American Alternative Ins. Co., Inc. v. York
679 N.W.2d 306
Mich.
2004
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*1 COMPANY, ALTERNATIVE INC AMERICAN INSURANCE v YORK May 5, 2004. application plaintiffs, Docket No. 121968. Decided On the Court, Supreme hearing on after oral whether the application granted granting leave, should be and in lieu of judgment Appeals. affirmed the of the Court of Company, Inc., subrogee American Alternative Insurance of its Ambulance, Inc., no-fault DVA and DVAAmbulance itself brought against an action in the Shiawassee Circuit Court Donald York, seeking money damage to recover for caused York to a driving court, DVA ambulance while York was while drunk. The Lostracco, J., following trial, D. judgment Gerald a bench entered American, determining for that the defendant’s conduct was wilful wanton, equivalent and and to intentional for conduct which he is 500.3135(a) pursuant hable to MCL of the no-fault act. The Court EJ., JJ., and and Sawyer reversed the Owens, Cooper, award basis that the defendant’s conduct was not inten- 500.3135(3)(a). required by tional as MCL plaintiffs appeal. seek leave to opinion per curiam, signed In an Chief Justice and Corrigan, Supreme Justices Cavanagh, Young, Weaver, Kelly, Taylor, Court held'. Although there was that evidence the defendant was intoxi- cated at the time of the the defendant is immune from suit in the absence of evidence that he intended strike the ambulance cause to it. using The Court of erred in wanton” measuring required for give standard intent to be shown to intentionally exception abrogation rise to caused harm liability act, of tort under the no-fault automobile insurance MCL seep, et at 500.3101 arrived the correct result. 500.31135(3)(a) concurring, Justice stated that MCL Markman, best, reasonably, abrogate personal and most understood to liability harm, from tort not for certain to occur. Affirmed. v York Ins Co Opinion of the Court — Intentionally — Liability — Harm. Caused Tort No-fault

Insurance act automobile the no-fault liable under insured is An inten- in the case of abrogation of tort exception to the the harm to cause tionally if the insured caused harm 500.3135[3][a]). (MCL resulted *2 L. Blanco Associates, Orlando (by EC. Blanco & Milliron), plaintiffs. for the Maureen R. Smith, (by EC. William & Foster, Collins Swift, defendant. Schulz), for the no-fault automobile Michigan Under the CURIAM. PER intentional con- et seq., 500.3101 act, MCL insurance insured tortfeasor an strips in harm resulting duct the act. otherwise liability from immunity to be wilful and found conduct was Here, the insured’s conduct held that such The Court wanton. and, misconduct intentional equivalent of not the so, retained the insured of the Court the decision act. affirm by the We

granted reasons. for different i defen- party a Christmas attending While hours. York or seven drank for six Donald York dant concerned he was him because pick up wife to called his changed his But he later safely. drive ability to his about home. On himself he could drive decided that mind and stop sign at a stop home, he failed way Ambulance owned DVA an ambulance with collided Al- by plaintiff was insured DVA Company. $61,000 paid DVA Company, which Insurance ternative filed this American then to the ambulance. from York. action, seeking reimbursement Opinion of the Court that, defended basis under the Michigan act, no-fault as a an tortfeasor automobile liability. he was immune from tort The trial court disagreed York. It his found conduct wilful and wanton, which it was equivalent determined Thus, intentional conduct. the court concluded that York was not immune from suit under no-fault act and he was appeal, liable American. On the Court of Appeals reversed the decision court, of the trial conclud- ing, essence, the actions York were not sufficiently wilful and wanton to be intentional.

ii This case involves the statutory language. Matters of statutory interpretation are re- viewed under a de novo standard. DiBenedetto v West Shore Hosp,

Dispositive in case is the statutory rule of construc- *3 tion that if the of the statute is clear and unambiguous, no necessary and the court must the clear follow of the wording statute. Cruz v State Co, Farm Mut Automobile Ins (2002); City NW2d 591 v Lansing Lansing of Twp, part

As of the automobile system no-fault insurance enacted in 1972,1 Legislature our at MCL 500.3135 abolished tort for harm caused while owning, maintaining, using motor in Michigan. vehicle The primary to exception this broad was that a suit could be maintained when death, there was a impairment function, serious of body or permanent 1 1972 PA 29.4. v York Ins Co Court relevant exception, Another disfigurement.

