Case Information
*1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
AMERICA FIRST LEGAL )
FOUNDATION, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) v. Civil Case No. 24-3105 (RJL) ) )
PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General )
of the United States, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
August S'", 2025 [Dkt. #5, Dkt. #6]
Plaintiff America First Legal Foundation ("plaintiff') brings this action against the Department of Justice ("DOJ") and the Attorney General of the United States (together,
"defendants"), seeking to compel defendants to register certain entities under the Foreign
Agents Registration Act ("FARA"), 22 U.S.C. § 611 et seq. alleges that
defendants have abdicated their duties to enforce FARA, and thus filed suit under the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. Now before the Court are
two motions: defendants' motion to dismiss and defendants' motion to excuse production
of the administrative record. For the reasons set forth below, I will GRANT both motions.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory and Regulatory Background
FARA is designed "to prevent covert influence over U.S. policy by foreign principals." United States v. Craig, 401 F. Supp. 3d 49, 54 (D.D.C. 2019); see also United
States v. McGoff, 831 F.2d 1071, 1073-74 (D.C. Cir. 1987). To that end, FARA requires
agents of foreign principals to register with the Attorney General. 2 2 U.S.C. § 612(a).
"Foreign principals" include, but are not limited to, foreign governments; foreign political
parties; persons outside of the United States who are not citizens of or domiciled within
the United States; and foreign partnerships, associations, corporations, and organizations.
Id. § 61 l(b). An "agent of a foreign principal" is any person who (1) "acts as an agent,
representative, employee, or servant" or "in any other capacity at the order, request, or
under the direction or control, of a foreign principal"; and (2) takes certain actions within
the United States on behalf of that foreign principal, such as engaging in political activities, serving as public relations counsel, collecting or-disbursing money, or representing the
foreign principal before U.S. Government agencies. Id. § 61 l(c).
Absent an exemption, an agent of a foreign principal must file with the Attorney General a registration statement which includes information about the agent, the foreign
principal, their relationship, and the agent's activities on behalf of the foreign principal.
Id. § 612(a). Submitted registration statements are "public records and open to public
examination." Id. § 616(a). The Attorney General must make each submitted
statement or its contents available to the public over the Internet. Id. § 616(d).
Failure to register can carry criminal penalties. Id. § 6 l 8(a). Additionally,
"[ w ]henever in the judgment of the Attorney General any person" fails to comply with
FARA's requirements, "the Attorney General may make application to the appropriate United States district court for an order enjoining such acts or enjoining such person from
continuing to act as an agent of such foreign principal, or for an order requiring compliance
with any appropriate provision of [FARA] or regulation thereunder." Id. § 618(f). "The
district court shall have jurisdiction and authority to issue a temporary or permanent
injunction, restraining order or such other order which it may deem proper." Id.
B. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff is "a national nonprofit legal foundation that advocates for 'America First' policies" and, "[t]o that end, it gathers official infonnation, analyzing and disseminating it
through reports, press releases, media, and communications with congressional oversight Compl. [Dkt. #2] ,r 5. Plaintiff
cmmnittees." believes that certain entities individuals-AJP Educational Foundation, Inc., National Students for Justice in Palestine, Osama Abuirshaid, Hatem Bazian, and WESPAC Foundation, Inc. (together, the "alleged
agents")-are agents of "Hamas, the Palestinian Authority, the Palestine Liberation
Organization, Islamic Jihad, and other similar 'Palestinian' organizations or persons." Id. ,r,r 35, 41, 47, 51, 56, 60. In August 2024, plaintiff petitioned defendants to register the FARA. Id. ,r 63. According alleged agents under to plaintiff, defendants have neither
adjudicated this petition nor required the alleged agents to register. Id. filed suit in this Court in November 2024, asserting that defendants violated
the APA by failing to enforce FARA's registration requirements against the alleged agents.
