139 Ky. 167 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1910
Dismissing appeal.
The motion to dismiss the appeal heretofore entered, and passed to he considered when the case came up on its merits, will now be disposed of.
These consolidated actions were originally brought by the appellant in the police court against the appellees, James and Kline, to .recover three separate amounts, aggregating less than $100. The police court dismissed the suits, and the appellant prosecuted an appeal to the quarterly court, where the same judgment was rendered; and thence to the circuit court. This appeal is from the judgment of the circuit court denying the appellant’s right to recover.
The actions are for the recovery of money alone, and, as section 950 of the Kentucky Statutes provides that “no appeal shall be taken to the Court of Appeals from a judgment for the recovery of money or personal property if the value in controversy be less than two hundred dollars, exclusive of interest and cost,” the appeal must be dismissed, unless the fact that because the validity of what is called a franchise is incidentally involved confers jurisdiction.
It appears from the record that the appellant obtained, or attempted to obtain, from the Johnson county fiscal court the right to establish, a boom in John’s creek, and to charge for catching timber in its boom fees specified, in the order of court. Under authority of this order of .court, as well as- by virtue of an act 'of the Legislature approved February 27, 1882 (Laws 1882, c. —), the appellant established its boom, and sought in these actions to recover from the appellees the fees allowed to be charged-by it for
If we should hold that we had jurisdiction in cases involving alone the recovery of money where the amount in controversy was less than $200 merely because the validity of the franchise was incidentally drawn in question, there is no reason why the jurisdiction should not be- further extended to include cases in which other kinds of personal property were involved, as, for instance, where it was sought to enforce an attachment lien for $100 upon a horse worth $500, or a mortgage lien for $150 upon a stock of goods worth $300. In many actions for the recovery of money it may happen that there will be affected
The fact that the appellant was defeated on account of the ruling of the lower court that it had no franchise does not by any means deprive it of its franchise, if it has one. The judgment of the circuit court in the case appealed from is only the law as to the case in which it was rendered and between the parties to that litigation. It would not be binding in the future on that court, or on other courts in an action between the appellant and appellees or other parties. It may be that the circuit court which rendered the decision and other inferior courts in that jurisdiction will follow the ruling of the circuit court in this case in other suits that may be brought against other parties, and thereby deprive the appellant' company of the right, if-it has the right, to collect “boom-age” fees in cases in which the judgment of the circuit-court would be final, -but, if so, it will be as a matter' of courtesy,- and not because 'the judgment in this case is res judicata.- But, if this’ should happen, it cannot be allowed to confer jurisdiction upon this court. We said in Town of Beaver Dam v. Stevens, 118 S. W. 320, in which it was argued that we should take jurisdiction although the amount in controversy was less- than $200, because the circuit court' in other similar cases between the same parties^ would render a judgment like the one'assailed: “We areunable to perceive how this circumstance can be considered to give this court jurisdiction of the pending- appeal. The amount sought .to be recovered, and for which the judgment was rendered, is the amount that determines the jurisdiction of this court. What the result of. future trials may be, or what effect the decision of the lower court in this case may have on
The motion to dismiss the appeal must he sustained.