Lead Opinion
OPINION
{1} Pеtitioners, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Council 18, AFL-CIO, Locals 1461, 2260 and 2499 (AFSCME), brought a declaratory-judgment action challenging the grandfather status of Respondent’s, Board of County Commissioners of Bernalillo County (County Commission), local lab or relations board. The merits of AFSCME’s claims were considered and rejected by both the district court and the Court of Appeals. We focus on the statutory jurisdictional prerequisites of New Mexico’s Declaratory Judgment Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 44-6-1 to -15 (1975), and hold that AFSCME failed to satisfy those prerequisites. AFSCME’s claims are not ripe, and AFSCME failed to assert an injury-in-fact. Accordingly, the district court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate AFSCME’s declaratory-judgment action. We remand to the district court to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. As the Court of Appeals also lacked jurisdiction, its opinion is vacated.
I. BACKGROUND
{2} AFSCME is the exclusive bargaining representative under the Public Employee Bargaining Act (PEBA), NMSA 1978, §§ 10-7E-1 to -26 (2003, as amended through 2005), for unionized public employees in Bernalillo County. The County Commission is the public employer of unionized public employees in Bernalillo County under the PEBA.
{3} In 1975, the County Commission enacted Labor-Management Relations Ordinances (LMROs) for the purpose of allowing “county employees to organize and bargain collectively with the county government.” Bernalillo County, N.M., Ordinances, ch.2, art. Ill, div.5, § 2-201 (1975). By these ordinances, the County Commission established a labor relations board (the County Labor Board) to adjudicate workplace disputes between the County Commission and its employees. See Bernalillo County, N.M., Ordinances, ch.2, art. Ill, div.5, § 2-210(f) (1975) (stating that “[a]ny allegation that a prohibited practice has been committed will be submitted to the [County Labor Board]” and describing the procedures the County Labor Board shall follow); Bernalillo County, N.M., Ordinances, ch.2, art. Ill, div.5, § 2-214 (1975) (establishing and defining the function and membership of the County Labor Board as well as the process for appointment of its members and their term lengths).
{4} The County Labor Board functions as the local equivalent of the Public Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB) and derives legal status from Section 10-7E-26(A), a provision of the PEBA this Court has previously referred to as the “grandfather clause.” See Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. N.M. Fed'n of Teachers,
{5} In July of 2013, AFSCME filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and permanent injunctive relief in the Second Judicial District Court under New Mexico’s D eclaratory Judgment Act. At the heart of this complaint were two allegations: first, AFSCME cоntended that the County Commission had engaged in a prohibited practice by allegedly refusing to engage in labor negotiations in April and May of 2013 even though a collective bargaining agreement between the parties purportedly required the County Commission to do so. Second, AFSCME alleged that four employees at the Bernalillo County Juvenile Detention Center had been wrongly designated as sirpervisors, and that these employees were entitled to be accreted into the bargaining unit.
{6} AFSCME acknowledged that these claims would typically be heard by the County Labor Board; however, AFSCME argued that it should not be required to proceed in front of that entity but should be permitted to file its claims with the PELRB because the LMROs deprive it and its members of due process. AFSCME offered the following argument to support this contention. While the LMROs designate the neutral County Labor Board as the initial adjudicator of prohibited-practice complaints, Bernalillo County, N.M., Ordinances, ch.2, art. Ill, div.5, Section 2-211(a) (1975) of the LMROs designates the County Commission as the final arbiter of any “violations” identified by the County Labor Board, and states that the County Commission is not bound by the Cоunty Labor Board’s findings and conclusions but is empowered to engage in independent review of the evidence and arguments. Id. According to AFSCME, the County Commission is self-evidently biased because it is the employer and is, therefore, necessarily opposed to employee interests. AFSCME claims that requiring it to proceed before a biased adjudicator violates its and its members’ due process rights. Accordingly, AFSCME concludes that the County Labor Board is not entitled to grandfather status under Section 10-7E-26(A). In its answer to AFSCME’s complaint, the County Commission denied having engaged in any unlаwful conduct and claimed, as an affirmative defense, that AFSCME’s action is not ripe and, therefore, should be dismissed.
