OPINION
This сase addresses the issue of whether two statutes which preclude county officers from being licensed as bail bondsmen or from receiving benefits from the bail-bonding business violate the equal protection clauses of the United States and New Mexico Constitutions. The trial court concluded that the statutes do violate equal protection guarantees, and we affirm.
BACKGROUND
NMSA 1978, Section 59A-51-4 (Repl.Pamp.1992) provides in pertinent part that:
Applicants for license as bail bondsman or solicitor under this article must not be law enforcement, adjudication or prosecution officials or their employees, attorneys-at-law, officials authorized to admit to bail or state or county officers____
NMSA 1978, Section 59A-51-13(C) (Repl.Pamp.1992) provides that:.
Law enforcement, adjudication and prosecution officials and their employees, attorneys-at-law, officials authorized to admit to bail, and state and county officers shall not directly or indirectly receive any benefits from the execution of any bail bond.
Alvarez is a bail bondsman. In 1988 Alvarez was elected as an Eddy County Commissioner. Alvarez applied for a renewal of his bail bondsman’s license in May 1990. The Superintendent denied his application, citing the prohibition in Section 59A-51-4 against licensing county officers as bail bondsmen. Alvarez filed an action for declaratory judgment, challenging the constitutionality of the above statutes. Alvarez moved for summary judgment, arguing that the statutes violated the equal protection clauses of both the United States and New Mexico Constitutions. The Superintendent filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, contending that the statutes were rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest and were therefore constitutional.
A hearing was hеld, and the trial judge found that the parties had stipulated to the facts necessary for the rendering of a decision. The following facts were stipulated to by the parties:
a. Plaintiff is licensed in the business of bail bonds in the State of New Mexico and has been licensed since January 1, 1979.
b. Plaintiffs main occupation and source of income is to write bail bonds in the State of New Mexico.
c. Defendants have recommended nonrenewal and revocation of Plaintiffs license to write bail bonds solely on the basis that Plaintiff is in violation of sections 59A-51-13(C) and 59A-51-4, NMSA 1978 (1992 Repl. Pamph.).
d. The County Commission has the responsibility for establishing and approving the budget for the County. This budget is proposed by the various officers and department heads of the County and is sent to the Commission for approval or disapproval.
e. Section 59A-51-13(C), NMSA 1978 (1992 Repl. Pamph.), does not prohibit city councilors or city officers from writing bail bonds.
f. The district court judges and magistrate judges are paid by the State of New Mexico and their salaries and income are derived from that source. The County Commission has no control over the judges, financially or administratively.
g. The city judges are paid by the various citiеs that employ these judges and the County Commission of Eddy County has no authority either financially or administratively over these city judges.
h. The office of Eddy County [sheriff] is an elected position and the duly elected sheriff does all the hiring and firing and supervision of the sheriffs department. The sheriffs office budget is reviewed by the County Commission consisting of five commissioners and the budget is either approved or disapproved by that Commission.
i. Mr. A.E. Jackson, who is licensed to issue bail bonds and works for Madrid Bonding Company in Carlsbad, New Mexico, writes bonds in both city and county jails.
j. Mr. A.E. Jackson has been a member of the City Cоuncil for the City of Carlsbad, New Mexico, while licensed to issue bail bonds. Mr. Jackson approved in his capacity as a member of the City Council the city budget which includes salaries for the municipal courts, funds for the holding of prisoners held in county jails and salaries of city police officers.
k. The county jails fall under the Sheriffs Department. The County Commission does not have any control or authority over the jail except mere approval or disapproval of the jail budget submitted by the sheriff.
The trial court concluded that the statutes at issue violated equal protection, both because they infringed Alvarez’s fundamental right to hold public office and because they were not rationally related to a legitimate state end. The Superintendent appeals.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, the Superintendent argues that the trial judge’s equal protection conclusion was error because he was wrong both in holding that Alvarez has a fundamental right to hold public office and in holding that the statutes are not rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. Alvarez responds by arguing that the statutes violate equal protection in thаt they preclude him from being a bail bondsman while holding county office, but simultaneously permit other bail bondsmen to hold city office. We believe a review of the current state of equal protection analysis is necessary before a determination of the constitutionality of the statutes at issue can be made.
A. Introduction
Both the United States and New Mexico Constitutions provide that no person shall be denied equal protection of the laws. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; N.M. Const. art. II, § 18. In Richardson v. Carnegie Library Restaurant, Inc.,
In the following sections we discuss each of these standards of review, we determine which standard is applicable in this case, and we then apply that standard to the statutes at issue.
B. Strict Scrutiny
As noted in Richardson, equal protection analysis traditionally involved only the striet-serutiny and minimal-scrutiny standards of review. Id.
