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ROBERTO ALVES v . JANICE GIEGLER ET AL. (SC 20907) (SC 20908) Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Alexander and Dannehy, Js.
Syllabus Pursuant to statute (§ 9-461), ‘‘[n]ot later than the seventh day following
the date set for the primary for nomination at any election at which a municipal office is to be filled, the clerk of the municipality in which such election is to be held shall file with the Secretary of the State a list of the candidates of each party for the municipal offices to be filled at such election nominated in accordance with the provisions of [the] chapter [of the General Statutes governing nominations to public office and political parties].’’ Pursuant further to statute (§ 9-452a), ‘‘[n]ot later than five days before a
minor party holds a party meeting to nominate a candidate for public office, the presiding officer of such meeting shall give written notice of the date, time, location and purpose of the meeting to, in the case of a municipal office, the town clerk of the municipality served by such office,’’ and, ‘‘[c]oncomitantly, the presiding officer of such meeting shall cause the written notice of such meeting to be published in a newspaper with a general circulation in the applicable town for such office.’’
The plaintiff, who was a candidate for mayor of the city of Danbury in the
November, 2023 municipal election, brought this action in the trial court, pursuant to statute (§ 9-328), seeking certain injunctive and declaratory relief in connection with the decision of the named defendant, G, the Danbury town clerk, to submit to the Secretary of the State (secretary), pursuant to § 9-461, one of two competing slates of candidates for various municipal offices, each purporting to be the endorsed slate of the Inde- pendent Party of Danbury (Independent Party). The first slate filed with the Danbury town clerk’s office consisted of candidates, including the plaintiff, who were supported by the Danbury Democratic Town Com- mittee and who were selected at an endorsement meeting held by the Independent Party on August 11, 2023. Notice of that meeting had been published in a local newspaper seven days in advance, and a copy of the newspaper notice was on file in the Danbury town clerk’s office. The second slate filed with the Danbury town clerk’s office consisted of candidates who were supported by the Danbury Republican Town Committee and who were selected at an endorsement meeting of the Independent Party held on August 21, 2023. When the defendant R, the chairperson of the Independent Party, filed the second slate of candi- dates with the Danbury town clerk’s office, he included a cover letter, on Independent Party letterhead, explaining that the submission repre- sented the party’s ‘‘official endorsements’’ and that, although he was aware of the prior submission of an ‘‘unofficial’’ slate of candidates, the Independent Party’s executive board had vetoed that slate and deemed it invalid in accordance with party rules. Although both slates were accepted by G, she ultimately submitted to the secretary, pursuant to § 9-461, only the second slate of candidates, and not the previously filed slate that included the plaintiff. After a trial to the court, the trial court ordered G to remove from the Independent Party line on the November, 2023 ballot those names that she had submitted to the secretary, exclud- ing four candidates for offices that the parties stipulated were unaffected by G’s decision. In its memorandum of decision, the court explained that placing either slate of candidates on the Independent Party line would be improper. With respect to the August 21, 2023 slate, the court concluded that that slate did not comply with the statute (§ 9-452) that governs the submission of a minor party’s list of nominees for municipal office to a town clerk because it was not ‘‘certified,’’ as that statute required. With respect to the August 11, 2023 slate, the court concluded that, although G had exceeded her authority by failing to file that slate with the secretary pursuant to § 9-461, that slate was invalid because *3 it was the product of a meeting that did not comply with the requirements of § 9-452a, insofar as the presiding officer had not provided the Danbury town clerk with notice of the meeting. Thereafter, the trial court certified
certain questions of law to this court for review pursuant to statute (§ 9- 325). G and R also filed separate appeals, and the plaintiff filed cross appeals, from the trial court’s judgment.
Held that the trial court’s ultimate determination that neither slate of candi- dates should be placed on the Independent Party line on the November,
2023 ballot was correct, albeit for reasons different from those stated in its memorandum of decision, and, accordingly, this court affirmed the trial court’s judgment:
1. This court clarified the extent to which, under § 9-461, a town clerk has
the discretion to accept or reject a minor party’s filing of its endorsement of candidates: Under § 9-461, which governs the town clerk’s responsibilities in filing a party’s list of candidates with the secretary, the town clerk has the ministerial obligation to accept and file with the secretary lists of minor party candidates that are facially valid under the terms of § 9-452, and, to be facially valid under § 9-452, the list must be (1) timely filed at least sixty-two days before the election, (2) certified by the presiding officer of the committee, meeting or other authority making such nomination, and (3) in the prescribed format with respect to the certification of the candidates’ names, signatures, addresses, and the title and district of the office for which each candidate is nominated.
Moreover, the town clerk’s function is limited to assessing the presence or absence of the facial requirements under § 9-452, and the town clerk has no discretion to consider the validity of the nominations or otherwise to determine whether a minor party has complied with the statutory scheme beyond the facial items. 2. G exceeded her authority under § 9-461 by failing to file with the secretary the slate of candidates approved at the Independent Party’s August 11, 2023 meeting, and the trial court, having incorrectly determined that
that slate was invalid for failing to comply with the notice requirements of § 9-452a, should have exercised its equitable authority to order G to forward that slate to the secretary: The plain and unambiguous language of § 9-452a, and especially the statute’s use of the word ‘‘concomitantly,’’ requires that the presiding officer of a minor party’s nominating meeting give two separate forms of written notice of that meeting, namely, notice to the town clerk and notice published in a suitable newspaper, and those two forms of written notice were an integral part of § 9-452a such that constructive or actual notice could not substitute for the written notice required by that statute. Contrary to R and G’s argument that the first slate did not comply with the requirements of § 9-452a because no separate notice of the August 11, 2023 meeting was given to the town clerk, this court concluded that a timely filed copy of the newspaper notice was sufficient to satisfy § 9- 452a, as there was no claim that the content of that notice itself, which included the date, time, location, and purpose of the August 11, 2023 meeting, substantively would not satisfy § 9-452a if it was separately filed with the town clerk in a timely manner.
