1 F. Cas. 658 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of South Carolina | 1870
This case comes up on a cross appeal, from a decision of the district court, adjudging a part of the res súbjecta to the libelants, and the residue to the claimants. The decree establishes the right of the parties libelant to recover, but dismisses the libel as to a great proportion of the cotton, on the ground of a defect of evidence to identify it. From the pleadings and testimony, it appears that the libelants were insurers to a large amount on a quantity of cotton shipped by certain individuals, in the French ship Point a Petre, on a voyage from Orleans to Havre; that the ship was stranded and lost on the coast of Florida, and the cotton abandoned to these underwriters. That the cotton libeled was a part of the cargo of the Point a Petre is admitted; but it appears, that after being saved from the wreck, it was deposited at Key West, where it was sold and purchased by Canter, the claimant, under the order of a municipal court, constituted under a law of Florida, with jurisdiction over cases of salvage.
The preliminary question alone has now been argued, to wit, whether the sale by that court was effectual to divest the interest of the underwriters. The general principle is not denied as to the mutations of property which takes place through the intervention of courts of justice; but it was argued that the constitution of the United States vests the admiralty jurisdiction exclusively in the general government. That no state can exercise a concurrent jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime causes, and that salvage was of that description. Wherefore the legislature of Florida had, in organizing this court, exercised a power not legally vested in it, and the act constituting it being a void act, it was as though no such court existed. That moreover, the nullity of that court did not rest merely on an inherent want of power to constitute it, but on positive prohibition contained in the acts organizing the government of the territory to pass any laws contrary to the laws and constitution of the United States. That the act organizing this court was an act of this nature, inasmuch as jurisdiction of causes, admiralty and maritime, were expressly vested in the superior courts of Florida; and that, without the right of exercising a concurrent power over the subject vesting this jurisdiction in an inferior court, is quoad hoc, devesting the superior court of its jurisdiction, and rendering null the act of congress, which vests the admiralty jurisdiction in that alone. On the other hand, it has been contended, that salvage is a subject of municipal and common law cognizance, not exclusively belonging to the admiralty; that although the constitution may vest the exclusive cognizance of admiralty and maritime causes in the United States, in those instances in which the admiralty at the adoption of the constitution had exclusive jurisdiction of the subject, yet, in those cases in which the common law exercised a concurrent jurisdiction with the admiralty, there is no reason for carrying the grant beyond a concurrent jurisdiction with the common law courts of the states. That
It becomes indispensable to the solution of these difficulties that we should conceive a just idea of the relation in which Florida stands to the United States, and give a correct construction to the second section of the act of congress of May the 26th, 1824, [4 Stat. 45,] respecting the territorial government of Florida; correct views on these two subjects will dispose of all the points that have been considered in argument. And first, it is obvious that there is a material distinction between the territory now under consideration and that which is acquired from the ab-origiries, (whether by purchase or conquest,) within the acknowledged limits of the United States, as also that which is acquired by the establishment of a disputed line. As to both these there can be no question that the sovereignty of the state or territory within which it lies, and of the United States, immediately attach, producing a complete subjection to all the laws and institutions of the two governments, local and general, unless modified by treaty. The question now to be considered relates to territories previously subject to the acknowledged jurisdiction of another sovereign; such as was Florida to the crown of Spain. And on this subject we have the most explicit proof that the understanding of our public functionaries is, that the government and laws of the United States do not extend to such territory by the mere act of cession. For, in the act of congress of March the 30th, 1S22, section 9, [3 Stat. 659,] we have an enumeration of the acts of congress, which are to be held in force in the territory; and, in the 10th section, an enumeration, in nature of a bill of rights, or privileges, and immunities which could not be denied to the inhabitants of the territory if they came under the constitution by the mere act of cession. As, however, the opinion of our public functionaries is not conclusive, we will review the provisions of the constitution on this subject.
