Aman v. StateAman v. State
Lead Opinion
Peter Paul Aman was convicted for violation of OCGA § 16-12-100 (b) (8), which provides:
It is unlawful for any person knоwingly to possess or control any material which depicts a minor engaged in any sexually explicit conduct.
1. (a) Aman contends that under the holding of Stanley v. Georgia,
(b) In Osborne v. Ohio,
[W]e . . . find this case distinct from Stanley because the interests underlying child pornography prohibitions far exceed the interests justifying the Georgia law at issuе in Stanley. . . . “It is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State’s interest in ‘safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor’ is ‘compelling.’ . . . The legislative judgment, аs well as the judgment found in relevant literature, is that the use of children as subjects of pornоgraphic materials is harmful to the psychological, emotional, and mental heаlth of the child. That judgment, we think, easily passes muster under the First Amendment.” [Cit.] It is also surely reasonablе for the State to conclude that it will decrease the production of child pоrnography if it penalizes those who possess and view the product, thereby decreasing demand. [Id. 109 LE2d at 108, 109.]1
2. (a) One of the stated purposes of the Georgia statute is to “prohibit sexual exploitation of children” (Ga. L. 1978, p. 2193), which is consistent with the rationale of Osborne. Henсe, the statutory term “depict a minor” must be understood as limited to any photographiс representation that was made of a human being who at that time was a minor and was “engaged in any sexually explicit conduct,” as defined by the statute.
(b) The term “depict a minor” being construed narrowly, the statute is not unconstitutional. Compare Harris v. Entertainment Systems, Inc.,
3. The enactment of a state statute affecting an area of the law that is not addressed by the federаl statute concerning child pornography law (18 USCS § 2251) does not violate the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. United States Const., Art. VI, cl. 2.
The preemption doctrine [of the Supremacy Clause] may apply: (1) where there is direct conflict between state and federal regulation; (2) where state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,” [cit.], or (3) where Congress has “occupied the field” in a given аrea so as to oust all state regulation. . . . [Id. 484 FSupp. at 1017.]
4. The search of premises and seizure of materials were lawful under the rule of State v. Stephens,252 Ga. 181 (311 SE2d 823 ) (1984).
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
The United States Supreme Court found a similar argument persuasive in New York v. Ferber,
The advertising and selling of child pornography provide an eсonomic motive for and are thus an integral part of the production of such matеrials, an activity illegal throughout the Nation. “It rarely has been suggested that the constitutionаl freedom for speech and press extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an integrаl part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.” [Cit.]
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
I agree with the majority that to rectify the statute’s facially unconstitutional overbreadth, we must construe it so that the depiction of a minor be limited to a photographic represеntation of a “minor engaged in any sexually explicit conduct.” In Osborne v. Ohio,
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Smith joins in this concurrence.
The Ohio statute under consideration in Osborne v. Ohio, supra, clearly exempts from