*3 DENNIS, Bеfore WIENER and Circuit LITTLE, Judges, and Judge.* District * Louisiana, Judge Chief District sitting by designation. of the Western District of I. AND PROCEEDINGS FACTS
LITTLE, Judge: District years, Appellants past several Over a consolidated Today we consider Fi- Republic loans from obtained consumer from the dis- Defendants-Appellants nance, purchase included the Plaintiffs- in favor of court’s trict disability insurance. and credit Defen- credit life arbitration. Appellees, Appellants entered into Specifically, when following include the dants-Appellants Finance, Sanford, Republic transactions with Orr, F. loan Betty D. John parties: disability Martin, sold Republic Finance Moore, Jimmie L. Frankie against insure the credit fife insurance to (collectively referred Henley Nathaniel In- and death. The risks of sickness Plaintiffs-Appellees “Apрellants”). as the poli- and issued the insurance surers wrote Corporation National Fidelity are: d/b/a *4 Appel- Finance sold Finance, Republic Fi- cies that (“Republic Inc. Republic “Lender”), lants. and American or the nance” Company Life Insurance
Heritage borrowing Ap- closings, the At the loan (“American First Colonial Heritage”) and signed Finance a doc- Republic and pellant (“Colonial of Florida Company Insurance Agreement” “Arbitration ument entitled “Insurers”).1 Insurance”) (collectively, (the to which the Insurers “Agreement”) Plaintiffs-Ap- granted court The district do not signatories. were not un- compel arbitration pellees’ petition Finance failed to Republic contend that (the Act Arbitration § 4 of the Federal der language in clear Agreemеnt prepare court “FAA”), state stayed pending Finance Republic or that legible print, closed. the case and ordered proceedings, on a place Agreement neglected § 4. 9 U.S.C. is, the loan apart from page, that separate Agreement Each are the benefi- transaction documents. Although language: ruling following the district court’s contains ciaries of arbitration, they appellants are compelled claim, controversy dispute or be- [A]ny court has (or this issue: Whether as to one lender undersigned ... and tween appeal. Appellants’ jurisdiction to entertain assigns or of agents employees, first, and disposed will be This issue lender) relating to the arising from or of the district portions consideration of of credit any prior extension loan or find order court’s insur- undersigned, any of the lender to wanting will follow. herewith, ... in connection ance written contract, tort, breach in and whether that, a matter of hold as ultimately We to) any not limited (including but duty law, court the district faith, and fair fiduciary, good alleged underly- arbitration, stays also duties, not limited including but dealing and closes proceedings court ing state this arbitration applicability to the court, immediately is an in federal case validity the entire agreement, under the ambit final decision appealable, by binding be resolved shall 16(a)(3) agreement the FAA. As of 9 U.S.C. in ac- one arbitrator before to enter- arbitration such, this court has Arbitration the Federal cordance with conclude also appeal. the instant We tain of the Act, procedures expedited should be court’s order the district rules of commercial affirmed. Finance, tively "Appellees.” Heritage, and American Republic to collec- will be referred Insurance Colonial Association, American Arbitration Appellees initiated independent actions Court, this agreement. the United States District North- ern Mississippi, only District of seeking orders compel of the court to parties agree that Lender is en- FAA, under the seq. et U.S.C. and to commerce, gaged in interstate and the stay the state court proceedings. After an governed by transaction is the Federal appropriate analysis Appellants’ de- Act, Arbitration 9 U.S.C. Section 1-16. mands and the Appellees’ oppositions to them, the district сourt issued an order In the party event either files a suit compelling arbitration accordance with any other, kind in against court Agreements, related, staying all state ifor a counter or cross-claim is filed proceedings, and closing the case. therein, the defendant counter-defen- The district court determined that Appel- stayed dant can have the suit and the lants’ implicated substantially claims inter- other party required to arbitrate under dependent and concerted misconduct agreement. non-signatory both the Insurers and the Directly signature above the date and signatory Lender. The district court also lines, bold, capital, readily legible let- that: concluded the McCarran-Fergu- *5 ters, following language. is the Act, son Insurance Regulation 15 U.S.C. THE PARTIES UNDERSTAND (1999) (the §§ 1011-1015 “McCarran-Fer- THAT BY SIGNING THIS ARBITRA- Act”) guson did not reverse-preempt AGREEMENT, TION THEY ARE FAA because Appellants identify failed to LIMITING ANY RIGHT TO PUNI- a Mississippi state law or statute that the TIVE AND DAMAGES GIVING UP invalidated, FAA had impaired, or super- THE RIGHT TO A TRIAL IN (2) seded; Appellees’ petition to compel COURT, BOTH WITH AND WITH- arbitration the district court did not OUT A JURY. amount to a compulsory counterclaim un- Despite the clear language Agree- of the 13(a) der rule of the Federal Rules of Civil provisions ments’ mandating arbitration (the “FRCP”), Procedure which would under the FAA and the commercial rules required Appellees to file the motion of the American Arbitration Association compel court, arbitration in state (“AAA”),Appellants commenced civil ac- § 4 that of the FAA plainly authorized a against Appellees tion in the Circuit Court party against whоm litigation has been Clay County, Mississippi. Appellants initiated to separate, commence a original for, sought monetary damages among oth- action in federal district court to enforce alleged er transgressions, fraudulent mis- (3) an arbitration agreement; and Appel- representation in connection with the loan lants did not proffer sufficient evidence to transaction, conspiracy life, to “sell credit support jury trial demand for resolution credit disability, property collateral and/or of the factual issues surrounding adop- protection ... insurance that was unneces- tion of the Agreements. Of im- particular sary and at an premium exorbitant far in portance in the dispute instant is the fact rate,” excess of the market breach of im- that, in addition to compelling arbitration plied covenants of good faith and fair deal- and staying pending pro- state court ing, duties, breach fiduciary and allega- ceedings, the district ordered the court tions that conspired Insurers with case closed but did not dismiss the action. agents of Republic final, Finance to sell unnec- The substantive paragraph of the essary insurance at inflated rates. provides district court’s order as follows: merits litigation the entire on the case CLOSED.”
“[T]his
court, leaving
more for that
appeal.
nothing
court
timely filed notices
judgment.
to do but execute the
Id.
II.
JURISDICTION
Supreme
held
In Green
Court
Compels Ar-
That
Order
A District Court
an
dismissing
action is
bitration,
Underlying State
Stays the
“final
within the traditional un
decision”
Proceedings, and Closes the
Cоurt
term,
derstanding of the
even when the
Immediately Appealable,
Case is an
favor of
and the
dismissal is in
the Contem-
Final Decision Within
return to court to
parties could later
enter
16(a)(3)
FAA.
plation of
at
judgment on an arbitration award.
Id.
16(a)(3)
pro
FAA
Section
85-88,
reaching
at
S.Ct.
519-21.
may
appeal
“An
be taken
vides as follows:
result,
Supreme
applied
this
Court
to an
respect
with
from a final decision
meaning of “final deci
well-established
subject to this title.” 9
that is
litigation
that “ends the
on
sion” as one
16(a)(3).
preserves
That section
U.S.C.
for the
nothing
the merits and leaves
more
‘“final decision’
immediate
judgment.”
do
execute the
court to
but
arbitration,” regardless
respect to
with
85;
(citing Digital
Id. at
121 S.Ct.
is favorable
hostile
whether the decision
Direct,
Corp. Desktop
Equip.
not,
FAA
Id. The
to arbitration.
L.Ed.2d
U.S.
S.Ct.
term “final
define the
expressly
(1994)),
Coopers
Lybrand
&
Appellees argue
decision.”
463, 467,
Livesay, 437
U.S.
S.Ct.
