126 Mo. App. 426 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1907
Lead Opinion
This is an action for the balance due on the purchase price of linseed oil sold and delivered by plaintiff to defendant. The contract was for one thous- and barrels of oil, of which it is alleged the defendant paid for nine hundred and twenty barrels and owes for the remaining eighty, the sum of $1,834.90. The first paragraph of the contract under which the oil in controversy was sold, will be quoted for the purpose of comparing it with the other contracts which are in controversy. Said paragraph reads as follows:
“St. Louis, Mo., Sept. 12, 1902.
“A. A. Eberson & Go., City.
“Dear Sirs: This will confirm sale made you Sept. 12th of 1,000 barrels Linseed Oil for delivery during the period from November 1, 1902, to August 1, 1903, it being understood that you are to take not less than 75 barrels per month and not over 180 in any one month.”
Following that paragraph are statements of the price of raw oil at the different dates between November 1, 1902, and August 1, 1903, and other paragraphs stating variations in the prices of boiled oil and bleached oil. Then follow these paragraphs:
“You have the option of taking such amounts as you desire in bulk, the price to be 2c per gal. less.
“Terms, 30 days net, or 1 per cent for cash paid within ten days of date of invoice.”
. “AMERICAN LINSEED COMPANY, ST. LOUIS.
G. W. Blow, Manager.
“St. Louis, Mo., 5-28-1901.
“Messrs. A. A. Eberson & Co., City.
“Gentlemen: We beg to confirm sale made you yesterday of 800 bbls. of Linseed Oil at 44c basis Raw for each 7% lbs.
“lc advance for Boiled and 3c for Bleached.
“Bulk shipments at 2c less.
“Terms 60 days from date of each invoice or 1 per cent for cash in 10 days.
“The oil to be taken by you at your option during the months of October, November and December, 1901.
“Thanking you and awaiting your counter-confirmation, beg to remain,
“Yours very truly,
“C. W. Blow, Mgr.”
After pleading the substance of said contract, defendant alleges that on September 26, 1901, he notified and required plaintiff to deliver on the first day of October, 1901, the oil called for by the contract; that in response to this request, plaintiff delivered on said date, twenty barrels and no more; that on October 1, 2, 3, and 4, defendant made other demands for the delivery
The second counterclaim is based on the following contract:
“AMERICAN LINSEED COMPANY, ST. LOUIS.
“O. W. Blow, Manager.
“St. Louis, Mo., Sept. 7, 1901.
“A. A. Eberson & Co., City.
“Gentlemen: We beg to acknowledge receipt of your esteemed order for 120 bbls. of Linseed Oil for delivery at your option between Oct. 1, 1901 and Jan. 30, 1902.
“Raw at ..................40c for each 7%lbs.
“Boiled, at................41c for each 7% lbs.
“Bleached, at..............44c for each 7% lbs.
*431 “Terms, 30 days or 1 per cent for cash in 10 days.
“Please issue counter-confirmation.
“We thank you for favoring' us.
“Yours very truly,
“O. W. Blow, Mgr.
“Correct this, please, to read June 30th.
“The delivery on above is Oct. 1, 1901, to June 30, 1902.
“C. W. Blow, Mgr.”
Defendant alleges that on September 26, 1901, he notified and requested plaintiff to deliver the oil called for by the contract last aforesaid, which defendant refused to do. Other demands for delivery of the oil are also averred, with the further averment that the demands were not complied with and that instead of compliance, plaintiff delivered sixty barrels of the oil on October 15, and sixty barrels on October 1 and the days of its delivery, plaintiff sustained a loss of $811.20 for which he prays judgment.
The third counterclaim is based on the following contract:
“AMERICAN LINSEED COMPANY, ST. LOUIS.
O. W. Blow, Manager.
“St. Louis, Mo., 9-12-1901.
“Messrs. A. A. Eberson & Co., City.