Moreover, the record did not establish as a matter of law that the copy of the newspaper notice was not timely filed with the Danbury town clerk’s office, insofar as it lacked a date and time stamp indicating when it was received and the record was otherwise silent as to when it was filed, the trial court did not make a specific finding regarding whether the notice to the town clerk was timely, and, because the issue of whether a filing was timely filed ordinarily is a finding of fact to be made by the trial court in the first instance, and because § 9-325 specifically limits the jurisdiction of this court to questions of law, this court was precluded from considering that factual issue in the first instance on appeal. 3. G properly filed with the secretary, pursuant to § 9-461, the slate of candidates approved at the Independent Party’s August 21, 2023 meeting
because, contrary to the conclusion of the trial court, R’s submission of that slate complied with the certification requirement of § 9-452: The term ‘‘certify,’’ as used in § 9-452, was not defined by the statutory *4 scheme, and, upon review of dictionary definitions of that term, this court concluded that its plain meaning was ambiguous as to whether it required a specific attestation of truth, veracity, or correctness, as the plaintiff argued, or whether the cover letter bearing R’s signature and purporting to offer the Independent Party’s ‘‘official endorsements’’ was sufficient to satisfy the certification requirement, as G and R argued. In resolving that ambiguity, this court declined to hold that the absence of the word ‘‘certification’’ renders a filing defective as a matter of law for purposes of § 9-452, as that statute does not prescribe any particular manner or form of certification, and reading additional requirements into the statute’s language would conflict with both the rule of statutory construction that courts are not permitted to supply statutory language that the legislature may have chosen to omit, as well as the maxim that ambiguities in election laws are to be construed to allow the greatest scope for public participation in the electoral process, to allow candidates to get on the ballot, to allow parties to put their candidates on the ballot, and, most important, to allow the voters a choice on election day. In the present case, R’s cover letter, printed on Independent Party letter- head and signed by R in his capacity as chairperson, indicated that the party was filing its ‘‘official endorsements,’’ that degree of formality met the dictionary definition of ‘‘certify’’ because the filing involved the presentation of a formal communication and a confirmation that the endorsements met a standard, and, accordingly, R’s letter constituted the voucher necessary to comply with the certification requirement under § 9-452, rendering the slate of candidates selected at the August 21, 2023 meeting validly filed.
Accordingly, in light of her ministerial role as town clerk, G was required to accept and transmit to the secretary the Independent Party’s two slates of endorsements, from both the August 11 and 21, 2023 meetings, insofar as both were facially compliant with the governing statutes, and, because it was undisputed that the presence of two facially valid slates had the effect of creating an over endorsement by the Independent Party, there was functionally no endorsement with respect to the affected offices by operation of statute (§ 9-414), and the trial court’s ultimate determination that neither set of endorsements should have been placed on the ballot was, therefore, correct. Furthermore, to the extent that the Independent Party was deprived of its first amendment rights to identify the people who constitute the association and to select a standard bearer, its remedy was within its own bylaws and any dispute resolution mechanism provided therein, coupled with judicial enforcement of the party’s internal resolution of that dispute, and there was no record establishing how the Independent Party resolved the two competing slates in accordance with its own intraparty dispute resolution procedures, or any request for a court order challenging or enforcing that resolution, such that neither the trial court nor this court was positioned to enforce that result via an order to the town clerk. Argued October 20, 2023—officially released January 23, 2024
Procedural History Action for a judgment declaring that the named defen- dant exceeded her statutory authority as town clerk in determining which slate of candidates had been nomi- nated by the Independent Party of Danbury in connec- tion with the 2023 Danbury municipal election for mayor, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Danbury and tried to the court, Medina , J ., which rendered judgment for the plaintiff and ordered the named defendant to remove the names of certain candidates from the Independent Party of Danbury line on the ballot that the named defen- dant had submitted to the Office of the Secretary of the State; thereafter, the named defendant and the defendant Veasna Rouen filed separate appeals with *5 this court; subsequently, the court, Medina , J ., certified certain questions of law to the Chief Justice pursuant to General Statutes § 9-325, the named defendant and the defendant Veasna Rouen filed amended appeals, and the plaintiff filed cross appeals; thereafter, this court consolidated the appeals and cross appeals. Affirmed.
Proloy K. Das , with whom was Candace V. Fay , assis- tant corporation counsel, for the appellant-cross appel- lee in SC 20907 and the appellee in SC 20908 (named defendant).
Eugene E. Glouzgal , for the appellant-cross appellee in SC 20908 and the appellee in SC 20907 (defendant Veasna Rouen).
Christopher M. Mattei , with whom were Colin S. Antaya and Luke Reynolds , for the appellee-cross appellant in SC 20907 and SC 20908 (plaintiff).