{7} The parties stipulated that the district court could decide AFSCME’s declaratory-judgment action on briefs only, and a briefing schedule was issued. AFSCME’s brief restated and clarified the arguments laid out in its complaint. The County Commission’s response brief focused on what it described as AFSCME’s central error: AFSCME failed to provide any evidence to support the contention that the County Commission is biased, and, therefore, AFSCME’s contention thatthe LMROs are not entitled to grandfаther status fails. The County Commission argued that, in New Mexico, it is presumed that public officials properly perform their duties, see City of Albuquerque v. Montoya,
{8} The district court entered an opinion and order in which it addressed the merits оf the parties’ dispute, rejected AFSCME’s argument that the County Labor Board was not entitled to grandfather status, and dismissed AFSCME’s complaint. The district court characterized AFSCME’s claim that the County Commission was self-evidently biased against employees as unsupported by facts or law. The Court of Appeals also reached the merits of the dispute and affirmed. Am. Fed’n of State v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Bernalillo Cty.,
{9} We granted certiorari, exercising our jurisdiction under Article VI, Section 3 of the New Mexico Constitution and NMSA 1978, Section 34-5-14(B) (1972). After careful review of the briefs and consideration of the parties’ presentations at oral argument, it is clear that the operative question in this case is whether AFSCME satisfied statutory jurisdictional prerequisites to bring suit under New Mexico’s Declaratory Judgment Act.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
{10} The standard of review for jurisdiсtional issues is de novo. Smith v. City of Santa Fe,
B. Declaratory-Judgment Actions
{11} The Declaratory Judgment Act (the Act), §§ 44-6-1 to -15, grants jurisdiction to the district courts to determine questions of the construction or validity of local laws and municipal ordinances. Smith,
{12} In its complaint, AFSCME relied on another provision of the Act, Section 44-6-13. This provision deals with the circumstances under which “the State ofNew Mexico, or any official thereof, may be sued and declaratory judgment entered ...” Id. We have addressed this provision in the context of waiver of state sovereign immunity and concluded that the provision “permits parties to sue the stаte when the state’s consent to be sued otherwise exists.” Gill v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd.,
{13} In 1935, the Legislature enactedNew Mexico’s first declaratory-judgment act, which was patterned on the federal act and provided that “[i]n cases of actual controversy, the courts of record of the State of New Mexico shall have power, upоn petition, declaration complaint, or other appropriate pleadings, to declare rights and other legal relations of any interestedparty petitioning for such declaration . . ..” 1935 N.M. Laws, ch. 143, § 1. Shortly thereafter, in Taos County Board of Education v. Sedillo, this Court held that “under section 1 of our [declaratory judgment] act an actual controversy must exist to confer jurisdiction.”
{14} Article VI, Section 1 of the New Mexico Constitution vests the “judicial power” in the courts “as may be established by law . . . .” The Legislature mаy establish a right and predicate a court’s power of review on the fact that suit is brought by one of a particular class of plaintiffs or petitioners. If a statute creates a right and provides that only a specific class of persons may petition for judicial review of an alleged violation, then the courts lack the jurisdiction to adjudicate that alleged violation when the petition is brought by a person outside of that class.
{15} From the foregoing, we reach the following conclusions. Under the Act, courts inNew Mexico have jurisdiction to adjudiсate and declare rights and legal relations only in cases of actual controversy. A case of actual controversy exists only where a plaintiff satisfies justiciability requirements. If a party fails to meet these requirements, then, under the Act, the district court lacks jurisdiction to decide the merits of the action.
{16} Issues of justiciability were raised in the proceedings below. The County Commission asserted ripeness as an affirmative defense in its answer to AFSCME’s complaint. It raised the issue again in its response in opposition to AFSCME’s brief in support of its complaint. The Cоmmission argued in its answer brief in the proceedings before this Court that AFSCME failed to show that it suffered any harm. And at oral argument, the Commission argued that AFSCME’s claims were non-justiciable. Regardless, we may consider the justiciability of AFSCME’s claims sua sponte. It is well settled that “{¡jurisdiction of the subject matter cannot be conferred by consent of the parties, much less waived by them.” State ex rel. Overton v. N.M. State Tax Comm'n,
{17} We are here concerned with two requirements of justiciability: ripeness and the injury-in-fact component of standing. An actual controversy is not present unless the issue raised by the litigant is ripe for judicial determination, Sanchez v. City of Santa Fe,
1. Ripeness
{18} The purpose of the ripeness requirement “is and always has been to conserve judicial machinery for problems which are real and present or imminent, not to squander it on abstract or hypothetical or remote problems.” N.M. Indus. Energy Consumers v. N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm’n,
{19} Ripeness analysis involves a two pronged inquiry. We “evaluate both the fitness for the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.” N.M. Indus. Energy Consumers,
{20} Fitness is concerned with “whether the claim involves uncertain and contingent events that may not occur as anticipated or may not occur at all.” 15 Moore’s Federal Practice § 101.76[l][a] at 101-312.2; accord Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra, § 3532.2 at 459 (“Many cases deny ripeness on the straight-forward ground that the anticipated events and injury are simply too remote and uncertain to justify present adjudication.”). We have previously observed that the “mere possibility or even probability that a person may be adversely affected in the future by official acts” is insufficient to establish ripeness. New Energy Econ.,
“[i]f the facts are uncertain and the court is being asked to make a legal ruling based on the possibility that certain facts will be found to exist at some point in the future, then a decision would constitute nothing more than an advisory opinion based on a hypothetical scenario.”
