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Ambrose Gill v. Robert J. Ayers, Warden Attorney General of the State of California
322 F.3d 678
9th Cir.
2003
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*1 little no ex if there was or Even GILL, Petitioner-Appellant, Ambrose dispatch tape, Riv to the

culpatory value government still violat argues that the era when it did not discovery request ed AYERS, Warden; Attorney Robert J. tape.12 Assuming, arguendo, produce the California, General State violated Rivera’s dis government Respondents-Appellees. tape by producing the covery request No. 01-55808. existed, it such a violation did when still rights on Rivera’s substantial not encroach Appeals, United States Court relevancy of the of the dubious because Ninth Circuit. tape. on the Am- conversations recorded lani, Argued Sept. and Submitted 2002. The district court 111 F.3d within its acted well discretion therefore Filed March government. to sanction the refusing Conclusion correctly refused to district jury

instruct the that failure enter the of attempting

United States an element

to enter the United States violation § 1326. The district court did not

U.S.C. by refusing its sanction

abuse discretion any discovery government viola- regarding production of the

tions dis-

patch tape containing conversations be- Agents Graving and

tween Jacobs

night government of Rivera’s arrest. The process rights

did not Rivera’s due violate dispatch destroying tape. We AFFIRM conviction.

therefore Rivera’s may tape patch 12. The tapes.” have still existed at the time discovery request Rivera made a for "dis- *3 CA, Goleta, for Goldsen,

Ralph H. petitioner-appellant. Attorney Torreblanca, Deputy

Teresa CA, respon- for General, Diego, San dents-appellees. R. THOMPSON DAVID

Before: RAWLINSON, Judges and Circuit Judge. SCHWARZER,* District Senior R. DAVID Opinion Judge THOMPSON; by Judge Dissent RAWLINSON THOMPSON, Judge. Circuit R. DAVID I Ambrose prisoner state California of his denial court’s district appeals the pursuant corpus relief for habeas petition Gill, a sen- serving § 2254. to 28 U.S.C. California’s life under years to tence he was Law,” contends “Three Strikes Three at his process of law due denied hearing. Strikes * California, designation. silting by Schwarzer, District Senior W William The Honorable Judge the Northern District United States Gill was convicted of one count jury on any person, other than an accom- deadly assault with a weapon three plice, or ... personally use[d] firearm” counts of assault means of force likely 1192.7(c)(8) under section or that he “per- produce great bodily injury, all viola- sonally a dangerous use[d] or deadly weap- tion of California Penal Code section 1192.7(c)(23): on” under section conviction”). 245(a)(collectively, the “1976 One may 245(a)(1) thus violate section Under California’s scheme, two ways that would not qualify as “seri- the 1976 conviction could only count as a ous” felonies under 1192.7, section Sub- upon “strike” a finding that Gill per- had (c): First, division one may aid and abet sonally used a dangerous weap- the assault without personally inflicting on during the assault. See CaLPenal Code *4 great bodily harm or using a firearm. 667(d) §§ (e), 1192.7(c)(23). and At Gill’s Second, one may commit the assault sentencing hearing, with “likely” force to great bodily cause court considered documentation from the injury without, however, actually caus- record of conviction, the 1976 including ing great bodily injury or using a deadly Gill’s own paraphrased statements as in a weapon. Accordingly, the adjudi- least probation department report. court, The cated elements of the crime defined however, refused to allow Gill to testify to 245(a)(1) section are insufficient to es- explain or refute the statements attributed tablish a felony. “serious” to him. Because we conclude that People v. Rodriguez, refusal to allow 253, 261, to Cal.4th testify Gill violated his 31, 36, P.2d process due rights Cal.Rptr.2d 334, clearly under estab- (1998) (citing People lished federal v. Equarte, law as by determined Cal.3d Court, 895-96, P.2d and the error was not Cal. harmless, Rptr. (1986)), 121-22 we superseded reverse. statute on other grounds as stated in Peo II James, ple v. 91 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1149, 293-94 prior “strike” Gill challenges in this appeal is his 1976 conviction of four counts At Gill’s Three Strikes sentencing hear- of violating California Penal Code section ing, prosecutor offered documentation 245(a) (currently 245(a)(1), section assault from 245(a)(1) Gill’s1976 section conviction with deadly weapon or by likely force to prove that the qualified conviction a as produce great bodily injury). “strike.” The documentation disclosed 245(a)(1)

