47 Wash. 447 | Wash. | 1907
J.;—One A. L. Campbell was an agent of the respondent American Bonding Company, and issued a bond in behalf of the respondent for a charter party entered into by Saunders, Ward & Company, and took security back from Saunders, Ward & Company. The appellant, Loeb, was a member of the transportation company for whose benefit the first bond was given. He became an officer of the transportation company to whom the charter party of the schooner Aberdeen was assigned, and said schooner was operated by said company. Twenty-five thousand dollars of the par value
After the commencement of this action a considerable time elapsed before it was brought to trial, and -in the meantime two amended complaints -were filed. The case was finally heard on the second amended complaint and the answer which raised the issues thereon.
It is insisted by the counsel for appellant that the allegations of the different complaints are conflicting, and that the court erred in adopting the theory of the second- amended complaint. An examination of the different complaints, however, fails to convince us that there was anything either wrong, suspicious, or unusual in the filing of - the specified complaints. In any event, the case is for trial here on the issues which were made by the final pleadings.
Without especially reviewing or analyzing the testimony, which we have carefully examined in detail, we are satisfied that the appellant’s main contention, that the findings of the court are against the testimony, cannot be sustained; but that, on the contrary, they are justified by undisputed testimony offered by respondent and by much of the testimony offered by the appellant. The many cases cited by appellant to sustain the doctrine that the right of a surety is strictly
It was held by this court in Douthitt v. MacCulsky, 11 Wash. 601, 40 Pac. 186, that a person may be bound by a decree though not a technical party to the action. And in Shoemake v. Finlayson, 22 Wash. 12, 60 Pac. 50, we held that a person who was a witness in an action, fully acquainted with the character and object and interested in the results, was estopped by the judgment as fully as if he had been a nominal party. The appellant attempts, but we think unsuccessfully, to distinguish these- cases from the case at bar. All
We are unable to discover any reversible error in the trial of the cause, and the judgment is affirmed.
Hadley, C. J., Root, Mount, Crow, Fullerton, and Rudkin, JJ., concur.