Opinion ROBINSON, C. J. This election appeal, which arises from a dispute over two slates of candidates each pur- porting to be the endorsed slate of the Independent Party of Danbury (Independent Party) for various municipal offices in the city of Danbury (city), raises two issues under the statutes governing nominations to municipal office by minor political parties in our state, namely, (1) the nature of the ‘‘certification’’ required by General Statutes § 9-452, which governs the submission of a party’s list of nominees for municipal office to a town clerk, and (2) the form that notice to a town clerk of a party’s meeting or caucus to nominate candidates for municipal office must take under Gen- eral Statutes § 9-452a. The plaintiff, Roberto Alves, a candidate for election as mayor of the city, brought this action pursuant to General Statutes § 9-328 against the defendants, Janice Giegler, the city’s town clerk, Dean Esposito, the city’s incumbent mayor who is seeking reelection to that office, and Veasna Rouen, the chair- person of the Independent Party, challenging Giegler’s decision on September 18, 2023, to file with the secre- tary of the state (secretary), pursuant to General Stat- utes § 9-461, a slate of candidates purporting to be the Independent Party’s nominations of candidates for municipal office. [1] The challenged Independent Party slate consisted of candidates supported by the Danbury Republican Town Committee, including Esposito and Giegler (Esposito slate); Giegler did not file with the secretary a previously submitted Independent Party slate consisting of candidates supported by the Danbury Democratic Town Committee, including the plaintiff (Alves slate). After a three day court trial, the trial court, Medina, J. , issued an order on October 12, 2023, which, pursuant to General Statutes § 9-329b, directed Giegler to remove the Esposito slate that she had submitted to the secretary from the ballot (October 12 order). [2]
The parties sought review of numerous questions of law by this court pursuant to General Statutes § 9-325, and they also filed appeals and cross appeals from the judgment of the trial court. After reviewing these questions and the trial court’s October 16, 2023 memo- randum of decision, which questions the trial court certified to the Chief Justice pursuant to § 9-325, we issued an order on October 17, 2023, modifying the questions. First, with respect to the notice issue under § 9-452a, did Giegler ‘‘[exceed] her statutory authority by failing to file with the secretary . . . pursuant to . . . § 9-461, the [Alves] slate . . . approved at the [Independent Party’s] August 11, 2023 caucus?’’ Second, did Giegler ‘‘improperly [file] with the secretary . . . pursuant to . . . § 9-461, the [Esposito] slate . . . approved at the [Independent Party’s] August 21, 2023 caucus on the ground that the filing with the Danbury town clerk’s office failed to comply with . . . § 9-452 *7 because it was not certified?’’ Following expedited briefing on these certified questions, we heard oral argu- ment on October 20, 2023. [4] We conclude that the answer to the first certified question is ‘‘yes,’’ and the answer to the second certified question is ‘‘no.’’ Consistent with these answers to the certified questions, after oral argu- ment, we issued an order, which we announced from the bench, affirming the judgment of the trial court and indicating that a written opinion would follow. [5] This is that opinion.
The record reveals the following facts, as found by the trial court, and procedural history. On August 4, 2023, Rouen had notice published in the Danbury News- Times (News-Times) of an ‘‘[e]ndorsement [m]eeting’’ of the Independent Party to be held at 6:30 p.m. on August 11, 2023, at the Maron Hotel. Although a copy of that notice, as published in the News-Times, is on file in the Danbury town clerk’s office (town clerk), and Giegler attended the meeting personally, the trial court found that ‘‘no separate letter or other notification to the town clerk was sent by Rouen or anyone else.’’
The Independent Party held its first endorsement meeting on August 11, 2023. Minutes of that meeting prepared by Jennifer Dorin, the Independent Party’s secretary and treasurer, indicate that Rouen called that meeting to order at 6:42 p.m. and adjourned it at 6:46 p.m. Dorin’s minutes also indicate that, at that meeting, Justin Chan, a new member of the party, challenged Rouen with respect to whom would be permitted to vote at the meeting, causing ‘‘chaos’’ to ensue and the ‘‘room [to become] unruly’’ as Rouen announced that the party ‘‘would need legal counsel to clarify who is allowed to vote.’’ At that point, Rouen and the deputy treasurer moved to adjourn the meeting, Dorin seconded the motion, and the ‘‘[e]xecutive [b]oard made the unan- imous decision to adjourn the meeting.’’ There subse- quently was some disagreement about whether the meet- ing had been properly adjourned, and a set of minutes prepared by Gretchen Lombardi, a party member, indi- cate that those remaining in attendance nevertheless held a caucus and proceeded to nominate, by unanimous vote, the Alves slate as the nominees of the Independent Party. Chan served as presiding officer of that caucus.
Subsequently, on August 15, 2023, Rouen sent a letter informing the town clerk of a ‘‘caucus’’ to be held at the Maron Hotel at 6:30 p.m. on August 21, 2023, ‘‘to nominate a slate of candidates on the Independent [Party] line for the 2023 Danbury municipal election.’’ On August 16, 2023, notice to that effect was published in the News-Times.
On August 16, 2023, Lombardi, accompanied by an attorney, attempted to file with the town clerk a docu- ment consisting of the Alves slate of candidates, a copy of the August 4, 2023 published notice of the August 11, 2023 meeting, and a page captioned ‘‘CERTIFICA- *8 TION OF PARTY NOMINATIONS FOR MUNICIPAL OFFICE,’’ stating that ‘‘it is hereby certified that at the Independent Party [c]aucus called for that purpose, held on August 11, 2023 . . . by a majority vote, the persons listed on the attached sheets were nominated as candidates for election . . . .’’ Chan signed that fil- ing as caucus chair. The town clerk received, but ini- tially rejected, that filing on August 16, 2023. That deci- sion was based on Giegler’s understanding that the endorsements might not be valid, in light of her personal knowledge of what had transpired at the August 11, 2023 meeting, along with the fact that Rouen had already noticed a second Independent Party caucus to take place on August 21, 2023.
