Case Information
*2 Before: G ARLAND , Chief Judge , and T ATEL and G RIFFITH , Circuit Judges .
Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge G ARLAND .
G ARLAND , Chief Judge : The plaintiffs filed a Freedom of Information Act request for records held by the Central Intelligence Agency pertaining to the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (“drones”) to carry out targeted killings. The Agency issued a so-called response, refusing to confirm or deny that it had any such records. The district court affirmed the Agency’s response and granted summary judgment in its favor. The question on appeal is whether the Agency’s Glomar response was justified under the circumstances of this case. We conclude that it was not justified and therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I
On January 13, 2010, the American Civil Liberties Union and American Civil Liberties Union Foundation (collectively, the ACLU) submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), seeking “records pertaining to the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (‘UAVs’) -- commonly referred to as ‘drones’ . . . -- by the CIA and the Armed Forces for the purpose of killing targeted individuals.” FOIA Request 2 (J.A. 48); see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a). The CIA responded with what is commonly known as a “ Glomar response,” declining either to confirm or deny the existence of any responsive records. The CIA’s Agency Release Panel accepted an administrative appeal, but failed to make a determination within twenty days as FOIA requires. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(ii). The ACLU then filed suit against the CIA in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking the immediate processing and release of the requested records. See id. § 552(a)(4)(B).
The CIA moved for summary judgment. It asserted that the answer to the question of whether it possessed responsive records was itself exempt from disclosure under FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3. See id. § 552(b)(1), (3). And it rejected the ACLU’s contention that there had been official public acknowledgments that warranted overriding the Agency’s exemption claims. In support of those arguments, the CIA submitted the affidavit of Mary Ellen Cole, the Information Review Officer for the Agency’s National Clandestine Service, who explained at some length why the CIA believed its Glomar response was justified. See Declaration of Mary Ellen Cole (Cole Decl.).
On September 9, 2011, the district court granted the CIA’s
motion for summary judgment.
Am. Civil Liberties Union v.
Dep’t of Justice
,
which had reputedly been used in an attempt to recover a lost Soviet
submarine. 546 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
see Military Audit
Project v. Casey
,
II
This appeal concerns the intersection of two lines of FOIA
cases. The first is the
Glomar
line, which permits an agency to
“refuse to confirm or deny the existence of records” in limited
circumstances.
Wolf v. CIA
,
The second line of cases is the “official acknowledgment”
line, which provides that when an agency has officially
acknowledged otherwise exempt information through prior
disclosure, the agency has waived its right to claim an
exemption with respect to that information. In other words,
“‘when information has been “officially acknowledged,” its
disclosure may be compelled even over an agency’s otherwise
valid exemption claim.’”
Wolf
, 473 F.3d at 378 (quoting
Fitzgibbon v. CIA
, 911 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). A
plaintiff mounting an official acknowledgment argument “must
bear the initial burden of pointing to specific information in the
public domain that appears to duplicate that being withheld.”
Id.
(quoting
Afshar v. Dep’t of State
,
These two lines of cases converge when a plaintiff seeks to
rebut a
Glomar
response by establishing official
acknowledgment. In the
Glomar
context, the “specific
information” at issue is not the contents of a particular record,
but rather “the existence
vel non
” of any records responsive to
the FOIA request.
Id.
at 379 (emphasis omitted);
see id.
at 380.
Accordingly, the plaintiff can overcome a
Glomar
response by
showing that the agency has already disclosed the fact of the
existence (or nonexistence) of responsive records, since that is
the purportedly exempt information that a
Glomar
response is
designed to protect.
See id.
at 379-80;
Marino v. DEA
, 685 F.3d
1076, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2012). As we have explained, “in the
context of a response, the public domain exception is
triggered when ‘the prior disclosure establishes the
existence
(or
not) of records responsive to the FOIA request,’ regardless
whether the contents of the records have been disclosed.”
Marino
,
“Under the FOIA, ‘the burden is on the agency to sustain its
action,’ 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B), and we review
de novo
the
agency’s use of a FOIA exemption to withhold documents.”