Not all section violations con- that the offense arose from an incident stitute strikes under California law.1 In Colton, that occurred at a California party. California, “strikes” include “violent felo- group A youths from Colton became 667.5(c) nies” defined in section and “seri- involved physical in a altercation with a ous felonies” 1192.7(c). defined in section group of youths Fontana, from California. 245(a)(1) Section is not explicitly listed in Gill was aligned with the group. Fontana Instead, either section. qualify a sec- Four or persons five from the Colton 245(a)(1) tion strike, conviction as a group injured were by someone from the prosecution must establish that the defen- Fontana group wielding a baseball bat. dant “personally great bodily inflict[ed] in- Gill another man were charged with specified, Unless otherwise all references to sections of the California Penal Code. code opinion sections in this are references law, judge the trial admitted the state- was convicted of one

those assaults. weapon proba- from the deadly attributable to Gill with ments assault count of excluded, means of force hearsay assault report, tion but three counts injury, bodily all produce great report. that likely grounds, sections of 245(a)(1). of section violation request court denied Gill’s making the state- explain reasons finding In violated sec per- did and to assert that he not ments 245(a)(1), have jury could found tion a deadly as sonally use the baseball bat weapon, used that he weapon. likely produce great force employed that he aided someone injury, or bodily making the court noted ruling, this such acts. We cannot else who committed Court and there were California particular jury’s verdict what tell from clearly held appellate court decisions which know, however, do it found. We facts that, of a proving substance per did determine that Gill jury conviction, prosecution is limited to Therefore, weapon. sonally used cases, record of conviction. Those howev- 245(a)(1) qualify the 1976 section convic er, acknowledged, as 1192.7(c)(23), tion a strike under section as *5 the a open question left whether defendant fact prove the had the additional State to See, e.g., similarly People restricted.3 personally had used the baseball that Gill Reed, 217, 229, 184, 13 Cal.4th 914 P.2d deadly weapon.2 bat as a (1996) (“We 192, 106, 114 52 (1) fact, the prove To that state offered: no as a defen- express opinion to whether information, charging the Gill with one dant entitled to call wit- would be live deadly weapon a with count of assault with of dispute [the] to circumstances nesses murder four intent to commit and counts ”); People .... prior the offense Guerre- by likely pro- of of force to assault means ro, 1150, 44 356 748 P.2d Cal.3d n. (2) injury; the great bodily jury duce ver- (1988) (con- Cal.Rptr. finding guilty of one count of dicts Gill may trial look to the cluding a court (a deadly weapon assault with a lesser determining entire record of conviction the crime of included offense of assault of prior-conviction allegations, the truth to weapon with a with intent com- declining but to address “whether on the murder) mit and three counts of assault peculiar facts of an individual case the likely produce of great means force application of the rule set forth herein (3) bodily injury; reflecting a minute order rights violate the of a might constitutional (4) verdicts; the minute jury’s a order defendant”). criminal (5) sentencing hearing; from the 1976 and precluding testifying, Gill from excerpt an from 1976probation depart- if documentation, sentencing were report. court reasoned he ment This ruled, part testify, surprise an of would be original constituted of element injected proceeding, pros- record. with case into the Consistent California (1988)] deadly weapon Cal.Rptr. a Whether bat is a didn’t resolve that issue baseball either, depends under California law on the manner appellate we have so now two courts McCullin, People in which it is used. Supreme saying, and the 'We’re not Cal.Rptr. Cal.App.3d going to decide whether not the defendant or testify.’ Flip a can coin as which side appeal? Draw wants straws?” stated, "Apparently [People The court v.] Guerrero 748 P.2d [44 Cal.3d presenting a difficulty timely petition ecution would have Gill filed for review in in view of the of passage Supreme rebuttal evidence the California Court. That court the 1976 conviction and the time between denied review. sentencing hearing.