The next day, August 17, 2023, Giegler reconsidered the rejection of the Alves slate and agreed to accept that filing based on legal advice that she had obtained from the secretary’s office, despite her continued doubts as to its validity. Giegler declined, however, to follow advice from the secretary’s office that she con- tact the interested parties to inform them of the poten- tial over endorsement issues. Giegler believed that instance to be the first time she had not followed legal advice from the secretary’s office.
Subsequently, the Independent Party held a caucus on August 21, 2023, which resulted in a vote awarding the party’s endorsement to the Esposito slate. On August 22, 2023, Rouen submitted the Esposito slate to the town clerk’s office, with a cover letter providing: ‘‘As [c]hairman of the Independent Party . . . I hereby sub- mit the [p]arty’s official endorsements of candidates for the November 7, 2023 municipal elections. The nomi- nation meeting was conducted on August 21, 2023, as advertised in the . . . News-Times.’’ The cover letter further stated that the ‘‘Independent Party . . . is aware of a submission of an unofficial slate, which was never recognized or approved by the [e]xecutive [b]oard, and out of caution, has been vetoed and deemed invalid in accordance with the rules of the Independent Party . . . .’’ The town clerk’s office stamped that doc- ument as ‘‘received for record’’ on August 23, 2023.
Attached to Rouen’s cover letter was the document containing the Esposito slate; that document listed the names of the Esposito slate candidates under the head- ing ‘‘INDEPENDENT PARTY OF DANBURY: CANDI- DATES’ STATEMENT OF CONSENT.’’ The trial court observed that ‘‘the individual proposed candidates all signed the sheet on which their names appeared weeks before the August 21, 2023 caucus.’’ (Emphasis added.)
The ‘‘fifth page of the [document], over the signatures of Rouen as chairman and Dorin as secretary, recites that the events occurred ‘[a]t a [s]pecial [m]eeting of the Danbury Republican Town Committee . . . [8] .’ ’’ Thereafter, on September 18, 2023, Giegler submitted only the Esposito slate to the secretary pursuant to *9 § 9-461.
On September 27, 2023, the plaintiff brought this action pursuant to § 9-328. The plaintiff sought (1) a judgment declaring that ‘‘Giegler acted without lawful authority when she determined which slate of candi- dates had been nominated by the Independent Party . . . and that, under [General Statutes] § 9-414, no such endorsement by the Independent Party . . . ha[d] occurred,’’ (2) injunctive relief ‘‘compelling [Giegler] and the secretary . . . not to identify the [Esposito slate] candidates, including . . . Esposito, as nomin- ees of the Independent Party . . . on ballots to be used in connection with Danbury municipal elections sched- uled for November 7, 2023,’’ and (3) ‘‘[s]uch other relief to which the plaintiff is entitled at law or in equity.’’ Following a three day court trial, the court issued the October 12 order that, subject to the parties’ stipulation as to four unaffected offices; see footnote 2 of this opinion; required Giegler ‘‘to remove from the Novem- ber 7, 2023 ballot those names submitted by her on September 18, 2023, to the [secretary] consisting of candidates on the line assigned to the Independent Party . . . .’’
The trial court subsequently issued a memorandum of decision expanding on the October 12 order. With respect to the questions certified for this appeal pursu- ant to § 9-325, [9] the trial court determined that whether Giegler properly had determined the Esposito slate to be ‘‘certif[ied]’’ for purposes of § 9-452 presented a ques- tion of statutory construction. The court concluded that the Esposito slate ‘‘was not certified and, therefore, did not comply with § 9-452’’ because ‘‘[c]ertification must mean more than just using the words ‘official endorsements.’ At a minimum, it is a warranty by the issuer with consequences.’’ Considering the ‘‘totality of the evidence,’’ the court concluded that the Esposito slate was not ‘‘certified’’ because the signatures had been affixed weeks prior to the date of the caucus, and ‘‘the signature page clearly states [that] it came from a special meeting of the Danbury Republican Town Committee.’’
The trial court next turned to the Alves slate. Although the court concluded that Giegler had exceeded her min- isterial authority by failing to file that slate with the secretary, the court nevertheless determined that the Alves slate was invalid because it was the product of a meeting that did not comply with § 9-452a, insofar as the presiding officer of the caucus had not provided the town clerk with notice of the August 11, 2023 meeting at least five days in advance. Observing that § 9-452a ‘‘requires such notice and, ‘concomitantly,’ legal publi- cation in a newspaper of the meeting notice,’’ the court rejected both the plaintiff’s argument that Giegler’s presence at the August 11, 2023 meeting was ‘‘enough to infer [that] she received notice’’ and the plaintiff’s *10 reliance on ‘‘the alleged lack of prejudice from any noncompliance, as well as the newspaper publication as sufficient compliance.’’ The court ‘‘agree[d] with Giegler and, on the evidence produced at trial, conclude[d] [that] the Alves slate did not satisfy § 9-452a.’’
