Alvarez v. HillAlvarez v. Hill
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Fisher
We revisit in this appeal the longstanding principle that federal complaints plead claims, not causes of action or statutes or legal theories. Blackie Alvarez (“Alvarez”) brought suit alleging that prison officials substantially burdened his religious exercise by denying him various accommodations. Those officials (“appellees”) now insist that Alvarez’s failure to specifically plead in his complaint a violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”),
see
BACKGROUND
In June 2004, Alvarez, then an inmate at the Oregon State River Correctional Institution, filed a pro se complaint seeking redress for violations of the “First [and]
Appellees thereafter filed for summary judgment in December 2004. They argued that although the prison’s policies burdened Alvarez’s constitutional free exercise rights, they were “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests” and consequently satisfied the standard set forth in
Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). Responding directly to appellees’ reliance on
Twmer,
Alvarez opposed their “concluso-ry” assertions of the governmental interest in security and safety, referring to the more stringent “standard set by the R.L.U.I.P.A.2000.” He asserted this wás so because RLUIPA “explicitly changed the standard by which restrictions on the free exercise of religion are to be judged, and clearly applies in the prison context.” Citing
Mayweathers v. Newland,
314 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir .2002), and
The appellees’ reply acknowledged that Alvarez’s “claim must be analyzed under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act.” His “claims of an RLUIPA violation [were] without merit,” they argued, given the serious “safety and security” concerns justifying restrictions on religious practice while an inmate was in disciplinary housing.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of appellees. Citing
Freeman v. Arpaio,
125 F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir.1997), a religious exercise case litigated
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district court’s grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Blanford v. Sacramento County, 406 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir.2005). “Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party ... we must determine whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law and whether there are any genuine issues of material fact.” Galvin v. Hay, 374 F.3d 739, 745 (9th Cir.2004).
I.
We agree with Alvarez’s contention that summary judgment would have been inappropriate on the available record had RLUIPA’s standard been applied to his religious exercise claim. Under
Turner,
which governs inmate free exercise claims brought under the First Amendment, prison restrictions will be upheld as long as they are “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”
Warsoldier v. Woodford,
418 F.3d 989, 997-98 (9th Cir.2005) (quoting
Turner,
482 U.S. at 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254). By contrast, RLUIPA disallows policies that impose “a substantial burden on ... religious exercise” unless the burden “furthers ‘a compelling governmental interest,’ and does so by ‘the least restrictive means.’ ”
Id.
at 994 (quoting
The district court’s analysis did not take account of RLUIPA, which “accord[s] religious exercise heightened protection from government-imposed burdens.”
Cutter v. Wilkinson,
544 U.S. 709, 714, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 161 L.Ed.2d 1020 (2005). In finding that Alvarez’s religious exercise was not substantially burdened, the district court required him to show he was prevented from “engaging in conduct mandated by his religious faith.”
3
RLUI-PA, however, defines “religious exercise” to include “any exercise of religion,
whether or not compelled by,
or central to, a system of religious belief.”
II.
Appellees offer no rebuttal to Alvarez’s suggestion that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether their restrictions on his religious exercise were the least restrictive means of maintaining prison security, and so essentially concede that a RLUIPA claim would have survived summary judgment. Instead, they assert that Alvarez pled only a First Amendment claim, because his “complaint [did] not identify RLUIPA as the basis for a separate claim.” The contention that his complaint’s omission of a citation to RLUIPA precludes Alvarez from advancing legal arguments based on that statute is entirely meritless. We hold that Alvarez’s RLUI-PA claim was presented to the district court because his complaint and subsequent filings provided appellees with “fair notice” of that claim, even though the statute was not cited in the complaint itself. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, - U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1969, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).
The form complaint used by Alvarez, which was provided by the prison itself, instructed inmates to “[s]tate here as briefly as possible the
facts
of your case”; they were
“not
[to] give any legal arguments or cite any cases or statutes.” (Emphasis in original.) In the space for indicating the “civil right” underlying his claim, Alvarez wrote that the appellees had violated his “First [and] Fourteenth Amendment ]” rights by “ ‘burdening substantially’ ... his religion.” Alvarez then pled with commendable — even greater than necessary — particularity how prison officials were doing just that.
