AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. COUNTY OF SAN MATEO, Defendant and Respondent.
No. S044279
Supreme Court of California
Apr. 8, 1996.
1110
Crosby, Heafey, Roach & May, Peter W. Davis, Jay R. Martin, John E. Carne, Kathy M. Banke, Kimberly S. Stanley, Goodwin, Procter & Hoar, John C. Englander, J. Anthony Downs and A. Lauren Carpenter for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
OPINION
ARABIAN, J.*-Here we determine whether California‘s ad valorem tax system is subject to challenge under former
We conclude that the airlines do have a private right of action under former section 1513(d). In considering whether the airlines have stated a claim for relief under that statute, we note that the airlines assert two bases on which they claim former section 1513(d) has been violated. We conclude that they have stated a claim for relief under former section 1513(d) on the first basis by alleging unequal enforcement of California‘s facially neutral tax laws. We further conclude, however, that the airlines have failed to state a claim for relief under former section 1513(d) on the second basis, that is, by alleging that the assessment ratio for railroad personal property is lower than that for airline personal property. Finally, we conclude that the
Ten commercial airlines2 (Airlines) brought separate actions against eighteen counties3 (Counties) seeking a partial refund of and declaratory judgment regarding ad valorem personal property taxes. They alleged in each action that the Counties collected the taxes in violation of former section 1513(d)4 of the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982 (AAIA). The actions were coordinated in San Mateo County.
The Counties asserted below that the purpose of their motion for summary judgment was to determine whether the Airlines had stated a cause of action. “A defendant‘s motion for summary judgment necessarily includes a test of the sufficiency of the complaint. (Centinela Hospital Assn. v. City of
“Accordingly, for purposes of this opinion, we treat the properly pleaded allegations of [the Airlines‘] complaint as true, and also consider those matters subject to judicial notice. (Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 12 Cal.3d 710, 714-715, fn. 3 [117 Cal.Rptr. 241, 527 P.2d 865]; Hunt v. County of Shasta (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 432, 440 [275 Cal.Rptr. 113]; April Enterprises, Inc. v. KTTV (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 805, 815 [195 Cal.Rptr. 421].) ‘Moreover, the allegations must be liberally construed with a view to attaining substantial justice among the parties.’ (Guild Mortgage Co. v. Heller (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1505, 1508 [239 Cal.Rptr. 59].) ‘Our primary task is to determine whether the facts alleged provide the basis for a cause of action against defendants under any theory.’ (Ibid.)” (Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1226, 1232 [44 Cal.Rptr.2d 352, 900 P.2d 601].)
The Airlines’ second amended complaint against Los Angeles County is representative of their refund causes of action. It alleges, in pertinent part:
“This action is brought pursuant to the applicable provisions of the
California Revenue and Taxation Code and other related provisions of state and federal law to obtain refunds of taxes which were paid by [the Airlines] to [Los Angeles County] . . . and which were illegally and erroneously collected from [the Airlines] in violation of [former]49 U.S.C. Section 1513 for the 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988 and 1989 tax years. . . .“Pursuant to California law and practice, all commercial and industrial property, other than air carrier transportation property, is assessed at amounts substantially below true market value of that property.
“All of [the Airlines‘] property used in interstate air transportation in the County of Los Angeles is assessed each year at amounts equal to or in
excess of the true market value of said property.5 Plaintiffs are taxed based on these assessments, and have paid taxes pursuant to said assessments.
“This disparity in tax treatment causes [the Airlines‘] property to be assessed at a value bearing a higher ratio to its true market value than the ratio that the assessed value of other commercial and industrial property in the county has to its true market value in violation of [former]
49 U.S.C. Section 1513 .“This discrimination is not less than forty-seven percent (47%) of the ad valorem property taxes paid to this county for the 1985 [through 1989] tax year[s].