1999 Three Strikes Gill corpus then filed habeas Counting the 1976 conviction as a “strike” petition the United States District Law, applying peti- Court. district court denied years to life in court sentenced tion, holding that the state court decision prison.4 was not an application unreasonable sentence, appealed his Three Strikes clearly established federal law as deter- alia, arguing, inter mined by Court of the United in refusing court had allow him to erred granted States. We a ap- certificate of testify. Appeal The California Court of pealability limited to “whether the state Appellate rejected for the Fourth District court’s allow a refusal to [Gill] argument. this The court reasoned that: sentencing hearing regarding the nature of adjudicated ‘The least elements of the conviction an involved unreasonable prior conviction remain the wheth same application clearly established federal questioned er it is in the trial court at law as determined Court.” the time of the determination habitual criminality corpus or on habeas after Ill such determination has final. become jurisdiction We have under 28 U.S.C. People Neither the nor the defendant §§ 1291 and 2253. We review de novo go adjudicated can behind those ele district grant deny court’s decision to ments in an attempt show that *6 prisoner’s state for a petition writ of habe- greater, lesser, committed a or different corpus pursuant as filed to 28 U.S.C. 389, Finley, re [In 68 Cal.2d offense.’ Lambert, 1040, § 2254. Benn v. F.3d 283 384, 393, 381, 733, Cal.Rptr. 438 P.2d 66 (9th Cir.2002) 1051 (citing Miles v. Prunty, (1968) Thus, upon 736 the authority ]. (9th 1104, Cir.1999)), 187 F.3d 1105 cert. prosecution Guerrero