See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit,
507 U.S. 163, 168, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993). He further alleged that prison of-fieials lacked any valid justification for these restrictions because the proscribed activities involved no “breach to security procedure.” Because Alvarez’s complaint contained factual allegations establishing a “plausible” entitlement to relief under RLUIPA, Alvarez satisfied the minimal notice pleading requirements of
Appellees’ argument that Alvarez’s complaint failed to “state a claim” under RLUIPA because he did not cite the statute misapprehends the function of pleadings in federal practice. Notice pleading requires the plaintiff to set forth in his complaint
claims for relief,
not causes of action, statutes or legal theories.
See
As contemplated by the regime of liberal notice pleading, Alvarez’s subsequent filings refined the factual allegations and legal‘theories supporting his religious exercise claims.
See Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 329-30 & n. 9, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989) (recognizing “[r]e-sponsive pleadings ... may be necessary for a pro se plaintiff to clarify his legal theories”). His reference to RLUIPA in his “Motion in Support of Original Complaint with Law” initially surfaced the statutory basis for his claim. His opposition to summary judgment described at length the RLUIPA standard and urged the court to apply it to the facts alleged in his complaint. Appellees exalt form over substance by arguing that Alvarez occasionally confused the relationship between RLUIPA and the First Amendment and so “effectively state[ed] that [his] citations to RLUIPA ... are not to be read” as asserting a “second, independent cause of action.” There is no suggestion that ap-pellees were led astray by Alvarez’s failure to appreciate the technical distinctions they now invoke.
Cf.
Moreover, because Alvarez proceeded pro se, the district court was required to “afford [him] the benefit of any doubt” in ascertaining what claims he “raised in his complaint and
argued to the district court.” Morrison v. Hall,
261 F.3d 896, 899 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Erickson v. Pardus,
- U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam)
(noting
that complaint “alone ... [was] enough to satisfy
Finally, we dispose of appellees’ argument that Henderson v. Terhune, 379 F.3d 709 (9th Cir.2004), precludes a RLUIPA claim when the complaint cites only the First Amendment. There, we “expressed] no opinion about whether” the challenged regulation violated RLUIPA because the inmate “brought his claim under the First Amendment, not the RLUI-PA.” Id. at 715 n. 1. Appellees’ reliance on Henderson is misplaced, because at no point did the plaintiff there even assert a RLUIPA claim. See id. at 711-12. Here, Alvarez specifically raised his RLUIPA theory in his post-complaint filings, thereby apprising appellees before summary judgment that he was claiming relief under both the First Amendment and RLUIPA. See Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1292-94 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that plaintiffs could not proceed with different theory of liability after close of discovery when defendant would be prejudiced by inability to develop newly relevant evidence and defenses). Appellees had notice of and the opportunity to challenge Alvarez’s RLUIPA claim. Consequently, that claim was properly before the district court at summary judgment and the court erred in not addressing it.
Having concluded that the district court erred in not addressing Alvarez’s RLUIPA claim, we vacate its grant of summary judgment as to his religious exercise claims without reaching his constitutional arguments in support of reversal. See Anchustegui v. Dep’t of Agric., 257 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir.2001).
This panel shall retain jurisdiction over any subsequent appeals in this matter. Alvarez shall recover his costs on appeal.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED.
Notes
. Alvarez also claimed that he was deprived of access to legal materials in violation of Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). We affirm the district court‘s grant of summary judgment as to this claim because Alvarez has not “allege[d] injury, such as inability to file a complaint or defend against a charge” resulting from deficiencies in access. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 936 (9th Cir.2004). Failure to show that a “nonfrivolous legal claim had been frustrated” is fatal to his Bounds claim. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353 & n. 4, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996).
. In addition to declaratory and injunctive relief, Alvarez sought a total of $55,000 in damages, so his subsequent release from custody has not mooted this action. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 566 n. 8 (9th Cir.2005).
. As we noted in Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884 (9th Cir.2008), Freemans requirement that an inmate must show that the prison had burdened “conduct mandated by his faith” to state a viable free exercise claim under the First Amendment has been undercut by Employment Div., Dep‘t of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990). Cf. Freeman, 125 F.3d at 736.