Id. ,r,r 61-67. Plaintiff asks the Court to ( 1) "[ c ]ompel the defendants to require [ the alleged
agents] to register as foreign agents"; and (2) "[h]old unlawful the defendants' refusal to
require" their registration. Id. at 19 (Prayer for Relief). filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to excuse compliance with Local
Civil Rule 7(n). See generally Defs.' Mot. to Excuse Compliance with Loe. Civ. Rule 7(n)
("Defs.' LCvR 7(n) Mot.") [Dkt. #5]; Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss Pl.'s Compl. ("Defs.' MTD")
[Dkt. #6]. The Court ordered the parties to brief the motions together, and they are now
ripe. Pl.'s Mem. Opposing Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss and Excuse Compliance with Loe. Civ.
Rule 7 (n) ("Pl.' s Combined Opp 'n") [Dkt. #7]; Defs.' Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss
and to Excuse Compliance with Loe. Civ. Rule 7(n) ("Defs.' Combined Reply") [Dkt. #11].
II. MOTION TO DISMISS seek dismissal of plaintiff's Complaint for lack of standing and for
failure to state a claim. See generally Defs.' MTD. Because I agree with defendants on
the former, I need not reach the latter.
"[O]ne 'essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement' is that a plaintiff must establish Article III standing to sue." See Kareem v. Haspel, 986 F.3d
859, 865 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560
(1992)). alleges informational standing: It has a statutory right to information which would be in the alleged agents' statements, but it has been wrongfully
deprived of that information. Pl. 's Combined Opp'n at 3-8. While informational injury can support standing, plaintiff has not met the standing requirements here.
"Under any theory, 'the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements': ( 1) the plaintiff must have suffered an 'injury in fact' that is 'concrete
particularized' and 'actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical'; (2) there must
exist 'a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of'; and (3) it
must be 'likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision."' Friends of Animals v. Jewell, 828 F.3d 989, 991-92 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61). In assessing standing, the Court assumes the merits
of plaintiffs legal claim and accepts the factual allegations in the Complaint as true. See
Tanner-Brown v. Haaland, 105 F.4th 437, 443, 445 (D.C. Cir. 2024). Still, plaintiff
ultimately bears the burden of establishing standing. Friends of Animals, 828 F.3d at 992. here has failed to carry this burden, as its injury in fact and redressability
arguments ignore the structure of FARA's registration and enforcement mechanisms. [1]
First, as to injury in fact, plaintiff must show the alleged injury is '"concrete and
particularized' and 'actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical[.]'" Id. at 991-92
(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61). Plaintiffs claimed injury is that "defendants' refusal
to require [ the alleged agents] to file registration statements has deprived [plaintiff] of
access to information for which it has a statutory right." Compl. ,i 64; see also Pl.'s
Combined Opp'n at 3-4. Assuming arguendo that plaintiff has alleged a concrete
particularized informational injury, it has not established that this injury is actual and
imminent, as opposed to conjectural and hypothetical. See Friends of Animals, 828 F.3d
at 991-92. Plaintiff has a statutory right to the alleged agents' statements only
once those statements have been filed with the Attorney General. 22 U.S.C. § 616(a).
For that to occur, a long and uncertain chain of events would have to unfold first.
Neither defendants, nor this Court, can register the alleged agents or require the alleged agents to register themselves. FARA places the onus of registration on the entities
acting as agents of foreign principals. See id. § 612(a). If the Attorney General believes
*6 an entity needs to register, she must either pursue a criminal case or file a civil suit seeking
an injunction ordering the alleged agents to register. See id. §§ 618(a), (f). This Court
cannot issue such an injunction in this lawsuit because the alleged agents are not parties to
this case and because FARA does not provide a private right of action. See Comm. for
Free Namibia v. South West Africa People's Org., 554 F. Supp. 722, 725 (D.D.C. 1982)
(finding that there is no private right of action under FARA).
Instead, the most this Court can do would be to order defendants to file a separate lawsuit seeking an injunction. [2] would then have to persuade the court handling
that case that the alleged agents violated FARA and that an injunction ordering
is appropriate. Only once the alleged agents comply with that injunction would the
Attorney General be obligated to make their registration statements publicly available to
plaintiff and others.