which rests treats — denied, -, 341, U.S. 123 S.Ct. 154 permitted and defense alike—neither is (2002). 249 L.Ed.2d reopen the proceedings to take testi mony. petition We review Gill’s under Gill, v. People provisions Consolidated Case Nos. the of the Anti-Terrorism and G022286,G022287, G022288, (“AEDPA”) slip op. Penalty at 10- Effective Death Act 1999) 9, 11 (Cal.Ct.App. (quoting petition March because Gill April filed his after Bartow, 1573, 24, 1996, v. People Cal.App.4th 46 AEDPA’s effective date. Lindh v. 482, (1996)) (em- 1582, 2059, 54 521 Murphy, 487 U.S. 117 S.Ct. phasis (1997); in also original).The court noted v. Patterson Stew art, (9th 1243, Cir.2001). opportunity had the same Gill as 251 F.3d 1245 prosecution AEDPA, to submit documents from is eligible Under Gill conviction, the record of the and concluded habeas federal relief unless the decision of error, had Appeal, “demonstrated no con- the California of Court the last 11. sys- stitutional otherwise.” Id. at reasoned decision from the state court originally 4. trial underlying court sentenced Gill to reversed the conviction one ol the years terms, of three consecutive terms 25 to life and years currently serving 25 life years an additional term five of and four years 55 to life. appellate months. the state Because precedent to, long A line of Court an un- contrary or involved tem5 was Beginning with of, compels this conclusion. clearly estab- application reasonable 517, States, 267 U.S. Cooke United by the law as determined federal lished (1925), 390, the Court 69 L.Ed. 767 S.Ct. 2254(d)(1) § U.S.C. Court. that, contempt proceed- ain criminal held recent- Supreme Court has As the open act outside ing for an that occurred ly explained, court, opportunity a afford “the court must clause, a “contrary to” feder- [u]nder by the accused to his defense of writ if the may grant al habeas court 536, 45 Id. at argument.” witnesses oppo- a conclusion court arrives at state Alabama, Later, in Powell v. S.Ct. 390. by Supreme] [the reached site to that 77 L.Ed. 158 S.Ct. U.S. if the on of law or state question Court a Cooke, (1932), held that citing Court differently than [the court decides case of to be heard counsel denial of materi- Supreme] has on set Court therefore, and, hearing, a “denial of a was facts. ally indistinguishable Under process due sense.” constitutional clause, application” a fed- “unreasonable Powell, 69, 53 287 U.S. at S.Ct. may grant the writ if eral habeas court subsequently applied these gov- identifies the correct the state court process due elements of to defendants principle erning legal [the from Su- proceedings. recidivist Chandler preme] decisions unreason- Court’s but Fretag, 99 L.Ed. 4 348 U.S. S.Ct. principle ably applies facts (1954), Court, part Pow relying on case. prisoner’s ell, process held it a denial of due that was 362, 412-13, Taylor, 529 U.S. Williams Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed (2000) 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 S.Ct. deny a defendant an (O’Connor,J.). against obtain counsel defend a recidi Id. also charge. vist at See IV Cunningham, Chewning v. Gill contends that had he been able (1962) 498, 7 L.Ed.2d hearing, his Three Strikes that, charge “a (holding because trial explained testimony would have the state being a habitual criminal is such a seri *7 probation to in attributed him the (Chandler 3, ments one Fretag, ous v. 348 U.S. 75 department have report and would estab 1, 4), presented 99 L.Ed. the issues S.Ct. personally that did not use a lished complex,, under and Virginia’s statute so He deadly weapon. argues that the sen potential prejudice resulting the from the tencing court’s failure to allow him to testi great,” must absence of counsel so counsel fy violated Fourteenth Amendment due his supplied to a with charged be defendant defense, Boles, a process right present criminality). Oyler habitual In v. objectively 448, 501, was an applica unreasonable 7 446 368 U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d (1962), clearly Court, citing tion of law as Chewning, federal established the Chan Cochran, Supreme Reynolds decisions of the We dler and 365 U.S. Court. 525, 723, (1961), agree. 81 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d Hubbard, Supreme judgment.” Because de- court's the California Court Shackleford 1072, (citing (9th Cir.2000) petition n. 2 nied review Gill's habeas without 234 F.3d comment, Nunnemaker, 797, 803-04, through' unexplained 501 U.S. "we 'look tire v.Ylst 2590, (1991)), Supreme 115 L.Ed.2d 706 cert. ] California Court decision! denied, 944, 324, decision, appellate 122 S.Ct. last reasoned the state 534 U.S. decision, (2001). court’s as the state L.Ed.2d 242 basis (1963)) (alterations § “[although stated that these cases were Stat. Ann. 39-19-1 in with specifically right concerned Specht). The compared Court sentencing counsel, it assistance of would have been hearings under Colorado’s Sex Offenders accomplishment say that an idle due Act sentencing hearings “under recidi- process requires counsel but not the right vist statutes” which “a distinct is- and[an] to reasonable notice sue;” and held that a sentencing hearing at be heard.” Id. 82 S.Ct. 501. The Act, under Colorado’s Sex Offenders a de- implicit that deci- Court held its earlier fendant is entitled to full panoply that requirement sions was a defendant process guarantees due of the Fourteenth opportu- “receive and an reasonable notice Amendment including right pres- be nity to be heard relative to recidivist [a] counsel, ent with to have the opportunity ” charge.... Id. There can be no doubt heard, to be to confront and cross-examine precedent clearly that Court has witnesses, adverse and to offer evidence of process, including established that due his own. Id. at 87 S.Ct. 1209.6 heard, applies right pro- to be to recidivist Law, California’s Three Strikes ceedings. like Act, Colorado’s Sex Offenders authorizes In applied beyond statutory sentences maximum process guarantees these due in the con- offense, upon proof for the current of addi text of a proceeding which scheme, tional facts. In the California petitioner beyond received sentence prosecution prove must either the fact of a statutory maximum for the crime he conviction, or, here, prior as pertain facts Patterson, Specht committed. ing prior to that conviction. The State Specht contends that is distinguishable be Specht, being instead of sentenced for Specht’s cause sentence was based on facts the “indecent liberties” of which he was conviction, than a whereas convicted, Specht was sentenced under is Gill’ssentence based on his 1976 convic Act, Colorado’s au- Sex Offenders which argument tion. That fails. While it is thorized a “if day sentence of one to life true that Three Gill’s Strikes sentence is opinion the trial court ‘is conviction, based on his 1976 that convic person specified ... [convicted of of- sex fenses], support tion will not if sentence without large, constitutes a threat of proof bodily public, personal harm to of the additional fact of use members or is ” mentally deadly weapon. an habitual offender of a in Specht, ill.’ As Id. at (quoting presents 87 S.Ct. 1209 Colo.Rev. determination distinct issue.7 cross-examine, noteworthy It the California Su- and to offer evidence ” (in Reed, preme People Court in v. Reed which that of his own.’ Cal.4th at 228 n. *8 106, court declined to address whether the defen- (quoting 914 P.2d 184 right 610, dispute 1209) (alter dant had a to call witnesses to Specht, 386 U.S. at 87 S.Ct. conviction), Reed). a prior circumstances of cited ations in Specht dismissing government's to con- right relitigate tention that a defendant has no constitutional 7. Gill has no to the fact of the right to confront witnesses in a sentence en- 1976 assault conviction. See Lackawanna Coss, 394, proceeding: County Attorney hancement "The United States Dist. 532 U.S. 402-04, 1567, Supreme Court has held that 'under recidivist 121 S.Ct. 149 L.Ed.2d 608 Gill, however, statutes where an habitual criminal issue is "a does not attack his process distinct issue” [citation] ... ... 1976 conviction. The [d]ue 1976 conviction for requires present [the defendant] be with coun- violation of California Penal Code section sel, heard, 245(a)(1) opportunity have an possibility to be be con- embraced him, against require fronted with weapon, witnesses have the used a but did not

