No. 12494 | N.D. Ga. | Feb 12, 1970
ORDER
This is an action under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 185) in which plaintiff, the duly recognized collective bargaining agent of defendants’ employees, seeks to recover from defendant certain past-due wages and other monies which defendant allegedly owes to individual employees. Default judgment was entered against Defendant Atlanta Municipal Theater, Inc. on June 25, 1969. The case is now before the court for consideration of motions for summary judgment by plaintiff and by Defendant Manos.
Defendant Manos has also raised a question as to whether an ac
”46. PERSONAL LIABILITY. It is understood and agreed that__ who is signing this Agreement on behalf of the Employer as an agent and representative of the Employer, is also signing this Agreement in his capacity as an individual in addition to his capacity as an agent and representative of the Employer, and his signature to this Agreement shall bind him, individually and personally, as well as the Employer. Christopher B. Manos hereby warrants and represents that he has the requisite authority as an agent and representative of the Employer to sign this agreement on behalf of,- and to bind, the Employer.” See page 19 of Exhibit “A” to the Complaint. Paragraph 41 of Contract “B” provides as follows:
As to the motions for summary judgment it appears that both must be denied because there is a factual issue as to whether Defendant Manos, who signed the contract between plaintiff and Atlanta Municipal Theater, Inc., signed only as the latter’s agent or whether he bound himself individually. The parties agree that when an individual signs a contract as agent for a disclosed principal the individual is not bound personally unless there is something in the body or on the face of the instrument to indicate otherwise. It is undisputed that the basic contracts in the instant case contain printed clauses which, if completed would bind the agent personally, but the lines provided in those clauses for insertion of the agent’s name are blank.
*945 ”41. OBLIGATIONS OF SIGNATORIES. It is understood and agreed that _ who is signing this agreement on behalf of the EMPLOYER as an agent and representative of the EMPLOYER, is also signing this agreement in his capacity as an individual in addition to his capacity as an agent and representative of the EMPLOYER, and as the EMPLOYER. Christopher B. Manos hereby warrants and represents that he has the requisite authority as an agent and representative of the EMPLOYER to sign this agreement on behalf of, and to bind, the EMPLOYER." See page 18 of Exhibit “B” to the Complaint.
. See, e. g., Auto Workers v. Hoosier Corp., 383 U.S. 696; 86 S. Ct. 1107" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1966-03-28" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/international-union-united-automobile-aerospace--agricultural-implement-workers-of-america-v-hoosier-cardinal-corp-107199?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="107199">86 S.Ct. 1107 (1966), where the court cites 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) for the proposition that “(a)ny * * * labor organization may sue * * * in behalf of the employees whom it represents in the courts of the United States.” Id. at 700, 86 S. Ct. 1107" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1966-03-28" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/international-union-united-automobile-aerospace--agricultural-implement-workers-of-america-v-hoosier-cardinal-corp-107199?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="107199">86 S.Ct. at 1110.
. Paragraph 46 of Contract “A” provides as follows: