ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s Order Denying in Part and Granting in Part Defendants’ Joint Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 85). Having considered Plaintiffs Motion, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs Motion.
Motions for reconsideration are disfavored, and the Court will ordinarily deny such motions in the absence of a showing of manifest error in the prior ruling or a showing of new facts or legal authority which could not have been brought to the Court’s attention earlier with reasonable diligence. Local CR 7(h)(1). In her motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff argues that the Court erred when it refused to consider her alternative theory of recovery under a particular line of Washington Supreme Court cases.
In her response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff presented what appeared to be two separate common law tortious interference claims, and Defendants treated the claims as such. In its Order, the Court construed Plaintiffs claims for common law tortious interference with a corpse as two separate claims-one under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 868, and the other under
Reid v. Pierce County,
Plaintiff contends that her claim under Reid,
Wright,
and
Gadbury
is the same common law claim for tortious interference as her Restatement claim. She argues that with these cases she presented a different legal theory-not a separate claim. Plaintiff alleged a claim for common law tortious interference with dead a body in her complaint; that claim referred only to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 868. But the facts underlying the two theories are essentially the same. Thus, Plaintiffs claim under Reid,
Wright,
and
Gadbury
may be regarded as merely a different legal theory for the same claim.
Crull v. GEM Ins. Co.,
Nevertheless, Plaintiff does not have standing to pursue this alternative legal theory. Plaintiff relies on Reid,
Wright,
and
Gadbwy
to show that she has standing. Reid, the most recent case, involved a right to privacy claim, not a tortious interference with a dead body claim, did not discuss standing for tortious interference, and only mentioned
Wright
and
Gadbury
in passing.
Reid,
In their motion, Defendants argued that Plaintiff did not have standing because she was not the legal next of kin and was not entitled to disposition of the body. (Mot. at 18). In their reply brief, Defendants reiterated their argument that under either the Restatement claim or the Wright/Gadbury common law claim, Plaintiff does not have standing because she was not entitled to possession of Bradley’s body. (Reply at 8-10). Defendants pointed specifically to RCW 68.50.160, which governs the right to control the disposition of the remains of a deceased person. (Reply at 10).
Because the Washington Legislature has enacted statutes governing the disposition of organs, tissue, and human remains, the Court must look to the statutes, not the common law, to determine if Defendants owed a duty to the Plaintiff.
State ex. rel. Madden v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1 of Douglas County,
Plaintiff also argues that she has standing when looking at the facts of this case through the lens of the discovery rule. Plaintiff argues that she has standing because at the time she discovered that Bradley’s tissue had been donated without consent, she was the next of kin because Robert had passed away. But the discovery rule only operates to toll an applicable statute of limitations; it does not create standing for a plaintiff who otherwise does not have it. Application of the discovery rule does not provide Plaintiff with standing.
Because Plaintiff does not have standing to bring a tortious interference with a dead body claim, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration.
The clerk of the Court is directed to distribute this order to all counsel of record.