretrial right this case is cove- but to execute limited reserved the execute, arguments nants not to relating against assets to his insurance. —that pretrial necessarily covenant not to ne- execute that a [the defendant/insured] Crowther asserts gates damages apply equally post- all legal consequence of is that no —would this covenant words, trial covenants not to In other execute. against damages are individu- enforceable him APIE, reasoning employed by if Carde- ally. plaintiff failed He further maintains that executed a covenant execute nas not to action: an element of his cause of establish assignment exchange Dr. Garcia in of his damages. disagree. proof of We Defendant’s underlying APIE and ICA claims after distinguish argument such fails to between trial, medical Dr. Garcia would still liability, damages, judgment and concepts as compensable suffer a harm because liability and the execution. Defendant's alleged "protective effects” of the covenant not amount were both established to execute. judgment. The execution determines used to suit, defendant’s assets will be appeal injury underlying limiting satisfy judgment. agreement An there was no asserted that defendant/insured negate specific damages: proof execution assets does not damages. and defendant into a covenant Plaintiff entered Crowther, Bishop v. 47 Ill.Dec. at plaintiff providing that not seek to exe- would *29 any judgment against personal assets N.E.2d 605. cute 21.21), The case pro and faith. credit or of dam- under article bad dollar rata reduction Second, in November and submitted was tried ages in the bad faith Texas case. negligence, negligence, jury gross to the following four contribution has distinct (includ- DTPA Code violations and Insurance based on and one schemes—three statute false, misleading deceptive acts or ing and law: at common created practices, practices unfair in the business (Tex. original The 1. contribution statute course of and an unconscionable seq.); § & Rem.Code 32.001 et Civ.Prac. (1) action). jury negli- APIE found that The prior Dr. gently settle comparative failed to Garcia’s negligence 2. The statute 1985, (2) (former sixth September Cardenas’ § 33.- Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code alleged separate and dis- petition amended seq.) only pure which applies 001 et by Dr. negligence committed tinct acts of September eases filed negligence before (3) period, Garcia 1987; Garcia, APIE denied to Dr. by The common law com- contribution trial APIE to defend Dr. at the failed Garcia (Duncan Air- parative causation v. Cessna case, and APIE’s actions of the Cardenas (Tex.1984)) 665 S.W.2d craft failing provide to defend and only applies in- products which cases false, misleading, deceptive acts or were liability, warranty, volving strict breach of practices. jury each further found that liability and mixed theories of strict and negligent, and acts was in heedless these 13, 1983; negligence tried after and disregard rights, of Dr. reckless Garcia’s business, an practice unfair in the insurance comparative responsibility 4. The statute action, action or unconscionable course of (Tex.Civ.Prac. § & et Rem.Code 33.001 proximate damages, Dr. cause of seq.) applies which filed on or to cases Dr. knowingly. jury awarded and done September after $2,235,000 apportioning in damages, Garcia Guaranty Sterling, Stewart Title Co. and 16 percent to ICA (Tex.1991). percent APIE.16 Dr. elected to Garcia article recover under 21.21. Dr. filed suit ICA August alleging negligence result, comparative negligence As a handling defending claim and him in the his applies negligence pure statute which Later, medical Dr. Garcia suit. (former September 2, 1987 cases filed before pleadings allegations amended his to include seq.), § & 33.001 et Tex.Civ.Prac. Rem.Code con- negligence, breach the insurance by comparative the common law contribution (false, tracts, violations DTPA mislead- (Duncan causation Cessna Aircraft acts, deceptive practices in the unfair (Tex.1984)), and the 665 S.W.2d of insurance an unconscionable business ap- comparative responsibility statute action), 21.21 course of violations of articles plies after September to cases filed (Tex.Civ.Prac. (including 21.21-2 of the seq.) § Insurance Code et & Rem.Code 33.001 regulations original Board apply. Consequently, the rules and of the State do not (Tex.Civ.Prac. applicable by & Rem. made or issued contribution statute of Insurance questions related to ICA 16. The was asked 2 84% Special “apportionment.” No. 33 asked: Issue percentage, any, if What 16% Court in were found Cardenas v. Garcia proximately caused the acts or omissions 100% Garcia on or after Dr. 1/8/83? special and 36 were Apparently, issue nos. 33 by stating percentage found. Answer We, Jury, by APIE. Answer: submitted 16% Special No. 36 Issue asked: party by you caused each found to have For percentage damage Dr. Garcia find by: caused *30 § seq.) applies. may Code 32.001 et through Stewart Title credit be determined either the Guaranty pro at dollar-for-dollar method or the rata re- S.W.2d method,