“[The Airlines] are therefore entitled to a refund of at least forty-seven percent (47%) of the ad valorem property taxes paid to this county for the 1985 [through 1989] tax year[s].
“This disparity also imposes an unreasonable burden on and discriminates against interstate commerce in violation of
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution violating the supremacy clause of theU.S. Constitution, Article VI , and denies plaintiffs due process and equal protection of the law in violation ofU.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 1 .”6
The Counties filed a motion for summary judgment “on the grounds that there is no triable issue of material fact as to [the Counties] because [the Airlines] have failed to state a cause of action under [former]
The trial court granted the Counties’ motion on the following grounds: “1. Based on the current assessment and taxing systems of airline property in California, the [Airlines] cannot, as a matter of law, state a cause of action under [former]
The Court of Appeal affirmed and denied the Airlines’ petition for rehearing. We granted the Airlines’ petition for review.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Background
1. Former Section 1513(d)
Pursuant to its plenary commerce clause power, Congress has enacted three statutory schemes that prohibit tax discrimination against interstate carriers, the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, former
commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction has to the true market value of the other commercial and industrial property.
“(2) levy or collect a tax on an assessment that may not be made under clause (1) of this subsection.
“(3) levy or collect an ad valorem property tax on rail transportation property at a tax rate that exceeds the tax rate applicable to commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction.
“(4) impose another tax that discriminates against a rail carrier providing transportation subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission under subchapter I of chapter 105 of this title.
“(c) Notwithstanding section 1341 of title 28 [the Tax Injunction Act] and without regard to the amount in controversy or citizenship of the parties, a district court of the United States has jurisdiction, concurrent with other jurisdiction of courts of the United States and the States, to prevent a violation of subsection (b) of this section. Relief may be granted under this subsection only if the ratio of assessed value to true market value of rail transportation property exceeds by at least 5 percent, the ratio of assessed value to true market value of other commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction. The burden of proof in determining assessed value and true market value is governed by State law. If the ratio of the assessed value of other commercial and industrial property in the assessment jurisdiction to the true market value of all other commercial and industrial property cannot be determined to the satisfaction of the district court through the random-sampling method known as a sales assessment ratio study (to be carried out under statistical principles applicable to such a study), the court shall find, as a violation of this section—
“(1) an assessment of the rail transportation property at a value that has a higher ratio to the true market value of the rail transportation property than the assessed value of all other property subject to a property tax levy in the assessment jurisdiction has to the true market value of all other commercial and industrial property; and
“(2) the collection of an ad valorem property tax on the rail transportation property at a tax rate that exceeds the tax ratio rate applicable to taxable property in the taxing district.”
The pertinent parts of the AAIA, the 4-R Act, and the Motor Carrier Act are strikingly similar. The differences between the statutes are highlighted as
of other commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction has to the true market value of the other commercial and industrial property;
“(2) levy or collect a tax on an assessment that may not be made under paragraph (1) of this subsection;
“(3) levy or collect an ad valorem property tax on motor carrier transportation property at a tax rate that exceeds the tax rate applicable to commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction.
“(c) Notwithstanding section 1341 of title 28 [the Tax Injunction Act] and without regard to the amount in controversy or citizenship of the parties, a district court of the United States has jurisdiction, concurrent with other jurisdiction of courts of the United States and the States, to prevent a violation of subsection (b) of this section. Relief may be granted under this subsection only if the ratio of assessed value to true market value of motor carrier transportation property exceeds by at least 5 percent, the ratio of assessed value to true market value of other commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction. The burden of proof in determining assessed value and true market value is governed by State law. If the ratio of the assessed value of other commercial and industrial property in the assessment jurisdiction to the true market value of all other commercial and industrial property cannot be determined to the satisfaction of the district court through the random-sampling method known as a sales assessment ratio study (to be carried out under statistical principles applicable to such a study), the court shall find, as a violation of this section—
“(1) an assessment of the motor carrier transportation property at a value that has a higher ratio to the true market value of the motor carrier transportation property than the assessment value of all other property subject to a property tax levy in the assessment jurisdiction has to the true market value of all such other property; and
“(2) the collection of an ad valorem property tax on the motor carrier transportation property at a tax rate that exceeds the tax ratio rate applicable to taxable property in the taxing district.”
