*1 article X of the Public Aid preempt MCCA does not Therefore, Code. affirm the judgment we court reversed the trial court. which
Affirmed. (No. 104922. al.,
SANTOS ALVAREZ et Indiv. and on Behalf All Situated, Others Similarly v. MARIA Appellants, PAPPAS, Treasurer and ex Collector of Cook officio County, Illinois, Appellee.
Opinion April Rehearing May denied 2008. filed 2008. *2 (Richard Chicago Rathsack, A. Michael Gins- W. burg, Schmidt, Salzman and Theodore J. Steven A. counsel), Timothy appellants. Moran, E. for Attorney, Chicago Devine, A. State’s Richard (Patrick Driscoll, Jr., Prinzi and Paul A. T. Michael C. counsel), Attorneys, Castiglione, Assistant State’s appellee. judgment delivered the of the
JUSTICE GARMAN opinion. court, with Fitzger- Freeman, and Justices
Chief Justice Thomas judgment in the ald, Karmeier, and Burke concurred opinion. opinion. dissented,
Justice Kilbride with OPINION parcels of real Plaintiffs are the owners of various they County. action filed a class estate Cook alleging they complaint against treasurer, defendant duplicate payments real estate taxes of their had made money. plaintiffs seeking their Most of a return of respective lenders. to their in escrow had they paid them, plaintiffs bills, received their When paying also apparently lenders were that their unaware being paid resulting twice. bills, in the taxes the same duplicate in 1990. made were The earliest under section dismiss a motion to filed Defendant (735 619(a)(5) ILCS Procedure of Civil of the Code 2— (West five-year 619(a)(5) 2006)), alleging 5/2 — statute of 20—175 of in section contained limitations (West (35 (Code) Property ILCS Code Tax 200/20—175 2006)) request plaintiffs’ expired for a and that had untimely. Cook court of The circuit was, therefore, complaint. plaintiffs’ County agreed dismissed judgment. appellate circuit court’s affirmed the court App. 3d 39.
BACKGROUND complete case is facts in this A statement Briefly, opinion. in the court’s contained alleg- complaint September filed seeking ing their taxes and had alleging complaint counts, contained six refund. The (2) *3 (1) equal conversion; violation causes of action for (3) taking process; protection without due unlawful (5) (4) unjust just compensation; enrichment; violation Property Disposition Act of Unclaimed Uniform (West Act) (765 (Unclaimed Property ILCS 1025/1 et seq. (6) rights. 2006)); pensioners’ of state violation alleged plaintiffs complaint, that defendant In their only county state who refused treasurer was duplicate payments the refunds were tax when refund requested payment years had after the
more than five alleged lacked that defendant Plaintiffs been made. authority duplicate taxes or to disburse to collect the alleged They taxing that further districts. them to plaintiffs knowledge made time had at the defendant owing. then due and no taxes were that their stated, As defendant filed a motion to dismiss complaint on the grounds five-year that statute of limitations contained in section 20—175 of the Code had expired. The circuit court agreed and dismissed the complaint. The appellate court affirmed. 374 Ill. App. 3d 39. court, the appellate argued that their
overpayments were not and were thus not subject to section They 20— 175. argued further request for a return of the payments were not claims for a “refund.” They argued also the pay ments constituted tangible subject Unclaimed Property Act. The rejected court all of these contentions. The court also found that reading of the language of together with the 20— legislative history statute, demonstrates plaintiffs’ tax payments were overpayments of their taxes and were therefore subject to the statute of limitations contained therein. 374 Ill. 3d App. at 48. This court (210 granted plaintiffs’ petition for leave to appeal Ill. 2d 315(a)). R. We now affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
ANALYSIS I. Standard of Review The question of whether a cause of action was properly 619(a)(5) dismissed under section of the Code of Civil 2— Procedure is reviewed de novo. Ferguson City Chicago, (2004). 213 Ill. 2d We are also called upon this case to interpret section 20 — 175 of the Code. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that subject to de novo review. Kownacki, Wisniewski v.
II Section 20— 175 of the provides Code in pertinent part: *4 or year, for the same is twice assessed any property
“If erroneously as- taxable, and the it becomes before assessed otherwise, or or either at sale have been sessed taxes by claimant by the same have been different Collector, being satisfied upon claimants, County claim- proper taxes to case, refund the in the shall facts *** unless not be allowed for refund shall A claim ant. right to a the date the years from filed petition within added.) 35 ILCS (Emphasis 200/20—175 refund arose.” 2006). (West voluntary exception an provides
This section may doctrine, taxpayer that Under doctrine. payment if the even voluntarily paid, that are recover taxes not illegally. Such the taxes or assessed body imposed taxing recovery is authorized only if the be recovered may Chicago, City v. by statute. Getto (1981). as follows: the doctrine explained has This court “ money recognized rule that universally ‘It has been a payment and right
voluntarily paid under a claim making pay person knowledge of the facts with ground that back on the cannot be recovered ment only to necessary not deemed illegal. It has been claim was unlawful, that but also was that the claim asserted show neces voluntary; that there was some payment was payment was compulsion, and sity amounted to which ” Getto, 86 compulsion.’ the influence of such made under Chicago 48-49, Illinois Glass Co. quoting Ill. 2d at Co., Ill. Telephone a refund requested undisputed plaintiffs It is they after years than five more duplicate payments their Thus, applies if 20—175 to defendant. were are barred. requests payments, plaintiffs’
Ill from duplicate payments their to remove an effort argue of section operation 20— reason They payments.” “tax were not mistaken simply were Accord satisfied. already been that had tax assessments *5 ing plaintiffs, making duplicate payments to their was no they given inadvertently if different than had defendant money too much left or had cash on the counter at belong, defendant, defendant’s office. Such funds not to taxpayer, but to the and the monies should be returned. payments Thus, reason, such would not payments constitute tax and a return those funds rejected would not be a The “refund.” court argument, declining plaintiffs’ pay this to characterize anything payments. Recognizing ments as other than tax they authority argument, that plaintiffs have cited little for their they
contend that should not have the burden showing right duplicate pay their a return of to their They attempt defendant, ments. arguing to that shift burden to payments, at the
that time made their already taxes had been and defendant was aware of they argue, authority Thus, that fact.1 no defendant had accept payments to that then taxes were not due and authority taxing no to transmit those to the districts. Gannaway
Plaintiffs cite this
decision in
court’s
(1903),
support
posi
Barricklow,
with paid plaintiff paid The date, the taxes. the a certain plaintiff had been that no assessment then discovered had that no taxes book and on the assessor’s entered filed suit recover extended. He been levied or county money paid. treasurer admitted he had argued money, no but he had plaintiffs claim voluntary payment payment of a tax and awas juryA for the not be rendered verdict could recovered. finding plaintiff. affirmed, treasurer This court authority money from the had no to collect receive appear plaintiff. It not a tax and did not on book was addition, because as a tax. court concluded that taxing money tax, had not districts levied *6 money and, fact, in not be distributed to them could voluntary payment belong did not to them. The doctrine apply money paid by plaintiff did not because the money in was not a tax. The court noted that the was authority thus, law; the treasurer’s hands belonged it without plaintiff equitably to the treasurer was Gannaway, to at bound refund it. 412-13. bar, In the case at there is no claim the taxes not do were levied or extended. Plaintiffs not contend they improper the tax in bills were received way. Their is had sole claim that because taxes already nothing paid, and, been on the tax was owed bills payments something therefore, the were other than tax payments. (35 argue
