44 F. 721 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Louisiana | 1891
This cause is submitted upon an application for a receiver. Some time in May last, the defendant Klotz, and Fitzpatrick, his partner, composing the firm of B. Klotz & Co., sold to the complainant their biscuit and confectionery manufactory for the price of $259,-000, and an assumption of the debts of B. Klotz & Co., amounting to $42,000, which it was understood and agreed should bo paid out of the income from the future business. The visible property was estimated to be of the value of $101,000, and the good-will of the business to be of the value of $200,000. The price was paid in stock of the complainant’s corporation, estimated to be of value at par; that is, to be worth
The immediate question before us is, what disposition shall be made of the res, the business of the bakery and manufactory, pending this contest? The vendor and agent asks that he be allowed to remain in adverse possession. The purchaser and principal asks for a receiver. It is clear that, as to this provisional disposition of the res, the defendant Klotz cannot be allowed to gain anything by his ouster of his vendee and principal. He must stand with those equities, and none other, which existed before the ouster. The case as to the appointment of a receiver must be reviewed and determined as if he (Klotz) had filed his bill averring possession as agent, which he asked to have changed by a decree into a possession as owner, through the cancellation of the sale and the lease; that is, he must aver a legal title in the American Biscuit & Manufacturing Company, which he seeks to have avoided and annulled. If, as in this case, he seeks to do all this by reason of fraud, .and he establishes the fraud, a court of equity will not refuse to hear him. He would not be estopped, for fraud vitiates and sets aside even estoppels. Herm. Estop. par. 22, p. 244; Pendleton v. Richey, 82 Pa.
“The point that struck me was whether, on a bill to impeach a sale for fraud, the court interposes so strongly before the hearing as to take away the possession from persons holding it under the effect of deeds not yet set aside by decree.”
—And he bolds that “it was not the general habit of the court.” There the case was so monstrous, and the proof was so strong, that “it was hardly possible that the transaction could stand,” and the legal title was interfered with.
This is a loading case, and gives what we find is the rulo. The possession under the title is not disturbed unless the proof of fraud is so strong as to lead the court to the clear conviction that it will, on the final hearing, he established. The fraud set up and relied upon by the defendant and intervenor is false and fraudulent representations by the agents of the complainant in this: that they represented that the stock was fully paid-up stock, whereas, in truth and fact, it was none of it paid np in money, and only paid up in part,-and, to the extent of that part, by transfer of plants or bakeries and manufactories at an estimated value as capital. The stock delivered to the defendant and intervenor was not paid up until it was issued to them, and was paid for by a transfer of the bakery and good-will; and then it became paid up, and they were discharged from all liability to be made to contribute as shareholders therefor. The testimony as to what was represented by complainants agents about the stock being paid up is conflicting; but, when viewed in connection with the circumstances under which the stock was received, fails to satisfy us, upon this preliminary hearing, that any false representations are proved to have been made. The case of the defendant and intervenor, set up in their cross-bill, wliereby they oppose the appointment of a receiver, is that of parties who seek to rescind a deed on the ground of fraud, which upon this hearing they fail to establish .
So far we have considered the question of appointing a receiver of the property in controversy inter partes, and mainly from the stand-point presented by the defendant’s showing, and thereon such appointment seems proper, and we should accord it, but for an aspect of the case originally suggested by the defendant, when the case was pending in the state court, apparently abandoned here, but sufficiently brought to our notice by the exhibits of both parties. We are not satisfied that the complainant’s business is legitimate. While the nominal purpose of the complainant’s corporation, as stated in its charter, is the manufacture and
“Section 1. That every contract, combination in the form of trust, or eon- „ spiracy in restraint of trade or commerce, or to fix or limit the amount or quantity of any article, commodity, or merchandise to be manufactured, mined, produced, or sold in this state, is hereby declared illegal.”
“Sec. 3. That evei / person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons to monopolize, any part of the trade or commerce within the limits of this state, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.”
In construing the federal and state statutes, we exclude from consideration all monopolies which exist by legislative grant; for we think the word “monopolize” cannot be intended to be used with reference to the acquisition of exclusive rights under government concession, but that the law-maker has used the word to mean “to aggregate” or “concentrate” in the hands of few, practically, and, as a matter, of fact, and according to the known results of human action, to the exclusion of oth-
Now it is to be observed that these statutes outline an offense, but require for its complete commission no ulterior motive, such as to defraud, etc.; and, further, that the language is altogether silent as to what means must be used to constitute the offense. The offense is defined to “combine in the form of trust, or otherwise, in restraint of trade or commerce,” and “to monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, any of the trade or commerce.” To compass either of these tilings, with no other motive than to compass them, and by any means, constitutes the offense. One just and decisive test of the meaning of the expression “to monopolize ” is obtained by getting at the evil which the law-maker has endeavored to abolish and restrict. The statutes show that the evil was the hindrance and oppression in trade and commerce wrought by its absorption in the hands of the few, so that the prices would be in danger of being arbitrarily and exorbitantly fixed, because all competition would be swallowed up, so that the man of small means would find himself excluded from the restrained or monopolized trade or commerce as absolutely as if kept out by law or force. If this is the meaning of the defining words, does not this corporation, thus glutted with the 35 industries of 12 states, disclose an “attempt to monopolize?” So far, therefore, as the complainant’s business is a combination in restraint of trade, or is an “attempt to monopolize, or combine, in the form of a trust, or otherwise, any part of trade or commerce,” as these words are properly defined, the law stamps it as unlawful, and the courts should not encourage it. Aside from this, the complainant’s business, even if lawful, being of tbc kind shown above, is not of that meritorious kind that it should be encouraged by a court of equity. The appointment of a receiver by a court of equity is not a matter of strict right, but" of judicial discretion. Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U. S. 235. It falls within that class of interlocutory remedies which courts must grant or withhold, according to a discretion conscientiously exercised, upon a consideration of all the facts which a cause presents, involving the rights of the parties and the interests of the public. The attempt to accumulate in the hands of a single organization the business of supplying bread itself to so large a portion of the poor, as well as the rich, people of the United States should not bo favored by a court of equity. It carries with it too much of danger of excluding healthy competition, thereby increasing the difficulty to the general public of participating in a most useful business, as well as adding to the possibility of multitudes of citizens being temporarily, at least, compelled to pay an arbitrary and high price for daily food.
Whatever we may feel compelled to do, on the final bearing of this cause, towards recognizing the complainant’s legal rights, and compelling a faithless trustee to account, we are clear that at this preliminary stage,