Ultimately, the trial court concluded that ‘‘placement of the Esposito slate on the Independent Party . . . line would be improper’’ and that ‘‘placement of the Alves slate on the line of the Independent Party . . . would be equally improper.’’ [11] Accordingly, the court acted pursuant to § 9-329b and ordered Giegler ‘‘to remove from the Independent Party line those names submitted by her to the [secretary] on September 18, 2023, excluding only those four candidates set forth in the parties’ October 10, 2023 stipulation . . . .’’ [12] (Cita- tion omitted.) This expedited appeal followed in accor- dance with § 9-325. See footnotes 3 through 5 of this opinion and accompanying text.
At the outset, we set forth the standard of review. It
is undisputed that the parties’ claims on appeal concern-
ing the various statutes governing the endorsement of
candidates by minor parties, and the extent to which
town clerks have discretion to administer those stat-
utes, present questions of statutory interpretation guided
by General Statutes § 1-2z and involve application of
law to fact over which we exercise plenary review. See,
e.g.,
Cohen
v.
Rossi
,
Before turning to the parties’ specific statutory claims, we begin by addressing the extent to which a town clerk has the discretion to accept or reject a minor party’s filing of its endorsement of candidates. The town clerk’s responsibilities are governed by § 9-461, which provides *11 in relevant part that, no later than seven days ‘‘following the date set for the primary for nomination at any elec- tion at which a municipal office is to be filled,’’ the town clerk is required to file with the secretary ‘‘ a list of the candidates of each party for the municipal offices to be filled at such election nominated in accor- dance with the provisions of this chapter . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) The town clerk’s responsibilities under § 9-461 are intended to aid the creation of the ballot, as the statute requires that the secretary provide a form for the town clerk to use in creating that list and that the town clerk include in the list ‘‘a statement of the total number of candidates for which each elector may vote for each office and term’’ and certify that he or she ‘‘has compared the name of each such candidate with the candidate’s name as the candidate authorizes the candidate’s name to appear on the ballot . . . and has verified and corrected the same.’’ General Statutes § 9-461; see also General Statutes § 9-461 (requiring town clerk to ‘‘forthwith notify the [s]ecretary . . . of any errors in such list or of any changes in such list provided for in section 9-329a or 9-460’’).
We agree with the plaintiff that the town clerk has
the ministerial obligation under § 9-461 to accept and
to file with the secretary lists of minor party candidates
that are facially valid under the terms of § 9-452. Under
the terms of § 9-452, a list is facially valid if it is (1)
timely filed at least sixty-two days before the election,
(2) ‘‘certified by the presiding officer of the committee,
meeting or other authority making such nomination,’’
and (3) in the prescribed format with respect to the
certification of the candidates’ names, addresses, signa-
tures, and office titles/districts. General Statutes § 9-
452. The town clerk’s function is limited to assessing
the presence or absence of these facial items, and the
town clerk has no discretion to consider the validity of
the nominations or otherwise to determine whether a
minor party has complied with the statutory scheme
beyond these facial items. See
Butts Bysiewicz
, 298
Conn. 665, 678–79, 682,
Although Giegler, as town clerk, lacked discretion to refuse the filing of facially valid slates, this preliminary conclusion does not complete our inquiry, as it ulti- mately falls to the courts acting under § 9-328 to deter- mine whether the filings at issue in this case complied with the governing statutes. With this background in mind, we turn to the parties’ specific statutory claims.
I We begin with the first certified question, which requires us to consider whether the trial court incor- rectly determined that the Alves slate was invalid because it ‘‘did not comply with all of the notice requirements of § 9-452a . . . .’’ The plaintiff contends that § 9-452a ‘‘requires that notice . . . be received by the town clerk ‘[n]ot later than five days’ before the nominating caucus’’ and that the trial court ‘‘did not specifically find that the notice was untimely.’’ The plaintiff emphasizes that, ‘‘[t]o the contrary, the evidence supports the con- clusion that the notice was timely. Giegler never testi- fied or claimed that she failed to receive timely notice of the August 11 [2023] caucus.’’ The plaintiff also argues that the copy of the newspaper notice in the town clerk’s file is sufficient as a matter of form to satisfy § 9-452a because it provided the requisite ‘‘written notice of the date, time, location and purpose of the meeting to the town clerk.’’
In response, Giegler, joined by Rouen, asserts that
*13
the Alves slate did not comply with the notice require-
ments of § 9-452a, thus precluding Giegler from submit-
ting it to the secretary as a matter of law pursuant to
§ 9-461. Giegler contends that there is ‘‘no evidence of
statutory written notice of the [August 11, 2023] meeting
being made to the town clerk, and certainly not at least
five days before the meeting,’’ and that, under,
Cham-
bers Electric Boat Corp.
,
Beginning with the statutory language, as required by § 1-2z, we observe that § 9-452a provides in relevant part: ‘‘Not later than five days before a minor party holds a party meeting to nominate a candidate for public office, the presiding officer of such meeting shall give written notice of the date, time, location and purpose of the meeting to, in the case of a municipal office, the town clerk of the municipality served by such office . Concomitantly , the presiding officer of such . . . meeting shall cause the written notice of such meeting to be published in a newspaper with a general circula- tion in the applicable town for such office. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) As Giegler argues, the word ‘‘con- comitantly’’ is the adverb form of ‘‘concomitant,’’ which the dictionary defines as ‘‘[o]ccurring or existing con- currently; attendant.’’ American Heritage College Dic- tionary (4th Ed. 2004) p. 297; see id. (noting that origin of ‘‘concomitant’’ is from Latin word for ‘‘to accom- pany’’); see also Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, available at https://www.merriam-webster.com/diction- ary/concomitant (last visited January 11, 2023) (defin- ing ‘‘concomitant’’ as ‘‘accompanying especially in a subordinate or incidental way’’). We conclude that the plain and unambiguous language of § 9-452a requires two separate written notices, one to the town clerk, and one published in a suitable newspaper.