Plaintiffs 20—170 of the Code section (West 2006)) supports descrip- ILCS their 200/20—170 payments payments tion of their as rather inadvertent payment than of taxes. That “Double section entitled Payment” provides: property on a been more than
“When taxes have year, by claimants, county once the same different report county surplus collector to the clerk all shall received, together so with the names the claimants. copies the report, county Certified or the clerk’s record thereof, shall prima be facie evidence all courts payment of tax on the therein for the described year years or township mentioned. The collectors shall report county once, to the collector taxes more than by year, county different claimants for the same and the report county collector shall clerk.” 35 ILCS 200/ (West 2006). 20—170 upon “surplus” meaning Plaintiffs seize the word as taxing that no district has a right rely pay- on or ments receive them. Plaintiffs also believe that section “implicitly” 20—170 directs that these funds are surplus not to be to taxing distributed districts and not could in any have been included levied district’s amount. Ac- cording plaintiffs, these are surplus payments not treated as tax payments reason that duplicate payments also be tax pay- should treated as ments. We note that cite no for their authority of section That interpretation simply 20—170. a reporting requirement. contains The sent to reports county may clerk then be used as prima facie payment evidence court of of “tax” on particular of real parcels very estate. The use of the word “tax” section 20—170 in describing payments the double plaintiffs’ argument undercuts that such are not taxes. Code treat does not excess tax payments
as nonpayments something other than *7 tax; rather, a payments “overpay- such are described as legislature of taxes. The there anticipated ments” that may will situations in which taxpayers overpay be a it to obtain provided taxes and has mechanisms (35 of taxes. For 21—60 ILCS example, those (West 2006)) Code, of the entitled of “Refund 200/21 —60 in billing,” provides accelerated overpayment; billing, pays if a county taxpayer which uses accelerated year in estimated than due for the entire more is 225 bill, county collector tax the on the actual as shown to the overpayment refund the amount “shall Section the estimated installments.” paid who person excess also describes certain 20—175 ‘ ’’ ‘ overpayments. pay- of plaintiffs’ characterization
In
of its
support
taxes,
court
the
of their
ments as overpayments
decision, United
Court
Supreme
a United States
cited
Ed. 2d
110 S.
108 L.
Dalm,
494 U.S.
States
(1990).
paid
taxpayer
case
who
1361
That
involved
Ct.
Later, the
she had received.
gift
tax on certain
(IRS) determined that
the
Internal
Service
Revenue
tax
After
have
income
instead.
taxpayer
should
set-
for
the tax court
a redetermination
petitioning
IRS,
sought refund of the
tling
taxpayer
with
the
However,
gift
she
tax.
statute
amount
had
rejected
district court
expired
limitations had
timely
that her suit was
under
taxpayer’s
contention
ap-
doctrine
court of
equitable recoupment.
affirmed
district
Supreme
reversed. The
Court
peals
In a
to a
made
Justice
responding
point
court.
footnote
no
dissent,
Stevens
the Court stated that
there was
overpaid gift
difference
a “refund of
taxes”
between
for
a tax
The Court
recovery
overpayment.”
a “claim
claims for refund of a
applied
noted
the statute
Court,
the com-
“overpayment.” According
is
“a tax
interpretation
“overpayment”
monsense
owed,
more than
for
taxpayer pays
when a
is
Dalm,
reason
U.S. at
whatever reason or no
at all.”
n.6,
n.6,
Ed. 2d at 562
We to characterize their something ments as other than tax plaintiffs’ payments properly conclude that are character- overpayments property ized as addition, of their taxes. In reject plaintiffs’ argu- court, as did the we also request money ment that their return for of their was Dictionary not a claim for “refund.” Black’s Law money “[t]he person defines “refund” as return of to a overpaid, taxpayer who such as a tax who overestimated liability employer or whose withheld much from too (8th 2004). earnings.” Dictionary Black’s Law ed. plaintiffs requested overpaid taxes, Since a return of their their claims for a are their taxes.