because the
appellate jurisdiction
lacks
(both
quoting Catlin
There no distinction between tion Prod. Co. v. Energy, & Ramco purposes (5th Cir.1998). “dismiss” and “close” 1061, 1065 application The of each word re- appeal. merits, sults a termination on the leav- McCarran-Ferguson B. The Act Did Not judgment-rendering court with ing the Reverse-Preempt the Application of more but
nothing judg- to do execute the FAA the Agreements. ment. hold that a district We where nothing it with before but whether com- Appеllants’ argument first is that pel stay pro- arbitration and state court FAA inapplicable to the instant ceedings issues an order arbi- Agreements, FAA is preclud because the tration, staying underlying state court by McCarran-Fergu- ed or preempted case, proceedings, closing thereby Act, (the “Act”). § son 15 U.S.C. The effectively ending the entire matter on its provides following: Act leaving nothing merits and more for the Congress No Act of shall be construed district court to but the judg- do execute invalidate, impair, any or supersede ment, lies, jurisdiction appellate the de- law enacted State for the pur- cision is “final” within the contemplation of pose of regulating the business of insur- 16(a)(3) Thus, of the FAA. we hold that ance, ... this court has to entertain the appeal. instant 1012(b). аp- U.S.C.A. The Act bars plication of FAA to insurance contracts III. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES only in the context of a state statute evinc- Appellants assert that the district court same, ing policy not mere statements (1) by: finding erred that the McCarran- of state in- officials administrative rule Ferguson Act not reverse-preempt did terpretations governmental entities. case; application of the FAA to the instant Co., Fidelity Miller v. Nat’l Ins. Life (2) denying Appellants a by jury trial (5 Cir.1979). th 186-87 decide factual surrounding issues party seeking to avail itself of the Act validity Agreements; failing must demonstrate that application of the the Agreements declare unenforceable invalidate, FAA impair, would or super- putative because of the cost high of arbi- particular sede a law regulates state *7 trаtion. For the reasons hereafter set the business of Id. insurance. at 187. forth, any find we no merit in issue raised McCarran-Ferguson “The test under by Appellants. not whether a state has enacted statutes regulating insurance, the business of but A. Standard Review of whether such state statutes will be invali- a grant We review district court’s dated, impaired, superseded by ap- or a novo, of to compel motion arbitration de plication of Appellants federal law.” Id. applying the same as standard the district fail any identify to statute that would be court. OPE LP v. Int’l Chet Morrison invalidated, impaired, by or superseded Contractors, Inc., (5th 443, 258 F.3d 445 Instead, the application of the FAA. Ap- Cir.2001) (citing Local Long 1351 Int’l pellants try perpetrate judicial a end- Serv., Inc., Ass’n shoremen’s v. Sea-Land by run asserting attorney general’s that an (5th 566, Cir.2000), 214 F.3d 569 cert. de opinion or nied, department’s insurance 1076, regula- 771, 121 S.Ct. 148 (2001)); tory, PaineWebber, policy administrative is the L.Ed.2d 670 functional Inc. v. Bank, equivalent relating Chase of state Manhattan Private a law insur- 453, (5th Cir.2001); ance, Explora- Pennzoil thereby triggering the of provisions arguments system. dispute, are with- In the event of a in- Appellants’ the Act. filed, being out merit. stead of lawsuit inde- pendent and neutral arbitrator licensed First, Mississippi “[ojpinions of practice law in Mississippi ren- would of not have the force Attorney General do position hearing der decision after County, Frazier v. Lowndes law....” 1097, Educ., The arbitrator’s de- parties.... 710 F.2d Bd. Mississippi of Cir.1983) (5th (citing binding Local Union and on cision would be final both Rubber, Cork, No. Linoleum United In- policyholder and Primerica Life Am., Workers Homе Assoc. and Plastic Company.2 surance of County Supervisors, v. Bd. Lee indicates, Appellants’ As record con- (Miss.1979)). Second, be So.2d per- tention that Commissioner never addresses, statute Mississippi cause no subject mits disputes insurance to be restricts, or arbitration prohibits much less arbitration is incorrect. The record indi- claims, dis insurance-related credit permit cates that the Commissioner can or controversies, putes, or the Commissioner disputes subject disallow insurance Mississippi of Insurance for the State of as to arbitration the Commissioner deems “Commissioner”) (the regulatory is without fit. re arbitration clauses authority prohibit lating Appellants espouse to insurance. meaning upon Based the clear of 15 administrative rulings by
variety of 1012(b), U.S.C.A. we hold that the dis Commissioner that disallowed arbitration Act properly trict court concluded proof all claims insurance-related FAA, apply, does not under subject to claims are never insurance valid, enforceable, Agreements are of Mississippi. the State Co., See Hart Ins. irrevocable. Orion brief, following: Appellants them state Cir.1971); 453 F.2d Ham that the “There is no evidence herein Com N.Y. Republic Ins. Co. ilton Life Life approved missioner has an insurance ever Cir.1969). Co., (2nd Ins. certificate, or policy, endorsement mandatory containing provisions form binding Consequently, arbitration. Jury Are Not Entitled to a C. mandatory, binding
