OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Luis Alvarez (“Plaintiff’) filed the instant Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 against the County of Orange, New York (“Orange County”), the Sheriff of Orange County, Carl E. DuBois (“DuBois”), Sergeant Laurence Cottone (“Cottone”), and Deputy Sheriff Rodney Carpentier (“Carpentier”), alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and claims of false arrest, negligent training and supervision, and respondeat superior liability under New York Law. (First Am. Compl. (“Am. Compl.”) ¶¶ 12-18 (Dkt. No. 13).) For the following reasons, Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.
' I. Background
A. Factual Background
The following facts are drawn from Plaintiffs Amended Complaint and certain documents submitted by Defendants that the Court considers, as explained below, and are taken as true for the purpose of resolving the instant Motion. Plaintiff is the owner and president of Newburgh Towing & Service, Inc. (“Newburgh Towing”), located in the City of Newburgh, County of Orange, State of New York, which provides towing services for hire. (Am. Compl. ¶ 16.) On or about December 28, 2010, Plaintiff was hired by Panayiotis Andrianis (“Andrianis”) to transport a large piece of equipment, known as a Bob
On or about December 29, 2010 at approximately 2 a.m., Plaintiff transported the Bobcat to his business location, a motor vehicle repair shop located at 230 Ann Street, Newburgh, New York (“Plaintiffs repair shop”). (Id. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff called the City of Beacon Police Department (“Beacon Police Department”) to notify them of the situation and “was instructed to hold the equipment pending payment pursuant to New York State Lien Law §184(1).” (Id. ¶ 20.)
On or about the same day, the City of Newburgh Police Department (“Newburgh Police Department”) and the State of New York Police Department (“New York State Police Department”) contacted Plaintiff to investigate allegations by the owner of the Bobcat, Summit Handling Services Inc. (“Summit”), that Plaintiff had stolen its equipment. (Id. ¶ 23, 25.) The Newburgh Police Department and the New York State Police Department separately “conducted ... thorough investigation^], including visiting and interviewing Plaintiff at his place of business, and declined to take any action against Plaintiff, indicating that no criminality had occurred and the issue was, at most, a civil matter between Plaintiff and Summit.” (Id. ¶¶ 24, 26.)
On or about January 2, 2011, the Beacon Police Department contacted Plaintiff to investigate allegations made by Summit that Plaintiff had stolen its equipment. (Id. ¶ 27.) The matter was assigned to “Detective Rios, who conducted an extensive investigation extending over several days,” during which the Beacon Police Department “interviewed witnesses and reviewed video surveillance from the alleged locations.” (Id. ¶¶ 28-29.) At the conclusion of its investigation, the Beacon Police Department found no criminality and that the issue was, at most, a civil matter between Plaintiff and Summit. (Id. ¶ 30.)
On January 3, 2011, to “compl[y] with the requirements of New York State Lien Law § 184(2),” Plaintiff mailed, “via certified mail, return receipt requested,” a notice to Summit, indicating that Plaintiff had towed and was storing the Bobcat, the amount claimed for such towing and storage, and the address and times at which the Bobcat could be recovered. (Id. ¶ 21.) The notice also stated that Plaintiff claimed a lien on the Bobcat and that the Bobcat would be released to the owner or his or her lawfully designated representative “upon full payment of all charges accrued to the date that said Bobcat is released.” (Id. ¶ 22.)
On or about January 13, 2011, Plaintiff was contacted by Cottone on behalf of the Orange County Sheriff’s Office. (Id. ¶ 31.) Plaintiff informed Cottone that he had a lien on the Bobcat for non-payment of towing services that Plaintiff provided. (Id. ¶ 32.) Cottone advised Plaintiff that he planned to visit Plaintiff’s repair shop later that day, at approximately 4 p.m., to continue his discussion with Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 33.) Cottone arrived at Plaintiffs repair shop at approximately 9 p.m., when Plaintiff was not present, and “demanded that Plaintiffs employees release the Bobcat to him, indicating that he had a court order to pick up the equipment.” (Id. ¶ 34.) Cottone “made numerous threats to Plaintiffs employees ... that he would arrest everyone at the location.” (Id. ¶ 35.) After his employees contacted him, Plaintiff arrived at his repair shop and demanded
On or about January 18, 2011, at approximately 3 p.m., Plaintiff and Summit entered into an agreement by which Summit would pay $2,476.06 to Plaintiff for towing and storage fees and that Plaintiff, in turn, would return the Bobcat to Summit. (Id. ¶ 40.) Plaintiff and Summit also agreed that Plaintiff would hold the equipment for an additional three days until Summit’s payment check cleared, and during the three-day period, Plaintiff was authorized to use the Bobcat so long as his use did not exceed five hours over three days, that he sign a rental agreement, and that he provide a certificate of insurance. (Id. ¶¶ 41-42.) Plaintiff went to Summit’s place of business at approximately 4 p.m. later that day to provide the certificate of insurance and sign a rental agreement, but was advised that the manager had left for the day and Plaintiff was turned away. (Id. ¶ 43.)