15 Moore’s Federal Practice § 101.75 at 101-312.1.
{21} Decisiоns of administrative entities are fit for review only when the agency’s decision is final. See N.M. Indus. Energy Consumers,
{22} AFSCME’s injury is based on two underlying claims: (1) the County Commission refused to negotiate and (2) it is entitled to accrete into the bargaining unit four employees at the Bernalillo County Juvenile Detention Center. As noted, AFSCME asserts that it need not file these claims with the County Labor Board because the Board is not entitled to grandfаther status. According to AFSCME, the Board is not entitled to this status because its decisions are subject to a biased review by the County Commission which would deprive AFSCME and its members of due process.
{23} With respect to the allegation that the County Commission refused to negotiate, AFSCME’s due-process injury would materialize only if the County Labor Board found that refusal to bargain was in fact a prohibited practice. If the County Labor Board makes no such finding, the County Commission has no right of review. See Bernalillo County, N.M., Ordinances, ch. 2, art. Ill, div.5, § 2-211(a) (stating that the County Commission shall exercise independent review only where the County Labor Board finds a party guilty of a violation). Where the Commission has no right to review, there can be no opportunity for the Commission to exercise an alleged bias and deprive AFSCME and its members of due process. And even if the County Labor Board found the County Commission’s refusal to negotiate to be a prohibited practice, AFSCME’s injury still would only actualize if the Commission reversed the Board’s findings. Only then would AFSCME allege a non-hypothetical injury.
{24} With regard to the accretion issue, it is not clear whether the County Commission is even adverse to AFSCME’srequestto accrete the employees. According to AFSCME, these employees were wrongly designated as supervisors when they are not. At oral argument, AFSCME contended that the County Commission would necessarily oppose the accretion of these employees in light of the fact that the employees would, after accretion, be entitled to additional rights and benefits. But this is speculation. Does the County Commission oppose AFSCME’s argument that the employees were wrongly designated? Will the County Labor Board agree with AFSCME about the errant designation of thеse employees? If the Board does agree, will it permit accretion and will it find a prohibited practice or other violation as defined in Bernalillo County, N.M., Ordinances, ch.2, art. Ill, div.5, § 2-211(a) such that the Board shall request the Commission to enter an order? Will the County Commission ignore the Board’s finding, engage in bias, and then enter an order contrary to the Board’s order? We do not know the answer to any of these questions. AFSCME asks us to speculate.
{25} Additionally, the LMROs and the proceedings they establish function, for all purposes and effect, as administrative proceedings. AFSCME’s deсlaratory-judgment action involved the district court in those proceedings well in advance of any final adjudication at the county level. AFSCME does not contest the neutrality or legitimacy of the County Labor Board; yet, even that entity was not given the opportunity to rule on the refusal-to-bargain and accretion issues. In this instance, there was no county-level adjudication at all. No concrete formulation of the issue was permitted to develop.