C.Traditional Rational Basis
At the opposite end of equal protection review is minimal scrutiny or the rational-basis standard. Traditionally, that standard was used to analyze social and economic legislation that affected othér than fundamental rights. Richardson,
D. Intermediate Scrutiny
Unsatisfied with the rigidity of the traditional two-tier system, the United States Supreme Court established a third level of equal protection review. Falling somewhere between the extremes of strict scrutiny and rational basis, intermediate scrutiny addresses the problem that “certain forms of legislative classification, while not facially invidious, nonetheless give rise to recurring constitutional difficulties[.]” Plyler v. Doe,
In Richardson, the New Mexico Supreme Court reviewed the aforementioned trends in federal equal protection analysis and adopted a “heightened, intermediate test” for equal protection review under the state constitution for certain laws.
We take this opportunity, however, to point out two potentially troubling aspects of the Richardson decision. As mentioned, under the federal constitution, a party challenging a statute on equal protection grounds need only show an important interest or a sensitive class to be afforded intermediate scrutiny. See Tribe, supra, at 1610, 1613. The Richardson Court, however, stated that intermediate scrutiny is applicable “in those limited cirсumstances when the class implicated is so sensitive to injustice and the rights affected are so substantial and important that they warrant special judicial attention.” Richardson,
One problem, therefore, is that the New Mexico, intermediate scrutiny standard, at least as it has been applied by the Supreme Court, appears to afford less protection under the state constitution to partiеs challenging statutes on equal protection grounds than does the federal standard. If it is true that the state constitution affords less protection, there would be little occasion to use it because “[fjederal law sets a minimum floor of rights below which state courts cannot slip.” See Developments in the Law — The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 1324, 1334 (1982). However, as is shown below, we do not confront this problem in the present case because we hold that the statute at issue is unconstitutional under a lower standard of review. See Richardson,
A second problem is whether the floodgates will be opened by the use of heightened scrutiny as that is described in City of Cleburne,
E. Heightened Rational Basis
The most recent development in federal equal protection analysis is an approach that one scholar has termed “rational bаsis with bite.” See James A. Kushner, Substantive Equal Protection: The Rehnquist Court and the Fourth Tier of Judicial Review, 53 Mo. L.Rev. 423, 458 (1988). Specifically, several cases were decided in the 1980s in which the Court asserted that it was applying the traditional rational-basis test, but which in fact appear to have been decided under some form of heightened judicial scrutiny. For example, in City of Cleburne, which involved an equal protection challenge to a zoning ordinance requiring a special use permit for a proposed home for persons who are mentally retarded, a plurality of thе Court stated that the lower court “erred in holding mental retardation a quasi-suspect classification calling for a more exacting standard of judicial review than is normally accorded economic and social legislation.”
the Court’s heightened-serutiny discussion is еven more puzzling given that Cleburne’s ordinance is invalidated only after being subjected to precisely the sort of probing inquiry associated with heightened scrutiny. To be sure, the Court does not label its handiwork heightened scrutiny, and perhaps the method employed must hereafter be called “second order” rational-basis review rather than “heightened scrutiny.” But however labeled, the rational-basis test invoked today is most assuredly not the rational-basis test of Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.,348 U.S. 483 [75 S.Ct. 461 ,99 L.Ed. 563 ] (1955); Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers,358 U.S. 522 [79 S.Ct. 437 ,3 L.Ed.2d 480 ] (1959), and their progeny.
Id. at 458,
The use of this heightened form of thе rational-basis standard, which falls somewhere between traditional rational basis and intermediate scrutiny, and which we label “heightened rational basis,” has been identified as implicit in several other Supreme Court decisions. See Kushner, supra, at 457-59 (discussing Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor,
A key difference between the traditional and heightened rational-basis standards is that, under certain circumstances, when using the heightened standard, the Supreme Cоurt apparently will examine the record “to determine whether policy decisions are squarely supported by a firm factual foundation.” City of Cleburne,
In sum, we believe that heightened rational-basis scrutiny has been used as a fourth level of equal protection review by thе United States Supreme Court. Further, we recognize that heightened rational basis has been expressly adopted by lower federal courts. In the interest of clarifying equal protection analysis under the New Mexico Constitution, we believe it would be appropriate to adopt heightened rational-basis review as a fourth level of review under article II, section 18. This fourth level would have achieved the same results in Richardson and Trujillo.