Given the strong similarity in statutory language and purpose between the three acts, cases interpreting one act are often relied on to interpret a different act. Moreover, because of this similarity, and the express reference in the legislative history of former section 1513(d) to the Motor Carrier Act (see ante, fn. 10) the legislative history of the 4-R and the Motor Carrier Acts is, as the parties agree, appropriately used to interpret former section 1513(d). (Western Air Lines v. Board of Equalization, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 131 [94 L.Ed.2d at pp. 120-121] [relying on legislative history of 4-R Act in interpreting former § 1513(d)]; Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. v. Lynch (4th Cir. 1983) 723 F.2d 365, 366, fn. 3 [“the parties’ reliance upon . . . the legislative history of the 4-R Act [in construing Motor Carrier Act] is correct“]; Sen. Rep. No. 97-494, 2d Sess., p. 37, supra, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, at pp. 781, 1188, 1484 [§ 1513(d) extends to air carriers same protections given to motor carriers].) In Western Air Lines v. Board of Equalization, supra, 480 U.S. at page 131, a case construing former section 1513(d), the high court examined the purpose behind the
In general, under the Tax Injunction Act11 federal courts may not enjoin the collection of state taxes. The 4-R and the Motor Carrier Acts, however, contain an express exemption from the Tax Injunction Act, according federal district and state courts concurrent jurisdiction over claims within their purview. (Former
2. California Tax System
California imposes an ad valorem tax upon all personal property within its jurisdiction, except property granted an express exemption. (
In California, property taxes on certificated aircraft having a tax situs in multiple jurisdictions are allocated according to a prescribed formula. (
In contrast, under the
“[U]nitary valuation is not limited to the valuation of public utilities nor is it synonymous with centralized state assessment. In theory, the unitary valuation concept is applicable to any combination of property and can be applied, with equal propriety, either by a local assessor or by a central assessing agency.” (Bertane, The Assessment of Public Utility Property in California, supra, 20 UCLA L.Rev. at p. 426.) However, “[i]n centralized assessments, the valuation ordinarily is made by the unit method.” (Amdur, Telecommunications Property Taxation, supra, 46 Fed. Comm. L.J. at p. 222.)
Private railroad cars are considered personal property and are subject to a separate tax under California‘s Private Railroad Car Tax Law. (
In California, assessors have a statutory duty to “assess all property subject to general property taxation at its full value.” (
During the tax years at issue, the auditor was required to audit at least once every four years the books and records of any profession, trade, or business with locally assessable trade fixtures and business tangible personal property with a full value of $200,000 or more. (
The law generally “presumes that an assessor has performed [his or her] duty and has assessed all properties fairly and on an equal basis. The taxpayer has the burden of proving otherwise.” (2 Ehrman & Flavin, Taxing Cal. Property, supra, § 27:10, p. 18; see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 59, 61 [116 Cal.Rptr. 759].)
B. Airlines’ Claims
The Airlines assert that the Court of Appeal erred in holding that there is no private right of action directly under former section 1513(d), and in concluding that the Airlines had failed to state a claim for relief under either former section 1513(d)(1)(A) or
In determining whether a federal statute creates a private right of action, we apply the now familiar test established by the United States Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash (1975) 422 U.S. 66 [45 L.Ed.2d 26, 95 S.Ct. 2080].12 Accordingly, we consider: (1) is the plaintiff ” ‘one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted’ “; (2) “is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one“; (3) is a private right of action “consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme“; and (4) “is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?” (Cort v. Ash, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 78 [45 L.Ed.2d at p. 36], italics in original.)