{26} If any doubt existed that AFSCME’s claims were not fit, those doubts dissipated at oral argument. There, AFSCME conceded that allowing the County Labor Board an opportunity to rule on the refusal to negotiate and accretion issues would help determine whether a “real dispute” exists in this case. AFSCME further conceded that there has been no single instance, in the forty-plus years the LMROs have existed, where the County Commission overruled the County Labor Board’s determination regarding a prohibited-practice violation. AFSCME attributed this positive state of affairs to the parties’ “good relationship,”
{27} Based on the foregoing, we conclude that AFSCME’s alleged injury is speculative and сontingent. Accordingly, under the Declaratory Judgment Act, it is not fit for review. See Rio Grande Kennel Club v. City of Albuquerque,
{28} The second step in the ripeness analysis is whether, and to what extent, the parties will endure hardship if a decision is withheld. See N.M. Indus. Energy Consumers,
{29} The hardship AFSCME faces here is speculative. As noted, AFSCME conceded at oral argument that further adjudication at the county level will help clarify whether a real dispute exists in this case, and also conceded that, if the type of biased administrative adjudication it fears does in factmanifest, then it can return to court and seek review of that decision. Accordingly, AFSCME will not be imminently injured by dismissal. Cf. Morgan,
{30} AFSCME’s claims are not fit for review, and declining to review them works no hardship on AFSCME. Accordingly, AFSCME’s claims are not ripe.
2. Injury-In-Fact
{31} Under New Mexico’s Declaratory Judgment Act, standing—like ripeness—is a jurisdictional prerequisite. State ex rel. Overton,
{32} To obtain standing in New Mexico, litigants must allege an injury-in-fact, i.e., that “they are directly injured as a result of the action they seek to challenge” in court. See ACLU of N.M.,
{33} Forreasons already stated, AFSCME asserts only the possibility of a hypothetical injury and, therefore, has not established an injury-in-fact.
III. CONCLUSION
{34} AFSCME did not establish the existence of an “actual controversy.” Its claims fail to satisfy the justiciability requirements of ripeness and the injury-in-fact component of standing. Therefore, the district court did not possess jurisdiction over AFSCME’s declaratory-judgment action. As the district court did not possess jurisdiction, its decision, as well as the decision of the Court of Appeals, must be vacated. We rеmand this matter to the district court for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
{35} IT IS SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
Concurrence in Part
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
{36} I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part with the majority opinion. I agree with the majority opinion that the AFSCME complaint for declaratory judgment is not ripe because AFSCME did not file with the County Labor Board. Maj. op. ¶ 23. After all, if the County Labor Board does not find a prohibited practice under Bernalillo County, N.M., Ordinances Chapter 2, Article III, Section 2-210(a) (1975), AFSCME will not have to argue its case before the Bernalillo County Commission (Commission).
{37} The Commission is a party to the collective bargaining agreement. If the County Labor Board finds the Commission guilty of a prohibited practice, the Commission independently decides whether it was guilty of such a violation. If the County Labor Board finds AFSCME guilty of a prohibited practice violation, the Commission independently decides whether AFSCME was guilty of such a violation. When a party to a contract gets to decide whether either it or the other party breached the contract, this in and of itself raises significant due process concerns. The United States Supreme Court recognized long ago that
[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness. T o this end no man can be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome. That interest cannot be defined with precision.
In re Murchison,
{38} Especially in this case, where the Commission independently makes its decision-the Commission’s review is not tethered to any standards of review. The Commission gives the evidence the weight it chooses. The Commission does not give any deference to the County Labor Board. The Commission is not limited to deciding whether the County Labor Board was arbitrary. In addition, once the Commission makes its decision, it “may petition the appropriate district cоurt to enforce its decision on the issue.” Bernalillo Cty., N.M., Ordinances ch. 2, art. Ill, § 2-211(a). The ordinance does not address any appeal rights that AFSCME might have.
{39} The ordinances under review are one-sided and is unlike any other Bernalillo County ordinances affecting employment relations. For example, a hearing officer is the final arbiter regarding employee discipline matters. See Bernalillo Cty., N.M., Ordinances ch. 2, art. Ill, § 2-99(a) (1998). The hearing officer’s decision is appealable to “district court pursuant to the provisions of the Uniform Arbitration Act, NMSA 1978 § 44-7-22 et. seq.” Section 2-99(i). Code of Conduct Review Board decisions are also appealed directly to the district court. Bernalillo Cty., N.M., Ordinances ch. 2, art. Ill, § 2-134 (2012) (“Any decision of the review board finding a violation of this code, with respect to an elected official, candidate or volunteer may be appealed to the Second Judicial District Court. Any decision regarding an employee shall be covered by the terms of the employment rules and regulations or collective bargaining agreement, as applicable.”).
{40} For the foregoing reasons, I concur in part and dissent in part.
EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Justice
I CONCUR:
PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice
Notes
AFSCME should be able to appeal directly to district court under Rule 1-075 NMRA. See Mills v. N.M. Bd. of Psychologist Exam’rs,