Given this plain and unambiguous statutory language,
we agree with Giegler that the two ‘‘written notices’’
are an integral part of § 9-452a and that constructive
or even actual notice will not substitute for the written
notice required by the statute. See
Chambers
v.
Electric
Boat Corp.
, supra,
Turning to whether the requirements of § 9-452a were satisfied in this case, we note that the record reveals that the newspaper advertisement for the August 11, 2023 meeting was published in the News-Times on August 4, 2023. There is no claim that the content of that notice itself substantively would not satisfy § 9- 452a if it had been separately filed with the town clerk in a timely manner. A separate copy of that advertise- ment is contained in the town clerk’s file, but, unlike the other documents from the town clerk’s file that were admitted into evidence, there is no time stamp on that notice indicating when the town clerk received it. Similarly, there is no testimony from any of the wit- nesses—either from Rouen, Chan, or Lombardi on behalf of the Independent Party, or Giegler on behalf of her office—about when or by whom it was filed. [16] Put differently, the record is silent as to when the notice to the town clerk in the form of a copy of the newspaper advertisement for the August 11, 2023 meeting was filed, *15 which likely explains why the trial court did not make a specific finding of untimeliness while concluding that the notice did not comply with § 9-452a.
The fact that the trial court did not make a finding
that the August 11, 2023 notice was untimely in its
analysis of the § 9-452a issue ultimately dooms any
attempt to invalidate it on that basis in this court. The
timeliness of a filing is ordinarily a finding of fact to
be made by the trial court in the first instance, which
is of particular importance in a proceeding in this court
under § 9-325, in which our jurisdiction is specifically
limited to ‘‘questions of law.’’
Wrinn
v.
Dunleavy
, 186
Conn. 125, 133–34,
II
The second certified question asks whether Giegler
improperly filed the Esposito slate with the secretary
*16
on the ground that the Independent Party’s August 22,
2023 filing did not ‘‘comply with . . . § 9-452 because
it was not certified.’’ Emphasizing Rouen’s signature on
a certain cover letter, which was printed on Indepen-
dent Party letterhead and stated that the Esposito slate
represents the party’s ‘‘official endorsements,’’ Giegler
and Rouen argue that the trial court incorrectly con-
cluded that the Esposito slate was not certified. They
also rely on the plain meaning of the word ‘‘certify’’ and
the fact that § 9-452 does not prescribe any particular
manner of certification, along with the Appellate
Court’s decision in
Williams Freedom of Information
Commission
,
Beginning with the statutory text, as required by the § 1-2z analysis, we observe that § 9-452 provides in rele- vant part: ‘‘All minor parties nominating candidates for any elective office shall make such nominations and certify and file a list of such nominations , as required by this section, not later than the sixty-second day prior to the day of the election at which such candidates are to be voted for. A list of nominees in printed or typewritten form that includes each candidate’s name as authorized by each candidate to appear on the ballot, the signature of each candidate, the full street address of each candidate and the title and district of the office for which each candidate is nominated shall be certified by the presiding officer of the committee, meeting or other authority making such nomination and shall be filed by such presiding officer . . . with the clerk of the municipality, in the case of any municipal office to be voted upon at a municipal election, not later than the sixty-second day prior to the day of the election. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)
It is undisputed that the term ‘‘certify’’ or ‘‘certified’’
is not defined by the applicable statutory scheme. Con-
temporary dictionaries indicate that the ordinary mean-
ing of the term ‘‘certify’’ is (1) ‘‘to attest [especially]
authoritatively or formally,’’ (2) ‘‘to present in formal
communication, [especially] in a document under hand
or seal,’’ or (3) ‘‘to confirm or attest often by a document
under hand or seal as being true, meeting a standard,
or being as represented . . . .’’ Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary (1976) p. 367; see Ballentine’s
Law Dictionary (3d Ed. 1969) p. 188 (defining ‘‘certify’’
as ‘‘[t]o authenticate by a certificate; to vouch for a
*17
thing in writing; a certificate is an authoritative attesta-
tion, and any form which affirms the fact in writing is
sufficient’’); see also American Heritage College Dic-
tionary, supra, p. 236 (defining ‘‘certify’’ as ‘‘[t]o confirm
formally as true, accurate, or genuine,’’ or ‘‘[t]o guaran-
tee as meeting a standard’’). In our view, the plain mean-
ing of the term is ambiguous for purposes of § 1-2z, as
we view both parties’ interpretations as reasonable with
respect to whether a specific statement of veracity and
correctness is required. See, e.g.,
Adesokan Bloom-
field
,
Our research did not reveal any case law construing the term ‘‘certify’’ as used in § 9-452, and the legislative history of the statute, which was originally enacted in 1955 as Public Acts 1955, No. 106, is silent on that point. The Appellate Court’s decision in Williams Freedom of Information Commission , supra, 108 Conn. App. 471, on which the parties heavily rely, is instructive. In that case, the Appellate Court, in a decision authored by former Justice David M. Borden, considered the meaning of the term ‘‘certifying’’ as used in the Freedom of Information Act, specifically with respect to a munici- pality’s obligation under General Statutes § 1-210 (a) to supply ‘‘certified copies . . . .’’ Id., 479–81. The plain- tiff in Williams argued that, under that statute, ‘‘prop- erly certified copies . . . must have the following char- acteristics: the certification must attest that it is a true and complete copy of the record on file; the certification must be issued by the person who maintains the record or his or her authorized representative; the certifier must sign the record; the raised seal of the certifier must appear on each page of the record; and the ‘certification shall be truthful.’ ’’ Id., 478–79.