IV argue Plaintiffs also that their constituted tangible personal property subject Unclaimed Property Act. Plaintiffs claim that defendant violated by failing money that law to turn the over to the state Property requires persons Treasurer. The Unclaimed Act tangible possession who are in gible personal intan abandoned timely property belonging to another to property Property remit the to the state is Treasurer. presumed abandoned if it is unclaimed owner (West 2006). period years. of five 765 ILCS 1025/2 custody property Thereafter, state assumes of the responsible safekeeping. and is for its 765 ILCS 1025/14 (West 2006). required publish The state Treasurer is all notice to the owner of the claims property must be directed to the state. 765 ILCS 1025/12 (West2006). Ownership remains with vests in the state. owner never v. Topinka, Canel (2004),quoting Ill. Presley City Memphis, 1988). (Tenn. App. 769 S.W.2d 223-24 rely Canel; however, that Plaintiffs on reliance the state Canel, issue was whether misplaced. that were on of stock dividends issued shares could retain This to the state. and delivered abandoned presumed not retain the dividends state could court held of the owner private property were because *9 difference Canel, 212 Ill. at 323-24. The stock. the is in case plaintiffs’ the Canel between situation did Canel, of not transfer that, in owner the stock the Here, did plaintiffs of stock to the state. ownership the funds; they transferred of their ownership not retain the taxes of payments to defendant. Plaintiffs’ ownership to them defen by to tax sent pursuant made bills were money on a counter They just did not leave dant. they the amounts pay Plaintiffs intended to somewhere. defendant, funds did, to title to the to they pass intended to be they payments applied intended those they were mistaken tax bills had received. That been believing the tax bills had otherwise change payments. does not the character of the had no author Although plaintiffs argue that defendant cite no overpayments, receive or retain their ity to The Tax Code authority proposition. Property this defendant, collector, mail tax county mandates 2006). (West 35 bills to owners. ILCS 200/20—5 county in Cook Tax received collector monthly upon must a County be disbursed on basis 35 ILCS receipt taxing to districts. See 200/20 —140 2006). (West monetary penalty imposes Section 20—145 monies as 35 required. for willful failure to disburse tax (West 2006). find nothing improper ILCS We 200/20 —145 payments. of acceptance plaintiffs’ defendant’s Estrays reject We also claim that plaintiffs’ (West (765 Property seq. Act ILCS et Lost 1020/0.01 2006)) that Act applies payments. to their Section 27 of money notify finder lost must requires known, owner, identity if his and return or her is (West 2006). to money owner. ILCS 1020/27 argue Plaintiffs identity that defendant knew the of those who made here, at issue but made no ef- fort to return plaintiffs. the funds to argument This lacks merit. did not Plaintiffs lose their money. They intended pay money to expectation defendant with the that defendant' apply money to their respective bills.
V We now turn to the question whether plaintiffs’ claims for refund requires are barred. This us to construe section 20—175 of the Code. principles guiding our familiar. analysis are The primary objective in construing statute to ascertain and effect give to the intent of Corp. General Motors v. State the legislature. Illinois Board, Motor Vehicle Review 224 Ill. 2d All statutory other rules of construction are subordinate Lieberman, In re this Detention cardinal principle. citing Sylvester Industrial (2002), Ill. 2d *10 Comm’n, (2001). 225, 197 Ill. 2d 232 In determining legislative intent, the step first is to examine the statute, language of the which is the most indica reliable legislature’s objectives tor of the enacting a particular (2001). Yang v. City Chicago, 195 Ill. 96, law. 2d 103 of The statutory language must afforded its plain, be ex ordinary, and popularly understood meaning. People (2003). rel. Sherman v. Cryns, 264, 203 2d Ill. 279 Where language the is clear and unambiguous, the statute must given be effect as written without resort to further aids Anderson, v. construction. Krautsack statutory of Ill. (2006). 