Wolf
,
In the district court, the CIA argued that it could neither confirm nor deny that it had responsive documents because confirming that it did would reveal that the CIA was either involved in, or interested in, drone strikes (while denying that it did would reveal the opposite). According to the Agency, its involvement or interest in such strikes is exempt from disclosure under FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3. On behalf of the Agency, Mary Ellen Cole declared that “[a]n official CIA acknowledgment that confirms or denies the existence or nonexistence of records responsive to Plaintiffs’ FOIA request would reveal, among other things, whether or not the CIA is involved in drone strikes or at least has an intelligence interest in drone strikes.” Cole Decl. ¶ 12; see id. ¶ 19. “[T]he existence or nonexistence of CIA records responsive to this request,” she continued, “is a currently and properly classified fact, the disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security.” Id. ¶ 15. And she further averred that, “[c]ontrary to Plaintiffs’ suggestion, no authorized CIA or Executive Branch official has disclosed whether or not the CIA possesses records regarding drone strikes or whether or not the CIA is involved in drone strikes or has an interest in drone strikes.” Id. ¶ 43; see id. ¶ 45.
In response, the ACLU argued both that: (1) the mere
existence or nonexistence of records responsive to its requests
was not exempt under FOIA Exemption 1 or 3; and (2) even if
it were, the existence of such records had already been officially
acknowledged by prior disclosure. The district court rejected
both arguments.
See Am. Civil Liberties Union
, 808 F. Supp. 2d
at 287-93, 298-301;
id.
at 293-98. On appeal, the ACLU
pursues only the second argument. Accordingly, that is the only
argument we consider, and we consider it
de novo
.
See Elec.
Privacy Info. Ctr.
,
III
For reasons that will become clear in a moment, the CIA
did not justify its response by contending that it was
necessary to prevent disclosing whether or not the
United States
engages in drone strikes. Rather, as we have noted, the response
was justified on the ground that it was necessary to keep secret
whether the
CIA itself
was involved in, or interested in, such
strikes. Although the Agency’s brief repeatedly emphasizes the
first prong of this justification -- protecting whether the CIA
operates drones -- that is not the issue before us on this appeal.
The plaintiffs requested the release of ten categories of
documents pertaining to drone strikes, each of which sought
documents about drones, but none of which was limited to
drones operated by the CIA. FOIA Request 5-8 (J.A. 51-54);
see
Cole Decl. ¶ 7 (noting that plaintiffs’ request sought
“records pertaining to the use of . . . ‘drones’ . . . by the CIA
and
the Armed Forces
” (emphasis added)).
[3]
Nor was the CIA’s
Glomar
response limited to documents about drones operated by
the Agency. Rather, the CIA asserted and the district court
upheld a sweeping response that ended the plaintiffs’
lawsuit by permitting the Agency to refuse to say whether it had
any documents at all
about drone strikes.
See Am. Civil
Liberties Union
,
The CIA has proffered no reason to believe that disclosing
whether it has any documents at all about drone strikes will
reveal whether the Agency itself -- as opposed to some other
U.S. entity such as the Defense Department -- operates drones.
[4]
There is no doubt, however, that such disclosure would reveal
whether the Agency “at least has an intelligence interest in drone
strikes.” Cole Decl. ¶ 12;
see id.
¶ 19. The question before us,
then, is whether it is “logical or plausible,”
Wolf
,
9
intelligence interest” in such strikes. Given the extent of the official statements on the subject, we conclude that the answer to that question is no.
