MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pending before the court is Defendant St. Luke’s Episcopal Hospital’s (“St. Luke’s”) Motion for Summary Judgment (#20). St. Luke’s seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff John Amato’s (“Amato”) claims of violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Having reviewed the pending motion, the submissions of the parties, the pleadings, and the applicable law, this Court is of the opinion that St. Luke’s motion should be granted.
I. Background
Amato was employed by St. Luke’s as a nursing care assistant from July 1990 until he was terminated in August 1994. Amato suffers from retinitis pigmentosa (“RP”), which has reduced his visual acuity to less than 20/200, and, therefore, he is classified as legally blind. St. Luke’s does not dispute that the plaintiff suffers from RP or that he is classified as legally blind. It is also undisputed that Amato disclosed his medical condition to St. Luke’s. While at St. Luke’s, Amato wore corrective eyeglasses.
As a nursing care assistant, Amato’s duties included, but were not limited to: cleaning operating rooms; responding to pages; and picking up deliveries, supplies, equipment, specimens, and blood. Amato was also responsible for mopping, picking up trash, and providing stretchers and recovery room beds for patients. In addition, Amato transported patients between their hospital rooms and the operating rooms. Amato testified that he had no problem moving patients to the proper location in the hospital.
In 1991, Amato received a copy of St. Luke’s new employee handbook. Amato testified at deposition that, as a St. Luke’s employee, he was responsible for knowing the contents of the handbook. The handbook included St. Luke’s revised time and attendance policy, which provided that each employee is expected to report as scheduled and to keep absences to a minimum. The policy specifically provided that when an employee’s attendance record fell below St. Luke’s acceptable standards for unscheduled absences, the following corrective action steps were to be taken:
• on the fourth (4th) unscheduled occasion of absence during the attendance *527 year, the employee will receive a verbal conference;
• on the sixth (6th) unscheduled occasion of absence during the attendance year, the employee will receive a written conference;
• on the seventh (7th) unscheduled occasion of absence during the attendance year, the employee will receive an additional written conference and be placed on probation for excessive absenteeism for ninety (90) days or the remainder of the attendance year, whichever is greater;
• any further unscheduled occasions of absence during the probationary period may result in the discharge of the employee for excessive absenteeism;
2. any employee, who is placed on probation for absenteeism in two consecutive years may be discharged for excessive absenteeism.
Amato had a history of poor attendance throughout his employment at St. Luke’s. Consequently, he was repeatedly counseled and disciplined for excessive absenteeism. On June 24, 1991, Amato received a verbal employee conference report due to four unscheduled absences. On December 27, 1991, he received a written employee conference report and was placed on probation for ninety days as a result of his continued poor attendance. Amato was then cautioned that immediate improvement in his attendance was required. By April 28, 1992, Amato had four additional absences. In accordance with St. Luke’s attendance policy, he was given another verbal conference. On- June 26, 1992, Amato received an additional written conference because he had accrued an additional six unscheduled absences. On August 31, 1992, Amato was given a written conference report and placed on probation for ninety days because of his continued absenteeism. Amato drafted a written statement in response to this written conference record in which he attributed his unscheduled, absences to abdominal pain or gastritis.
On November 18, 1992, Amato called St. Luke’s to report that he was sick with a headache. Because he was still on probation, this additional unscheduled absence was grounds for termination. St. Luke’s opted, however, to extend Amato’s probationary period for thirty more days rather than terminating him. He was once again warned that his attendance must improve ■ immediately. Amato signed the employee conference record but did not include any comments. Despite these explicit warnings, Amato’s poor attendance continued. By June 16, 1993, he had four unscheduled absences within the 1993 attendance year. As a result, Amato was given another verbal conference report. By September 24, 1993, he had accumulated a total of six unscheduled absences. Once again, Amato was given a verbal conference report and was informed that he must improve his attendance immediately. By October 7, 1993, however, Amato had seven unscheduled absences and, as a result, was placed on probation for the second time.