541, statute, presume 2d construing we legislature did the intend inconve absurdity, or injustice. Burger v. Lutheran General Hospital, nience 21, Ill. Assembly The General the predecessor amended section 20— 175 in 1975 to the regarding add words §1, 1,1975. October 184, eff. Pub. Act overpaid taxes. 79— the amendment, statute, section 286 of the to that Prior of “Refund erroneous Act was entitled Revenue fol- part in relevant as provided It payment Appeal.” — lows: be twice assessed any personal property shall “If real or taxable, becomes year, or assessed before it
for the same paid have erroneously shall been the so assessed and taxes otherwise, paid by twice or have been either at sale or dif claimants, court, petition person the the circuit on ferent being satisfied of the facts same, agent, his paying county collector to refund such case, in the direct the shall thereof, rata, pro from the the amount deduct legal or their succes moneys taxing various bodies due the added.) Rev. Stat. ch. (Emphasis ***.” Ill. sors par. 767. say demonstrate that
Plaintiffs cite cases which only in cases of erroneous assess applies section 20—175 however, cases, were decided ment. All but one of these at here. many years prior to the 1975 amendment issue meaning the Accordingly, those cases do not address Plaintiffs do cite two the current version of statute. Ry. Chicago One Belt Co. postamendment cases. case is (1987). There, 3d 697 a railroad Hynes, App. filed of taxes to the company an action law, county. Pursuant state taxed railroad’s taxed all real county other operating property estate, plaintiff known “noncarrier real estate.” The as it had taxes on the same railroad claimed that both railroad land. The court determined entity, the land had been classi wrong had sued if and, real estate fied the state as noncarrier due, state, county. from not the refund was it was allegation The court did find merit the railroad’s county two identification numbers had issued *11 it The court land and had taxed twice. parcel same of recovery to that this entitle the railroad opined would Ill. at Co., App. 286. Belt Ry. under former section 698-99. This does support plaintiffs’ argument, case as it does not stand the proposition that the statute apply overpayments does not to of taxes.
The second Stuart Town Homes case cite v. Rosewell, 176 Ill. Corp. App. There, 3d 59 plaintiff, owner of a common parcel of real estate used owners, for the benefit of individual house brought town an recovery taxes, action for of alleging that the common parcel assessed, had been twice once to plaintiff once to parcel. each owner’s individual plaintiff claimed that it was owed a refund under former section 286. The court rejected this argument, noting plaintiff that the allege had failed to facts in complaint its demonstrating the property that had been twice assessed. The court noted that the record showed that property listed only legal was once under its description Rosewell, permanent index App. numbers. 3d at fail supports 62. We to see this plaintiffs’ argu how case ment.
Plaintiffs
that
argue
plain language of section
20—175 of the Code demonstrates
that
ap-
the statute
plies only to tax payments made due to erroneous assess-
plaintiffs,
of property. According
ments
to
the clause
referring
to taxes that have
is not
been
an
clause;
rather,
independent
it modifies
the preceding
clause
refers
on
has
property
to
been
twice
or
it
assessed
on
before
becomes taxable.
hand,
argues,
Defendant
on the other
the plain
of
20—175
to
language
applies
overpayments
of
taxes,
as well as to
made
pursuant
the erroneous
assessment
Defendant
also
property.
points
proof
the title
section 20— 175 as
legislature’s
intent. The section is entitled “Refund for
Indeed,
erroneous
assessments
overpayments.”
title
a statute
may provide guidance
meaning
if
sheds
on some
statutory language
light
the title
*12
limit
statute;
or
in the
it cannot
word
ambiguous
phrase
Land v.
Educa
meaning of the text.
Board
plain
the
of
(2002).