The President of the United States has himself publicly acknowledged that the United States uses drone strikes against al Qaeda. In response to a question about drone strikes on a live internet video forum, the President said:
I think that we have to be judicious in how we use drones. But understand that probably our ability to respect the sovereignty of other countries . . . is enhanced by the fact that we are able to pinpoint-strike an al Qaeda operative in a place where the capacities of th[e] military in that country may not be able to get them. So obviously a lot of these strikes have been . . . going after al Qaeda suspects who are up in very tough terrain along the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Similarly, in a speech at the Woodrow Wilson International Center, the President’s counterterrorism advisor, then-Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism John Brennan, said:
So let me say it as simply as I can. Yes, in full accordance with the law . . . the United States Government conducts targeted strikes against specific
10
al-Qaida terrorists, sometimes using remotely piloted aircraft, often referred to publicly as drones. And I’m here today because President Obama has instructed us to be more open with the American people about these efforts. [6]
Although these statements do not acknowledge that the CIA itself operates drones, they leave no doubt that some U.S. agency does. The CIA does not dispute that these statements qualify as official acknowledgments of at least that much. Oral Arg. Tr. 25-26. To the contrary, it concedes that “Mr. Brennan officially acknowledged that the United States conducts drone strikes,” albeit without “reveal[ing] whether the CIA (as opposed to another federal entity such as the Department of Defense) is involved in these drone strikes.” CIA Br. 40.
Given these official acknowledgments that the United States has participated in drone strikes, it is neither logical nor plausible for the CIA to maintain that it would reveal anything not already in the public domain to say that the Agency “at least has an intelligence interest” in such strikes, Cole Decl. ¶ 12. The defendant is, after all, the Central Intelligence Agency. And it strains credulity to suggest that an agency charged with gathering intelligence affecting the national security does not have an “intelligence interest” in drone strikes, even if that agency does not operate the drones itself.
But there is more. Counterterrorism advisor Brennan did not merely acknowledge that the United States “regularly conduct[s] strikes using remotely piloted aircraft.” Wilson Center Speech. He also stated that, in deciding whether to carry out a strike, “[w]e . . . draw[] on the full range of our intelligence capabilities” and “may ask the intelligence community to . . . collect additional intelligence or refine its analysis so that a more informed decision can be made.” Id. “We listen to departments and agencies across our national security team,” he said, and “don’t just hear out differing views, we ask for them and encourage them.” Id. Needless to say, by statutory definition the Central Intelligence Agency is part of “the full range” of the nation’s “intelligence capabilities.” See 50 U.S.C. §§ 403-4, 403-4a.
And there is still more. In 2009, then-Director of the CIA
Leon Panetta delivered remarks at the Pacific Council on
International Policy. In answer to a question about “remote
(citing
Davis v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice
,
drone strikes” in the tribal regions of Pakistan, Director Panetta stated:
[O]bviously because these are covert and secret operations I can’t go into particulars. I think it does suffice to say that these operations have been very effective because they have been very precise in terms of the targeting and it involved a minimum of collateral damage. . . . I can assure you that in terms of that particular area, it is very precise and it is very limited in terms of collateral damage and, very frankly, it’s the only game in town in terms of confronting and trying to disrupt the al-Qaeda leadership.
It is hard to see how the CIA Director could have made his Agency’s knowledge of -- and therefore “interest” in -- drone strikes any clearer. And given these statements by the Director, the President, and the President’s counterterrorism advisor, the Agency’s declaration that “no authorized CIA or Executive Branch official has disclosed whether or not the CIA . . . has an interest in drone strikes,” Cole Decl. ¶ 43; see CIA Br. 43, is at this point neither logical nor plausible.
It is true, of course, that neither the President nor any other official has specifically stated that the CIA has documents relating to drone strikes, as compared to an interest in such strikes. At this stage of this case, however, those are not distinct issues. The only reason the Agency has given for refusing to disclose whether it has documents is that such disclosure would reveal whether it has an interest in drone strikes; it does not
13
contend that it has a reason for refusing to confirm or deny the existence of documents that is independent from its reason for refusing to confirm or deny its interest in that subject. And more to the point, as it is now clear that the Agency does have an interest in drone strikes, it beggars belief that it does not also have documents relating to the subject. [9]
But again, there is more. In the above-quoted excerpt from the CIA Director’s Pacific Council remarks, the Director spoke directly about the precision of targeted drone strikes, the level of collateral damage they cause, and their usefulness in comparison to other weapons and tactics. Given those statements, it is implausible that the CIA does not possess a single document on the subject of drone strikes. Unless we are to believe that the Director was able to “assure” his audience that drone strikes are “very precise and . . . very limited in terms of collateral damage” without having examined a single document in his agency’s possession, those statements are tantamount to an acknowledgment that the CIA has documents on the subject. In short, although the President and Messrs. Brennan and Panetta did not say that the CIA possesses responsive documents, what they did say makes it neither “logical” nor “plausible” to maintain that the Agency does not have any documents relating to drones.