686 the defendant’s con- imposed limitation that because Gill was argues

The State 55-56, testify.” Id. at present right to documen to opportunity stitutional given the evidence, oppor only evidentiary and denied The Arkansas tary 107 S.Ct. afforded a suffi testify, he was tunity to trial in Rock did not allow rule invalidated heard and there be opportunity cient post-hypnot- to admit courts discretion Amendment violation. no Fourteenth was Here, Three testimony. ic California’s the mark. The Su misses argument This subjected procedure similarly Strikes right that the to be has held preme Court him arbitrary process that denied to an testify. Rock right heard includes beyond the record of con- any right go 44, 49, Arkansas, 107 S.Ct. testify. viction and Rock, (1987). In 2704, L.Ed.2d 37 gave two reasons grounds process on due Court invalidated precluding testify- Gill from for its decision prohibition against complete Arkansas’ “surprise” prosecu- and the ing. It cited testimony, asserting refreshed hypnotically evi- difficulty presenting tion’s rebuttal in a that a defendant “it cannot be doubted lapse of time between dence because of the to take the right has the criminal case and the 1999 Three the 1976 conviction testify in his or her and to witness stand court, in hearing. appellate to tes opportunity Id. The Strikes own defense.” wrote, necessary decision, corol primarily is “a on the relia- tify, the Court its relied guarantee lary department report to the Fifth Amendment’s bility probation 52, testimony.” Id. at compelled against opportunity evidence and Gill’s “right reach [that] 2704. It is a reasons, 107 S.Ct. testimony. than his These procedur beyond criminal trial: es however, given lack substance the Rock required constitutionally process al due important that “the most Court’s assertion includes extrajudicial proceedings some in many witness for the defense criminal testify” person to right of the affected himself. There is cases is the defendant pro parole revocation probation at justification today for a rule that denies no hearings at on the ter ceedings and even an to offer his accused Id. at 51 n. welfare benefits. mination of Rock, testimony.” own U.S. Scarp (citing Gagnon v. 107 S.Ct. 2704 S.Ct. 778, 782, 786, 93 S.Ct. elli, 411 U.S. (1973); Morrissey v. Brew conclude that the state court’s We er, U.S. denying right decision Gill the (1972); Goldberg Kelly, L.Ed.2d 484 right his Fourteenth Amendment violated 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d U.S. process. Applying to due the clear error (1970)). review, that decision was an standard application of objectively unreasonable recognized has Although the Court clearly established federal law as deter testify may be right that a defendant’s mined Court. See Van restricted, a defendant’s “restrictions of Lindsey, Tran v. F.3d 1153-54 arbitrary testify may be (9th Cir.2000) (reasonableness of state disproportionate purposes they are error). reviewed for clear court decision eviden designed applying to serve. its AEDPA, to ha Under the Gill is entitled evaluate whether tiary rules a State must *9 justify corpus unless the state court’s a rule beas relief interests served weapon proof weapon. introduced a new factual issue at the -personally that he used such hearing. charge personally used a that Gill 690-91, (citations erroneous decision was harmless. See Id. at omitted). Shackleford, 234 at F.3d 1077-79. The Court remanded the case to