The Appellate Court rejected the contention that the Freedom of Information Act ‘‘mandates such a compre- hensive set of requirements.’’ Id., 479. The court observed that, ‘‘[u]nlike some other statutes,’’ such as General Statutes § 7-23 (certification by town clerk) [19] and Gen- eral Statutes § 7-36 (certification by registrar of vital statistics), [20] ‘‘the [Freedom of Information Act] does not prescribe any particular form or content of a certifi- cation of records.’’ Id., 480. The Appellate Court held that the ‘‘use of the term ‘certified’ [in § 1-210 (a)] sug- gests that as long as an official with legal authority to do so attests, or states in writing, that the records are true copies of the originals, he or she has issued a ‘certified record’ properly under the [Freedom of Infor- mation Act].’’ Id., 481. Relying on dictionary definitions for the general meaning of the term ‘‘certify,’’ the Appellate Court observed that §§ 7-23 and 7-36, on which the plaintiff in Williams relied for those ‘‘addi- tional requirements,’’ ‘‘simply represent two instances in which the legislature has decided that a specific form of certification is necessary due to the nature and importance of the records. [The Appellate Court saw] nothing in the language or purpose of either of those *18 statutes or the [Freedom of Information Act] to suggest that the specific requirements of those statutes be imported into the provisions of [that] act.’’ Id., 482.
Given the lack of specificity as to the required form
of ‘‘[c]ertification’’ under § 9-452, we find
Williams
instructive. First, reading additional requirements into
the statute’s language runs afoul of the well settled rule
of statutory construction that ‘‘[w]e are not permitted
to supply statutory language that the legislature may
have chosen to omit.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.)
Mayer
v.
Historic District Commission
, 325 Conn.
765, 776,
Turning to the document at issue, we observe that it is a cover letter printed on Independent Party letterhead and signed by Rouen in his capacity as the chairperson of that party. That cover letter indicates that the party was filing its ‘‘official endorsements . . . .’’ This degree of formality, with Rouen’s averment that the endorse- ments are ‘‘official,’’ meets the dictionary definition of ‘‘certify’’ because the filing involved the presentation of a ‘‘formal communication,’’ and a confirmation that the endorsements ‘‘[met] a standard.’’ Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, supra. This is particularly so when the cover letter is read in context, with its averment that the attached endorsements are ‘‘official,’’ as opposed to the previously filed competing set that Rouen sought to revoke in the same cover letter. Although one of the *19 annexed signature pages tellingly refers to the Danbury Republican Town Committee’s support of that set of endorsements, and the other candidate signatures also predate the August 22, 2023 filing by more than one month, this nevertheless does not detract from the fact that Rouen’s letter—which is the controlling docu- ment as to certification—meets the broad standard applicable to that term under current statutory law. Accordingly, we conclude that Rouen’s letter consti- tuted the voucher necessary to comply with the statu- tory certification requirement under § 9-452, rendering the Esposito slate validly filed.
Given the ministerial role of the town clerk, we con-
clude that Giegler had no choice under the statutory
scheme but to accept and to transmit to the secretary
both filings—August 11, 2023, by Chan, and August 21,
2023, by Rouen—purporting to be the endorsements of
the Independent Party, insofar as both were facially
compliant with the governing statutes. It is undisputed
that the presence of two facially valid slates had the
effect of creating what, at the time, would be an over
endorsement by the Independent Party; in such a case,
there functionally would be no endorsement with
respect to the affected offices by operation of § 9-414,
which provides: ‘‘No town committee, caucus or con-
vention shall endorse and certify to the clerk of a munic-
ipality, and no primary shall choose, more candidates
for nomination to municipal office or more persons as
members of a town committee than an elector may
vote for in each such case.’’ See also, e.g.,
Lobsenz
v.
Davidoff
,
We acknowledge Rouen’s argument that this result
has deprived the Independent Party of its first amend-
ment rights ‘‘to identify the people who constitute the
association . . . and to select a standard bearer who
best represents the party’s ideologies and preferences.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Nielsen Kezer,
supra,
The answer to the first certified question is ‘‘yes,’’ and the answer to the second certified question is ‘‘no.’’
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
[1]
Also named as a defendant was Stephanie Thomas, the secretary of the
state. The trial court subsequently granted the secretary’s motion to dismiss
the action against her, subject to a stipulation that she would ‘‘abide by any
ruling of [the] court, directed to the town clerk or other parties, with regard
to the substance of this matter . . . .’’
[2]
Specifically, the trial court ordered Giegler ‘‘to remove from the Indepen-
dent Party line those names submitted by her to the [secretary] on September
18, 2023, excluding only those four candidates set forth in the parties’
October 10, 2023 stipulation . . . .’’ (Citation omitted.) We note that those
unaffected offices, as set forth in the October 10 stipulation, include the
Board of Education (2-year term), Board of Education (4-year term), City
Council, Ward 5, and City Council, Ward 6.
appealed, directly to this court from the judgment of the trial court pursuant
In Docket No. SC 20907, Giegler appealed, and the plaintiff cross
to General Statutes §§ 9-325 and 51-199 (b) (5).