These factors are not accorded equal weight. (Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington (1979) 442 U.S. 560, 575 [61 L.Ed.2d 82, 95-96, 99 S.Ct. 2479].) Rather, “[t]he central inquiry [is] whether Congress intended to create, either expressly or by implication, a private cause of action. Indeed, the first three factors discussed in Cort—the language and focus of the statute, its legislative history, and its purpose . . .—are ones traditionally relied upon in determining legislative intent.” (Id. at pp. 575-576 [61 L.Ed.2d at p. 96].) “[W]hat must ultimately be determined is whether Congress intended to create the private remedy asserted. . . .” (Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis (1979) 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 [62 L.Ed.2d 146, 152, 100 S.Ct. 242].)
“Accordingly, we begin with the language of the statute itself.” (Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, supra, 444 U.S. at p. 16 [62 L.Ed.2d at p. 152].) As noted above, former section 1513(d)(1)(A) proscribes, in part, state assessment of “air carrier transportation property at a value that has a higher ratio to the true market value of the air carrier transportation property than the ratio that the assessed value of other commercial and industrial property of the same type in the same assessment jurisdiction has to the true market value of the other commercial and industrial property,” and states that such an act “unreasonably burden[s] and discriminate[s] against interstate commerce.”
Second, there is evidence of legislative intent to create a private remedy. As noted earlier, other than the language expressly granting railroads and motor carriers jurisdiction in federal as well as state court, the 4-R and Motor Carrier Acts are in all relevant respects identical to former section 1513(d)(1)(A). A statute that is modeled on another, and that shares the same legislative purpose is in pari materia with the other, and should be interpreted consistently to effectuate congressional intent. (See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans (1979) 441 U.S. 750, 756 [60 L.Ed.2d 609, 616, 99 S.Ct. 2066] [“Since the ADEA and Title VII share a common purpose, the elimination of discrimination in the workplace, since the language of § 14(b) is almost in haec verba with § 706(c), and since the legislative history of § 14(b) indicates that its source was § 706(c), we may properly conclude that Congress intended that the construction of § 14(b) should follow that of § 706(c).“].) Defendants concede both the 4-R and the Motor Carrier Acts grant plaintiffs a private right of action. (Cf. Cannon v. University of Chicago, supra, 441 U.S. at pp. 695, 696 [60 L.Ed.2d at pp. 574-575] [title IX and title VI “use identical language to describe the benefited class” and “when Title IX was enacted, the critical language in Title VI had already been construed as creating a private remedy“].) Thus, while Congress did not include an express exemption to the Tax Injunction Act in former section
Third, a private right of action is “consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme.” As evident from the statutory language and its legislative history, Congress enacted former section
Finally, while taxation is an area “traditionally relegated to state law” and “basically the concern of the States,” in enacting former section
The Counties contend that Congress did not intend to grant the Airlines a private right of action under former section
Moreover, former section
We therefore conclude that the Airlines have a private right of action under former section
2. Airlines’ Claim for Relief Under Former Section 1513(d)
We now turn to whether the Airlines have stated a claim for relief under former section
The Airlines assert that they have stated a claim for relief under former section
a) Inclusion of Underassessed or Unassessed Property in the Comparison Class
The Airlines concede that under California law, all personal property is to be taxed at 100 percent of its fair market value. They contend,
De facto discrimination arises when state law is facially neutral, but its application nevertheless results in a disparity. (Clinchfield R. Co. v. Lynch (1981) 527 F.Supp. 784, 785, fn. 3, affd., Clinchfield R. Co. v. Lynch (4th Cir. 1983) 700 F.2d 126, 130; Discriminatory Demands, supra, 39 Vand. L. Rev. at p. 1119.) Such discrimination has been found to occur, for example, when a state‘s reassessment procedures require railroad property to be assessed annually, but other forms of commercial or industrial property to be assessed less frequently, such as every five years. (Clinchfield R. Co. v. Lynch, supra, 700 F.2d at p. 130.) “As a consequence of this process, the interstate carriers pay higher taxes than most other commercial and industrial taxpayers because their assessments reflect current increases in true market value while delayed assessment of other property delays increases in their tax assessments.” (Discriminatory Demands, supra, 39 Vand. L.Rev. at pp. 1119-1120; Clinchfield R. v. Lynch, supra, 700 F.2d at p. 130.)