The Glomar doctrine is in large measure a judicial construct, an interpretation of FOIA exemptions that flows from their purpose rather than their express language. In this case, the CIA asked the courts to stretch that doctrine too far -- to give their imprimatur to a fiction of deniability that no reasonable person would regard as plausible. “There comes a point where . . . Court[s] should not be ignorant as judges of what [they] know as men” and women. Watts v. Indiana , 338 U.S. 49, 52 (1949) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). We are at that point with respect to the question of whether the CIA has any documents regarding the subject of drone strikes.
Indeed, the CIA itself now appears to have recognized the
indefensibility of its position. Shortly after filing its appellate
brief defending its response in this case, the Agency
filed pleadings in litigation in the Southern District of New York
acknowledging that it does have documents concerning targeted
killings. Declaration of John Bennett ¶¶ 17, 27,
New York Times
Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice
, No. 11-cv-9336,
The CIA’s New York filing was unclear as to whether it was acknowledging that the Agency had anything responsive to the requests in that case beyond the two public speeches it noted. At oral argument in this case, CIA counsel appeared to
15
acknowledge that it did. Oral Arg. Tr. 33-35. Even if we are overreading that acknowledgment, however, the official statements of the President and Messrs. Brennan and Panetta render it impossible to believe that those two speeches are the only documents related to drone strikes in the Agency’s files. Accordingly, the CIA’s broad Glomar response is untenable, and we therefore reverse the district court’s judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ FOIA action.
IV
The collapse of the CIA’s
Glomar
response does not mark
the end of this case. FOIA contains exemptions, including
particularly Exemptions 1 and 3, that the government argues
permit withholding. “To determine whether the
contents
-- as
distinguished from the
existence
-- of the officially
acknowledged records may be protected from disclosure by
Exemptions 1 and 3[,] . . . we [must] remand the case to the
district court” for further proceedings.
Wolf
,
Just how detailed a disclosure must be made, even in an
index, is another matter. A
Vaughn
index indicates in some
descriptive way which documents the agency is withholding and
which FOIA exemptions it believes apply. As the plaintiffs
acknowledge, there is no fixed rule establishing what a
Vaughn
index must look like, and a district court has considerable
latitude to determine its requisite form and detail in a particular
case. Oral Arg. Tr. 57-58 (plaintiffs’ acknowledgment that the
district court has “a lot of leeway” in determining the degree of
detail required in a
Vaughn
index);
see Judicial Watch, Inc. v.
FDA
,
In the New York litigation, the CIA said that it did not want
to file a
Vaughn
index at all, but instead submit what it called a
“no number, no list” response -- acknowledging that it had
responsive documents, but declining to “further describe or even
enumerate on the public record the number, types, dates, or
other descriptive information about these responsive records.”
Bennett Decl. ¶ 28. Although the CIA’s New York filings speak
as if the notion of a “no number, no list” response is well-
established, it has not previously been considered by this court.
Indeed, at the time of those filings, there were only two
previously reported instances of such a response: it was briefly
mentioned in one district court case in this circuit,
Jarvik v. CIA
,
Citing the Seventh Circuit’s view that a “no number, no
list” response is “legally identical” to a
Glomar
response,
Bassiouni
,
Indeed, a “no number, no list” response might be viewed as a kind of Vaughn index, albeit a radically minimalist one. Such a response would only be justified in unusual circumstances, and only by a particularly persuasive affidavit. Nor is there any reason to regard this approach as subject to an on/off switch. As we have just noted, once an agency acknowledges that it has some responsive documents, there are a variety of forms that subsequent filings in the district court may take. A pure “no number, no list” response is at one end of that continuum; a traditional Vaughn index is at the other. Not quite as minimalist as a pure “no number, no list” response might be a “no number, no list” response (or even a response) with respect to a limited category of documents, coupled with a Vaughn index for the remainder.
