This lawsuit arises from injuries sustained by Ryan Corrigan, son of the appel-lees, Jeff and Kirsten Corrigan, when Ryan was in the care of Mark Francke, who was providing childcare services to the Corrigans. Mark Francke was later convicted of child endangerment as a re- *110 suit of this incident. The district court ruled in a summary judgment decision that the appellant, American Family Mutual Insurance Company, had no coverage for claims made by the Corrigans against Mark Francke. The court did, however, find coverage for the Corrigans’ claims against Mark’s father, Harold Francke, which were based generally on Harold’s allegedly negligent supervision of Mark and on Harold’s ownership of the premises where the injuries occurred. On appeal, American Family claims that several -exclusions in its homeowners policy preclude coverage for these claims.
We agree that based on the undisputed facts, coverage is excluded by the policy exclusion for “bodily injury ...’ arising out of ... violation of any criminal law for which any insured is convicted.” Therefore, we reverse and remand for entry of judgment in favor of American Family.
I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.
The record establishes the following facts. Mark Francke operated a daycare business in the home of his father, Harold Francke. On January 16, 2002, eight-month-old Ryan Corrigan was left in Mark’s care. Ryan did not seem normal when his father, Jeff Corrigan, took him home that afternoon, so later that evening Jeff took Ryan to a local hospital. Ryan was soon airlifted to the University of Iowa Hospitals where it was determined he suffered injuries resulting from shakén-baby syndrome. Emergency surgery saved the child’s life, but Ryan suffered permanent brain damage. During the course of treating Ryan, the doctors discovered that he had suffered other injuries, including four fractured ribs, consistent with prior abuse. Although Mark Francke initially denied he had done anything that could have resulted in Ryan’s injuries, Mark eventually pled guilty to child endangerment, in violation of Iowa Code section 726.6 (2001).
The Corrigans filed suit against Mark and Harold seeking damages for the injuries to their son. Their claim against Mark was based on his allegedly negligent, reckless and/or intentional conduct resulting in serious harm to Ryan. The Corri-gans’ claim against Harold was based on three theories: (1) failure to warn of the danger Mark presented; (2) failure to supervise, monitor, or otherwise take action to discover Mark was a danger; and (3) knowingly allowing dangers to exist at the daycare that created a substantial risk of harm to children on the premises. The Franckes did not file an appearance in this lawsuit, so the court entered a default judgment against them for money damages.
While the tort action was pending, American.Family filed the present declaratory judgment action against the Corri-gans and the Franckes to-establish that a homeowners policy it had issued to Harold, which was in effect on January 16, 2002, did not provide coverage for the injuries suffered by Ryan. Again, the Franckes did not defend, and the district court entered a default judgment against Mark and Harold.
Subsequently, American Family filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming several exclusions in the liability coverage of its policy precluded coverage for the Corrigans’ claims against the Franckes. The Corrigans resisted, essentially filing a cross-motion for summary judgment. At the summary judgment hearing, the parties agreed there were no genuine issues of material fact and the case could be decided as a matter of law.
In a subsequent ruling, the district court held there was no coverage for Mark based on the business pursuits and crimi *111 nal acts exclusions in the American Family policy. The court concluded these exclusions did not apply to Harold, however, because the Corrigans “[did] not seek to hold Harold vicariously liable for Mark’s actions, but assert[ed] separate claims against Harold for negligence.” Therefore, the court held, American Family’s policy provided coverage for the claims made against Harold.
The Corrigans did not appeal the district court’s decision that American Family had no liability under its policy for the judgment the Corrigans obtained against Mark. On the other hand, American Family appealed, reasserting its claim that several policy exclusions preclude coverage for the judgment against Harold. ■ Because we think the criminal acts exclusion applies, we limit our opinion to an analysis of that policy provision. In addition, we consider the Corrigans’ contention that the reasonable expectations doctrine requires that coverage be extended to Harold.
II. Standard of Review.
On appeal from a summary judgment ruling, this court reviews the district court’s decision for correction of errors at law.
Lee v. Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co.,
III. General Principles of Insurance Policy Construction and Interpretation.
In resolving the dispute before us, we must first interpret the insurance policy by ascertaining the meaning of the words used in the parties’ contract, and then construe the policy by determining its legal effect.
See LeMars Mut. Ins. Co. v. Joffer,
The principles governing our interpretation and construction of insurance policies are well established:
The cardinal principle in the construction and interpretation of insurance poli- . cies is that the intent of the parties at the time the policy was sold must control. Except in cases of. ambiguity, the intent of the parties is determined by the language of the policy. “An ambiguity exists if, after the application of pertinent rules of interpretation to the policy, a genuine uncertainty results as to which one of two or more meanings is the proper one.”
