AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, et al., Petitioners, v. Hon. Susana MARTINEZ, Governor of the State of New Mexico, Respondent, and State of New Mexico, Real Party in Interest.
No. 32,905.
Supreme Court of New Mexico.
May 13, 2011.
2011-NMSC-018 | 257 P.3d 952
NMCA-026, ¶ 14, 147 N.M. 506, 226 P.3d 20. Although our review of the proceedings indicates that the incidents involving Patients A and B were of primary concern to the peer reviewers, the final action suspending Plaintiff‘s medical privileges was taken after a fact-finding process that involved a broad and thorough investigation of Plaintiff‘s care regarding a number of patients. We conclude that the fact-finding process conducted by Defendants was reasonable as a matter of law.
III. CONCLUSION
{23} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the opinion of the Court of Appeals. Because the district court did not consider the remaining three immunity requirements of the HCQIA summary judgment standard, we remand for further proceedings.
{24} IT IS SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR: CHARLES W. DANIELS, Chief Justice, PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, RICHARD C. BOSSON, and EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Justices.
Jessica Hernandez, Jennifer L. Padgett, Matthew J. Stackpole, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent.
OPINION
CHÁVEZ, Justice.
{1} May the Governor use the broad removal authority under
{2} The PELRB is composed of three members appointed by the Governor, whose appointment power is circumscribed as follows: “The governor shall appoint one member recommended by organized labor representatives actively involved in representing public employees, one member recommended by public employers actively involved in collective bargaining and one member jointly recommended by the other two appointees.”
{3} The PELRB has rule-making authority,
{4} Petitioners are organized labor representatives actively involved in representing public employees. They seek a writ of mandamus prohibiting the Governor from removing Boyd and Westbrook from the PELRB,1 arguing that the Governor‘s removal authority under
{5} The Governor counters that her actions are consistent with this Court‘s broad interpretation of
THE GOVERNOR MUST ENSURE THAT THE INTENDED GOALS OF DULY ENACTED LEGISLATION ARE EFFECTUATED
{6}
{7} The question in this case is whether the Governor‘s removal of the members of the PELRB is at odds with the Governor‘s responsibility to ensure that the Act‘s intended goals are effectuated. We conclude that it is. Under the Act‘s structure, the Governor does not have the absolute power to appoint any person to the PELRB. The Governor has a clear and indisputable duty to appoint one representative for labor, one for management, and the third based on the designation by the other two appointees.
{8} The Legislature‘s stated purpose in promulgating the Act sets forth the rationale for the Governor‘s limited role in the appointment of PELRB members and the importance of a continuously operating PELRB. In particular, the Legislature established the following purpose for the Act:
The purpose of the Public Employee Bargaining Act is to guarantee public employees the right to organize and bargain collectively with their employers, to promote harmonious and cooperative relationships between public employers and public employees and to protect the public interest by ensuring, at all times, the orderly operation and functioning of the state and its political subdivisions.
{9} The removal of the board member selected by the unions casts a pall over the operations of the PELRB and evinces a willingness to interfere with the unions’ right to designate a board member of their choice. The Act expressly prohibits an employer from interfering with a public employee‘s rights under the Act.
CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS PROHIBITS ARBITRARY REMOVAL OF BOARD MEMBERS BY THE GOVERNOR WHO ADJUDICATE DISPUTES INVOLVING THE GOVERNOR
{10} Due process considerations are also implicated because when the Governor reserves the power to remove board members at any time and for any reason, the Governor exerts subtle coercive influence over the PELRB, further compromising its balanced and fair character. “A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.” In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955).
At a minimum, a fair and impartial tribunal requires that the trier of fact be disinterested and free from any form of bias or predisposition regarding the outcome of the case. In addition, our system of justice requires that the appearance of complete fairness be present. The inquiry is not whether the [b]oard members are actually biased or prejudiced, but whether, in the natural course of events, there is an indication of a possible temptation to an average man sitting as a judge to try the case with bias for or against any issue presented to him. Reid v. N.M. Bd. of Exam‘rs in Optometry, 92 N.M. 414, 416, 589 P.2d 198, 200 (1979) (citations omitted).
{11} What is significant in this case is that the PELRB adjudicates disputes involving the Governor and all the myriad executive department agencies under her control, including determining whether the Governor or her appointees have engaged in prohibited labor practices under
ESPINOSA IS INAPPOSITE BECAUSE BROAD REMOVAL AUTHORITY OVER THE PELRB WOULD DIRECTLY CONTRAVENE THE LEGISLATURE‘S PURPOSE IN PROMULGATING THE ACT AND CONFLICT WITH THE GOVERNOR‘S DUTY TO FAITHFULLY EXECUTE THE LAWS
{12} The Governor urges us to adhere to our broad interpretation of
{13} In Espinosa, members of the Judicial Standards Commission (Commission) challenged then-Governor Bill Richardson‘s authority to remove the Commission‘s six gubernatorial appointees en masse. 2003-NMSC-017, ¶ 1, 134 N.M. 59, 73 P.3d 197. One argument advanced by the Espinosa petitioners was that the language in
{14} In this case, there are three compelling reasons to hold otherwise. First, in Espinosa the Governor had absolute appointment authority—that is, the Governor was at liberty to appoint anyone he chose to the Commission. That is not so in this case, where the Governor has a clear and indisputable duty to appoint those members designated by labor, management, and a neutral designated by the labor and management designees. Second, in Espinosa the appointees were not empowered to adjudicate disputes involving the Governor. In this case, the PELRB must decide disputes involving the Governor. Third, in Espinosa we could read the competing constitutional provisions harmoniously, whereas in this case, we cannot read the competing duty of the Governor to faithfully execute the laws, with her appointment and removal authority, or with the due process requirements of our Constitution as interpreted by this Court.
CONCLUSION
{15} For the foregoing reasons, a writ of mandamus has issued ordering the reinstatement of members Boyd and Westbrook to the PELRB, effective immediately, and otherwise enjoining their removal.
{16} IT IS SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR: PATRICIO M. SERNA, PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justices and CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Judge, Sitting by Designation.