the use of a Validity Regarding Trial agreement, though in a even contained Agreements. ... unlawful in Mis third-party contract Second, maintain that sub sissippi.” Appellees, FAA, they §§ 2 & 4 of the are is press mitted into record release jury entitled to a trial on issue 2on sued the Commissioner October states, 2 of the FAA arbitrability. Section states, pertinent part, pertinent part, that an arbitration clause following: *8 “valid, ir interstate commerce is involving policy first [Commissioner] announces enforceable, revocable, upon such save filing allowing arbitration. equity exist at law or in for the grounds as a approve[d] ... [The] Commissioner § 2. of contract.” 9 U.S.C. revocation by Life Insurance Com- filing Primerica provides “[i]f The FAA also that the mak provision. an arbitration pany containing in agreement of ... be ing the arbitration dis- provision require This would certain issue, proceed summarily shall to the court the putes through process to be resolved § 4. of rather in the court the trial thereof.” 9 U.S.C. than www.doi.state.ms.us, 2 Department October 2001. Mississippi 2. See Insurance web- site: § Right a Trial Jury “making” to Under the of Agreements. the See k of Johnston, the FAA. Bhatia v. 818 F.2d 421-22 (5th Cir.1987) (stating that af- self-serving Appellants they contend that a deserve type fidavits do amount to the of evi- jury question trial on the of the of validity dence required “making to call the the of Agreements. by Specifically, alleging agreement arbitration” question). into unconscionable, that are Agreements Furthermore, Appellants’ affidavits fail to of products unequal bargaining power identify any by misrepresentation Appel- parties, lacking between the of mutuality peculiar to Agreements, lees which obligation parties, failing between the Appellants’ forecloses minds, ability to state a to of the meeting Appel- result a claim of fraud in the inducement. See argue they put lants that have the “mak- issue, Burden v. ing” Agreements thereby Kentucky, Check into Cash LLC, (6th Cir.2001). § 4 complying with of the FAA. The 267 F.3d dis- held, however, trict court affidavits, that the issues Other than their self-serving by raised relate Appellants to enforceabili- Appellants have whisper not submitted a ty of the Agreements, impact but do not to support evidence the conclusion that “making agreement. arbitration” jury trial is warranted under agree We holding with the district court’s FAA. Raising Agreements’ issues and rationale. procedural or substantive unconscionabili- ty, as Appellants case, the instant Although permits parties the FAA is not equivalent of questioning the jury to demand a trial rеsolve factual “making” of an agreement. surrounding making issues of an arbi Burden, 492. Under failure, agreement, tration neglect, or Dillard, therefore, of the FAA and Appel- perform or agreement, refusal to it is lants have not met their burden to show well-established that party “[a] an arbi their jury entitlement to a trial. agreement tration jury cannot obtain trial merely demanding one.” Dillard 2. The Right Seventh Amendment Pierce, Smith, Lynch, Merrill Fenner & by Jury. Trial Cir.1992). Next, Appellants claim that Further, analysis, under Dillard a par forcing them to submit their claims to ty contesting “making” of the arbitra arbitrator, the deprived district court them agreement tion must “make at least some of their Seventh right Amendment showing prevailing law, that he by jury. Appellants trial suggest would be relieved of his contractual obli waiver of a constitutional right should be gations if to arbitrate allegations his closely scrutinized, and that a waiver proved to true ... produce [and] be some jury trial rights clearly must un evidence substantiate his factual allega mistakably expressed. tions.” Id. at 1154. Appellants’ argument is without founda- case, In the Appellants instant submit- First, tion. point we Appellants out that
ted evidence in the form of affidavits that agreed to submit to arbitration because claim, alia, inter did not they assented to the terms of the Agree- explain Agreements ments, following contained the did not they realize that *9 clause, just located above signature the a waiving jury. were trial by The affida- lines: proffered however, by vits Appellants, hollow, nothing
amount to than more bald THE PARTIES UNDERSTAND assertions that do in approaсh not fraud THAT BY SIGNING THIS ARBITRA-
7H AGREEMENT, right ARE Amendment to a trial THEY The Seventh TION jury by is limited a valid arbitration ANY TO PUNI- LIMITING RIGHT UP the a provision right AND GIVING that waives to resolve TIVE DAMAGES A TRIAL IN dispute through litigation judicial TO in a fo- THE RIGHT COURT, AND WITH- following BOTH WITH rum. the rea- We concur with A JURY. soning: OUT arbitration, Amendment does not con- The Seventh
Therefore,
Ap-
agreeing to
trial,
fer
right
only
right
a
but
necessarily
the fol-
waived
pellants have
forum;
(1)
jury
to have a
hear the case once it is
judicial
lowing:
a
right
their
(2)
jury
litigation
determined that
should
right to
corresponding
their
and
If
proceed before a court.
the claims
trial.
are
an arbitral forum
properly before
Nevertheless,
Wright v.
cite
Appellants
pursuant
agreement,
Corp., 525 U.S.