At approximately 5 p.m. on the same day, Carpentier, along with other members of the Orange County Sheriffs Department, arrived at Plaintiffs rental shop, “placed Plaintiff in handcuffs, and ushered him into the back of a patrol car in front of numerous eyewitnesses, customers, and employees.” (Id. ¶44.) Plaintiffs arrest was at the direction and order of Cottone. (Id. ¶45.) In fact, Plaintiff alleges, upon information and belief, that between January 13, 2011 and January 18, 2011, Cottone participated in and oversaw the investigation that led to Plaintiffs arrest. (Id. ¶ 46.) After Plaintiffs arrest, members of the Orange County Sheriffs Department entered Plaintiffs “secure” repair shop, and authorized a tow truck driver who was hired and paid by Summit to enter onto Plaintiffs property, remove the Bobcat, and return it to Summit. (Id. ¶ 47.)
Plaintiff alleges that neither Cottone nor Carpentier took photographs of the Bobcat, conducted an inspection of the equipment, made an odometer reading on the Bobcat, or gathered evidence or secured the Bobcat before it was released to Summit. (Id. ¶ 48.) Plaintiff also alleges that neither Cottone nor Carpentier obtained a search warrant or court order authorizing the release of the Bobcat to Summit and did not direct Summit to pay Plaintiff for the outstanding debt owed to Plaintiff for his towing and storage of the Bobcat. (Id. ¶¶ 49-50.)
Carpentier transported Plaintiff to the Orange County Sheriffs Office, where Plaintiff was held for several hours without being told the nature of the charges against him, without being able to make a telephone call, without food or water, and without the ability to use the restroom. (Id. ¶ 51.) Cottone denied Plaintiffs request for Tylenol. (Id. ¶ 52.) Plaintiff was then transported by members of the Orange County Sheriffs Department to the Town of New Windsor Justice Court in Windsor, New York, where he was held for approximately one hour prior to being arraigned on Grand Larceny in the Third Degree, Criminal Possession of Stolen Property in the Third Degree, and Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle in the Third Degree. (Id. ¶¶ 53-54.) Plaintiff was released from custody after' posting bail. (Id. ¶ 55.)
Plaintiff alleges upon information and belief, Carpentier executed, “at the behest of, and/or in concert with Cottone,” a felo
On December 29, 2010 Newburgh Towing removed a Bobcat T300 Compact Truck Loader serial # 532015494 from 200 Main Street in the City of Beacon and transported it to 230 Ann Street in the City of Newburgh without the authorization of the owner of [Summit] or. its agent Mr. David A. Morgan. As of the above date [Plaintiff], as an agent of Newburgh Towing is still in possession of the Bobcat T300 serial # 532015494.
(Id. ¶ 56, 58.) Moreover, Plaintiff alleges, upon information and belief, that Carpentier, “at the behest of, and/or in concert with Cottone” executed a second felony complaint on January 14, 2011, which provided:
On December 29, 2010 Newburgh Towing removed a Bobcat T300 Compact Truck Loader serial # 532015494 from 200 Main Street in the City of Beacon and transported it to 230 Ann Street in the City of Newburgh without the permission and authority of the owner [Summit], or its agent Daniel A. Morgan. The estimated value of the Bobcat T300 Serial # 532015494 is $40,000.
