*896 OPINION
This wаs a breach of contract action which was tried before a jury which rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $1,594,855.00. A judgment in that amount was entered on May 11, 1982. On November 24, 1982, the Court denied defendant’s motion for judgment n.o.v., new trial, and remittitur.
There are now pending two issues whiсh have arisen since trial. First, there is a dispute as to how interest on the judgment is to be cоmputed. Second, plaintiff has filed a motion for sanctions and an order of contempt against the defendant as a result of longstanding discovery disputes.
A. INTEREST
In diversity actions, interest on the judgment, including prejudgment interest, is allowed if available under state law. 28 U.S.C. § 1961;
Massachusetts Benefit Assoc. v. Miles,
(1) Interest shall be allowed on a money judgment recovered in a civil action, as provided in this section.
(2) For cоmplaints filed before June 1, 1980, in an action involving other than a written instrument having a rate of intеrest exceeding 6% per year, the interest on the judgment shall be calculated from the date of filing the complaint to June 1, 1980 at the rate of 6% per year and on and after June 1, 1980 to the date of satisfaction of the judgment at the rate of 12% per year cоmpounded annually.
M. C.L.A. § 600.6013. This statute is remedial in nature and is to be liberally construed in order to effectuate its purpose. M.C.L.A. § 600.102;
Denham v. Bedford,
The dispute in this matter focuses on three questions. 1 First, is the interest at the six per cent rate to be comрounded annually? Second, is the “anniversary date” on which the interest is to be compоunded the date on which the complaint was filed or June 1? Third, should the damage award be apportioned, for the purpose of computing the interest, over the twenty-six months bеtween the filing of the complaint and the entry of judgment?
Prior to the 1980 amendment, § 600.6013 set the statutory interest rate at six per cent. This had been construed as being simple, not compound, interest.
Schwartz v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,
The purpose of interest is to “recompense the prevailing party for the delay in payment of the money damages determined and to put back in his pocket some of the expense he incurs in instituting and prosecuting an aсtion.”
Waldrop v. Rodery,
B. DISCOVERY DISPUTE
This dispute centers around the failure of the defendant to сomply with a dis *897 covery request and a subpoena which sought documents relating to the сontract which was the subject matter of this action. Plaintiff now seeks to have this Court apply sanctions pursuant to Rule 37 and to hold the defendant in contempt pursuant to Rule 45. 3
Althоugh certain documents were not produced at the deposition of George Mоnie, the Court is not of the opinion that there was willful misconduct on the part of the defendant or conduct so egregious as to warrant the imposition of sanctions. Therefоre, the request for sanctions is denied.
Notes
. Plaintiff also seeks precomplaint interest running from the date of the breach of the contract. This was a matter within the province of the jury, however, and would correctly have been awarded as part of the damages by the jury. It is not for the Court to award it at this time.
See, e.g., Vannoy v. City of Warren,
. For this reason, the artificial anniversary date of June 1, 1980 is inappropriate.
. By means of a single document dated March 25, 1980, plaintiff nоticed the deposition of George Monie and requested that he bring with him certain documents. Plaintiff refers to this as a document request and a subpoena — violation of which could render defendant liable for both sanctions and an order of contempt. Defendant, on the other hand, refers to it as a subpoena duces tecum — violation of which сould only render defendant liable for a finding of contempt. Particularly in light of the fact thаt the document is entitled “Notice to Take Deposition,” the Court is of the opinion that it is a notice of deposition accompanied by a request for documents filed pursuant to Fed.R. Civ.P. 30(b)(5), and not a subpoena. The issuing of an order of contempt would therefore be inappropriate.