At .the time the constitution was formed, the limits of the territory over which it was to operate were generally defined and recognized. These limits consisted in part of organized states, and in part of territories, "the absolute property and dependencies of the United States. These states, this territory, and future states to be admitted into the Union, are the sole objects of the constitution; there is no express provision whatever made in the constitution for the acquisition or government of territories beyond those limits. The right, therefore, of acquiring territory is altogether incidental to the treaty-making power, and perhaps to the power of admitting new states into the Union; and the government of such acquisitions is, of course, left to the legislative power of the Union, as far as that power is controlled by treaty. By the latter we acquire either positively or sub modo, and by the former dispose of acquisitions so made; and in case of such acquisitions I see nothing in which the power acquired over the ceded territories can vary from the power acquired under the law of nations by any other government over acquired or ceded territory. The laws, rights, and institutions of the territory so acquired remain in full force until rightfully altered by the new government. In the present instance, however, the laws of Florida were not left to derive their force from general principles alone; for by the 13th section of the same act it is declared, “that the laws in force in the said territory at the commencement of this act, and not inconsistent with the provisions thereof, shall continue in force until altered, modified, or repealed by the legislature. From these views of the subject it results, 1st. That, whatever may be the correct idea of the distribution of the admiralty jurisdictions as between the states and the United States, it can have no application here, since this territory does not stand in the relation of a state to the United
In defining the legislative power, the words of the act of 1S22 are these: “They shall have power to alter, modify or repeal the laws which may be in force at the commencement of this act. These legislative powers shall, also, extend to all the rightful subjects of legislation; but no law shall be valid which is inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the United States, or which lay any person under restraint, burthen or disability, on account of his religious opinions, professions or worship; in all which he shall be free to maintain his own, and not to be burthened with those of another.” The language of the act of 1823 [3 Stat. 751, § 5] is: “They shall have legislative power over all rightful subjects of legislation; but no law shall be valid which is inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the United States; or which lay any person under restraint,” &c.
That jurisdiction of salvage is a rightful subject of legislation is not to be questioned. The jurisdiction, then, vested by the legislature in this municipal court, must be sustained, unless inconsistent with the laws or constitution of the United Stales. But with the constitution, in legislating on the subject of salvage, there can be no incongruity; it is only, therefore, the supposed inconsistency with the act of congress of May, 1824, that can impugn it The provisions of that act upon this subject are these: “Each of the said courts (meaning the superior courts of the district of Florida) shall moreover have and exercise the same jurisdiction within its limits, in all cases arising under the laws and constitution of the United States, which, by an act to establish the judicial courts of the United States, approved the 24th day of September, 17S9, [1 Stat. 73,] and ‘an act in addition to the act, entitled an act to establish the judicial courts of the United States, approved the 2nd of March, 1793,’ [1 Stat 33, c. 22,] was vested in the court of Kentucky district.” The question, then, is reduced to this, in what cases arising under the laws and constitution of the United States is jurisdiction vested in the court of Kentucky district by the two acts of the 21th September, 1789, and the 2d March, 1793? It has been erroneously assumed, that all the jurisdiction vested by those acts in the Kentucky court, was vested by this law in the superior court of Florida; it is expressly confined to cases arising under the laws aud constitution of the United States; and the reason is obvious. In all cases arising under the laws of the district, jurisdiction is given by the preceding section of the same act; but, as most of the laws of the United States had been made of force in the territory as before observed, the 2d section is intended to extend the jurisdiction of the court to cases arising under the latter laws, and further, if necessary, to all eases arising under laws of the United States, over which jurisdiction had been given to the Kentucky court,— a practice in defining jurisdiction that had been pursued by congress with regard to all the territories subsequent to the time when the Kentucky court was estaolished. In the original organization of the judiciary of the United States, Kentucky and Maine wore excluded from the arrangement of circuits. And, as no circuit court was required in law to be held there, the district court was vested with circuit court jurisdiction. This is tb.e whole purport of the act of 1789, referred to in the Florida act of 1824. The other act there referred to, to wit, that of 1793, has no other operation as to the Kentucky court, besides vesting iu it the power given to the circuit courts to hold special sessions. If the Florida act were as broad in its operation as the two