By contrast, “de jure” discrimination is typically created by state classification systems, i.e., when different classes of property are assessed at different percentages of full value. (Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. State of Ariz. (D.Ariz. 1983) 559 F.Supp. 1237, 1243; Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Lennen (10th Cir. 1983) 715 F.2d 494, 497; Discriminatory Demands, supra, 39 Vand. L.Rev. at p. 1119 [“State property tax classification systems are typical forms of de jure discrimination.“]; Amdur, Telecommunications Property Taxation, supra, 46 Fed. Comm. L.J. at p. 262.)
The Counties do not dispute the Airlines’ claim that former section
We are guided in our analysis by the high court‘s opinion in Department of Revenue of Ore. v. ACF Industries, Inc., supra, 510 U.S. at pp. 342-344
The railroad argued that it would be “nonsensical for Congress to prohibit the States from imposing higher tax rates or assessment ratios upon railroad property than upon other taxed property, while at the same time permitting the States to exempt some or all classes of nonrailroad property altogether.” (Department of Revenue of Ore. v. ACF Industries, Inc., supra, 510 U.S. at p. 346 [127 L.Ed.2d at p. 177, 114 S.Ct. at p. 851].) The court rejected this argument, observing in part that “this is not a case in which the railroads—either alone or as part of some isolated and targeted group—are the only commercial entities subject to an ad valorem property tax. Cf. Burlington Northern R. Co. v. City of Superior, 932 F.2d 1185 (CA7 1991) (occupation tax on owners and operators of ‘iron ore concentrates docks,’ in practical effect, applied only to docks owned by one particular rail carrier). If such a case were to arise, it might be incorrect to say that the State ‘exempted’ the nontaxed property. Rather, one could say that the State had singled out railroad property for discriminatory treatment.” (Ibid.)
Here, the Counties assert that “[l]ike exempt property, personal property that inadvertently escapes taxation (notwithstanding the good faith efforts of the assessor) is not ‘taxed property’ and therefore should not be included as part of the comparison class.” This is not entirely correct. Escaped property, unlike exempt property, is by definition taxable; however, that tax has not been assessed or paid.
However, contrary to the Airlines’ assertion, we conclude that discrimination under former section
Moreover, any claim of de facto discrimination based on the unequal enforcement of otherwise neutral tax laws must consist of some practice or policy on the part of the assessor that has a discriminatory impact or effect. In this time of shrinking local revenue bases, county assessors may simply lack the resources necessary to discover or assess all items of taxable personal property in their jurisdiction. They are therefore compelled to make difficult decisions about the allocation of enforcement resources. As with legislation exempting specific personal property, so long as those enforcement decisions are reasonable, and are neither targeted to disadvantage nor have a disparate effect on a particular group such as the Airlines, we do not believe that Congress intended to condemn the resulting assessment ratios as acts that “unreasonably burden and discriminate against” interstate commerce within the meaning of former section
The Airlines argue that they are not required to demonstrate discriminatory intent. We agree that claims under former section
Moreover, the Airlines bear the burden of demonstrating a practice or policy on the assessor‘s part that is either targeted to disadvantage or that has an unreasonably disparate effect on the Airlines because it results in significant amounts of unassessed or underassessed other commercial and industrial personal property. (Cf. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Lennen (10th Cir. 1984) 732 F.2d 1495, 1500-1501 [plaintiff‘s “real burden is to prove the true market and assessed values of ‘all other commercial and industrial property.‘“].)