By February 1994, Amato had accumulated two additional unscheduled absences. In light of the two consecutive probationary periods, St. Luke’s management met with Ama-to to advise him that pursuant to St. Luke’s attendance policy, he would be terminated if he accumulated an additional absence during the remainder of the 1994 attendance year. On August 4 and 5, Amato did not report to work. On August 8, 1994, St. Luke’s terminated Amato for excessive absenteeism. Amato concedes that his attendance was poor under the standards set forth in St. Luke’s attendance policy, but he contends that his vision disability caused him at times to board the wrong Metro bus, leading him to miss work altogether. Amato further claims that he missed work on other occasions due to headaches caused by RP.
Amato timely filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and received a right to sue letter. On June 17, 1996, Amato filed this action alleging that St. Luke’s had discriminated against him in violation of the ADA and had intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon him.
II. Analysis
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56(c) provides that “[summary] judgment ■ shall be rendered forthwith if the
*528
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
Once a proper motion has been made, the non-moving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in the' pleadings, but must set forth specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial.
See Celotex Corp.,
B. Americans with Disabilities Act
The ADA is a federal antidiscrimination statute designed to prevent otherwise qualified individuals from being discriminated against in employment based on a disability.
See
29 C.F.R. § 1630, App.;
Taylor v. Principal Fin. Group, Inc.,
1. Prima Facie Case and Burden of Proof
To recover under the ADA, the plaintiff must prove that he was discriminated against on the basis of his disability.
See Daigle, 70
F.3d at 396;
Jacques v. Clean-Up Group, Inc.,
If the plaintiff succeeds in making this
prima facie
showing, a rebuttable presumption of discrimination arises, and the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.
See Daigle,
If the employer meets its burden of production, the presumption is dissolved, and the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the proffered reason is a pretext for diserimination-the defendant’s alleged nóndiscriminatory reason’ is false and the real reason for the adverse action is disability discrimination.
See Armendariz v. Pinkerton Tobacco Co.,
a. Otherwise Qualified Individual with a Disability
In this case, St. Luke’s does not contest that Amato suffers from a disability. St. Luke’s contends, however, that Amato was not otherwise qualified for his position, as he was unable to maintain an acceptable attendance record.
As discussed above, a “qualified individual with a disability” under the ADA is “an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds....” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Therefore, in order for Amato to demonstrate that he was qualified for the nursing care assistant position, he must establish that: (1) he could perform the
*530
essential functions of the job; or (2) if he was not able to perform the essential functions of the job, that a reasonable accommodation by St. Luke’s would have enabled him to perform those functions.
See Chandler v. City of Dallas,
b.Essential Functions of the Job
Essential functions are those that bear more than a marginal relationship to the job at issue.
See id.
In determining the essential functions of a position, “consideration shall be given to the employer’s judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an employer has prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Without regard to the essential nature of certain functions, however, no disabled person is “qualified” if he needs accommodation precisely because he failed to manage an otherwise controllable disorder.
See Siefken v. Village of Arlington Heights,
St. Luke’s asserts that regular attendance is an essential function of all of its jobs, including that of a nursing care assistant. Accordingly, the hospital distributed to all of its employees a written statement of its time and attendance policies. It is apparent from this statement that St. Luke’s considers regular attendance to be an essential function of the job held by Amato. Amato’s description of his job duties further confirms that his presence at the hospital was essential for the performance of his job. Indeed, numerous courts have held that attendance at work, the most basic element of an employee’s duties, is an essential element of almost all jobs.
See, e.g., Tyndall v. National Educ. Ctrs., Inc.,
c. Capability of Essential Functions Without Accommodation
Amato maintains that he could perform the essential functions of his job. In support of his position, Amato points out that St. Luke’s representative, Rena Sebesta, admitted that Amato competently performed every other essential function of his job, except regular attendance. Nevertheless, Am-ato concedes that he had eight unscheduled absences in 1991, eight unscheduled absences in 1992, seven unscheduled absences in 1993, and four unscheduled absences in 1994. Furthermore, at deposition, Amato admitted that his record of attendance was “poor.” Hence, it is manifest that, during four consecutive years, the plaintiff was unable to perform an essential function of his job-regular attendance at work. Thus, Amato cannot be said to be capable of performing the essential functions of his job without reasonable accommodation.
d. Capability of Essential Functions with Reasonable Accommodation
Amato also contends that he would be able to perform the essential aspects of his job if the hospital made reasonable accommodation for his disability. Specifically, he suggests an accommodation of leave flexibility and unpaid leave.
*531 Under the ADA, the term “Reasonable Accommodation,” may include—
(a) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
The plaintiff is required to demonstrate, as part of his
prima facie
ease, that an accommodation of his disability exists and that such accommodation is reasonable.
See Riel v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp.,
An examination of Amato’s suggested accommodations reveals that they differ in kind from the types of accommodations set forth in the ADA definition. While this definition is non-exclusive, each example of a “reasonable accommodation” listed has as its inherent prerequisite an employee who reports for work.
See
42 U.S.C. § 12111. Furthermore, Amato’s suggested accommodations are unreasonable, in that “these accommodations do not address the heart of the problem: the unpredictable nature of ... [plaintiffs] absences.”.
See Jackson v. Veterans Admin.,
In Jackson, the plaintiff was terminated from a probationary housekeeping position after accruing six unforeseen absences in a period of about two and one-half months, ostensibly due to' his rheumatoid arthritis. See id. at 278. The plaintiff requested that his employer accommodate his disability by allowing him to trade work days with other employees, delaying the start time of his shift, or by delaying some of his tasks to another day. See id. The Eleventh Circuit held that such accommodations were not reasonable, however, as they would place an undue hardship on the employer. See id. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs suggested accommodations would require the employer to make last-minute arrangements for the plaintiffs work to be done by some other emplqyee every time the plaintiff was unexpectedly absent. See id. at 279.
Similarly, in the instant case, Amato’s suggested accommodations provide no remedy for the sporadic and unpredictable nature of Amato’s absences. His suggestions essentially require the hospital to retain and compensate a surplus of employees on Amato’s scheduled work days to be available in the event he fails to report for work. This would require substantial modification of the hospital’s basic employment practice of requiring employees to follow a regular schedule of attendance. Altering an employer’s general practice of requiring regular attendance would be unduly burdensome to most employers, but is especially onerous for a hospital where the predictability of a certain level
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of staff is essential for proper patient care. On its face, the financial burden of such an accommodation outweighs any conceivable benefit. Moreover, Amato’s suggestions do not address the manner in which St. Luke’s could accommodate Amato’s disability at his place of employment, but rather, are merely ways in which the hospital could deal with Amato’s absences from work. Thus, the suggested accommodations place an undue burden on the employer, and therefore are not required under the ADA.
See Daugherty,
In short, Amato’s disability affects his employment, if at all, long before he arrives at his place of employment or before he fails to arrive. Therefore, any accommodation of this disability, aside from tolerating numerous sporadic absences, is really outside the employer’s realm. Furthermore, “[wjhile the ADA focuses on eradicating barriers, the ADA does not relieve a disabled employee or applicant from the obligation to perform the essential functions of the job. To the contrary, the ADA is intended to enable disabled persons to compete in the work-place based on the same performance standards and requirements that employers expect of persons who are not disabled.”
Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,
e. Failure to Inform of Limitation and Request Accommodation
In any event, if Amato were found to be a qualified person as defined by the ADA, a review of the evidence indicates that he failed to inform St. Luke’s of any limitation resulting from his disability or to request accommodation.
An employee has the initial duty to inform the employer of his disability before ADA liability is triggered for the employer’s failure to provide accommodation.