I have taken a week to reflect upon this question alone, and I csinnot withhold from the gentleman, who argued the cause for the libelants, an acknowledgment, that I have not been able to draw any line of discrimination, between this and the decided cause, which satisfies my mind. Yet, I am thoroughly persuaded that the learned men who decided that cause, never contemplated that such an application would have been given of their decision. I am happy in the prospect that this cause will finally be disposed of elsewhere, not doubting that the mental acumen of those who decided the other, will be found fully adequate to distinguish or reconcile the two cases, on grounds which have escaped my reflections. At present, I must content myself with observing, that it is too much to require of a court, upon mere analogy, to sustain an argument that not only proves too much, if it proves anything, but which leads, in fact, to positive absurdity. It will be recollected that it is not only in the territories that we find bodies politic created by the laws of the ’United States, but that near one-lialf the states derive their origin and admission into the Union under laws of the United States. But w'ill it be contended that all the causes arising under their laws, are causes arising under laws of the United States? It is true, that in the District of Columbia, the appellate jurisdiction given to the supreme court, can be maintained only on the ground that the laws of that District are laws of the United States: and that all the laws of the district of Florida derive directly, or indirectly, their force from the same origin. But in the case of the District of Columbia, this power is expressly given to the supreme court, and we are not now inquiring whether congress might not have vested this jurisdiction in the superior court of Florida, but whether they have so vested it. The simple inquiry is, what force and operation is to be given to those words, in the second section of the act of 1824, “Jurisdiction in all cases arising under the laws and constitution of the United
It has also been contended that the Florida act, under which the court at Key West was organized, is void, 1st, because never ratified by congress; and 2nd, because inconsistent with that provision of the first section of the act of 1824, which gives original jurisdiction to the superior courts of the territory in all cases of $100 in value. To the first of these reasons, the 5th section of the act of 1822 furnishes an unequivocal answer. It is only the right of repealing that congress retains over the laws of Florida. That clause which requires the governor to report the laws of the territory to the president, to be laid before congress, is merely directory, but has no bearing upon the validity of those laws, until repealed. The words are “which, if disapproved by congress, shall thenceforth be of no force;" necessarily implying their previous operation. With regard to the second, I have no doubt but that the individual who chooses to resort to his common law remedy, of an action for work and labor, instead of libeling for salvage, may maintain an original suit in the superior court of the territory. But 1 see nothing in the act which makes that jurisdiction exclusive, in a case in which both remedies are open to the choice of the party. The language of the 6th section is, “that the judicial power shall be vested in two superior courts, and in such inferior court and justices of the peace as the legislative council of the territory may from time to time establish.” The 7th section of this act, and the 2d of the subsequent act, confine to the superior courts exclusively the jurisdiction over the cases arising under the laws, &e„ of the United States, of which the Kentucky court had jurisdiction; but as to all others, I perceive nothing in the law which precluded the Florida legislature from making any distribution of jurisdiction, consistent with preserving to the superior court a concurrent jurisdiction, to be exercised according to its own terms.
It is proper to remark here, that whatever may be the fact as to the integrity and propriety, which regulate the proceedings of the court of Key West, there is nothing novel or unprecedented in the organization of that court. The model of it is of great antiquity, and throughout the civilized world some such summary mode of adjusting salvage, in cases of wreck of the sea, is to be found. We had just such a court here, and I believe in most of the states, when the constitution was adopted; and although jurisdiction of the subject has been everywhere 'abandoned to the district courts of the United States, where it is generally adjusted with great solemnity and discretion, and, I believe, very much to the satisfaction of all the commercial world, there exists no reason to preclude the congress of the United States from constituting similar summary tribunals, whenever and wherever it may become necessary. The establishment of this tribunal, therefore, however justice may be distributed in it, is no unwarrantable exercise of the legislative or judicial power vested in Florida.
Finally, I am of opinion that there is error in the decision of the district court, and adjudge that it be reversed, and the goods restored to the claimant with costs.