As such, plaintiffs purported injury in fact depends on the outcome of a separate case and "is too speculative to invoke the jurisdiction of an Art. III court." See Whitmore
v.Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 157-59 (1990) (finding that an alleged injury in fact was
"nothing more than conjecture" because "[i]t is just not possible for a litigant to prove in
advance that the judicial system will lead to any particular result in his case"); see also
2 It is questionable whether this Court could even issue such an order. Defendants compellingly argue that
deciding whether to pursue enforcement of a potential FARA violation is an act of prosecutorial
enforcement discretion, and that a court order requiring defendants to prosecute the alleged agents would
inappropriately involve the Court in such discretionary decision-making. Defs.' MTD at 9-11, 15-16;
see also United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670, 684-85 (2023) ("[T]his case raises only the narrow Article
III standing question of whether the Federal Judiciary may in effect order the Executive Branch to take
enforcement actions against violators of federal law-here, by making more arrests. Under this Court's
Article III precedents and the historical practice, the answer is no.").]
Cl app er v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410, 414 (2013) (emphasizing the Supreme
Court's "reluctance to endorse standing theories that rest on speculation about the decisions
of independent actors"). Plaintiff therefore fails to establish the injury in fact element of
standing.
Second, and for essentially the same reasons, plaintiff cannot establish redressability. Plaintiff must "show that it is 'likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that
the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.'" ASPCA v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum
& Bailey Circus, 317 F.3d 334, 338 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S.
154, 167 (1997)). As discussed, the outennost limit of this Court's ability to provide relief
would be ordering defendants to initiate a separate lawsuit. I do not have a crystal ball to
reveal the outcome of that case, nor could I simply mandate that the other court rule in
defendants' favor. Since any prospect of relief in this lawsuit is purely speculative, plaintiff
has failed to establish redressability. See Hecate Energy LLC v. FERC, 126 F.4th 660,666
(D.C. Cir. 2025) (explaining that "standing theories that require guesswork as to how
independent decisionmakers will exercise their judgment" are not sufficient to establish
redressability (quoting Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 57 (2024))). cannot show injury in fact or redressability, and therefore cannot establish
standing. I will grant defendants' motion to dismiss with prejudice. [3]
3 "A dismissal with prejudice is warranted only when a trial court 'determines that "the allegation of other
facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency."'" Firestone v.
Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ( emphasis omitted) (quoting Jarrell v. United States Postal
Serv., 753 F.2d 1088, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). Here, plaintiff fails to establish standing because ofFARA's
statutory enforcement scheme and this Court's inability to either predict or mandate the outcome of a case
before another court. There are no facts plaintiff could plead to overcome these obstacles.
III. MOTION TO EXCUSE COMPLIANCE WITH LOCAL CIVIL RULE 7(N)
Defendants also move to excuse compliance with Local Civil Rule 7(n), which provides that "[i]n cases involving the judicial review of administrative agency action ...
the agency must file a certified list of the contents of the administrative record with the
Court ... simultaneously with the filing of a dispositive motion." Loe. Civ. R. 7(n). seek excusal from this obligation because their motion to dismiss raises only
threshold questions of law and does not rely on any materials that would be part of the
administrative record. Defs.' LCvR 7(n) Mot. at 2. As set forth above, I will grant
defendants' motion to dismiss with prejudice, and the grounds for doing so do not require
production of the administrative record. See supra ·Section II. I will therefore grant
defendants' motion to excuse compliance with Local Civil Rule 7(n).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion to dismiss and motion to excuse with Local Civil Rule 7(n) are GRANTED and the Complaint is DISMISSED compliance
with prejudice. A separate Order consistent with the above accompanies this Memorandum
Opinion.
RICHARD J. LEON
United States District Judge
[1] The Court need not reach the issue of traceability, as plaintiff must establish all three elements of standing and here fails to establish at least two of them.