delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Amеrican Federal Savings and Loan Association appeals from an order of the District Court for the First Judicial District, Broadwater County, granting summary judgment in favor оf Townsend Electric, Inc. We reverse and remand.
Dennis Schenk borrowed $80,000 from appellant American Federal Savings and Loan to purchase the Commercial Bar in Townsend. Schenk executed a promissory note secured by a deed of trust recorded February 28, 1984, in favor of appellant. Subsequent to its completion of remodeling and electrical work on the Commercial Bar, respondent Townsend Electric perfected a mechanic’s lien on April 26,1985. None of the proceeds of appellant’s loan were used as payment for respondent’s improvements.
Appellant filed its сomplaint on November 27, 1987, seeking, among other things, foreclosure of the deed of trust. Respondent asserted as an affirmative defense the priority оf its mechanic’s lien. Both appellant and respondent moved for summary judgment and after hearing on May 19, 1989, the District Court entered judgment in favor of respondеnt on June 22, 1989. Appellant raises the following dispositive issue on appeal: Did the District Court erroneously conclude that respondent’s mechanic’s lien has priority over appellant’s prior recorded deed of trust?
Appellant contends that mechanic’s liens have priority over mortgages оnly when improvements are severable from real property citing as authority for its contention Interstate Lumber Co. v. Rider (1933),
Although the materialman’s lien statute was broadly interpreted and this Court found the remedy thereby provided equitable in nature, it held thаt the lien gave priority to the materialman only so far as the structure was concerned and did not extend to the land.
“The reсorded mortgage gives to the materialman constructive notice of the existence of the lien, and he deals with the owner with knowledge that the housе, as well as the land, is pledged as security for the payment of the mortgage debt.”
Interstate Lumber,
Both appellant and respondent cite a trio of cases in support of their arguments. The first of the so called “trilogy” is Beck v. Hanson (1979),
Respondent on the other hand, contends that Beck stands for the proposition that a mechanic’s lien takes priority over all the purchaser’s rights at a trust indenture foreclosure sale thus giving the mechanic’s lien priority over all encumbrances. Additionally, respondent argues a mechanic’s lien is prior in right not only as to the severable improvements, but also as to concurrently erected structures and the owners’ interest in the real property itsеlf.
Balancing the competing policies behind the Small Tract Financing Act and the mechanic’s lien statutes, this Court found the beneficiary of the prior recorded trust indenture better equipped than the material supplier to protect its rights. Beck,
The second case in the trilogy is Home Interiors, Inc. v. Hendrickson (1984),
“[Therefore [held] the party having the greatest ability to protect its interests has the burden of exercising due сare to prevent overreaching by an interested party. In this case [lender] was in the best position to protect against non-payment by the landоwner by either withholding funds to the extent of the contemplated improvements or by requiring the landowner to obtain lien waivers from the mechanics. [It found] no merit in [lender’s] argument that section 71-3-502(4) should be construed strictly to pivot on the words ‘upon the land.’ Such a narrow interpretation would defeat the purpose оf the statute. [The Court held] appellants’ liens [took] priority over respondents’ trust indenture.”
Home Interiors,
Where the plaintiff-materialman filed suit to foreclose its mechanic’s lien naming the lender as defendant by virtue of its mortgage on improved real property, the Court upheld Home Interiors and rejected the rule that only mechаnic’s liens filed as to new structures have priority over other prior encumbrances. Tri-County Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Levee Restorations, Inc. (1986),
We find the instant case readily distinguishable from the triо of cases set forth above. Appellant and Schenk entered into the loan agreement almost a year prior to the commencement of improve-
In Beck, Home Interiors, and Tri-County the lenders knew or had reason to believe the borrowers would incur additional obligations in improving the property encumbered when making the loans. In each case the Court found the party with the least ability to protect its financial interest should have priority over other prior recorded liens. In the case at hand, respondent could easily have determined that appellant had a prior recorded security interest. The result in the instаnt case is consistent with § 71-3-542, MCA, the current priority statute. We therefore reverse the order of the District Court granting respondent’s motion for summary judgment and remand for entry of judgment in appellant’s favor.