As noted earlier, in California, assessors have a duty to “assess all property subject to general property taxation at its full value.” (
We note that unlike the 4-R and Motor Carrier Acts, which both require a 5 percent disparity in assessment ratios before a federal district court may assume jurisdiction, nothing in former section
As noted, the Airlines alleged that their property was “assessed at a value bearing a higher ratio to its true market value than the ratio that the assessed value of other commercial and industrial property in the county has to its true market value in violation of [former]
b) Inclusion of Railroad Personal Property in the Comparison Class
The Airlines also assert assessment ratio discrimination because their personal property is assessed at 100 percent of full market value, but railroad personal property is assessed at 70 percent of full market value. Once again, the question we consider is whether railroad property is properly included in the comparison class of “other commercial and industrial property of the same type.” (Former
The Counties do not dispute the Airlines’ claim that railroad property is assessed by the State Board of Equalization at less than 100 percent of full value. Our research has indicated that during at least two of the years at issue, the board applied an assessment ratio of less than 100 percent to the value of “all rail transportation property in an effort to remove the equalization issue from possible petitions for reassessment and eliminate further
The Counties contend, however, that the comparison class under former section
As noted earlier, former section
The Airlines assert that “transportation property” means “air carrier transportation property,” and thus the only property (relevant to the issues in this case) excluded from the comparison class of other commercial and industrial property is airline, not railroad property. They argue that the exclusion of “transportation property” from the definition of other commercial and industrial property merely acknowledges that assessments on airline property must be compared with assessments on nonairline property. However, we generally do not construe different terms within a statute to embody the same
As noted earlier, the 4-R and the Motor Carrier Acts also exclude “transportation property” from their definitions of other commercial and industrial property. Moreover, just as former section
Moreover, Congress‘s purpose in enacting former section
The Airlines assert that as originally enacted in 1976, the 4-R Act defined “transportation property” as “transportation property, as defined in regulations of the Commission, which is owned or used by a common carrier by railroad subject to this part or which is owned by the National Railroad Passenger Corporation.” (Pub.L. No. 94-210 (Feb. 5, 1976) § 306, 90 Stat. 31, 55.) This language was changed and recodified at former
However, we have already noted that while the original version of the 4-R Act referred only to “transportation property,” the amended version refers to
In addition, the Airlines assert that prior to the 1982 passage of former section
In sum, we conclude that railroad property is transportation property within the meaning of former section
3. Cause of Action Under 42 United States Code Section 1983
The Airlines assert that they have a cause of action under
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal affirming the entry of summary judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Lucas, C. J., Mosk, J., Baxter, J., George, J., and Werdegar, J., concurred.
KENNARD, J., Concurring.—In California, personal property, unless expressly granted an exemption, is subject to an ad valorem tax, which is a tax levied on property in proportion to its value. (
The lawsuit in this case, a coordinated action against 18 counties for a refund of personal property taxes for the years 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, and 1989, was brought by 10 commercial airlines. They alleged that while their personal property was assessed at its full value, as provided under the law, the commercial and industrial personal property of others was assessed at amounts below full value, resulting in discriminatory assessments against the airlines, in violation of the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982 (AAIA). (
The majority holds: (1) the airlines have a private right of action for de facto discrimination under former section
I write separately to express my concern that the majority opinion, because it permits the airlines to maintain a cause of action against the
In this case, the airlines concede that their personal property was assessed at 100 percent of fair market value (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1119 fn. 5), as provided under state law (
In my view, before allowing the airlines a refund (if they succeed in establishing discriminatory assessment) the county assessors should be given an opportunity to end the discriminatory assessment of the airlines by correcting underassessments of other commercial and industrial property. (See, e.g., Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal v. Webster County (1989) 488 U.S. 336, 346 [102 L.Ed.2d 688, 698-699, 109 S.Ct. 633]; Iowa-Des Moines Bank v. Bennett (1931) 284 U.S. 239, 247 [76 L.Ed. 265, 273, 52 S.Ct. 133].) California law requires county assessors to retroactively assess property that has been underassessed. (See Bauer-Schweitzer Malting Co. v. City and County of San Francisco (1973) 8 Cal.3d 942, 946-947 [106 Cal.Rptr. 643, 506 P.2d 1019]; Ex-Cell-O Corp. v. County of Alameda (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 135, 139-140 [107 Cal.Rptr. 839];
With this reservation, I concur in the majority opinion.