Maritime Serv.
Universal
jury
right
trial
vanishes.
(1998),
391,
70,
L.Ed.2d
142
361
119 S.Ct.
Pierce,
pro-
Lynch,
that an arbitration
v.
Fenner
proposition
for the
Cremin Merrill
Smith,
rights
1460,
must be
jury
that waives
trial
F.Supp.
vision
&
unmistakably expressed.
(N.D.Ill.1997). Here,
Reli-
clearly and
Appellants agreed to
however,
unavailing.
Wright,
on
ance
with
disputes
resolve their
acknowledge
Supreme
that the
Appellants
arbitration,
they
in
through
and
did so
holding Wright
its
Court limited
unmistakable, capitalized
clear
bargaining agree-
of a collective
context
expressly
words
waived
boldfaced
ment,
his
to an individual’s waiver of
Thus,
not
jury
right
their
trial
well.
situation in which the “clear
rights—a
own
validly
rights to a
waived their
applica-
is not
and unmistakable” standard
forum, including
corollary right
judicial
80-81,
at 396-97.
ble.
Id.
S.Ct.
by jury.
to a trial
Thus,
the area of collective
outside
bar-
Agreements
D. The
Are Not Unenforcea-
union)
(the
party
in which a third
gaining,
High
Alleged
Because
Cost
ble
rights of
contractually
waive
seeks to
Arbitration.
(the employеe),
individual member
Third, Appellants
contend
an arbitration
requirement
there is no
fees for
filing
and case service
arbitra
unmistakably
clearly
must
provision
present
hardship,
oppressive,
tion are
express
waiver of an individual’s
unconscionable,
rendering
thereby
and are
758,
rights.
Imhoff,
Williams v.
As to the
Agreements
unenforceable.
(10th Cir.2000).
costs of arbitra
potentially burdensome
cite the talisman
Appellants further
tion,
resisting arbitration has the
party
Arizona,
v.
86 S.Ct.
Miranda
U.S.
“ar
the likelihood that
showing
burden
support
prohibitive costs of the arbitration pro
fees, including paying the
fee
arbitrator’s
ceeding, a court is not required to invali
if directed to do so by
arbitrator,
date the arbitration agreement. Green
not render
Agreements
unenforceable.
90-91,
shall at pay time the arbitrator IV. CONCLUSION $125.00. Lender pay shall arbitrator all For the other foregoing reasons, arbitration expense fees and the district costs court’s up for order compelling day hours) arbitration, one (eight proceed stay- ing the ings. state court Any proceedings, other such costs shall clos- be paid ing the case is AFFIRMED. non-prevailing party....” Accord ing to record, date, only Appellees DENNIS, Circuit Judge, concurring: paid have appropriate fees; however, if I concur prevail, fully in then Chief Judge must Little’s pay all opinion excellent costs expenses of write separately only arbitration. Presently, elaborate on question reasons why we party to appellate jurisdiction the arbitration over will this matter. ultimately prevail at subject to speculation only The Federal (“FAA”) Arbitration Act and, therefore, is not a basis to hold the permits appeal of any “final decision with Agreements unenforceable. Appellants’ respect an arbitration” subject that is reliance on Shankle B.G. Mgmt., Maint. the Act. 16(a)(3). § U.S.C. On the other 1234-35 Cir. hand, “[ejxcept as otherwise provided in 1999) and Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Services 1292(b) section of title an appeal may Co., (D.C.Cir.1997) 1483-89 not be taken from an interlocutory order misplaced. case, In each the court (1) ad ... granting a stay action under dressed an agreement that did section 3 title; of this [or] directing not expressly specify which party would arbitration proceed under section 4 of pay the arbitrator’s fees or whether this title....” 16(b)(l)-(2).1 9 U.S.C. Appellate permitted review is under the 28 court certifies an appeal. immediate 1292(b) U.S.C. exception i£ the district
713
def-
longstanding”
and
“well-developed
the
is
Thus,
order
an
a
“It is
decision
“final
In
of
decision”:
order.
inition
is a final
if it
only
appealable
and
merits
on the
litigation
the district
the
finality of
ends
words,
that
the
other
juris-
but
to do
court’s
the
this
for
court
nothing more
determines
leaves
order
court’s
Tree,
appeal.
