Amanda ELLIOTT v. R. Michael COBB.
Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Jackson.
Sept. 23, 2010.
322 S.W.3d 246
April 6, 2010 Session.
Marty R. Phillips, Michelle Greenway Sellers, and Ashley D. Cleek, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellee, R. Michael Cobb, M.D.
John A. Day, Brandon E. Bass, and Wayne A. Ritchie, Nashville, Tennessee, for the Amicus Curiae, Tеnnessee Association for Justice.
David L. Steed, Nashville, Tennessee, for the Amicus Curiae, Tennessee Medical Association.
OPINION
SHARON G. LEE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which JANICE M. HOLDER, C.J., CORNELIA A. CLARK and GARY R. WADE, JJ., joined.
The issue presented in this interlocutory appeal is whether a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action is prohibited from arguing or suggesting to the jury any monetary amounts for noneconomic damages. We hold that the language of
I.
This appeal arises out of a medical malpractice action brought by Amanda J. Elliott against her surgeon, Dr. Michael R. Cobb. Before trial, Dr. Cobb filed a motion in limine requesting that the trial
The trial court granted Ms. Elliott‘s application for permission to file an interlocutory apрeal on the issue of whether the motion in limine was correctly granted. The Court of Appeals denied her interlocutory appeal, and Ms. Elliott appealed to this Court. See
II.
In Tennessee, counsel for civil litigants are allowed to:
(1) “read the counsel‘s entire declaration, including the amount sued for, to the jury at the beginning of the lawsuit, and may refer to the declaration in argument or summation to the jury,”
(2) “argue the worth or monetary value of pain and suffering to thе jury; provided, that the argument shall conform to the evidence or reasonable deduction from the evidence in such case.”
In medical malpractice cases, the first of these general rules was modified with the enactment of the Medical Malpractice Review Board and Clаims Act of 1975. The section of the Act at issue here provides: “In a medical malpractice action the pleading filed by the plaintiff may state a demand for a specific sum, but such demand shall not be disclosed to the jury during a trial of the case; notwithstanding the provisions of
Ms. Elliott and amicus curiae Tennessee Association for Justice argue that
Dr. Cobb and amicus curiae Tennessee Medical Association argue that the trial court‘s interpretation should be upheld because allowing a plaintiff to argue the monetary value of non-economic damages would circumvent the intention of the legislature in enacting
The issue before us involves what plaintiff‘s counsel may argue to the jury regarding damages. Trial courts have wide latitude with regard to their control of arguments of counsel. Crowe v. Provost, 52 Tenn. App. 397, 374 S.W.2d 645, 652 (1963); Cosmopolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Woodward, 7 Tenn.App. 394, 404 (1928). These decisions lie within the trial court‘s discretion. Ferguson v. Moore, 98 Tenn. 342, 39 S.W. 341, 343 (1897); Davis v. Hall, 920 S.W.2d 213, 217 (Tenn.Ct.App.1995); J. Avery Bryan, Inc. v. Hubbard, 32 Tenn.App. 648, 225 S.W.2d 282, 287 (1949). Accordingly, we review the trial сourt‘s decision regarding jury argument using the “abuse of discretion” standard. A trial court abuses its discretion by “(1) applying an incorrect legal standard, (2) reaching an illogical or unreasonable decision, or (3) basing its decision on a clearly
During arguments to the jury, counsel may argue their analysis of the evidence that has been presented at trial. Skoretz v. Cowden, 707 S.W.2d 529, 533 (Tenn.Ct.App.1985); Rogers v. Murfreesboro Hous. Auth., 51 Tenn.App. 163, 365 S.W.2d 441, 446 (1962). However, statements and arguments of counsel are neither evidence nor a substitute for testimony. Metropolitan Gov‘t of Nashville and Davidson County v. Shacklett, 554 S.W.2d 601, 605 (Tenn.1977); Hathaway v. Hathaway, 98 S.W.3d 675, 681 (Tenn.Ct.App.2002).
Although this Court has not previously addressed the issue presented here, the application of
In construing statutes, the Court‘s role is well established—we seek to ascertain the legislative intent and рurpose by examining the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used in a statute “without unduly restricting or expanding a statute‘s coverage beyond its intended scope.” Limbaugh v. Coffee Med. Ctr., 59 S.W.3d 73, 83 (Tenn.2001). “Our approach to statutory construction begins with the statute‘s language, and if it can end there—with our finding of a clear meaning of the Legislature‘s intent—then we must stop.... [w]ith no recourse to the broader statutory scheme, legislative history, historical background, or other external sources of the Legislature‘s purpose.” Calaway ex rel. Calaway v. Schucker, 193 S.W.3d 509, 516 (Tenn.2005); see also Lee Medical, Inc., 312 S.W.3d at 527 (“When a statute‘s text is clear and unambiguous, the courts need not look beyond the statute itself to ascertain its meaning.“).
Applying these rules of statutory construction, we find the language of
We do not find sections
To hold otherwise would be to effectively rewrite the statute, adding an additional provision regarding non-economic damages and unduly expanding the scope of the statute. “Courts are not authorized to alter or amend a statute, and must ‘presume that the legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.‘” Limbaugh, 59 S.W.3d at 83 (quoting Mooney v. Sneed, 30 S.W.3d 304, 307 (Tenn.2000)). To the extent that Guess and DeMilt conflict with our holding that
III.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Madison County Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs on appeal are assessed to the appellee, R. Michael Cobb, M.D., for which execution may issue if necessary.
WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., J., filed a separate concurring opinion.
WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., J., concurring.
I concur with the Court‘s conclusion that
First,
Second, our interpretation of