“Gentlemen: Beg to confirm sale made you on the 9th for 120 bbls. of Linseed Oil for delivery at your option during the period from October 1,1901, to June 30, 1902, at 40c for each 7% lbs. of Raw Oil; 41c for each 7ló lbs. of Boiled Oil; 44c for each 7% lbs. Bleached Oil delivered.
“Terms, 30 days or 1 per-cent for cash in 10 days from date of each invoice.
*432 “Kindly favor us with your counter-confirmation by return mail and oblige,
“Yours very truly,
“0. W. Blow, Mgr.”
It is alleged that on September 26, defendant requested the delivery of the oil called for by the last stated contract, and made subsequently other requests for its delivery, all of which plaintiff refused to comply with; that instead, he delivered sixty barrels of oil on October 16 and sixty on October 17; that in consequence of the lower price of oil on those dates, as compared with its price on October 1, the defendant sustained a loss of $811.20, for which he prays judgment.
A replication was filed in which the allegations of the three counter claims are denied, and it is also further alleged that defendant is not entitled to recover on the counterclaims because plaintiff was not bound to deliver all the oil mentioned under the contracts at any one time or on any of the days on which defendant alleges he demanded delivery. It is further averred in the reply that plaintiff delivered all the oil mentioned in the counter claims and defendant received and accepted the same as performance of the terms of the several contracts, paid the purchase price of the oil, and that by an agreement and understanding between plaintiff and defendant, the latter waived any right “he may have had for the delivery of all of said oil at any one time, or at any time prior to the actual delivery thereof.” The several contracts on which the counter claims are based were introduced in evidence, with testimony to prove defendant demanded delivery of all the oil called for by the three contracts (540 barrels) October 1, 1901. This demand was in writing, and dated September 26. There were also subsequent oral demands. Plaintiff’s manager in St. Louis refused to make delivery on October 1, contending that defendant was not entitled to full delivery of the oil called for by any one
An exception was taken by defendant to the admission of evidence regarding the previous course of delivery of oil, but we do not perceive that the evidence established a course of dealing inconsistent with his contention regarding the meaning of the contracts on which the counterclaims are based. In fact, it rather favors his contention, in showing that in some instances, when it was desired to limit his option as to when he would take oil under a given contract, the limitation was expressly stipulated by the parties. This fact encourages the view that when nothing was said about a minimum or maximum quantity to be ordered by defendant, his option to take the oil throughout a specified period was unrestricted and he might take it in any quantity and at any time he desired. But leaving out of view the extraneous evidence, we think that is the true interpretation of the contract before us. Much importance was attached to the use of the word “during” in the first and third contracts; the idea being that the word prevented the defendant from ordering all the oil called for by the purchase in either of the three months specified in the first memorandum or at any one time in the period from October 1, 1901, to June 30, 1902, specified in the third memorandum. The utter indefiniteness of such a requirement is apparent at a glance. It amounts to this; that defendant might order any number of barrels less than the whole amount during a month but could not order it all. The trial court said:
“They could not force you to take it all at one time except on the last day when the contract expires. You' didn’t need to order any in October; that was your option, under that contract. You didn’t need to order any until the last day of November. That was your option;*437 but you could not call for it all during one month. Only on one day out of the entire period would they have a right to force you to take all the oil. Out of the balance of the entire period you had the option to call for the oil during the months as specified in the contract.”
It is obvious that this interpretation of the contract is vague to the last degree. But it is contended the defendant might order only reasonable quantities during the three months, distributing the entire order over them. Such a view is inconsistent with the language used and simply fixes the rights of the parties by a new contract instead of the one they made. Moreover, the third contract, which is admitted to stand on the same footing as the first, does not specify the months, but says: “during the period from October 1,1901, to June 30, 1902.” Hence the reasoning on which the lower court concluded there was to be a distribution of. the oil throughout the months, is not applicable to the third contract. In all three of the writings the words “at your option” are employed, and those are the decisive words in ascertaining the intention of the parties; although the first and third contracts provided for delivery at his option “during” specified periods and the second one, for delivery at his option “between” specified dates. But there is not the least ground for believing the parties meant to provide differently in their different contracts, or used the word “during” to express an intention regarding the delivery of the oil in the writings wherein that word appears, different from their intention regarding delivery under the contract in which the word “between” occurs. Indeed, it is not contended there was a different intention. The purpose, in every instance, was to give defendant an option regarding the delivery of the oil, and to bind plaintiff to deliver at his option. Now if we attend to the testimony, it is apparent that instead of the oil being delivered at the defendant’s option, it was, in fact,
Plaintiff may not have expected all the oil to he called for at one time, but nevertheless the contracts gave defendant the right to call for it at his pleasure within a specified period; to call for any quantity or all at once. To hold otherwise would be to disregard the option feature of the contract, which was an integral part of it and a stipulation in defendant’s1 favor. It is true the word ‘-during” has one meaning which is not inconsistent with the idea of continuous delivery throughout a given period, but it has another meaning compatible with total delivery on any date within the period. It is defined as follows: “In or within the time of; at some period in; or throughout the course, action existence or continuance of; as fit happened during the war;’ fit continued during the night.’ [Standard Dictionary.] A fair interpretation of the instruments in suit shows that whether there should be a continuous delivery or a total delivery at one time, was made dependent on the will of the defendant. [Johnston v. Trippe, 33 Fed. 530; Posey v. Scales, 55 Ind. 282; Dodge v. Kiene, 28 Neb. 216; Cleveland v. Sterrett, 70 Pa. St. 204; Pickering v. Demerritt, 100 Mass. 416; Levy v. Rothe, 17 N. Y. Misc. 402.] But it is said the memoranda provide for payment within sixty days “from date of each invoice,” thereby showing several deliveries were contemplated. These words merely show it was contemplated that several deliveries might occur; not that they necessarily would occur. In other words, it was meant that the defendant might demand the oil in different invoices or might not. The very essence
Neither do we accede to the view that no demand was made for the delivery of the oil called for by the second contract. On September 26, defendant demanded delivery of the entire five hundred and forty barrels of oil, for which he had contracts. This covered the oil due under the second contract as well as the others, and if the plaintiff was bound to deliver all the oil called for in said second contract on demand, it was sufficiently notified that defendant asked for delivery. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
Dissenting Opinion
DISSENTING OPINION.
On September 12, 1902, defendant purchased of plaintiff (a New York corporation, authorized to do business in Missouri) one thousand barrels of linseed oil, at a stipulated price, for delivery during the period from November 1, 1902, to August 1, 1903, in lots of not less than seventy-five or more than one hundred and eighty barrels in any one month. The oil was delivered as per contract and all of the purchase price paid, except $1,834.90, which, on demand, defendant refused to pay, hence this suit.
“St. Louis, Mo., May 28,1901.
“Messrs. A. A. Eberson & Co., “City.
“Gentlemen: — We beg to confirm sale made you yesterday of 300 bbls. of linseed oil at 44c. basis raw for each 7% lbs.
“1c. advance for Boiled and 3c. for Bleached.
“Bulk shipments at 2c. less.
“Terms 60 days from date of each invoice or 1 per cent for cash in 10 days.
“The oil to be taken by you at your option during the months of October, November and December, 1901.
“Thanking you and awaiting your counter-confirmation, beg to remain,
“Yours very truly,
“C. W. Blow, Manager.”
“St. Louis, Mo., Sept. 7, 1901.
“A. A. Eberson & Co., “City.
“Gentlemen:— We beg to acknowledge receipt of your esteemed order for 120 bbls. of Linseed Oil for deliverv at your option betAveen October 1, 1901, and Jan. 30, 1902.
“Raw, at.................40c. for each 7% lbs.
“Boiled at.................41c. for each 7y2 lbs.
“Bleached at..............44c. for each 7% lbs.
“Terms 30 days or 1 per cent for cash in 10 days.
“Please issue counter-confirmation.
