134 N.E. 703 | NY | 1922
The plaintiff in November, 1917, was a tenant in the defendant's apartment house in the city of New York. She was injured while in her room by a falling ceiling, which the defendant, after timely notice of the danger, had omitted to repair. So, at least, the jury found, and the unanimous affirmance at the Appellate Division carries with it the presumption that there is evidence to sustain the verdict. The question to be determined is whether the omission was a breach of duty.
At common law there was no duty resting on the landlord of an apartment house to repair the rooms demised (Golob v.Pasinsky,
The comprehensive sweep of this enactment admits of no exception. We are not at liberty to confine it to those parts of the building not included within the premises demised. The legislature has said that the duty shall extend, not only to some parts, but to all. Apter words could hardly have been chosen wherewith to exclude division of responsibility between one part and another. The command of the statute, directed, as it plainly is, against the owner (cf. sections 76, 103, 104, 140) has thus changed the ancient rule. Whether "owner" may mean at times a lessee of the whole building (section 140) is a question not before us. No doubt, before a right of action will accrue in favor of the tenant, there must be notice, actual or constructive, of the defect to be repaired. No doubt the defect itself must be one that has relation to the maintenance of the building as a tenantable habitation. This limitation results by implication from the context of the section, which forms part of an article entitled "sanitary provisions." The meaning is that the premises shall not be suffered to fall into decay. The duty to prevent this, which, in part at least, once rested upon the tenant, is now cast upon another.
A narrower construction ignores, not only the letter of the statute, but the evil to be cured. A "tenement house," as the meaning is enlarged by the definition of the statute, may include the dwellings of the rich. *19
In its primary and common application, it suggests the dwellings of the poor (Kitching v. Brown,
We are not unmindful of possible objections to the form of the complaint. It is subject to criticism in that it describes the building as an apartment house without adding all the elements of a tenement house within the statute. The objection was not made upon the trial. It ought not to vitiate the judgment if made for the first time upon appeal.
The judgment should be affirmed with costs.
HISCOCK, Ch. J., HOGAN, POUND, MCLAUGHLIN and CRANE, JJ., concur; ANDREWS, J., dissents.
Judgment affirmed.