the state court for application of a harm- analysis. less error remand, After V Sixth Circuit determined that exclusion A error of trial-type constitu proffered of the testimony was not harm- dimension is it tional harmless unless had less due to its noncumulative nature and injurious a “substantial and effect or influ because it cast upon doubt the reliability of in determining ence the [fact ver finder’s] confession, the crucial element of the Abrahamson, dict.” Brecht v. 507 U.S. prosecution’s Sowders, case. Crane v. 619, 637, 113 S.Ct. (6th Cir.1989). F.2d (1993) States, (quoting Kotteakos v. United case, present In the the crucial 750, 776, 328 U.S. 66 S.Ct. 90 L.Ed. evidence the language proba was from (1946)). inquiry “The cannot be report tion paraphrased Gill’s state merely whether enough sup was there probation ments to the officer to the effect result, port apart phase from the af during the altercation personally he rather, so, by the error. It fected is even hit persons from the rival faction with a whether the error itself had substantial baseball bat. Gill asserts that he made so, If influence. or if one in grave is left those attempt statements an appear doubt, the conviction cannot stand.” Kot conciliatory contrite at a time an when teakos, 328 U.S. at 66 S.Ct. 1239. personal admission of weapon use had no effect on the sentence he would receive. Kentucky, In Crane v. the Court held He contends that had he been able to that a analysis harmless error be should testify at his Three hearing Strikes applied to a bearing striking case similari explained could have this and could have present ties to the case. Crane v. Ken that he did not personally established use tucky, 106 S.Ct. deadly weapon. bat as a baseball Crane, L.Ed.2d 636 In the Court Kentucky’s held that exclusion of a habeas We do know whether the sentencing petitioner’s testimony bearing upon the court would have believed testimony, Gill’s circumstances of his confession had, violated if it but that testimony would have right Fourteenth Amendment to a fair tri allegation personal refuted the weapon al, that: reasoning use. Gill was entitled to have the sentenc- ing court that testimony. hear essential component procedural

[A]n fairness is an opportunity Crane, to be heard. In testimony the excluded was That empty would be an one central to the defendant’s defense. Crane if the permitted State were Sowders, to exclude v. 889 F.2d at 718(citing Crane v. competent, 2142). reliable evidence bearing Kentucky, 476 U.S. at the credibility Here, of a confession when testimony such only Gill’s was not central defense, evidence central to the defendant’s to his it only was his defense. claim of innocence. the absence of right present denial justification, valid state testimony deprived exclusion Gill of his constitution- this kind of exculpatory right evidence de- al That error defense. prives a defendant of the basic injurious had a “substantial effect or prosecutor’s have the case determining encounter influence in [fact finder’s] Brecht, and “survive the of meaningful crucible verdict.” U.S. testing.” Kotteakos,