See Hunt-Golliday v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation Dist.,
As the Fifth Circuit has noted, it is important to distinguish between an employer’s knowledge of an employee’s disability versus an employer’s knowledge of any limitations experienced by the employee as a result of that disability, because the ADA requires employers to accommodate limitations, not disabilities.
See id.
at 164-65. Furthermore, the ADA does not require an employer to assume that an employee with a disability necessarily suffers from a limitation; “a disabled employee cannot remain silent and expect his employer to bear the initial burden of identifying the need for, and suggesting, an appropriate accommodation.”
Id.
at 165;
Scheer v. City of Cedar Rapids,
In this situation, Amato testified that he had no difficulty performing any of his job duties when at work and that he neither requested nor could even think of an appropriate accommodation. He further testified that he did not request a change in job shift or work hours because the shift he had was “the best schedule,” as he was able to ride to work with his brother. At deposition, Amato stated both that he did not need accommodation and was unaware of any manner in which the hospital could have accommodated him:
Q: You didn’t need accommodation to perform you duties, correct?
A: I didn’t need accommodations.
Q: Okay. And — but you couldn’t think of anything — anyway that you could have been — that St. Luke’s could have accommodated you?
A: I was trying, and, no, I couldn’t think of anything.
When the plaintiff fails to request an accommodation, the defendant cannot be liable for failing to provide one.
See Taylor,
f. Circumstances of Termination Indicative of Unlawful Discrimination
In addition, Amato has failed to satisfy the fourth element of a
prima facie
case. Amato has not demonstrated that the circumstances of his termination give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination by showing that he was replaced by a non-disabled person, that he was treated less favorably than non-disabled employees, or through some other means. Although “[t]he evidence necessary to support an inference of discrimination will vary from case to case,” Amato has presented no evidence which would sustain such an inference.
Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools,
2. Nondiscriminatory Reason for Termination and Lack of Pretext
Finally, even if Amato had established the necessary elements of a prima facie case, St. Luke’s has adequately demonstrated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Amato-excessive absenteeism under the attendance policy.
Once the defendant articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action at issue, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s articulated reason is false and that prohibited discrimination is the real reason for the employer’s action.
See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr.,
In attempting to establish pretext, however, a plaintiff cannot solely rely on his subjective belief that discrimination has occurred.
See Price v. Marathon Cheese Corp.,
In the instant ease, Amato has made no showing that St. Luke’s proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination. Beyond speculation and conjecture, he has adduced no evidence that the hospital’s nondiscriminato^ ry reason is untrue or that the real reason for his termination is his disability. Hence, Amato has failed to demonstrate that the hospital’s explanation is unworthy of credence. In fact, at deposition, he acknowledged that his attendance was poor. Amato also has made no showing that he was treated less favorably than non-disabled employees who had accrued a similar number of unscheduled absences. To the contrary, the evidence indicates that St. Luke’s actually treated Amato with leniency when enforcing its new attendance policy. In November 1992, the hospital extended Amato’s probationary period by thirty days, rather than terminate him. Thus, instead of treating Amato less favorably than employees who were not disabled, St. Luke’s was more accommodating than required under its own policies. Such conduct is hardly indicative of discriminatory animus. Accordingly, there is no evidence that St. Luke’s discriminated against Amato for any reason, much less because of his disability. Under these circumstances, it is apparent that Amato’s disability was neither the sole cause nor even a determining factor in his discharge.
See Turco,
C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim
In his original complaint, Amato alleged that St. Luke’s intentionally inflicted emotional distress on him. He now admits, however, that St. Luke’s conduct was not extreme and outrageous, an essential element of an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim under Texas law.
See, e.g., Burden v. General Dynamics Corp.,
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, St. Luke’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. There are no outstanding issues of material fact with regard to Amato’s claims of disability discrimination or intentional infliction of emotional distress, and St. Luke’s is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notes
. , "The elements of a plaintiff's prima facie case necessarily vary according to the facts of the case and the nature of the claim.”
LaPierre v. Benson Nissan, Inc.,