“We thank you for favoring us.
“Yours very truly,
“C. W. Blow, Manager.
*441 “Correct this please to read June 30th.
“The delivery on above is October 1, 1901, to June 30, 1902.
“C. W. Blow, Manager.”
“St. Louis, Mo., Sept. 12,1901. “Messrs. A.. A. Eberson & Co.,
“City.
“Gentlemen:
“Beg to confirm sale made you on the 9th for 120 bbls. of Linseed Oil for delivery at your option during the period from October 1,1901, to June 30, 1902, at 40c. for each 7% lbs. Raw Oil, 41c., for each 7% lbs: of Boiled Oil, 44c. for each 7% lbs. of Bleached Oil delivered.
“Terms 30 days or 1 per cent for cash in 10 days from date of each invoice.
“Kindly favor us with your counter-confirmation by return mail and oblige.
“Yours very truly,
“C. W. Blow, Manager.”
It was alleged in the three counterclaims, in substance, that defendant, on the first, second and third of October, 1901, demanded the delivery of all the oil called for in the contracts of May 28th, and September 7,1901, and on the twenty-sixth of September, 1901, demanded the delivery of all the oil called for by the contract of September 12, 1901; that plaintiff failed to deliver the oil as demanded, whereby defendant was damaged on account of a decline in the price of the oil thereafter: The counterclaims show that all the oil called for by the several contracts was delivered within the period mentioned in each of them.
A reply was filed, the contents of which it is not necessary to set out, in view of the construction the learned trial court put upon the several contracts. At the opening of the trial the defendant withdrew his general denial and admitted the amount sued for was due under the contract of September 12, 1902.
The court, at the instance of plaintiff, gave the following instructions:
“The court instructs the jury that under the pleadings and admissions of the defendant in this case the plaintiff is entitled to recover on the cause of action stated in the petition, and your verdict must, therefore, be in favor of the plaintiff on the plaintiff’s cause' of action for the sum of eighteen hundred and thirty-four dollars and ninety cents, with interest on said sum at the rate of six per cent per annum from February 1, 1904, to this date, amounting in all to the sum of two thousand and sixty-two dollars and sixty cents.
‘“The court instructs the jury that finder the pleadings and the evidence the defendant is not entitled to recover under any of his counterclaims.”
Verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $2,062.60, from which defendant duly appealed.
1. The learned trial judge ruled, that under the contracts of May 28 and September 12, defendant had no right to demand the delivery of all the oil on one day. Under the contract of September 12, 1901, deliveries at defendant’s option were to be made “during the period from October 1, 1901, to June 30, 1902.” Under the contract of May 28, 1901, oil was to be taken by defendant, at his option, “during the months of October, November and December, 1901.” Under the terms of the latter contract it is evident the parties con
2. In respect to the contract of September seventh, I think defendant had the option to require a delivery of the one hundred and twenty barrels of oil mentioned in that contract on any day between October 1, 1901, and June 30, 1902, and is entitled to recover, if he exercised his option by demanding the delivery of the one hundred and twenty barrels on any day between said dates. Defendant’s testimony is that he demanded a delivery of all the oil called for in the three contracts on September twenty-sixth, and renewed his 'demand on October first and second; that plaintiff denied he was entitled to a delivery of the whole and thereafter delivered the oil from time to time in small quantities until it was all delivered. There was no separate demand made at any time for the delivery of one hundred and twenty barrels of oil called for in the contract of September seventh. It is conceded that under the terms of said contract, a request for the delivery of the one hundred and twenty barrels of oil was an essential prerequisite to defendant’s right to recover for a breach of the contract; and defendant contends that as the demand for the delivery of five hundred and forty barrels necessarily included the one hundred and twenty barrels, the delivery of the one hundred and twenty barrels was requested. The demand was for the performance at one time of three distinct and independent contracts as though they were one. If the demand had individualized the several contracts, and defendant had requested a delivery of .all the oil specified in each, plaintiff would have been notified that defendant de