City
the
Chicago,
tion
of
of
“or,” sug
Here,
that the title contains the word
we note
encompasses
separate
section
two
gesting that
20—175
(1)
errone
pursuant
to
categories
payments:
(2)
assessments,
overpayments
and
of taxes.
ous
argument
plain
that the
disagree with defendant’s
We
her
interpretation
the
language
supports
statute
Instead,
that
agree
section 20—175.
we
with
the same
says
by
that
“or
been overpaid
the clause
have
by
preced
different claimants” modifies the
claimant
of taxes.
regarding
clause
the erroneous assessment
ing
end
In determin
analysis,
This is not the
of our
however.
intent, we
Assembly’s
may
the General
consider
ing
statute, but
the
language
purpose
of the
also
only
remedied,
necessity
law,
sought
for the
the evils
to be
Cryns,
to be
As noted, we have predecessor the to section 20—175 was amended in 1975 to add the “overpaid” language. The amendment originated as Bill House 184. In discuss bill, ing the Representative Schlickman stated that 184, “House Bill as it was originally introduced, created a new in paragraph the Revenue Act providing for a by the county collector in case installment of real estate taxes is in paid twice error. It opinion was the of the Cook County Collector instead of adding new amendment Code, Revenue existing an *** paragraph should be amended.” 79th Ill. Gen. As sem., (state House Proceedings, 19,1975, March at 12-13 Schlickman). ments of Representative Later, Representa tive Schlickman noted that the bill “concerns itself with problem that confronts real estate property taxpay *** ers who paid have an installment twice ***. Pres ently, there is no statutory authority in the Revenue Act county which collectors can make refund of over payment by taxpayers.” Assem., 79th Ill. Gen. House (statements 20, Proceedings, March at 48 Schlickman). Representative In the Senate debate on the provides Bill 184 stated, “House Moore bill, Senator install where an in cases county collector by the refunds in error. twice has been estate taxes ment of real *** authority county collector give This does *** nothing on [T]here’s payments. refund such As it.” 79th Ill. Gen. them to do that allows books now (state 1975, at 227 Proceedings, May sem., Senate Moore). ments of Senator in amend- history thus confirms legislative As- the General to section
ing predecessor 20— the statute to scope intended to broaden sembly regard taxes without overpayments include to errone- pursuant were those overpayments to whether reading of the adopt plaintiffs’ To ous assessments. overpay- owners whose deprive property statute would assess- an erroneous their taxes does not involve ment of a refund. Refunds would ability ment of the to obtain provided limited circumstances be allowed only applies That section where 21—60 the Code. taxes in the first more real estate has taxpayer year. the entire Section than is owed for installment taxes. That sec- a refund of the 21—60 allows accelerated bill- in counties that have applies only tion 2006). (West overpay- Refunds of ing. 35 ILCS 200/21 —30 20— scope of section taxes that fall within ment of *14 Thus, in if many, 21—60. are not included to receive most, cases, not be able taxpayers would to the existence of taxes due overpaid refunds of of the Yet, purpose voluntary doctrine. payment in the remedy an omission amendment was to refunds of to claim right give taxpayers tax laws and language effect to the give taxes. To overpaid their of purpose remedial statute, written, defeat the would that, give Accordingly, we conclude the amendment. sec- intent, must construe we legislature’s effect to the taxes, overpaid of 20—175 as refunds permitting tion regardless whether erroneous assessment property is involved. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ overpayment of their taxes are subject to section 20—175 claims for refund are barred because were made more years than five after made the overpay ments. As this court Homes, noted Sundance Inc. v. County Du Page, (2001), 195 Ill. 2d the right request a refund of taxes generally accrues at the time the taxes paid. are
We are not unsympathetic to plaintiffs’ predica- They ment. paid taxes that were not owed and the voluntary doctrine, payment which is often harsh in its application, precludes them from receiving refund absent statutory authority. It is unfortunate plaintiffs did not realize their However, error sooner. legislature has established a mechanism for obtaining a refund taxes and taxpayers comply must with its terms to receive a refund.
We therefore conclude that plaintiffs’ complaint was properly dismissed as untimely.
CONCLUSION For the stated, reasons we conclude that plaintiffs’ claims for refunds of their overpaid taxes are subject to the limitations period set forth in section 20—175 of the Code and that their action for refunds is therefore time- barred. The judgment court, of the appellate which af- firmed the judgment of court, the circuit is affirmed.