duction whichever results 10; greatest reduction. at n. See id. Pales- XIII. Contractors, Perkins, tine Inc. v. 386 S.W.2d (Tex.1964) (citing Hodg- Gus M. Baylor University, Bradshaw v. 126 Tex. es, Indemnity Among Contribution and 84 S.W.2d and the “one (1947)). Tortfeasors, 26 Tex.L.Rev. apparently satisfaction apply rule” in this case, applied either the credit is after the Guaranty case. See Stewart Title Co. v. (or trebling doubling) damages of actual un- Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 5-8. Under Brad- Code, der article 21.21 of the Insurance Baylor University shaw v. and the “one sat- Title, 8-9, Stewart 822 S.W.2d at and the rule,” joint nonsettling isfaction tortfeasors percentages responsibility found are entitled to receive a credit jury inapplicable. are See Tex.Civ.Prac. & judgment based on the settlements reached (Vernon 1986). § seq. 32.001 et Rem.Code plaintiff joint between the and other tortfea- sors. Guaranty Stewart Title If the dollar-for-dollar credit method is jury at 8. applied, When the has fixed the damages Dr. Garcia’s cal- would be defendant, nonsettling culated as follows: Damages $2,235,483.30 Actual Damages $4,470,966.60 Additional $2,235,483.30 damages actual x2 under amended art. 21.21 x2

$4,470,966.60 -$2,500,000.00 Settlement credit $500,000.00 APIE offset $2,000,000.00 ICA settlement $2,500,000.00 $820,500.00 Attorney’s fees $5,026,949.90 TOTAL TOTAL RECOVERY $2,000,000.00 APIE, “partial by dividing Under the settlement” with credit is “determined number agreed Dr. Garcia and APIE that Dr. Gar- of all into liable defendants the total amount $2,000,- damages cia’s would be limited to 32.003(a). judgment.” § Id. Consequently, 000.00. the total award case, determined that ICA and using any method of calculat- damages. APIE were liable for Dr. Garcia’s $2,000,- damages would be limited to Therefore, pro rata reduction is deter- 000.00. by dividing mined the total amount of dam- (or .5). ages by multiplying by pro If the method, pro rata Under reduction provided by rata reduction Palestine Con- solely amount of on the contribution is based tractors, Perkins, Inc. v. 386 S.W.2d number of defendants found liable for the (Tex.1964) damages applied, Dr. Garcia’s plaintiffs damages. See Tex.Civ.PRac. & (Vernon 1986). § 32.003 The would be calculated as follows: Rem.Code $2,235,483.30 Damages Actual $4,470,966.60 Damages Additional $2,235,483.30 actual x 2 under art. 21.21 _x2 amended

$4,470,966.60 figure when deter-

17. This does not include amounts ment interest should be considered prejudgment mining pro rata reduc- be recoverable as inter- dollar for dollar credit or express opinion prejudg- est. We whether tion. *31 -$3,353.224.95 pro rata reduction APIE’S $6,706,449.90 _x,50 rata reduction Pro $3,353,224.95 $820,500.00 Attorney’s fees $4,173,724.95 TOTAL $2,000,000.00 TOTAL RECOVERY result, regardless As a which method (dollar-for-dol- JOINER, calculating damages was Appellant. used parte Cecil Ex Orien reduction), pro lar rata result credit or No. 25981-01. $2,000,- was the same —APIE’s 000. Texas, Appeals of Criminal Court En Banc.

XIV. argues agree- the settlement Feb. (1) Cardenas, Dr. ments between $2,000,000 ICA for Dr. Garcia $500,000

APIE for should admit- have been disagree. ted I into evidence. “The traditional Texas rule is that settle- ment agreements plaintiff between and a

co-defendant should excluded from the jury. contrary A rule would frustrate

policy favoring the settlement of lawsuits.” Simmons, Corp. v.

General Motors (Tex.1977); City Houston S.W.2d v. Sam P. Wallace and 585 S.W.2d (Tex.1979); v. McGuire Commercial Un- (Tex.1968). ion Ins. 431 S.W.2d Smithwick, Oil Co. v. 12A Scurlock (Tex.1986).18 1, 4 S.W.2d The settlement Title agreements in cases such as Stewart (Tex. Sterling, Guaranty Co. v. S.W.2d 1991) Company Title v. and First Waco Garrett, (Tex.1993) 860 S.W.2d were jury admitted into evidence to consid- However, they er. were considered Bay- v. Bradshaw applying trial when court University and the lor “one satisfaction rule.” herein, explained

For I would the reasons appeals. affirm the court Welch, Austin, appellant.

Mandy Simmons, 4; However, Corp. settling General Motors "when defendant retained argue plaintiff's recovery at 858-59. APIE does not [such a financial stake in a 558 S.W.2d agreement], excluding in Dr. Mary of evi- ICA retained "financial stake” Carter it or recovery. Consequently, this case fact from the was harmful Garcia's dence of that Smithwick, Maty Co. from a Carter case. Scurlock Oil different error.”

Case Details

Case Name: American Physicians Insurance Exchange v. Garcia
Court Name: Texas Supreme Court
Date Published: Jun 8, 1994
Citation: 876 S.W.2d 842
Docket Number: D-1239
Court Abbreviation: Tex.
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