serious caused intentionally had the tortfeasor here, when MCL at exception defined this Legislature harm. encompassed: 500.3135(3), saying property. (a) to Intentionally caused harm persons or that harm to though person knows Even by his or her to be caused certain property is or suffer omission, person not cause does act or refrains intentionally if he or she acts or including any person, averting injury to averting to herself, purpose of or for the himself or [Emphasis added.] tangible property. The first sentences. contains two

This subsection for which injuries class of general out the sentence sets liable, i.e., harm that the tortfeasor exception an presents then The second sentence caused. to avert attempting when the tortfeasor to this class: the harm was for harm even if he is not liable injury, an resulting from Harm substantially certain to result. “intentionally caused.” injury avert is not attempt attempt in an case, the did not act In this determine if the class must therefore injury. avert We subsection, by the first sentence of harm defined harm,” “[ijntentionally applies. determination that reviewing the trial court’s In equivalent conduct was defendant’s wilful and wanton conduct, Appeals attempted intentional the Court Lowery, Ins Co America Citizens qualify (1987), and thus 616-618; distinctions in a of the common-law engaged discussion and wanton” concepts the tort between The Court stated: intentional. *4 persuaded qualification, not defen- some we are

With wrongly decided. Where Lowery was dant’s claim that unambiguous, statutory language clear and statute 32 28 the Court does not need and must be enforced as Hosp, Roberts v General written. Mecosta Co 466 63; phrase § 642 NW2d 663 Because 3135 used the “intentionally harm,” phrase unambigu and that ous, Therefore, phrase must we enforce it as written. may “wilful and wanton” substituted for “intentional” only meaning the extent has the same quotations Lowery “intentional.” As the above and Corp, App [v Boumelhem Bic 535 NW2d (1995)] suggest, generally and “wilful wanton” is Therefore, equated with “intentional.” the extent Lowery equates “intentional,” wanton” with However, agree Lowery. we with the decision to the extent that “wilful and is read to wanton” include conduct intentional, recklessness, less than such as the deci then Lowery interpreted improperly sion in the statute and Lowery cannot stand. to the meaning employs extent that it of “wilful wanton” synonymous that is with “intentional” limit and we its holding accordingly. 79-80; [252 Mich (2002).] gist is, it, The this read as we that while much wanton, intentional conduct is wilful all wilful and wanton conduct intentional. Be may, that as it lends simpler analysis. case itself to a Legislature, § in speaking 3135(3), so made unmistakable its intent define where immunity As set was lost. out in the the test is: was the harm intentionally caused.2 The no statute makes ref- erence to “wilful and Accordingly, analyz- wanton.” 3135(3)(a), § ing are to courts review whether the defendant intended to cause the harm that resulted. case,

As to the instant there while is evidence that intoxicated, there is none to support finding Vaught, accurately stated in Hicks v App 438, This test (1987), the Court of which whatever reason, did not discuss. *5 2004], York Ins Co v by Concurring Markman, J. the to collide with ambulance actually

that he Thus, it. the damage cause under did not to cause intend because suit. the ambulance, he is immune from the correctly the trial determined Appeals Court 2.613(C). MCR clearly erroneous. finding court’s the Appeals applied The trial and the court Court However, legal because the Court wrong standards. result, affirm the reached the correct Court Appeals the stated herein. decision for reasons Corrigan, C.J., Weaver, Taylor, Cavanagh, Kelly, YOUNG, JJ., concurred. I Although I concur. (concurring). J. MARKMAN, majority, reached find its result all because it fails at to address analysis inadequate “intentionally plaintiffs’ principal —that of MCL caused harm” in first sentence 500.3135(3)(a) defined, the second implication sentence, result, “inten- and, encompasses aas that is harm,” “substan- tionally caused also tially certain” occur.1 3135(3)(a) argument, essentially parties § both contended that At oral Sralla, plaintiffs’ attorney, Kevin

should be understood such manner. stated: you something you’re you if where know that substan- Or do

tially hit the other and there’s no element of certain to truck harm, then I also would he an inten- to avert think that why precisely tional act. And that’s the reason think Legislature contemplated a for intentional acts broader umbrella “substantially say It if it certain.” didn’t because used words “substantially you something, intend certain.” to do said statement, Schultz, attorney opening as- William defendant’s In his serted: Concurring Opinion Markman, 3135(3)

Section enumerates several circumstances which an may tortfeasor be held liable for a vehicular despite the automobile no-fault act’s broad personal immunity from liability. tort Section 3135, in particular, provides: (3) Notwithstanding any provision law, other tort

liability arising ownership, maintenance, from the or use within this state of a motor except vehicle ... is abolished as to:

(a) Intentionally caused harm property. *6 though person Even a knows that harm to property substantially certain to be caused his or her omission, person act or does not cause or suffer that if he or she acts refrains from purpose averting injury any person, including herself, himself or or for averting damage to tangible property. (a)

While the second in sentence subsection conceiv- ably can be read to imply that the “intentionally caused harm” standard of the first sentence is to be defined with reference to a state of in mind which person Legislature particular that [in the provide sentence] second then to that there was a status of get immunity. misconduct that did not That misconduct includes and includes person intended actions where the knows that

harm is certain to person’s occur as the result of that conduct. Later, Mr. Schultz stated: you harmony don’t believe that can read in the second 3135(3)(a)] [sentence] [§ with an that in all cases immunity only there is no if there is an intended action that words, results in intended harm. In other that in order to [the read first and harmony, sentences] second there has to be a concession that there is some conduct less than the true person get intentional tort for which the does not

provided by Otherwise, us, the no-fault act. it seems to that second unnecessary. [sentence] of the statute is Co v York Ins Concurring Opinion Markman, will result certain” that an outcome “substantially is the conduct, that do not believe particular Rather, “intentionally provision. of this reading better meaning, ordinary be its harm” should part requires purposefulness one probabilities. than a mere awareness driver, rather “intention definition of is, special That absent some “inten it should be assumed ally” in the Morey, “intentionally.” People tionally” means (1999).2 Although the 325, 330; 603 NW2d something free define words to mean Legislature mean, nonetheless ordinarily they what other than ordinary their possess that words should be assumed manner. contrary defined meanings unless argued that the unreasonably, might, itWhile (a) to redefine attempts of subsection second sentence it with “substan by impliedly equating “intentionally” certain,” my judgment, implication, such an tially in this context to overcome too obscure simply by their be understood that words should presumption term, “inten Here, in the case of a ordinary meanings. and well-defined longstanding that has a tionally,” areas of the variety across a discrete meaning ranging 3135(3) with sufficient law,3 § fails to communicate Mich poses intended”]). NW2d tort,” Webster’s 588, 595; *7 2 3 only See In re See, where 109, 114; for of MCL e.g., 648 NW2d 591 College purposes MCL (1996) 28 See also Cruz Certified Travis v 600.2961[5][b], 659 NW2d employer Dictionary (opinion by certain Question Dreis & (2002); v State Farm Mut Automobile Ins has 418.131[1], occurs, 597 [1991] Boyle, “in mind a Krump Mfg in accordance with the (Kenneth Hicks (2003) injury [“done with J.) (concluding v (defining Vaught, Henes v Biomass will result from his purpose Co, not where the intention or on 453 162 Mich “intentional,” that an “intentional bring Random House Ind, Inc), 468 149, 171; Co, 466 Mich about “employer acts,” 438, 440; purpose; for given pur 551 but Concurring Opinion by Markman, clarity that the term here is to an alternative meaning. Instead, and inconsistent the statute leaves such a conclusion to be only by negative drawn infer ence from what an awkward phraseology. I

Although believe that the purpose of the prefatory clause the second sentence is merely introduce an exception to the rule sentence, of the first rather than to serve as a sentence, definitional clause for the first purpose considerably this less clear than it might have been. I do not plaintiffs’ proposed view unreasonable, simply but as less rea- than that adopted by sonable the majority. Choosing among these interpretations requires this Court among select imperfect alternatives. (3)(a)

Although § 3135 is certainly crafted more awk- wardly than it might been, have I believe that majority’s interpretation of provision is the more reasonable interpretation, and therefore concur with the majority. consequences”); Churchman, Auto-Owners Ins Co v (1992) (holding 489 NW2d 431 that the insured’s actions satisfied an policy’s exclusionary clause, exempted coverage which “bodily injury property damage expected or intended an insured person,” “purposely because [the victim’s] went to house and range”); People Dykhouse, shot him four times at close (1984) (stating “very high 345 NW2d 150 that a risk of death” intent satisfy first-degree murder, is insufficient to specific which is a intent requiring proof crime life); of a defendant’s intention to take a Book (1958) Chance, 521, 526-527;

Furniture Co v (holding “[w]aiver relinquishment is the intentional of a known right----The waiving right usual manner of acts which indicate relinquish it,... an intention to neglecting failing so to act as waive.”). to induce a that it belief was the intention and 4 provision sought surmise that the drafters of this to restate the rule prefatory of the sentence, first sentence in the clause to the second sought repeating also to avoid the awkwardness of doing. Unfortunately, first sentence in so their resummarization was imprecise engendered and has confusion.