But we are getting ahead of ourselves. None of these issues has been litigated in this case, either in this court or in the district court, because summary judgment was granted in the face of an unqualified, across-the-board response. No government affidavit has yet been filed in this case that even attempts to justify a “no number, no list” response. And neither a traditional Vaughn index nor affidavits justifying an alternative submission have been filed. Accordingly, all such issues remain open for the district court’s determination upon remand.
V
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered .
Notes
[1] The name is derived from the facts of Phillippi v. CIA , in which this court addressed the CIA’s refusal to confirm or deny whether it had documents relating to Howard Hughes’ ship, the Glomar Explorer,
[2] Exemption 1 permits the government to withhold information “specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy,” if that information has been “properly classified pursuant to such Executive order.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). Exemption 3 permits the government to withhold information “specifically exempted from disclosure by statute,” if such statute either “requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue” or “establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld.” Id. § 552(b)(3). The government relies on the National Security Act of 1947 and the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 as the relevant withholding statutes under Exemption 3. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 403-1(i)(1), 403g.
[3] See ACLU Reply Br. 1 n.1 (confirmation by plaintiffs that their FOIA request was for documents relating to the use of drones to carry out targeted killings, not only for documents relating to the use of such drones by the CIA); Oral Arg. Tr. 17.
[4] There might be a reason if it were unlikely that any entity other than the CIA operates drones. But the CIA does not make that argument. To the contrary, the Agency itself notes the possibility that official acknowledgments of U.S. drone strikes may refer to operations of “another federal entity such as the Department of Defense.” CIA Br. 40. See also Robert M. Gates, Remarks by Secretary Gates at the United States Air Force Academy , U.S. D EP ’ T OF D EF . (Mar. 4, 2011), http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4779 (“The Air Force now has 48 Predator and Reaper combat air patrols currently flying . . . and is training more pilots for advanced UAVs than for any other single weapons system.”).
[5] President Obama Hangs out with America , W HITE H OUSE B LOG (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/01/30/ president-obama-hangs-out-america; The White House, Your Interview with the President - 2012 , Y OU T UBE , at 28:37-29:23 (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eeTj5qMGTAI; see id. at 26:20-30:18.
[6] John O. Brennan, The Ethics and Efficacy of the President’s Counterterrorism Strategy , W ILSON C ENTER (Apr. 30, 2012), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-efficacy-and-ethics-us- counterterrorism-strategy [hereinafter Wilson Center Speech]; see id. (“The United States is the first nation to regularly conduct strikes using remotely piloted aircraft in an armed conflict.”)
[7] We have permitted agencies to give a
Glomar
response despite
the prior disclosure of another, unrelated agency.
See, e.g.
,
Frugone
v. CIA
,
[8] Director’s Remarks at the Pacific Council on International Policy , C ENT . I NTELLIGENCE A GENCY (May 19, 2009), https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/ directors-remarks-at-pacific-council.html.
[9] Compare
Moore v. CIA
,
[10] Although the statements by the President and Mr. Brennan postdated the district court’s grant of summary judgment, the CIA does not argue that we may not take judicial notice of them on appeal.
[11] Because the ACLU does not make the argument on appeal, we
do not consider whether -- in light of those official statements -- a
response would also be unwarranted on the ground that it is
implausible that revealing that the CIA merely has an interest in drone
strikes “would cause harm cognizable under [a] FOIA exception.”
Wolf
,
[12]
See Gallant v. NLRB
,
[13] For this reason, we also do not decide whether the government would be warranted in making a more limited response to one or more of the specific categories of documents “pertaining to drone strikes” included in the plaintiffs’ FOIA request.
