*1 prejudice by of the likelihood of publicity.” reason of extensive How showing? much of is a showing “substantive” is a What “likelihood” (For prejudice? prejudiсe enough? How much example, what if shows strong prejudice? defendant likelihood of minimal ifWhat he possibility strong prejudice?) shows a minimal publicity How much is “extensive?” of this is in the explained majority opinion, None seems it obvious to me that no one will know majority’s what apply “standard” means until As Attorney cases. General argued:
If attempting the court is potential to avoid future reversals by standard, new, new creating a amorphous then “rule” unwittingly invites more errors its lack of definition and precision.
I5. do not 'agree that this pre- case should be reversed under our sent standards I cоncerning changes persuaded of venue. am not necessity I of a new rule. disagree adopt. new rule we would affirm the denial of change Jones’ motion for of venue.
I am authorized to state that Justice Smith and Justice join in Bell this dissent. September
Decided denied November Plunkett, Jimmy Wills, D. John P. fоr Sanders, Bowers, C. Attorney, Dennis Michael J. Attor- ney General, Benjamin C. A. Woolf,
S91A1221. v. THE AMAN STATE.
Weltner, Justice. Peter Paul Aman was OCGA 16-12- convicted violation of (b) (8), providеs: It is unlawful for person knowingly control any sexually depicts material which explicit conduct. holding Stanley Aman contends v. Geor- that under the
gia, 394 U. S. hе is not law- LE2d fully subject his of such materials own home. S. _ (110 LE2d 495 U. Osborne
(1990),
Court stated:
Stanley
because the
[W]e . . . find this case distinct
pornography prohibitions
underlying сhild
far ex-
interests
ceed the interests
ley.
justifying
*2
in Stan-
the
law at issue
beyond
. .
need for
. “It is evident
the
elaboration
psychologi-
‘safeguarding
and
the
Stаte’s interest
cal
‘compelling.’
legislative
well-being
is
. . . The
of a minor’
judgment
judgment,
well
relevant litera-
as
subjects
ture,
that the use of children as
is
psychological, emotional, and
is harmful to the
materials
mental health of the child. That
passes
easily
judgment,
think,
we
[Cit.]
It is also
muster under
First Amendment.”
surely
that it
de-
reasonable for the State to conclude
will
production
penalizes
pornography if it
crease the
of child
thereby decrеasing
product,
those
and view the
who
[Id.
108, 109.]1
demand.
109 LE2d at
purposes
of the
is to
One
stated
statute
(Ga.
2193),
exploitation
p.
“prohibit
L.
sexual
children”
Hеnce,
of Osborne.
statu-
which
tory
consistent with the rationale
“depict
any pho-
term
must
minor”
be understood as limited to
being
tographic representation that was made of a human
who at that
“engaged
sexually explicit conduct,”
time was a minor and
was
by the
as defined
statute.
being
narrowly,
“depict
The term
a minor”
construed
Compare
v. Entertainment
statute
not unconstitutional.
Harris
(1) (386
(1989).
140)
Systems, Inc.,
under the rule
State v.
Judgment All the Justices concur. affirmed. concurring. Justiсe,
Hunt, agree majority rectify facially the statute’s un- depiction overbreadth, constitutional must construe so that the representation рhotographic of a minor be limited to a of a “minor any sexually explicit In Osborne v. conduct.” *3 _ 1691, 1696, U. S. States child guarding the United Supreme upheld pоssession banning Court Ohio’s law “ pornography, noting compelling the state’s interest in ‘safe- ” psychological well-being of a minor.’ This by banning possessiоn interest is served by, is based on the use of a live child model. It is not served nor legitimate clearly legislation prohibiting for, there a basis con- other stitutionally protected “depict” engaged materials which explicit (4).3 sexually § conduct defined in OCGA 16-12-100 possession conviction, Aman’s based on his video- tapes engaged sexually explicit magazines of children conduct and containing photographs prop- conduct, children such erly affirmed. joins
I am authorized to state that Justice Smith concurrence.
them. contains certain limited Code Ann. 2907.323 The Ohio statute possession (A) under exemptions, (Supp. art, Osborne v. consideration in literature, 1989). Id. at 110 and other artistic SC 694. While constitutionally literary supra, OCGA 16-12-100 protected clearly works is not exempts works. Rev. among from (d) 21,
Decided October 8, November denied Wayne Lancaster, for G. Blaney, Solicitor, Jr., N.
Gerald M. MEADE-MURPHY. IN THE MATTER OF SHARMAN Disciplinary (Supreme Nos. Court (410 SE2d Per curiam. complaints against Rе- formal State Bar of filed two attorney prac- Meade-Murphy, spondent licensed to M. Sharman Supreme Georgia. Docket In Court No. tiсe law the State the Bar alleged Respondent engaged in had conduct meaning she is “want of a sound mind” within demonstrated that of (a), Bar Rule 4-104 and that she should therefore be removed practice Bar al- Court Docket No. law. (b), Respondent leged 47 of had violated Standards (d), Bar Rule 4-102 and that should be disbarred. Respondent by jury pursuant 4- Bar moved Rule trial summary Subsequently judgment in the State Bar moved for summary Special both cases. Master dеnied Bar’s motions judgment, finding genuine were issues of fact be decided that there jury. Superior
These matters were then transferred to County, 4-214, Bar Fulton and thе State moved that (d). rulings Special to review the Master under Bar Rule 4-215 Superior Special Master. The court found Court reversed the had Statеs District filed four lawsuits United Georgia. All cases had been Court for Northern four dismissed, De- with three of them. costs awarded the defendant spite separate dismissals, on filed af- these two occasions *4 garnishment fidavits dollars in the the amount of 30 million County, representing in- State Court of Fulton court each prevailed litigation. These stance that she had actions were the aforementioned subsequently determined that dismissed. trial court Respondent’s conduct constituted a violation of Standards 4-102. The trial court further found that directly violated Standard 47 of Bar Rule 4-102 communi- representеd opposing party litigation cated with an by who was obtaining counsel first The trial without consent of counsel. attempted justify had neither refuted nor