Notes
“(d) Acts which unreasonably burden and discriminate against interstate commerce; definitions.
(1) The following acts unreasonably burden and discriminate against interstate commerce and a State, subdivision of a State, or authority acting for a State or subdivision of a State may not do any of them:
“(A) assess air carrier transportation property at a value that has a higher ratio to the true market value of the air carrier transportation property than the ratio that the assessed value of other commercial and industrial property of the same type in the same assessment jurisdiction has to the true market value of the other commercial and industrial property;
“(B) levy or collect a tax on an assessment that may not be made under subparagraph (A) of this paragraph; or
“(C) levy or collect an ad valorem property tax on air carrier transportation property at a tax rate that exceeds the tax rate applicable to commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction.
“(2) In this subsection—
“(A) ‘Assessment’ means valuation for a property tax levied by a taxing district;
“(B) ‘assessment jurisdiction’ means a geographical area in a State used in determining the assessed value of property for ad valorem taxation;
“(C) ‘air carrier transportation property’ means property, as defined by the Civil Aeronautics Board, owned or used by an air carrier providing air transportation;
“(D) ‘commercial and industrial property’ means property, other than transportation property and land used primarily for agricultural purposes or timber growing, devoted to a commercial or industrial use and subject to a property tax levy; and
“(E) ‘State’ shall include the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, the District of Columbia, the territories or possessions of the United States, and political agencies of two or more States.
“(3) This subsection shall not apply to any in lieu tax which is wholly utilized for airport and aeronautical purposes.”
“(a) In this section—
“(1) ‘assessment’ means valuation for a property tax levied by a taxing district.
“(2) ‘assessment jurisdiction’ means a geographical area in a State used in determining the assessed value of property for ad valorem taxation.
“(3) ‘rail transportation property’ means property, as defined by the Interstate Commerce Commission, owned or used by a rail carrier providing transportation subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission under subchapter I of chapter 105 of this title.
“(4) ‘commercial and industrial property’ means property, other than transportation property and land used primarily for agricultural purposes or timber growing, devoted to a commercial or industrial use and subject to a property tax levy.
“(b) The following acts unreasonably burden and discriminate against interstate commerce, and a State, subdivision of a State, or authority acting for a State or subdivision of a State may not do any of them:
“(1) assess rail transportation property at a value that has a higher ratio to the true market value of the rail transportation property than the ratio that the assessed value of other
“(a) In this section—
“(1) ‘assessment’ means valuation for a property tax levied by a taxing district;
“(2) ‘assessment jurisdiction’ means a geographical area in a State used in determining the assessed value of property for ad valorem taxation;
“(3) ‘motor carrier transportation property’ means property, as defined by the Interstate Commerce Commission, owned or used by a motor carrier providing transportation in interstate commerce whether or not such transportation is subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission under subchapter II of chapter 105 of this title; and
“(4) ‘commercial and industrial property’ means property, other than transportation property and land used primarily for agricultural purposes or timber growing, devoted to a commercial or industrial use and subject to a property tax levy.
“(b) The following acts unreasonably burden and discriminate against interstate commerce and a State, subdivision of a State, or authority acting for a State or subdivision of a State may not do any of them:
“(1) assess motor carrier transportation property at a value that has a higher ratio to the true market value of the motor carrier transportation property than the ratio that the assessed value