F. Heightened Rational Basis is the Applicable Standard of Review in this Case
As we have noted, the heightened rational-basis standard is one that is implicit in several United States Supreme Court decisions. Because of its implicit nature, the Court has yet to define expressly what criteria trigger the use of the standard. See Ellen E. Halfon, Comment, A Changing Equal Protection Standard? The Supreme Court’s Application of a Heightened Rational Basis Test in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 20 Loy.L.A.L.Rev. 921, 957-58 (1987). However, we read several of the Supreme Court cases applying heightened rational basis as involving legislation that implicated some interest that, although not necessarily fundamental or even important enough to warrаnt strict or intermediate scrutiny, was nevertheless of such significance as to be afforded more study than the de facto non-scrutiny of traditional rational basis. For example, in Zobel, the Court considered an Alaska statute which, by distributing oil revenues to residents on the basis of their length of residency in the state, implicated the constitutional right to travel.
Similarly, we believe the statutes at issue here implicate an interest significant enough to be afforded at least the heightened rational-basis standard of review. Specifically, we note that Sections 59A-51-4 and 59A-51-13(0, which рrohibit state and county officials from being bail bondsmen, arguably infringe the ability of a certain class of persons to be candidates for elected office. See Deibler v. City of Rehoboth Beach,
We arе guided by the plurality of the Supreme Court’s decision in Clements v. Fashing,
We believe the implication of the Clements decision is that access to the ballot is an interest that under certain circumstances can be afforded some form of heightened scrutiny, such as when a statute acts as a substantial barrier to a person’s candidacy. Cf. McDaniel v. Paty,
G. The Statutes at Issue are Invalid Under a Heightened Rational-Basis Analysis
Having determined that, at a minimum, heightened rational basis is to be applied to the statutes at issue, we review the statutes under that standard. As we have noted, a statute will be upheld under traditional rational basis if there is any conceivable basis to support it, even if the basis has no foundation in the record. Heller,-U.S. at-,
In this case, the Superintendent proffers as a basis for the statute the need to protect the integrity of the bail-bonding process. We agree that protecting the integrity of the bail-bonding process is a legitimate state goal. See, e.g., Stephens v. Bonding Ass’n,
The most significant classification is the presence of county officers but not city officers in the statutes. The Superintendent proffers two reasons why prohibiting county officers from being bail bondsmen improves the integrity of the bail-bonding process. The Superintendent proffers the same reasons to justify imposing the prohibition on оnly county officers while simultaneously allowing city officers to be bail bondsmen. First, the Superintendent asserts that county officials have access to county jails and, consequently, county officials who are also bail bondsmen could unduly influence the bonding business by referring criminal defendants held in county jail to their own bail-bond practice. Second, the Superintendent asserts that most criminal defendants are taken to county, not city, jails, and therefore the legislature could have rationally believed that prohibiting city officials from being bail bondsmen was not as pressing a cоncern as prohibiting county officers.
However, the stipulated facts in this case fail to address the issues of whether county officials actually do have access to county jails and whether county jails actually do house more criminal defendants than city jails. In fact, the parties appeared to disagree about these issues at oral argument. Moreover, we were informed- at oral argument that there are bail bondsmen, of whom Alvarez is one, whose businesses are limited to city jails or municipal offenses. Thus, to the extent that people like Alvarez are included in the statute, the statute appears overinclusive. Consequently, as the Superintendent conceded at argument, the record in this case simply does not support his asserted rational basis, which has a factual premise.
The Superintendent also contends that the legislature could have reasonably felt that the licensing of city councilors, who are elected in non-partisan elections, as bail bondsmen would be less of a threat to the integrity of the bail-bonding system than the licensing of county commissioners who may be elected under a pоlitical party affiliation. However, as with the prior contention, there is no factual basis to suppose that party affiliation constitutes any threat whatsoever, and the rationale that party affiliation may even be relevant is seriously undermined by the fact that party officials are not included in the prohibitions.
In connection with the showing made below, we note that our notice of oral argument questioned whether some form of heightened scrutiny should not be utilized in this case, and the parties, through the cases cited in their briefs, have demonstrated their awarenеss of the theory of heightened scrutiny. At no time has the Superintendent asked us to remand the case so that a record might be made to support his proffered bases for the statute. Nor has the Superintendent relied on the presence of a factual conflict’ as precluding summary judgment. Rather, the Superintendent has taken the position that granting judgment for Alvarez was legal error and instead, on the undisputed facts of this case, judgment should have been granted for the Superintendent. Under these circumstances, we accept the case as postured by the parties and decide it accordingly. See Gonzales v. Public Employees Retirement Bd.,
We hold, therefore, that upon the record before us, the presence of the prohibitions against county officers acting as bail bondsmen in Sections 59A-51-4 and 59A-51-13(C) fails to satisfy heightened rational-basis scrutiny, and that that element of the statutes is invalid under the equal protection clause of the New Mexico Constitution.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the trial court is affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
