Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO, Local 697 v. Toledo Area Regional Transit Auth.Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO, Local 697 v. Toledo Area Regional Transit Auth.
Decided: September 27, 2013
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Joseph S. Pass and Christine A. Reardon, for appellant.
Ronald G. Linville and Joseph C. Devine, for appellee.
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OSOWIK, J.
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas that dismissed appellant‘s “Application/Petition to Compel Enforcement of Arbitration Agreement” for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. For the following reasons, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded.
{¶ 3} An appeal of a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under
{¶ 4} Appellant ATU is the exclusive representative of approximately 300 TARTA workers. At all relevant times, TARTA has provided both “fixed route” and
{¶ 5} Paragraph 9 of the section 13(c) agreement, included as an addendum to the July 23, 1975 agreement, provides in relevant part:
In the event of any labor dispute involving the Authority and the employees covered by this Agreement which cannot be settled within thirty (30) days after such dispute first arises, such dispute may be submitted at the written request of either the Union or the Authority to a board of arbitration selected in accordance with the existing collective bargaining agreement, if any, or if none, as hereinafter provided. * * * The term labor dispute shall be broadly construed and shall include, but not be limited to, any controversy concerning wages, salaries, hours, working conditions or benefits, including health and welfare, sick leave, insurance, or pension and retirement provisions, the making or maintaining of collective bargaining
agreements, the terms to be included in such agreements and the interpretation or application of such collective bargaining agreements, any grievances that may arise, and any controversy arising out of or by virtue of any provisions of this Agreement. (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 6} The protective arrangements set forth in the section 13(c) agreement are reviewed for compliance annually by the United States Department of Labor when TARTA applies for federal funding for its non-fixed route paratransit service.
{¶ 7} Subsequently, ATU was party to a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA“) with TARTA that established the terms and conditions of employment for all of TARTA‘s paratransit service drivers. The CBA was effective October 1, 2009, through November 30, 2010. The CBA‘s terms were extended twice, first to January 29, 2011, and then until May 31, 2011, while the parties attempted to negotiate a new labor agreement. However, the parties were not able to come to terms and the CBA expired on May 31, 2011. On June 6, 2011, ATU sent a letter notifying TARTA that it was submitting the dispute over the terms and conditions of a new labor agreement to binding arbitration pursuant to paragraph 9 of the section 13(c) agreement.
{¶ 8} The June 6, 2011 letter notified TARTA that the ATU‘s legal counsel would serve as the ATU-appointed member to the board of arbitration established pursuant to paragraph 9 of the section 13(c) agreement. TARTA did not appoint a member to the board of arbitration or comply with any of the requirements of the agreement relative to ATU‘s demand for interest arbitration. On September 14, 2011, TARTA confirmed to
{¶ 9} On January 11, 2012, TARTA filed its motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, citing various provisions of
{¶ 10} On August 17, 2012, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, finding simply that “the [SERB] has exclusive jurisdiction as regards the disputes at issue.”
The Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, per the Honorable J. Ronald Bowman, erred in its Judgment Entry dated August 17, 2012 dismissing the Application/Petition to Compel Enforcement of Arbitration filed by the Plaintiff/Appellant Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO, Local 697 (hereinafter the “ATU“). The Trial Court erred as a matter of law in concluding that the action should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
{¶ 12} ATU now asserts that TARTA seeks to avoid its contractual commitment to proceed to binding interest arbitration under the parties’ section 13(c) agreement. By granting the motion to dismiss, ATU argues, the trial court disregarded the allegations of the complaint, which set forth the elements of an action to enforce the terms of a contractual agreement between ATU and TARTA. The complaint, ATU asserts, identifies the original agreement entered into by TARTA in 1975, as well as the annual requests by TARTA to obtain federal funding pursuant to the UMTA. According to ATU, the section 13(c) agreement that ATU seeks to enforce did not arise under Ohio public sector labor law and
{¶ 13} The record reflects that ATU‘s action was brought pursuant to the Ohio Arbitration Act,
{¶ 14}
{¶ 16} TARTA asserted in its motion to dismiss, as it does on appeal, that ATU‘s claim arose out of the collective bargaining rights created pursuant to
{¶ 17} However, ATU alleged in its complaint, and asserts on appeal, that the dispute between the parties was over enforcement of a contractual right that was established by a multi-party agreement entered into in 1975, long before
{¶ 18} Specifically,
(A) An agreement between a public employer and an exclusive representative entered into pursuant to this chapter governs the wages,
hours, and terms and conditions of public employment covered by the agreement. * * * Except for sections 306.08 ,306.12 ,306.35 , and4981.22 of the Revised Code and arrangements entered into thereunder, and section4981.21 of the Revised Code as necessary to comply with section 13(c) of the “Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964,” 87 Stat. 295,49 U.S.C.A. 1609(c) , as amended, and arrangements entered into thereunder, this chapter prevails over any and all other conflicting laws, resolutions, provisions, present or future, except as otherwise specified in this chapter or as otherwise specified by the general assembly.
{¶ 19} Therefore, consistent with the above-quoted section,
Any board of county commissioners operating a transit system or any county transit board shall, if it acquires any existing transit system, assume all the employer‘s obligations under any existing labor contract between the employees and management of the system. The board shall, if it acquires, constructs, controls, or operates any such facilities, negotiate
arrangements to protect the interest of employees affected by such acquisition, construction, control, or operation. * * * Such arrangements may include provisions for the submission of labor disputes to final and binding arbitration.
{¶ 20} TARTA long ago entered into the protective arrangement set forth in the section 13(c) agreement in exchange for the receipt of federal funds. The exceptions set forth in
{¶ 21} The issue of where jurisdiction over enforcement of section 13(c) agreements lies has been addressed by a series of federal court decisions, most notably the United States Supreme Court in Jackson Transit Auth. v. Local Div. 1285, Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO-CLC, 457 U.S. 15, 102 S.Ct. 2202, 72 L.Ed.2d 639 (1982), wherein the court discussed the purposes of the UMTA.
{¶ 22} While the issue in Jackson Transit Auth. was whether Congress intended to create federal causes of action for breaches of section 13(c) agreements and collective bargaining contracts, see Jackson Transit Auth. at 29, the court noted, “it is reasonable to conclude that Congress expected the § 13(c) agreement and the collective-bargaining agreement, like ordinary contracts, to be enforceable by private suit upon a breach.” Id. at 20-21. The court concluded that the contracts at issue in that case were to be governed by state, not federal, law. Id. at 29. The court explained therein, “[c]ongress designed
{¶ 23} We note that numerous state courts have concluded that “arrangements under section 13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act are not collective bargaining contracts,” but are “contracts albeit contracts required by federal statute.” Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. Plummer, 841 S.W.2d 870, 874 (Tex.1992). Section 13(c) agreements “are valid and enforceable in state courts.” Id. See also Local Div. 732, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 251 Ga. 15, 303 S.E.2d 1 (1983) (where the court held that interest arbitration agreements entered into pursuant to Section 13(c) are enforceable under state law despite the fact that under Georgia state law, governmental entities generally were not permitted to bargain collectively with employee representatives); Stockton Metro. Transit Dist. v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 132 Cal.App.3d 203, 183 Cal.Rptr. 24 (1982) (unions were free to pursue a contract action in state court); Municipality of Metro. Seattle v. Div. 587, Amalgamated Transit Union, 118 Wash.2d 639, 826 P.2d 167 (1992) (in the absence of a specific legislative declaration prohibiting such a provision, the parties are free to agree to interest arbitration).
{¶ 24} Jackson Transit Auth. concluded that legislative history indicates Congress intended section 13(c) agreements and collective-bargaining contracts between UMTA aid recipients and transit unions to be governed by state law applied in state courts. Jackson Transit Auth. at 29.
{¶ 26} On consideration whereof, the judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas is reversed and this matter is remanded for further proceedings. Costs of this appeal are assessed to appellee pursuant to
Judgment reversed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Arlene Singer, P.J.
Thomas J. Osowik, J. CONCUR.
James J. Jensen, J., DISSENTS.
JENSEN, J.
{¶ 27} Because I agree with the trial court‘s conclusion that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over ATU‘s claim, I respectfully dissent from the majority decision.