531
present
Green
judgment.”
the
over
the
diction
execute
(internal quota-
86,
likely hand, raise on the Appellees, other (at time, judges and chief period ble argument: equivalent their own functional levels) district-court appellate both the closure we treat suggest they that appear cases a sixth sense would, in *13 order, stay as a order clo- administrative languishing. be jurisdiction turn, appellate deprive us a by providing problem solves sure Tree decis two of Green under footnote court remove for the district vehicle fails, for it likewise argument ion.8 This making files without its active from case rule. In judgment of the final sight loses v. Revolu- Lehman adjudication. any final order that an proceeding, an independent L.L.C., 392 F.3d 166 tion entered as those Portfolio final—such is otherwise Cir.1999). Thus, (1st the administrative final not lose its present in the case—does fed- than the nothing more reflects closure juris retains district court ity bеcause the tidy concern with overarching courts’ eral with the compliance supervise diction to signifi- dockets; jurisdictional has it no award. an to enforce order or cance.6 Delaware Kidney Amgen, Inc. v. Ctr. of (7th Ltd., 566 Cir. F.3d County, in the their case to cast
In an effort 1996) (“[A]n independent pro in an order Tree, mold Green same if district final even the ceeding can still be a case issued closing an order argue that the case to over jurisdiction func- court retains is the proceeding independent in an order.”); with the compliance supervise If we a dismissal.7 equivalent of tional Philadelphia Rein v. Ins. Co. North River argument, accept their were (2d 160, 164 Cir. Corp., sig- surance jurisdictional attributing be would we Am. v. 1995); University Co. Ins. not sanctioned designation a nificance Life (7th Ltd., F.2d 848-50 Unimarc typically Rules that by the Federal Cir.1983). Moreover, if the district even con- or statistical for administrative made pro independent stayed these Although had do. This cannot we venience. arbitration, the order ceedings pending plain prevail court, compelling arbitration order Lehman, ("Properly district at 392 F.3d 6. See a understood, equivalent to closing no case is closing has not an administrative Filanto, from the remove a case judgment than to of dismissal. effect other final permit the transfer Corp., active docket court's S.p.A. Int’l v. Chilewich to an with case associated 1993); Corp. of records (2d v. Arthur see also ATAC Cir. repository. In event no appropriate storage Cir.2002) Inc., Treacher’s, F.3d 1091 restoring party from an order bar does suсh stay perpetual argument (rejecting an upon active calendar to the Court's the action not differ closing coupled order with (internal quota- application.”) appropriate dismissal); Corion judgment of final from a omitted). acknowledge I tion and citation (holding that an at 56-60 Corp., 964 F.2d specifically here did not that the district court arbitration, proceed staying "administratively the cases direct closing administratively the case ings, and imprecise or use of an But a closed." court's final). misleading alter character label cannot (treating a n. 2 at 391 action. See id. its at 87 n. 8. See Green admin- as an of dismissal” "procedural order ("Had entered Court the District S.Ct. 513. case). istrative closure of case, that in this a dismissal stay instead litigants place proceedings where appealable."). In not be order would arbitrability before than the issue more compelling arbitration would still Inc.; resolve Texaco Exploration Texaco & the only issue before the court in each Production Plaintiffs-Counter action, and therefore an immediate appeal Defendants-Appellees, from the order would permitted. still be short, See supra note 4. even though the district court probably intended to re- Board Parish, School Vermilion jurisdiction
tain actions, over these neither Defendant-Counter Claimant- the retention nor the closure Appellant. of the cases affects appealability.9
Although immediate from an Corp., or- Amerada Hess Plaintiff-Counter der compеlling arbitration may frustrate Defendant-Appellee, the oft-cited federal policy arbi- favoring tration, policy concerns *14 yield must to the
plain language of the statutory text of the
School Board
Parish,
Vermilion
FAA. See Green
85-89,
U.S.
Defendant-Counter Claimant-
v. School Board Parish, Vermilion Defendant-Counter Claimant- Appellant. INC.,
CHEVRON USA Plaintiff-Counter Exxon Mobil Corp., Plaintiff-Counter dant-Ap Defen Defendant-Appellee, pellee, SCHOOL BOARD VERMILION Guidry, Marshall W. Defendant-Counter
PARISH, ant-Ap Defendant-Counter Claim
Claimant-Appellant. pellant. 9. The bravely complain that moving compel instead arbitration in the impeding Any arbitration. delay, earlier-filed proceedings. state-court ap- This however, is of making. their They own peal decid- is one consequences of that strate- ed independent to file actions in gic federal court decision.