LeMars Mut. Ins. Co.,
Due to the adhesive nature of insurance contracts,. ambiguous policy provisions are interpreted in the- light most favorable to the insured.
See Cairns v. Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co.,
IV.Criminal Acts Exclusion.
The liability coverage pi the American Family policy states the-insurer “will pay, *112 up to our limit, compensatory damages for which any insured is legally liable because of bodily injury or property damages caused by an occurrence covered by this policy.” (Emphasis omitted.) The policy also contains a severability-of-interests clause that states the insurance “applies separately to each insured.” (Emphasis omitted.)
The liability coverage contains several exclusions. The one pertinent to this case provides: “Violation of Law. We will not cover bodily injury or property damages arising out of ... violation of any criminal law for which any insured is convicted.” (Emphasis omitted.) The district court relied on this exclusion in ruling there was “plainly” no coverage for the judgment against Mark. The court’s conclusion rested on two undisputed facts: (1) Mark caused Ryan’s bodily injuries; and (2) Mark’s conduct constituted a violation of criminal law for which he was convicted.
The Corrigans contend the same conclusion is not warranted with respect to coverage for Harold. They argue there were two causes of Ryan’s injuries — Mark’s conduct and Harold’s negligence. Relying on this court’s decision in Kalell, they assert the mere fact that the injury arising from Mark’s intentional acts is excluded does not mean the same injury also caused by Harold’s negligent acts is excluded, particularly in view of the policy provision that coverage is applied separately to each insured. ■ ■
In
Kalell,
an insured sought coverage under his homeowners policy for claims made against him when he áttached a rope to his car to remove a dead limb from a tree, resulting in injuries to a third person.
This court then considered how the exclusion should be applied when there are two proximate causes, of the third party’s injuries, one cause falling within the exclusion and one cause not encompassed in the exclusion. Id. We stated the following test for determining when bodily injury arises out of the excluded act: “[W]hen two independent acts of negligence are alleged, one vehicle-related and one not vehicle-related, coverage is still provided under the homeowners policy unless the vehicle-related negligence is the sole proximate cause of the injury.” Id. (emphasis added). Applying this test to .the facts presented in Kalell, this court observed that “[rjemoval of a limb with a rope could be negligence without regard to whether a motor vehicle was used to pull the rope.” Id. We concluded, therefore, that “[t]his [act of negli-,genee] could be found to be an independent act of negligence and one which is covered by the policy.” Id.
The present'case is clearly distinguishable because the acts of negligence alleged against Harold are not independent of the excluded acts of Mark. All three theories of liability asserted against Harold require as an element proof of Mark’s conduct in inflicting the injuries. Starting first with the negligent supervision claim, we note that this theory includes “ ‘as an element an underlying tort or wrongful act committed by the [person who was not properly supervised].’ ”
Schoff v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am.,
The remaining claims of negligence— failure to warn of the danger posed by Mark, failure to discover this danger, and allowing this danger to exist — are really just different alternatives of the liability imposed on the possessor of land under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344 (1965).
See generally Continental Ins. Co. v. Bones,
A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for his business purposes is subject to liability to members of the public while they are upon the land for such a purpose, for -physical harm caused, by the accidental, negligent, or intentionally harmful acts of third persons or animals, and by the failure of the possessor to exercise reasonable care to
(a) discover that such acts are being done or are likely to be done, or
(b) give a warning adequate to enable the visitors to avoid the harm, or otherwise to protect them against it.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344, at 223-24 (emphasis added). This rule makes a landowner liable for “the acts of independent contractors ... who are permitted to carry on activities upon the land.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344 cmt. c, at 224. Although the liability imposed on a landowner under section 344 requires proof of the landowner’s own negligence in failing to discover the harmful acts, warn visitors of the harmful acts, or protect visitors against the harmful acts, there must also be proof that the physical harm was “caused by the accidental, negligent, or intentionally harmful acts of [a] third person[].” Restatement- (Second) of Torts § 344, at 224. Consequently, these specifications of negligence, just like the failure-to-supervise and failure-to-monitor claims, are dependent upon proof that the person constituting the danger caused the physical harm.
Because Mark’s acts must be established to prove that Harold’s negligence was a proximate cause of Ryan’s injuries, none of the claims of negligence alleged against Harold are independent of the wrongful conduct of Mark so as to be subject to the sole-proximate-cause requirement announced in the
Kalell
case.
1
See Pike v.