{¶ 28} The majority does not explain the history underlying the section 13(c) agreement, which I believe is important in considering this jurisdictional issue. In the years leading up to the enactment of the Urban Mass Transportation Act, privately-owned transportation companies were collapsing. Jackson Transit Auth. v. Local Div. 1285, Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO-CLC, 457 U.S. 15, 17, 102 S.Ct. 2202, 72 L.Ed.2d 639 (1982). Congress believed that this was a national problem and it intervened to incentivize a shift from private ownership of transit systems to public ownership at a state or local level. Id. It enacted the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964. As part of that act, federal funds would be available to local governments acquiring private transit systems. Id. At that time, however, many states—including Ohio—had not adopted public employees’ collective bargaining statutes. Moreover, the National Labor Relations Act was inapplicable to public employers. Id. at 23. There was concern, therefore, that the acquisition of private transit systems by local governments would be curbed if provisions were not in place to protect rights that had been granted to transit employees under existing collective bargaining agreements (“CBAs“). Id. at 17. To alleviate that concern, Congress conditioned federal grants on certification that “fair and equitable” arrangements were in place to preserve rights granted by existing CBAs and to protect those employees against a “worsening” of their employment positions after acquisition. UMTA, Section 13(c).
{¶ 29} In enacting UMTA, however, Congress expressed a clear intent “that labor relations between transit workers and local governments would be controlled by state law.” Jackson Transit Auth. at 24. This was crucial to its passing. The United States Supreme Court described the congressional hearings on UMTA as follows:
Before both Committees, Members of Congress expressed concern about the effect of the statute on state laws. And Secretary [of Labor] Wirtz explained to both Committees that, while attempts would be made to
accommodate state law to the preservation of collective-bargaining rights, state law would control local transit labor relations. The Secretary told the House Committee that “this proposal is submitted on this basis, . . . that the State laws must control.” Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1963, Hearings on H.R. 3881 before the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 482 (1963) (House Hearings). A Committee member raised the issue again; the Secretary repeated that “State laws would be controlling in the situation,” though he suggested that there “would be few, if any, situations” where state law and § 13(c) could not be reconciled. House Hearings, at 486. When similar concerns were expressed during his testimony before the Senate Committee, the Secretary reiterated: “I should like it quite clear that I think that there could be no superseding here of State law.” Senate Hearings, at 313. Id.
{¶ 30} UMTA did pass, and public transit systems entered into “section 13(c) agreements” that offered the required protections. TARTA entered into such an agreement with ATU, AFL-CIO, and the Transport Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, on July 23, 1975. TARTA and ATU also executed an addendum to that agreement on March 4, 1975, which contains the arbitration provision upon which ATU now relies.
{¶ 31} Section 13(c) agreements were designed “merely to maintain the status quo by preserving existing rights of public employees upon acquisition of a transit system and not to create any new rights or enhance prior rights under pre-acquisition labor
{¶ 32} So while 13(c) protective agreements may have played an important role in assuring private transit company employees that they would not lose bargained-for rights upon being publicly acquired, the Ohio legislature now offers those employees two additional layers of protection. See Local Div. 589, Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO, CLC v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 666 F.2d 618, 634 (1st Cir.1981) (recognizing that state law may modify section 13(c) assurances without bringing about an unfair or inequitable result.)
{¶ 33} Turning back to the present case, ATU and TARTA entered into a CBA in 2009 after TARTA acquired the non-fixed route paratransit provider. The parties used the Chapter 4117 procedures to negotiate that CBA. That CBA defines a procedure for grievance arbitration, but not for interest arbitration. In its efforts to renegotiate the terms of the 2009 CBA, ATU filed with SERB a notice to negotiate on July 10, 2010. It was not until these negotiations failed that ATU abandoned the Chapter 4117 bargaining process and asserted the arbitration provision of the 13(c) agreement.
{¶ 34} I realize that ATU maintains that the 13(c) agreement outlines the applicable arbitration procedures. But to the extent that ATU argues that an alternate arbitration provision applies to the parties’ negotiations (and not the procedure outlined in
{¶ 36} For these reasons, I would affirm the trial court‘s dismissal of ATU‘s complaint.
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court‘s web site at: http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/?source=6.