(Id. ¶¶ 57-58.) The complaints were filed with the City Court of the City of New-burgh in the State of New York. (Id. ¶ 59.) The Orange County District Attorney’s Office dismissed all felony counts against Plaintiff for lack of jurisdiction and insufficient evidence, and after a four-day bench trial, Plaintiff was acquitted on June 17, 2011 of the misdemeanor count for Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle in the Third Degree. (Id. ¶¶ 61-64.) Plaintiff alleges that because of the charges against him, he was “required to retain counsel, at a significant personal cost,” was unable to work for approximately sixty days due to court appearances and meetings with his counsel, and “routinely saw acquaintances and customers at the courthouse and suffered extreme embarrassment by defending the ... charges against him.” (Id. ¶¶ 60, 65-66.)
Plaintiff alleges that DuBois, Cottone, and Carpentier should have been aware that Plaintiffs conduct was permissible under the New York State Lien Law, that there was no lawful basis to place Plaintiff under arrest, and that there was no lawful basis for Carpentier, acting at the behest and direction of Cottone, to execute and file the felony complaints. (Id. ¶¶ 69-72.) Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that DuBois, Cottone, and Carpentier “were acting outside of their jurisdiction in placing Plaintiff under arrest, as evidenced by the sworn allegations in the [f]elony [c]omplaints indicating Plaintiffs conduct occurred in Duchess County, not Orange County where the Orange County Sheriffs Office is located and regularly conducts its business.” (Id. ¶ 73.) Plaintiff also alleges that the conduct occurred as a result of the unconstitutional policies, customs, or practices of Orange County, including the inadequate retention, training, and supervision of its employees. (Id. ¶ 74.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that as early as 2006, Orange County and DuBois were aware that Cottone had violated the constitutional rights of another individual, but failed to take corrective action. (Id. ¶¶ 76-77.)
B. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed the initial Complaint on October 16, 2013. (Dkt. No. 1.) On February 25, 2014, Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint. (Dkt. No. 13.) In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts violations of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments against Cottone and Carpentier in their individual and official capacities, DuBois in his official capacity, and Orange County. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 78-104.) Plaintiff alleges that Cottone and
II. Discussion
A. Applicable Law
1. Standard of Review
The Supreme Court has held that although a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss, “a plaintiffs obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his [or her] ‘entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
2. False Arrest
A “§ 1983 claim for false arrest derives from [the] Fourth Amendment right to remain free from unreasonable seizures, which includes the right to remain free from arrest absent probable cause.” Jaegly v. Couch,
“Probable cause ‘is a complete defense to an action for false arrest’ brought under New York law or § 1983.” Id. (quoting Weyant v. Okst,
“An arresting officer advised of a crime by a person who claims to be the victim, and who has signed a complaint or information charging someone with the crime, has probable cause to effect an arrest absent circumstances that raise doubt as to the victim’s veracity.” Singer v. Fulton Cnty. Sheriff,
“[AJlthough a police officer is generally not required to investigate an arrestee’s claim of innocence, ‘under some circumstances, a police officer’s awareness of the facts supporting a defense can eliminate probable cause.’ ” Conte,
3. Qualified Immunity
“A police officer is entitled to qualified immunity from liability for his discretionary actions if either (1) his conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known, or (2) it was objectively reasonable for him to believe that his actions were lawful at the time of the challenged act.” Cerrone v. Brown,
B. Analysis
1. Documents to be Considered
Defendants argue that it is appropriate for the Court to consider the documents annexed to the Barry Affidavit. (Defs.’ Mem. of Law (“Defs.’ Mem.”) 6 (Dkt. No. 22).) As discussed above, although generally a court “look[s] only to the allegations on the face of the complaint” to decide a motion to dismiss, Roth v. Jennings,
Defendants do not claim that Plaintiff incorporated the Incident Report, the depositions, and the Misdemeanor Complaint by reference, but rather argue that these documents are integral to the Amended Complaint because “the underlying facts that were before Sergeant Cot-tone and Deputy Carpentier are integral to determining whether the arrest was proper.” (Defs.’ Reply Mem. of Law (“Defs.’ Reply”) 2 (Dkt. No. 27).) Some courts have reasoned that it is proper to consider incident reports, arrest reports,- and police complaints in resolving 12(b)(6) motions for false arrest claims because these documents are integral to such claims. See Betts,
