213 F. 185 | 3rd Cir. | 1914
This action was brought in a state court by Camilla Porreca against the American Ice Company, to recover damages for alleged negligence of such defendant, which caused the death of her husband, Joseph Porreca, its employé. Thereupon the defendant, on the ground of diversity of citizenship, removed the case to the court below. The case was there tried, • and resulted in a verdict for plaintiff. On entry of judgment thereon, defendant sued out this writ of error.
At the time of his death, Joseph Porreca was working as a day-laborer attendant upon an ice cutting saw machine in defendant’s artificial ice factory. While engaged in sweeping up the slush ice thrown off by the cutting of the saw, he was struck and killed by a part of a hard wood wedge which was hit by the saw and thrown backwards. •The man was found lying at some distance to one side of a line running directly back from the travel of the saw. Just where and how he was struck is not known, as the room was so full of fog or steam at the time that no one could see. . In view, however, of proof by the sawyer that he felt the saw strike the wedge; that part of it was found where it was struck; that the other jpart was found lying by Porreca, there can be no doubt, and indeed it is not disputed, that the man was killed by the flying wedge, violently thrown backward by the saw. As pertinent to the question now before us, the negligence charged was that defendant omitted to comply with the requirement of section lb of the Pennsylvania Factory Act of May 2, 1905, P. L. 355, viz., “all * * * saws, * * * and machinery of every description shall be properly guarded,” in that it- negligently failed—
“to provide and maintain upon or about the saw, 'carriage and turntable, above described, any proper, suitable or sufficient guard to prevent the said wedges or pieces thereof from being thrown away from said ice by the action of the saw and to prevent the said wedges or pieces thereof being thrown against and coming in contact with the said Joseph Porreca, or other workmen whose duties required them to work in proximity to the said turntables.”
“there is absolutely nothing under those I-beams to prevent a wedge from going in a straight line from the ice when it is encountered under the I-beams. That is a clear space of 14 or 15 inches.”
The proof tended to show that when the accident occurred, the room was full of steam, so that one could not see anything; that one of Porreca’s duties was to clear away the slush as the saw'cut it and threw it back, and Giordano, in answer to the question as to what Porreca was doing just before the accident, said, “he had a shovel when I started to cut the ice, to start to clean the snow”; that he was from six to nine feet away from the saw.
“I started the power on the saw to cut the ice, and before I cut on the ie» I heard the saw strike the wedge. I stopped the saw right away, and took the wedge out of the saw, and Mr. Dominick Rossi, they were back of me, about 10 feet back of me, he says, ‘Tony, what happened?’ I says, ‘The saw caught a wedge.’ Then he came right over. I looked around, and he was following me, right after me. When we went near the Washington avenue wall, on the Washington avenue side, we saw Mr. Joe Porreca was lying down on*188 the floor, and a piece of wedge right near his head, a big heavy piece, and the small piece right under the saw.”
At the close of' the testimony the court refused defendant’s request for binding instructions and affirmed a point of the plaintiff’s as follows :
“(3) The Pennsylvania Act of Assembly, dated May 3, 1905, P. L. 355, section 11, provides in part as follows:
“ ‘All vats, pans, saws, planers, cogs, gearing, belting, shafting, set screws, grindstones, emery wheels, fly-wheels, and machinery of every description shall be properly guarded.’
“Properly guarded means effectively guarded in the light of the danger to be anticipated. If you believe from the evidence that there was danger of contact between the saw and the wedges, and that there wás no guard provided either about the saw or around the cutting table to protect the workmen whose duties required them to be in that vicinity, then you would be justified in concluding that the defendant failed to comply with its statutory duty.”
Its action in so doing is, inter alia, here assigned for error. In substance., therefore, the case turns on whether, under the proofs, the court erred in submitting, to the jury to find the defendant guilty of negligence by reason of noncompliance with the Pennsylvania Factory Act quoted.
“to provide and maintain upon or about the saw carriage and turntable, above described (see clause 3 of amended statement) any proper, suitable, or sufficient guard to prevent tbe said wedges or pieces thereof from being thrown away from the said ice by the action of the saw, and to prevent the said wedges or pieces thereof being thrown against and coming in contact with the said Joseph Porreca or other workmen whose duties required them to work in proximity to the said turntable.”
While the proofs showed that the saw as a saw was properly hooded and guarded, and failed to show anything in reference to the platform or turntable, they did show the carriage was not guarded so as to prevent wedges struck by the saw from flying out from beneath the carriage, as testified to by defendant’s witnesses quoted above. Under these pleadings and proofs, we think the court could not take the case
“The learned recorder has supplied us with the keynote of his judgment in one sentence, in which he says that ‘the manufacturer is only responsible for machinery which is in itself dangerous in the ordinary course of lawful working.’ He seems to think that no machinery can be said to be dangerous unless it is dangerous in itself, however carefully worked. I entirely disagree with such an interpretation, and think it would limit most materially a very beneficial act of Parliament. It seems to me that machinery or parts of machinery, is and are dangerous if in the ordinary course of human affairs danger may be reasonably anticipated from the use of them without precaution."
In this case we have the factors of heavy hard wood wedges, occasionally struck by a saw, revolving at a very high rate of speed, and liable to fly across the place where a workman’s duty brought him. Under such circumstances, we cannot, as a matter of law, say that the carriage was properly, guarded, when there was no guard or barrier save chance to protect the man doing his work from being struck by a wedge flying out from under the unguarded rear of such carriage. Such was the view of the trial judge, who in submitting this phase of' the case to the jury said:
“Now, coming to the statutory duty imposed on the defendant; that is, a duty to properly guard the saw. There does not seem to me to be any dispute as to the extent to which the saw was guarded. The top part of the saw, where it was above the ice, was covered with a sheet iron hood, and it seems to have been properly guarded in that respect, so far as any one coming in contact with it is concerned. So that the question here would be as to whether it was properly guarded to prevent- anything flying out, whether there was*190 any ordinary reason for anything such as happened here, a wedge flying out, and whether there was a substantial compliance with the statute with the guard that was theje to prevent any such risk as might be reasonably expected. The defendant contends that it has done its duty in supplying the guard that was there. The question is, as I have stated, and it is for you to determine, whether there was a risk there which the master or any one having to do with the machinery could reasonably expect, and whether there was a substantial compliance with the act providing for a guard by the guard that was there. In other words, would the guard there prevent any foreign substance from flying out and striking anybody, and, if it was not, was it an occurrence which was reasonably to be expected in a plant of this sort?”
These questions having been submitted to and determined by the jury adversely to the defendant, we find no error to warrant our reversing the judgment entered on the verdict.