*114
Am. States Preferred Ins. Co.,
We have considered the Corrigans’ claim that the exclusion is ambiguous and accordingly should be interpreted in their favor, but we find no merit in this argument. The Corrigans point to a discrepancy between the liability and property coverages of American Family’s policy to support their claim of ambiguity. The property coverage of the policy, unlike the liability coverage, specifically prefaces the list of exclusions applicable to that coverage with the statement that “[sjuch loss is excluded regardless of any other cause or event contributing concurrently or in any sequence to the loss.” This statement is apparently meant to avoid the sole-proximate-cause requirement courts have adopted in cases of multiple causation. The Corrigans argue American Family could have included such a statement in the liability coverage if it had intended to preclude coverage in multiple causation situations where one cause is excluded and another cause is not. The company’s failure to do so, they contend, evidences an intent to extend coverage in multiple-cause situations so long as any one cause is not excluded.
It is true a statement in the liability coverage like the one in the property coverage would have made resolution of the issue in the present case clearer because this court would not have even had to consider the
Kalell
test. But “Ambiguity is not present merely because the provision ‘could have been worded more clearly or precisely than it in fact was.’ ”
Cairns,
The Corrigans also contend the policy’s severability-of-interests clause creates an ambiguity. They rely on this court’s decision in
United Fire & Casualty Co. v. Shelly Funeral Home, Inc.,
The Corrigans contend the same result is required here because American Family’s policy also contains a severability-of-interests clause. They assert this clause requires that we interpret the policy as if Harold were the only insured. Because Harold did not commit a criminal act for which he was convicted, they argue, coverage for the claim made against him is not excluded by the criminal acts exclusion. This argument is not sound, however, when one examines the language of American Family’s exclusion, which is significantly different from the exclusion at issue in United Fire.
In order to appreciate the significance of differences in policy language, it is helpful first to understand this court’s interpretation of the severability-of-interests clause. This court first addressed the meaning of such a provision in
Zenti v. Home Insurance Co.,
In contrast to the exclusions at issue in
Zenti
and
United Fire,
the American 'Family policy excludes coverage for bodily injury “arising out of ... violation of any criminal law for which
any
insured is convicted.” (Emphasis added.) This court has held that the term “any insured” as used in an exclusionary provision of the property coverage of a homeowners policy means that coverage is voided as to all insureds if any insured committed a prohibited act.
Webb v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co.,
American Family’s use of the term “any insured” in its criminal acts exclusion unambiguously conveys an intent to exclude coverage when recovery is sought for bodily injury proximately caused by the criminal act of
any
insured.
See Webb,
In summary, we conclude that even though the severability-of-interests clause requires that we apply the criminal acts exclusion from the viewpoint of Harold, the plain language of the exclusion mandates that we consider whether the claims made against Harold include as an element conduct by
any
insured that is a violation of the criminal law.
See Chacon,
As a final matter, we acknowledge the Corrigans’ assertions that the insurance policy should be interpreted to protect the insured’s interests and provide compensation to victims of wrongdoing. They argue considerations of public policy dictate that we find coverage for their claims. Although insurance policies are interpreted favorably toward the insured, this rule applies only when there is an ambiguity in the policy, and we have found. none here.
See Continental Ins. Co.,
596 N.W.2d at, 558. Thus, this court is constrained by the unambiguous language of the policy in determining whether there is coverage for the judgment obtained by the Corrigans.
See LeMars Mut. Ins. Co.,
V. Reasonable Expectations.
The defendants assert that even if American Family’s interpretation of the policy is correct, the doctrine of reasonable expectations mandates coverage. As we have stated on a prior occasion, “The doctrine [of reasonable expectations] is carefully circumscribed and does not contemplate the expansion of coverage on a general equitable basis.”
Johnson v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co.,
We conclude neither of these prerequisites has been satisfied. In
Vance,
this court held a reasonable person in the insured’s position would understand that an exclusion for “any loss arising out of any act committed ... by or at the direction of
an
insured” would preclude coverage for all insureds.
Vance,
VI. Summary and Disposition.
The district court erred when it ruled American Family’s homeowners policy provides coverage for the negligence claims asserted against Harold Francke. The undisputed facts show the bodily injury resulting from Harold’s negligence was proximately caused by Mark Francke’s violation of criminal law. This violation was not independent of the negligence claims against Harold as Mark’s conduct was a required element in establishing Harold’s *119 liability. Therefore, even though the policy is applied separately to Harold, it does not provide coverage. In addition, the reasonable expectations doctrine is not implicated by the criminal acts exclusion. For these reasons, we reverse the district court’s summary judgment ruling in favor of the Corrigans and remand for entry of judgment in favor of American Family.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Notes
. The Corrigans claim this conclusion is inconsistent with our decisions in
Gabe's Construction Co. v. United Capitol Insurance Co.,
. Other courts have also concluded that "the term 'any insured' unambiguously precludes coverage to all persons covered by the policy if any one of them engages in excludable conduct,” notwithstanding a severability clause.
See Taryn E.F. v. Joshua M.C.,