In Docket No. SC 20908, Rouen appealed, and the plaintiff cross appealed,
directly to this court from the judgment of the trial court, along with its
October 12 order, pursuant to §§ 9-325 and 51-199 (b) (5).
On October 17, 2023, we consolidated the appeals and cross appeals with
the questions of law certified under § 9-325 and directed all filings to take
*21
place in Docket No. SC 20907. See, e.g.,
Keeley Ayala
,
to Judge Medina, for their professionalism in conducting these proceedings,
We take this opportunity to express our gratitude to all counsel, and
which required trial and appellate review to be conducted on a highly
expedited basis given the need to finalize, print, and distribute ballots in
*22
advance of the November 7, 2023 municipal elections. We emphasize, how-
ever, that the scheduling of expedited proceedings such as this case should
account for a meaningful time for appellate review, including briefing, oral
argument, and decision.
[14]
We acknowledge Giegler’s argument that the language of § 9-461, which
requires the town clerk to file with the secretary nominations made ‘‘in
accordance with the provisions of this chapter,’’ permits the town clerk to
file only those lists that are statutorily compliant. With respect to compliance,
that argument merely begs the question: who decides? Consistent with our
understanding of the case law governing the duties of town clerks and the
secretary, we do not understand Giegler to argue that this language gives
town clerks the authority to conduct investigations or to make assessments
that go beyond the face of the documents. Indeed, during her testimony
before the trial court, Giegler conceded that a town clerk is required to
accept filings but is not required ‘‘to seek minutes from groups’’ submitting
endorsements. She further conceded that the position of town clerk does
not afford her any investigative or adjudicatory powers concerning circum-
stances that have resulted in contested endorsements, or their ultimate valid-
ity.
the legislative history indicates that the newspaper publication provision
[15]
Assuming ambiguity in the statute for purposes of § 1-2z, we note that
was added to § 9-452a in 2007 via the enactment of § 46 of No. 07-194 of
the 2007 Public Acts, which was a broader election reform and security bill
aimed at auditing voting machines. The limited commentary in the legislative
history indicates that it was intended to conform the notice practices of
minor parties to those of the major parties. See 50 S. Proc., Pt. 16, 2007
Sess., p. 5092, remarks of Senator Gayle Slossberg.
[16]
We disagree with Giegler’s argument that notice of the meeting could
be filed only by Chan because § 9-452a requires the ‘‘presiding officer’’ of
the meeting to file the notice, and he had served as chairperson of the
caucus on August 11, 2023. This argument is inconsistent with the statutory
scheme, in particular § 9-452, which contemplates certification of endorse-
ments by a ‘‘presiding officer of the committee, meeting or other authority
making such nomination,’’ which would encompass the caucus, as distinct
from the presiding officer of the meeting, who must give the premeeting
notice contemplated by § 9-452a. As was discussed at oral argument before
this court, it is entirely plausible for one individual to call and preside over
the meeting, and then to turn over the chair to another individual for purposes
of presiding over the nomination proceeding.
[17]
Although Giegler accurately points out that no participant in the August
11, 2023 meeting, including Chan, Rouen or Lombardi, testified as to when
the notice was filed with the town clerk’s office, it bears mention that
Giegler was uniquely positioned, in her role as town clerk, to establish when
documents were filed with her office. In comparison to the other documents
from the town clerk’s office that were submitted into evidence, the potential
timeliness issue in this appeal renders all the more significant the lack of
a date and time stamp on the advertisement in her file. We simply decline
to presume that the filing was not timely or properly filed. See, e.g.,
Scovil
Planning & Zoning Commission
,
[19] General Statutes § 7-23 provides in relevant part: ‘‘No copy of record
certified by the town clerk or assistant town clerk of any town shall be
deemed valid in law unless the seal of such town is affixed thereto; and the
town clerk of each town . . . shall affix the seal of such town to all certified
copies of record . . . .’’
[20]
General Statutes § 7-36 (5) provides: ‘‘ ‘Certified copy’ means a copy
of a birth, death, fetal death or marriage certificate that (A) includes all
information on the certificate except such information that is nondisclosable
by law, (B) is issued or transmitted by any registrar of vital statistics, (C)
includes an attested signature and the raised seal of an authorized person,
and (D) if submitted to the department, includes all information required
by the [Commissioner of Public Health] . . . .’’
Appellate Court observed that ‘‘this general meaning is consistent with the
[21]
Consistent with the dictionary definitions cited in this opinion, the
most apt definition provided by the dictionary for the word ‘certify’: ‘To
confirm formally as true, accurate, or genuine; testify to or vouch for in
writing.’ American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (New College
Ed. 1981).’’
Williams
v.
Freedom of Information Commission
, supra, 108
Conn. App. 481; see id. (observing that plain language definition was consis-
tent with ‘‘the purposes of the [Freedom of Information Act], namely, to
make public records available to the public, except when specifically
exempted . . . and to do so without undue burden on the provider of the
records’’ (citation omitted)).
the secretary of the nominating proceeding specifically certify under oath,
[22]
For example, an Illinois statute requires that the presiding officer and
in a document ‘‘annexed to the certificate of nomination,’’ that their report
of the nominations is ‘‘true to the best of their knowledge and belief . . . .’’
10 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/10-1 (a) (West 2022); see, e.g.,
People ex rel. Vigilant
Party
v.
Dolton
,