Affirmed. KILBRIDE, JUSTICE dissenting: I believe the language of section 20—175 of the Tax Property Code is clear and unambiguous. The plain language of the applies only statute to tax payments based on erroneous assessments. Plaintiffs’ claims for a duplicate of their tax payments do not involve er- Therefore, roneous assessments. section 20—175 does
235 apply circumstances, the circuit court to these Accordingly, complaint. dismissing plaintiffs’ I in erred respectfully dissent. to dismiss filed a motion case, the defendant In this 619(a)(5)
plaintiffs’ complaint of the section under 2— (West 619(a)(5) (735 ILCS Civil Procedure Code of 2006)). 5/2 — request plaintiffs’ a Defendant asserted that untimely duplicate payments was tax refund of five-year period in 20— limitations because the expired. Property Thus, the had Tax Code 175 applies only in these section 20—175 issue is whether duplicate plaintiffs’ to bar a refund of circumstances question presents payments. The issue statutory construction. construing primary goal is to a statute
The legislature’s give intent. effect to the determine and (2004). 30, best 2d 34-35 DaRosa, 209 Ill. Metzger v. statutory legislature’s intent is the indication of the language, given ordinary meaning. plain ex its People (2005), quot 222, Inc., 214 Ill. 2d 226 rel. v. Ryan Agpro, (2003). ing Ill. 2d 87-88 When Bower, Caveney v. unambiguous, language plain and we of a statute is apply must it as written resort to aids of statu without tory Ill. 2d construction. Krautsack v. Anderson, (2006). plain language depart We will not from the exceptions, reading limitations, into it or statute expressed by legislature. conditions not ex rel. People Manos, Department Regulation of Professional part: provides pertinent Section 20—175 year, for the same or “If is twice assessed taxable, erroneously as- it becomes and the assessed before otherwise, at sale or taxes have been either sessed byor different overpaid by the same claimant have been claimants, County Collector, upon being satisfied of the case, claim- proper refund the taxes to the facts in the shall *** be allowed unless a A claim for refund shall not ant. petition years is filed within 5 from the date the right to a (West 2006). refund arose.” 35 ILCS 200/20 —175 According plain language, ap- to its section 20—175 *16 plies only introductory to the claims identified any property “[i]f clause, is twice assessed for the same year, plain or assessed it before becomes taxable.” The language, applies only therefore, to erroneous assess- following ments. word, “and,” The indicates additional conditions for a refund of based on erroneous remaining language provides, assessments. The as ad- statutory ditional refund, conditions for a that the er- roneously assessed taxes have been at sale or overpaid by otherwise, or have been the same claimant or different claimants. majority appears agree plain language
The
to
that the
supports plaintiffs’ argument
of section 20—175
that it
applies only
to
based on erroneous assess
majority
ments.
The of section 20—175 is limited to erroneously the refund of assessed taxes. Plaintiffs’ Rather, claims do not involve erroneous assessments. duplicate payments are based on the inadvertent plain language taxes. The of section 20—175 apply Accordingly, does not to this case. I believe that the granting circuit court erred in defendants’ motion to dismiss based on section 20—175. majority’s
Given the facts of this case view of apparent ambiguity legislature statute, in the may wish to amend section 20—175. The taxes, it be viewed may diligently paid them a refund of the fundamentally deny unfair to certainly wish legislature may The duplicate payments. a refund in these seeking a mechanism for provide circumstances five-year period or alter the limitation legislature, the statute. Those decisions are for according however. We are bound to construe statute language of the statute plain language. plain its apply shows that section 20—175 does not here. Accord- respectfully I dissent. ingly,
(No. 104976. *17 THE THE ILLINOIS, PEOPLE OF STATE OF Appel
lant, BEACHEM, v. WADE Appellee.
Opinion May 2008. filed