The Second Circuit has explained that a “necessary prerequisite for the exception” that materials integral to the complaint may be considered on a motion to dismiss “is that ‘the plaintiff rely on the terms and effect of the document in drafting the complaint ...; mere notice or possession is not enough.’ ” Global Network Commc’ns, Inc. v. City of New York,
The Court will not consider the Incident Report, depositions, or the Misdemeanor Complaint, as “there is no indication in the record that [Plaintiff] relied on [them] in drafting the [Amended Complaint].” Allyn,
Plaintiff also alleges that “[u]pon information and belief, between January 13, 2011 and January 18, 2011, Cottone participated in and oversaw the investigation that led to the arrest of Plaintiff.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 46). While it is clear that Plaintiff was aware of an investigation, “mere notice ... is not enough” for the integral exception to apply. Global Network,
Defendants also label the documents “public documents.” • (Defs.’ Reply 4.) To the extent that Defendants suggest that the Court should take judicial notice of these documents because they are in the public record, this argument is rejected. It is worth noting that several courts have taken judicial notice of incident reports, arrest reports, police reports, and similar materials on a motion to dismiss, not for the truth of their contents, but rather to establish their existence. See e.g., Liang v. City of New York, No. 10-CV-3089,
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, “a court may take judicial notice, whether requested or not[,] of a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” United States v. Bari,
As to the second category of facts of which a court may take judicial notice— those that are “capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned,” Bari,
2. Claims Against the County, DuBois, and Defendants in Their Official Capacities
As an initial matter, Plaintiff “concedes that he has failed to plead plausible claims against the County and Sheriff DuBois,” and therefore, “does not oppose the relief requested in Defendants’ [M]otion as to the County and DuBois only.” (Pl.’s Mem. 7.) Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion is granted as to all claims against DuBois and Orange County. See Willner ex rel. Willner v. Doar, No. 12-CV-1955,
3. Deprivation of Federal Civil Rights Claim
Plaintiffs first claim for relief alleges that Cottone and Carpentier “deprived Plaintiff of the rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed to citizens of the United States by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 80.) Plaintiff incorporates the factual allegations in the Amended Complaint by reference into this claim. Plaintiff does not, however, “explain how this claim is distinct from those identified in his other claims for relief,” Widget,
A False Arrest Claim
Defendants do not contest that Plaintiff has adequately alleged the first three elements of a claim for false arrest, but rather contend that Plaintiff cannot satisfy the fourth element that “the confinement was not otherwise privileged,” Ackerson,
To begin, “[n]either the ultimate disposition of an action, nor the crimes eventually charged, are dispositive of a probable cause determination.” Betts,
According to the Amended Complaint and the documents the Court takes judicial notice of, as explained above, by the time Plaintiff was arrested, Carpentier and Cottone were aware that Plaintiff was in possession of the Bobcat and that Plaintiff claimed he had a lien on the Bobcat for non-payment of towing services provided in connection with the equipment. (Am. Compl. ¶ 32.) Plaintiff provided Cottone with evidence that he had complied with “all aspects of the New York State Lien Law.” (Id. ¶ 39.) Moreover, Plaintiff informed Cottone of the previous investigations conducted by the Newburgh Police Department, the Beacon Police Department, and the New York State Police Department, and of the fact that they had determined that the matter was a civil one between Plaintiff and Summit. (Id. ¶ 38.) Cottone also knew that, despite Cottone’s
It is open to question on the facts that Plaintiff alleges and the documents the Court takes notice of in deciding the Motion whether Carpentier and Cottone had arguable probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. As noted above, “[a]n arresting officer advised of a crime by a person who claims to be the victim, and who has signed a complaint or information charging someone with the crime, has probable cause to effect an arrest absent circumstances that raise doubt as to the victim’s veracity.” Singer,
In sum, Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to plausibly claim that his arrest was not
III. Conclusion
In light of the foregoing analysis, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint. Specifically, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion as to the claims against the County, DuBois, Defendants in their official capacities, and Plaintiffs claim for “Deprivation of Federal Civil Rights.” The Court denies the Motion as to the claim of false arrest against Cottone and Carpentier in their individual capacities. The Clerk of Court is respectfully requested to terminate the pending Motion. (Dkt. No. 19.)
SO ORDERED.
Notes
. The Court notes that "[i]t is well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983." Colon v. Coughlin,