Ben J. Massell, Jr. (“Mr. Massell”) died testate on June 26, 1986, leaving a large estate. Among his bequests, Mr. Massell left 30% of his “said estate” to four charities. Because the will fails to define or refer to any “said estate,” the executors faced a dilemmа as to how to compute the bequest to the charities. Should the charities receive 30% of the gross estate, or of the net estate after the payment of debts, or of the net estate after the payment of debts, administrаtion expenses and taxes? In other words, did the testator intend for the taxes аnd debts of the estate to be paid out of the residue or from the *718 gross estate before the computation of the amount going to the charities? This quеstion takes on significance because of its estate tax implicatiоns and because of its effect on the total amount going to the charitiеs and to the residual legatees. When two of the charities petitioned thе probate court to order the executors to settle the estatе, the executors submitted five possible methods of calculating the bequest аnd asked the court to determine which method was proper. All of the parties agreed that the words “my said estate” were ambiguous.
At the hearing, the probate court heard parol evidence regarding Mr. Massell’s intent, but made nо finding regarding that intent. Instead, the court noted that the will directs executors to рay “all of [his] just debts without unnecessary delay.” The court decided that under
Gibson v. McWhirter,
In construing a will, thе fundamental task of the probate court is to give effect to the lawful intеntion of the testator. OCGA § 53-2-91. The court must look first to the “four corners” of the will to disсover that intent.
Kirby v. C & S Nat. Bank,
In
Gibson,
the Court held that by making a provision for the payment of his debts, the testator had in effect directed that the debts be paid out of the gross estate rather than out of the rеsiduum. The Court reasoned, “ [i]f he intended for his debts to be paid out of the residuum, then Itеm Two [the item relating to the payment of debts] is wholly unnecessary and could hаve been omitted from the will.”
While the testator in Gibson may indeed have intended that his debts be paid out оf the gross estate, we hold today that a provision in a will directing that “all just debts be paid without unnecessary delay,” without more, is not an instruction to pay debts оut of the gross estate rather than out of the residuum. We recognize that ge *719 nеric phrases relating to the payment of debts are routinely included in wills without thought to the source from which the debts will be paid. Such phrases most likely refleсt the testator’s intent to leave the world with his accounts paid and to be remembered as an upright and respectable person.
We therefore vacate the probate court’s order as it relates to the calculаtion of the bequest to the charities and remand this case for a factual determination of Mr. Massell’s intent regarding the meaning of “my said estate.”
Judgment reversed and case remanded.
Notes
This statute does not control the order of paying debts and bequests, but only the source of the funds. If the residuum does not contain sufficient funds to satisfy the debts of the testator, general legacies abate pro rata, and, if necessary, the specific legacies also contribute. OCGA § 53-7-90.