adversarial (quoting S.Ct. 1710 328 U.S. at *10 1239). a baseball bat dur- personally wielded The error was 776, 66 S.Ct. fracas. Fast forward ing Saturday-night a harmless. possible a life facing with Gill under California’s “Three Strikes VI sentence fact, Twenty-one years Law.” after remand this case to the and We reverse sentencing hearing, his “Three Strikes” to issue the with instructions district court the statements sought challenge Gill corpus relieving Gill of the writ of habeas probation depart- attributed to him in the imposed under Cali- court’s sentence state report. The state trial court denied ment Law in reliance on fornia’s prior statement request Gill’s to refute violating California his 1976 conviction contrary at “Three by testifying to the 245(a)(1), unless section Penal Code sentencing hearing. Strikes” period of time afforded within reasonable in request The trial court denied Gill’s Three testify at a new opportunity part recognized the court because hearing on the issue of Strikes time had lessened the likeli- passage of deadly weapon personal of a use obtaining countervailing eyewit- hood of offenses. commission of the 1976 testimony regarding ness the extent of and REMANDED. REVERSED in administer- personal Gill’s involvement ing the blows. The trial court assaultive RAWLINSON, Judge, Circuit binding existence of also considered the Dissenting: prosecution precedent limiting state I respectfully dissent. establishing the record of conviction when acknowledged, federal recently As we the existence of a conviction. lightly. granted not be habeas relief should Appeal Court of con- California Rather, and Effective the Antiterrorism Citing Peo- ruling. firmed the trial court’s (“AEDPA”) Act of 1996 Penalty Death Bartow, ple Cal.App.4th standard for “imposes highly deferential (1996), the Court of demands evaluating rulings[;] state-court Appeal prosecu- declared “neither given the that state court decisions be tion call may nor the defense live wit- doubt”[;] mandates “our benefit of the and Gill, People nesses.” Consolidated Case “co-equal full respect” rulings of our G022286, G022287,G022288, slip. op. Nos. Murphy, 317 F.3d judiciary.” Clark 1999). (Cal.Ct.App. at 10 March (citations (9th Cir.2003) Appeal noted that “a defendant’s omitted). quotation internal marks post-conviction probation statements in a mind, proceed I With cautions report reliably those do reflect the conduct of accompanying to the habeas inquiry first which a defendant was convicted. The review: “whether the state court erred at judge surely any would note deviation omitted). (citation all.” If the Id. at 1044 description crime from evi- of the error, state court no our habeas committed dence adduced at trial.” Id. at 12. inquiry ends. See id. Finally, in disposing process of Gill’s due (“Gill”) claim-, Appeal was con-

Petitioner Ambrose Gill the California Court of ob- reliability [proba- victed in count of assault with served that of the “[t]he 1976 of one deadly weapon report three counts of as- is further ensured fact tion] likely produce sault that defendant had the to chal- means of force great bodily During lenge accuracy report an interview at sen- injury. officer, probation tencing with a admitted that and to correct misstatements. *11 Thus, may while there be a case where due the state I court’s decision. would do the process will demand that a court hear the same. conviction, concerning

defendant 13(citation is not it.” Id. at and inter-

this omitted).

nal quotation marks majority assigns error to the Cali Appeal’s ruling, relying

fornia Court of Supreme opinion

the United States Court’s Arkansas, 44, 55-56,

in Rock v. MARQUEZ, Plaintiff-Appellee, Vincent However, majority gives short shrift to Supreme recognition Court’s that “[o]f GUTIERREZ, R J Defendant- course, the right to relevant testi Appellant, mony may, is not without limitation [and] cases, appropriate bow to accommodate legitimate interests the criminal Gomes; White, Warden; James Theo M proces.” trial Id. at 107 S.Ct. 2704. Bishoff; Armendariz; D Suzan Hub added) (citation (emphasis and internal bard, Warden; Vance; Johnson; S J C omitted). quotation marks Helder; Sandt; L Dr D H W V Moehr acknowledgment Court’s matter-of-fact of ing; Connolly; Williams; E A S procedural the need to accommodate other George Galaza; Loo; Harway; M L R priorities question majority’s calls into Kellawan; Bynam, K B Defendants. application facile of Rock to the facts of this case. For the Court ex No. 02-15017.

pressly cautioned that the exercise of the United of Appeals, States Court defendant’s right must be consistent with Ninth Circuit. reliability.” “both fairness and Id. at 11, 107 n. 2704. Argued and Submitted Feb. fairness fostered if the defendant Filed March

Js presents testimony at the Three Strikes

Hearing may when the not? State Do

twenty-year-old the in- recollections serve reliability?

terests of The California Appeal questions

Court of answered these negative,

in the and committed no error

doing so. accordance with the dictates Rock, Appeal the California testify

restricted defendant’s after

considering parallel interests of fair- reliability.

ness and The California Court Appeal ruled that on the facts of this

case, defendant’s right to did not

outweigh properly the other interests con-

sidered the court. The district court

gave appropriate respect deference and

Case Details

Case Name: Ambrose Gill v. Robert J. Ayers, Warden Attorney General of the State of California
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date Published: Mar 6, 2003
Citation: 322 F.3d 678
Docket Number: 01-55808
Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.
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